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Abstract 
The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) has received considerable attention in the 
behavioural literature, but not in the tax compliance domain. The key purpose of this study is 
to determine the influence of selected tax compliance variables on tax compliance behaviour. 
The secondary objectives are to explore the applicability of the TPB in predicting and 
explaining tax compliance behaviour, and to provide justification for the application of 
Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) employing the Partial Least Squares (PLS) statistical 
software or PLS-Graph (which has not been widely used in tax compliance research). The 
results provide evidence supporting the use of PLS-Graph in undertaking SEM analysis in tax 
compliance research, especially when smaller samples are involved and the data collected 
may not be normally distributed. This study also demonstrated the wide applicability of the 
TPB, including its application in tax compliance research. 
This study modified and extended the standard TPB behavioural model with the inclusion 
of a number of economic and noneconomic constructs. Most of the constructs used for this 
study are grounded in a number of theories: Deterrence Theory; Procedural Justice Theory; 
and Motivational Posturing Theory; in addition to the TPB. Data to test the research 
hypotheses was collected using a mail and a web-based survey.  
The results of this study suggest that noneconomic variables, such as beliefs and attitudes, 
are good predictors of tax compliance behaviour. Consistent with the majority of studies, the 
most influential factor in predicting and explaining tax compliance behaviour (through the 
mediating effects of behavioural intention) is attitude towards the behaviour. Other factors 
such as personal, social and societal norms were also significant predictors of tax compliance 
behaviour. Perceived behavioural control was only significant for the taxpayers but not for the 
tax agents. In contrast, perception of the tax authority was significant for New Zealand tax 
agents, but not for taxpayers. The results also suggest that tax compliance behaviour is 
complex, and different determinants of compliance behaviour affects different sub-groups of 
taxpayers differently. The results lend further support to the literature that indicates that 
taxpayers are not a homogeneous group. This study also found that taxpayers and tax agents 
generally perceive tax noncompliance as less serious relative to a number of other similar 
civil offences. This perception may explain why respondents (from both sample groups) who 
were penalised for noncompliance felt that the penalties imposed were harsh, unfair and 
excessive.    
Overall, the current study illustrates the importance of incorporating noneconomic 
variables comprising beliefs, attitudes, and norms, with widely used economic variables such 
as penalties and other enforcement tools, for achieving an optimal compliance strategy.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.1 INTRODUCTION - A BRIEF HISTORY OF TAXATION 
The origins of taxation can be traced as far back as biblical times.
1
 Historical records 
indicate that various forms of taxes were levied as far back as 1700 B.C. and include those 
levied on income and property. In addition, a form of poll tax was also imposed on 
individuals. During 1700-1300 B.C. a tax of a fifth (20 percent) of the yield of property was 
levied on the Egyptians under the ruling Pharaoh‟s authority (see Genesis 47:26, quoted in 
Jose & Moore, 2002) since a fifth of all income (20 percent) produced by the Egyptians was 
considered to belong to the Pharaoh. The Pharaohs also imposed taxes on property (see II 
Kings 23:35, quoted in Jose & Moore, 2002), which were based on the value of the property, 
and were quite distinct from tax on the yield from the land (Jose & Moore, 2002).   
Although taxes of some form have been around since biblical times, the earliest instances 
of a general income tax were those levied in France in 1793, followed by Great Britain in 
1799. Prior to 1799, taxation in Great Britain was a haphazard affair and was usually 
associated with some form of national emergency (Sabine, 2002). William Pitt the Younger, 
who served as prime minister from 1784-1801, introduced the Income Tax Act of 1799, 
which was the first modern English attempt to impose a general income tax (Sabine, 2002). 
Taxpayers made their own calculation of their tax liabilities and were not required to specify 
the sources of their income. Further, the law did not allow officials to examine taxpayers‟ 
records, which created widespread tax evasion (Coffield, 1970).  
New Zealand‟s tax system was developed from adopting and adapting many of the 
practices of Great Britain, which include the Rule of Law and other key constitutional 
documents or conventions which define the rights of the citizen and the state (Vosslamber, 
2010). The first form of tax levied was customs duties, which was introduced in 1841 (Oliver 
& Williams, 1992). The Land Tax Act 1878 was the first New Zealand statute which levied a 
tax at a flat rate on unimproved land, but due to its unpopularity was repealed and replaced in 
1879 by a property tax, enacted by the Property Tax Act 1879, which levied a flat tax rate on 
both real and personal property (Cunningham & Casey, 1942). The introduction of this tax 
saw the establishment of a tax administration body, the Land Tax Department, which can be 
traced to the present day Inland Revenue Department (IRD). Over the years, the tax base has 
been widened, and in 1891 the Land and Income Assessment Act 1891 was introduced, 
                                                     
1 Information on the state of taxation during biblical times was taken from a paper developed by Jose and Moore 
(2002) which examined the development of taxation from the Bible. 
2 
 
within which taxation was extended to include income levied at graduated rates on individuals 
(Cunningham & Casey, 1942). One of the aims of introducing the progressive or graduated 
land tax was to also break up large land holdings, rather than to solely increase revenue 
(Reeves, 1911). 
During the early part of the twentieth century customs and excise duties were still the 
major source of revenue for New Zealand, although income tax was becoming increasingly 
significant. The land tax meanwhile had begun to decline in importance as a source of 
revenue. In 1924, a Royal Commission on Taxation was appointed to inquire into the taxation 
of land and income (Gibbs, 1936). The Commission reported that the graduated income tax 
rate was detrimental to enterprise and one of the recommendations was for a more 
comprehensive base for income tax. The depression that followed in the 1930s saw increased 
expenditure in the social security area with a corresponding increase in taxation. During this 
period a range of other taxes were introduced (for example, taxes or duties on entertainment 
and film hire). Expenditure taxes were also increasing in importance, making up more than 
half the tax revenue collected. Source deductions for income tax were introduced in 1958, in 
order to match the period of income earned with the period of payment made. In addition, in 
1958 dividends received by taxpayers became liable to ordinary income tax, which also 
ensured that companies declared the dividends paid to their shareholders. This was followed 
in later years by a number of newer taxes, for example, the non-resident withholding tax 
(New Zealand Taxation Review Committee, 1967).
2
 
In the 1960s another comprehensive review of the tax system was undertaken by a 
committee of independent experts known as the Ross Committee (New Zealand Taxation 
Review Committee, 1967). The Committee was critical of the tax system in its current form, 
noting that the system had become outmoded and cumbersome, while the incidence of tax had 
not been adjusted to meet changing economic circumstances (New Zealand Taxation Review 
Committee, 1967). The key recommendation was for a new structure and scale of tax on 
individual income, which would provide substantial relief from direct taxation for the 
majority (New Zealand Taxation Review Committee, 1967).  
In 1976 the Land and Income Assessment Act 1891, which had been consolidated in 1900, 
1908, 1916, 1923, and 1954,
3
 had undergone a major change. The Land and Income 
Assessment Act 1976 was rewritten as two Acts, with one emerging as the Income Tax Act 
1976 and the other as the Land Tax Act 1976 (Mancer, 1988). In addition, the Inland Revenue 
                                                     
2 Most of the information in this paragraph was sourced from New Zealand Taxation Review Committee (1967). 
3 Further consolidations occurred over the years, for example in 1994, 2004, and 2007. 
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Department Act 1974 set up the IRD and contains some administrative provisions relating to 
various taxes collected by the department. It also set up the Taxation Review Authority 
(Mancer, 1988), now governed by the Taxation Review Authority Act 1994. 
The Report of the Task Force on Tax Reform (also known as the McCaw Report) which 
was released in 1982 resulted in significant changes to the tax system. There was a major shift 
in the incidence of taxation, a shift from direct taxation to indirect taxation and a reduction in 
the high marginal tax rates of personal taxation. The report also suggested addressing the 
legal loopholes being exploited by taxpayers, which would also achieve greater equity among 
taxpayers in the tax system.  
In the 1980s New Zealand went through one of the most radical tax reform programs ever 
introduced by a Western government (Tax Working Group, 2010). The top marginal rate of 
income tax was reduced from 66 percent to the current 33 percent.
4
 The corporate tax rate 
was reduced from 48 percent to 33 percent (and gradually reduced to 30 percent and currently 
is at 28 percent). Further, the multi-rate wholesale tax was replaced by a value added tax (a 
goods and services tax) at a rate of ten percent, which was subsequently increased to 12.5 
percent and then to 15 percent (as of 1 October 2010). The reform program concerned the 
broadening of tax bases and a move towards flatter tax-rate scales. By the end of the 1980s 
and early 1990s, the New Zealand tax system was regarded as one of the least distortionary in 
the OECD and the tax rates were considered to be internationally competitive (Tax Working 
Group, 2010).  
The Tax Review of 2001 (also known as the McLeod Report) was tasked with reviewing 
the tax system and recommending any required structural changes (McLeod et al., 2001). The 
Tax Review was required to focus on determining whether the New Zealand tax system is 
adequate for New Zealand‟s current needs, focusing on: the level of tax; the appropriate bases 
for tax; the detailed definition of those bases; and the rates of tax that should apply (McLeod 
et al., 2001). In contrast to the McCaw Report some twenty years ago which recommended 
radical changes, the McLeod Report recommended that there was no need for any radical 
restructuring of the tax system. The review found that the tax system generally compared 
favourably with tax systems of other countries.  
However, over the years, a number of changes in New Zealand, including the effects of 
increasing globalisation and international tax trends have eroded its effectiveness (Tax 
Working Group, 2010). As a result the latest tax review carried out by the Tax Working 
                                                     
4 The tax rates increased to 39 percent in April 2000, followed by a reduction to 38 percent in April 2009, and a 
further reduction to 33 percent on 1 October 2010. 
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Group (2010) recommended a total reform of taxes. One of the recommendations made was 
to align the top personal and corporate income tax rates with the trust tax rate in order to 
improve the overall integrity of the tax system.
5
 
The earliest form of noncompliance in New Zealand was avoidance of customs duty 
imposed under the Customs Ordinance in 1840 (Oliver & Williams, 1992). The long coastline 
of New Zealand provided opportunities for goods to be traded illegally, thereby avoiding 
customs duties, which would otherwise be due to the Crown and also made it costly and 
difficult to police all illegal trading activities. Further, the cost associated with the Crown‟s 
enforcement activities appeared to absorb a significant part of the revenue collected (Sinclair, 
1980). This suggests that noncompliance was a problem in New Zealand as far back as the 
1840s, with the introduction of the customs duties.  
Taxes are important for countries where a large proportion of government is funded by the 
taxes collected by tax authorities; however, most tax authorities have a limited budget (Chung 
& Trivedi, 2003). It is evident from prior research that the cost of enforcement continues to be 
relatively high (for example, Hartner et al., 2008). Consistent with these findings, 
enforcement measures are also likely to be costly for New Zealand, which highlights the 
importance of encouraging voluntary compliance.   
The problem of noncompliance is an on-going concern internationally and poses a 
challenging problem for policy makers, tax authorities and ultimately for society (McKerchar, 
2001). Statistics for the 2006 year reveal that the average size of the shadow economy was: 
38.7 percent for the 98 developing countries included in the study; 38.1 percent in 21 Eastern 
European and Central Asian (mostly transitional) countries; and 18.7 percent in 25 high 
income OECD countries (Schneider, 2011). For the 2006 income year, the level of tax 
shortfall reported for the United States was estimated at around USD450 billion (equivalent to 
NZD693 billion based on the 2006 exchange rate).
6
  The above estimates parallel those of 
Alm and Embaye (2011),
7
 who found the estimated unweighted average size of the shadow 
economy across all countries, and across all years, to be 35.5 percent of the GDP.
8
 
                                                     
5 The current top personal, corporate and trust income tax rates are 33 percent, 28 percent and 33 percent, 
respectively. 
6
 Reported on 6 January 2012 at http://www.irs.govt/newsroom/article/0,,id=252038,00.html. Historical exchange 
rates found at http://www.x-rates.com/d/NZD/USD/hist2006.html. 
7 Quoted in Alm (2012, p.57). 
8 In terms of individual groups of countries, the size of the hidden economy was 47.7 percent for “low income” 
countries, 36.7 percent for “lower middle income” countries, 25.9 percent for “upper middle income” countries, 
16.2 percent for “high income, non-OECD” countries, and 14.7 percent for “OECD” countries.    
5 
 
In New Zealand the tax gap
9
 is estimated to be around $7 billion a year, with the shadow 
economy making up 12.4 percent of New Zealand‟s gross domestic product (Francis & Field, 
2011).
10
 This represents a significant loss of revenue for the New Zealand Government. In 
almost a decade, in absolute terms the tax shortfall had doubled in size providing further 
evidence that tax noncompliance is a continuing problem for the New Zealand tax authority.
11
 
The old penalties regime in New Zealand dates back to 1916 and over the years a number 
of major changes and new rules have been added in an ad hoc manner (Inland Revenue, 
1996). A number of weaknesses were identified in the old penalties regime which include: no 
direct penalties to address specific forms of noncompliance; inconsistency in the manner the 
legislation was applied between different district offices and interpretation by different IRD 
staff; and the Commissioner of Taxation had excessive discretion in determining the quantum 
of the penalty, up to 300 percent (McLisky, 2011). Penalties were also imposed by multiple 
sections of the Inland Revenue Acts.
12
 These concerns resulted in a proposal to review the 
penalties legislation in the Inland Revenue Acts, leading to the release of two discussion 
documents. The first discussion document identified and outlined the shortcomings of the 
existing legislation and included a broad proposal for a new penalties framework (IRD, 1994). 
A second discussion document provided detailed proposals and a copy of the draft legislation 
(IRD, 1995). The legislation was adapted from the penalty rules introduced by the Australian 
Tax Office (ATO), indicating that New Zealand was a follower and not a leader in 
introducing the new rules. Nonetheless, the process involved extensive consultation with most 
key stakeholders.   
The new Compliance and Penalties Regime (CPR) was introduced to take effect from the 
1997/1998 income year. The key contributions of the CPR are that the legislation: provides 
clear guidelines on the standards expected of taxpayers; sets out the purpose of the legislation; 
provides guidelines on the application of appropriate penalties for specific forms of 
noncompliance; and explains the consequences of noncompliance. Sections 141A to 141E of 
Part IX of the Tax Administration Act 1994 (TAA 1994) sets out the civil penalties, whereas 
sections 143, 143A and 143B are the main criminal penalties legislation. Civil penalties were 
                                                     
9 The tax gap refers to “the difference between what taxpayers should pay and what they actually pay on a timely 
basis” (IRS Press Release IR-2005-38, 29 March, 2005), retrieved from www.irs.gov/pub/ird-utl/tax_gap_ 
facts_figures.pdf.  
10 The tax gap figures were published by the International Tax Justice Network and reported by Fairfax NZ News, 
see http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/money/6065508/Cash-jobs-crime-drive-black-economy. 
11 In 1994 the tax gap was estimated to be around $3.2 billion (Committee of Experts, 1998). 
12 Penal tax was provided under: section 369 and section 420 (in respect of PAYE tax); section 378O (relating to 
family support credits); section 394N (imputation penalty tax), and section 394ZZG (dividend withholding 
payment penalty tax) under the Income Tax Act 1976. In addition, sanctions were also provided for in section 67 
of the Goods and Services Act 1985. 
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designed to encourage future compliance whereas the criminal penalties were intended to 
deter bad conduct without punishing good conduct (McLisky, 2011).  
Deterrence has been the most widely utilised policy instrument of choice used by most tax 
authorities to deter noncompliance (Schneider, 2011). Consistent with this trend the IRD has 
relied on deterrence as its main policy tool for reducing noncompliance. This is illustrated by 
the introduction of a comprehensive penalties regime, the CPR, which took effect from 1 
April 1997. However, with a tax gap estimated at $7 billion a year and only $832 million 
recovered from audit activities (approximately 12 percent of the estimated tax gap), the 
efficiency of enforcement as a policy tool to deter noncompliance comes into question.
13
 
Further, a number of studies have acknowledged that enforcement is costly, and that most tax 
authorities have limited resources to address the scale of noncompliance in their respective 
tax jurisdictions (for example, McKerchar, 2001; and Frey, 2003). There is therefore a need to 
find alternative approaches to encourage and improve the level of compliance. 
Recently, the IRD began trialling a new compliance strategy (Cooperative Compliance), 
which attempts to enhance the relationships between IRD, taxpayers and tax intermediaries. 
The objective of this initiative is to use it as a tool to reduce noncompliance by managing 
risk.
14
 However, at the time of writing, this strategy is aimed at large corporates, and although 
the potential looks promising, the impact of this on compliance is yet to be tested.    
The IRD‟s attempt at looking at alternative approaches to encourage compliance is a 
positive step taken by the tax authority. This is consistent with calls from a number of 
researchers, including Schneider (2011), who contends that while deterrence policy is well-
founded from a theoretical point of view, the empirical evidence on its success tends to be 
weak. Further, Schneider (2011) emphasises the importance of tax morale on compliance 
behaviour, noting that compared to the impact of tax morale (or noneconomic variables), 
deterrence is quantitatively less important. Consequently, there is an increasing need for tax 
researchers to focus on noneconomic determinants of tax compliance, rather than rely on the 
traditional models of tax compliance, in order to better understand and address 
noncompliance in the current tax environment.  
                                                     
13
 IRD Annual Report retrieved from http://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/1/8/187dfa8048ab122ea8b4bd6425fa4360/ 
ar-2011.pdf.  
14
 Large Enterprise Update, Number 10, February, 2010, retrieved from http://www.ird.govt.nz/aboutir/newsletters 
/corporates-contact/2010/large-enterprises-2010-02.html#04. 
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1.2 BACKGROUND TO COMPLIANCE RESEARCH 
A large volume of research over the last four decades has examined the reasons for 
taxpayers‟ noncompliance with the tax laws (for example, Roth et al., 1989; Andreoni et al., 
1998; Niemirowski et al., 2001; and Alm, 2012).
15
 Kirchler (2007) observes a significant 
increase in tax compliance research over the last few decades. However, despite the 
significant increase, Kirchler (2007) comments that most research continues to be based on 
the economic model of tax compliance, albeit with some modifications.   
The genesis of the Economic Deterrence Models is in Becker‟s (1968) Theory of Crime, 
which relies on the theory of a rational individual who weighs expected utility against 
expected costs (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; and Srinivasan, 1973). The traditional approach 
in the tax compliance literature, therefore, tends to focus mainly on the direct incentives, 
which include the probability of audit, the probability of detection, and the severity of 
penalties imposed for detected shortfalls. The message this gives to tax authorities is that tax 
noncompliance can be reduced and managed by either increasing the penalties imposed for 
any shortfalls, or by increasing administrative expenses (that is, audit rates, which in turn will 
increase the probability of detection). However, over the years, the Economic Deterrence 
Models have received increasing criticism from researchers, whose main contention is that the 
models predict too much tax evasion and too little compliance behaviour, and therefore do not 
entirely explain tax compliance or noncompliance behaviour (Graetz & Wilde, 1985; Alm et 
al., 1992; Wallschutzky, 1993; Feld & Frey, 2002; Kirchler, 2007; and Slemrod, 2007). 
Torgler (2007) observes that in many countries the level of deterrence is too low to support 
the high degree of tax compliance.  
One key concern that has been raised over the years, and is still being raised in research 
since Allingham and Sandmo‟s (1972) seminal paper, is deterrence. It has been continually 
debated whether deterrence alone encourages compliance. The premise of most prior research 
on compliance that included a measure of deterrence is that: increased levels of deterrence 
will lead to increased compliance by taxpayers because of their fear of being penalised for 
noncompliance.  However, in proving this relationship, the research has still been indecisive 
as the overall outcome from past research is still inconclusive (for example, see Richardson & 
Sawyer, 2001).   
As a result, other hybrid models (for example, Social Psychology and Fiscal Psychology 
Models) were introduced, which include a range of economic as well as social variables, with 
                                                     
15 A historical overview of tax compliance research over the last three decades is presented by Niemirowski et al. 
(2001). 
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tax morale being one of the newer variables introduced (McKerchar, 2001).
16
 Tax morale has 
yet to be clearly defined, with various researchers offering slightly different definitions. 
However, there is clear consensus that tax morale refers to noneconomic variables such as 
feelings of guilt, sense of civic duty, and moral and ethical values (Kirchler, 2007; 
Kornhauser, 2007; and Torgler, 2007).  
Tax morale was first introduced in the 1960s, and was based on attitudes related to tax 
compliant and noncompliant behaviours (Schmölders, 1959). However, tax morale was rarely 
used in tax compliance research until after the 1990s when interest in tax morale began to 
emerge. Further studies followed, which emphasised the relevance of integrating tax morale 
into tax compliance models to explain compliance behaviour (Schmölders, 1959; Andreoni et 
al., 1998; Torgler, 2007; and Kirchler, 2007). Richardson (2006) examined the relationships 
between the determinants of tax evasion across 45 countries, and found that noneconomic 
determinants, such as behavioural determinants, have a strong influence on tax evasion 
behaviour.  
In summary, recent studies have demonstrated the relevance of integrating non-economic 
and economic variables for a more comprehensive tax compliance model which would be 
capable of better explaining tax compliance behaviour.  
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH AND THE RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS 
The main purpose of this study is to examine selected determinants of tax compliance 
behaviour, within Fishbein and Ajzen‟s (1975; 2010) Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) 
framework. It also seeks to test whether a compliance model based on the TPB is able to 
predict tax reporting decisions made by three distinct stakeholders of the tax system, namely: 
taxpayers, accountants (for the purposes of this thesis referred to as tax agents), and tax 
lawyers.
17
 Based on the TPB, three unobservable influences were examined: the influence of 
attitudes; the influence of relevant referents; and perceptions of behavioural control. Further, 
the TPB based research model was extended with the inclusion of a further five unobservable 
influences: perception of the tax authority; perception of the tax system; societal norms 
(prevalence of compliance or noncompliance); and the perceived injustice (or justice) of the 
CPR; together with perception of the effectiveness of the regime. 
                                                     
16 McKerchar (2001) provides a useful discussion on three commonly used models in tax compliance research: 
Economic Deterrence Models, Social Psychology Models and Fiscal Psychology Models.  
17 For the purposes of this study the term “tax agent” is used to describe members of the New Zealand Institute of 
Chartered Accountants. 
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 Overall, the theoretical model developed for this study will provide evidence of the 
applicability or relevance of the TPB in tax compliance research, and provide interested 
parties with a better understanding of the effects of individuals‟ beliefs, attitudes and norms 
on tax compliance. The wider research objective stated here is addressed by the following 
specific questions: 
1. To what extent can the TPB be used successfully in tax compliance research? 
2. To what extent do attitudes based on legal sanctions and non-legal sanctions (or tax 
morale) influence behavioural intentions?  
3.  To what extent do social norms and societal norms influence intentions to comply (or 
not comply) with individuals‟ tax obligations? 
4. To what extent does perceived control over tax compliance (or noncompliance) 
behaviour directly influence intentions and behaviours, respectively? 
5. To what extent do perceptions of the tax authority and tax system influence intentions 
and tax compliance behaviours? 
6. To what extent do the effectiveness and procedural fairness attributes of the CPR 
affect attitudes towards compliance (or noncompliance), and tax compliance 
behaviour, respectively? 
7. To what extent does the social distance, placed by individuals, between individuals 
and the tax authority influence tax compliance behaviour? 
In response to calls for using different methodologies to investigate tax compliance 
behaviour, the secondary objective of this study is to apply Structural Equation Modelling 
(SEM) analysis with Partial Least Squares (PLS), a path modelling technique, together with 
the application of PLS-Graph, to analyse the survey data. The SEM approach, unlike the other 
widely used methods (such as multiple regression, multivariate analysis of variance and factor 
analysis) which can only examine a single relationship at a time, combines factor analysis and 
multiple regression analysis which enables the investigation of a series of dependent 
relationships (Hair et al., 2006). To date, no other techniques enable the assessment of both 
measurement properties and at the same time test the key theoretical relationships in one 
technique (Hair et al., 2006). Most studies applying SEM have used the covariance-based 
methodology (found in software such as LISREL, AMOS and EQS),
18
 whereas the PLS-
Graph software used in the current study is based on PLS methodology.
19
 To the best of the 
                                                     
18 LISREL, AMOS and EQS are software used for SEM analysis, which are all based on the covariance approach. 
19 A detailed discussion on the differences between the covariance and PLS approach is presented in Chapter 5.   
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author‟s knowledge, PLS-Graph has been used in only one recent tax compliance study.
20
 The 
aim is to introduce an alternative methodology to analyse tax compliance data, and a model 
that is capable of predicting compliance behaviour, which does not rely on a normal 
distribution, or on a large sample size.
21
 
A related objective is to determine if taxpayers view noncompliance as a serious offence, 
relative to other similar civil offences, and whether this view has any effect on their 
compliance behaviour. The final objective of this study is to examine survey respondents‟ 
own views and experiences of being subject to the CPR. This will provide a useful insight 
into the effects of imposing penalties on noncompliant taxpayers, as prescribed by the CPR, 
and how this affects their future intentions to comply.   
In order to address the above research questions, the relevant areas of literature within the 
domain of tax compliance behaviour were reviewed, including literature on the TPB. The 
relevant theories underlying the research variables were also reviewed. Specific questions 
arising from the research objectives were developed into a number of hypotheses. A survey 
instrument was then developed to capture the responses used to address the hypotheses. 
In summary, this study rests on the assumption that tax compliance behaviour can be 
explained as a process in which a broad range of beliefs, attitudes, values and other aspects of 
tax compliance behaviour generally may contribute towards determining compliance 
behaviour. The TPB has the capability of integrating all these measures or variables including 
normative (civic duty, guilt feelings and moral values) and self-interested deterrence concepts 
(fear of detection and punishment, and the severity of penalties) into one integrated causal 
model.  
1.4 DEFINITIONS OF TAX COMPLIANCE AND RELATED TERMS 
In order to fully understand the research model developed for the current study, a brief 
description of the underlying theory, together with the constructs used in the model, is 
presented in this section. The following discussions include the definitions of tax compliance 
behaviour, and the various terms, or constructs used in the research model.  
                                                     
20 This study was reported in two parts, the first part in 2009 followed by the second part in 2011 (Saad, 2009; 
2011).  
21 A small sample size and data that are not normally distributed are commonly associated with survey research. 
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1.4.1 Tax Compliance and Noncompliance 
The definition of noncompliance clearly distinguishes between tax avoidance and tax 
evasion. Tax avoidance involves attempts by legal means to prevent or reduce a tax liability 
which would otherwise be incurred by taking advantage of some loopholes in the tax law 
(Webley et al., 1991; Wenzel, 2002; and Murphy, 2010). Essentially, tax avoidance is 
associated with legal measures adopted to reduce a taxpayer‟s tax liability (James & Alley, 
2002). New Zealand has largely adopted a purpose test to establish avoidance, that is, “tax 
avoidance will be established if and to the extent that an arrangement displays a purpose (or if 
there is more than one purpose, a non-incidental purpose) of tax avoidance” (Sawyer, 1996, 
p.484). 
Tax evasion, on the other hand, is generally considered to be illegal and involves acts of 
commission or omission (Webley et al., 1991; Sawyer, 1996; and Wenzel, 2002). A recent 
review of the literature identified a number of characteristics associated with tax evasion 
which is necessary in order to establish the presence of tax evasion: knowledge; deliberate 
act; illegal act; failure to comply with the tax law; element of concealment; recklessness; 
disregard for the tax system; and falsification of documents (Wu, 2012). Wu (2012) contends 
that „knowledge‟ and „deliberate act‟ are the more important factors in describing tax evasion.   
A review of prior tax compliance research revealed that the terms „noncompliance‟ and 
„compliance‟ were commonly used to describe tax reporting behaviours. In a tax context, 
noncompliance refers to the intentional or unintentional failure of taxpayers to comply fully 
with their tax obligations (Webley et al., 1991; McKerchar, 2003a; and Kirchler, 2007). This 
indicates that noncompliance is used as a neutral term to refer to both intentional and 
unintentional noncompliant behaviour, although they are both distinct behaviours. Intentional 
noncompliance occurs when a person, fully aware of his or her obligations under the tax laws, 
deliberately chooses not to comply with their obligations. Conversely, unintentional 
noncompliance occurs when a person inadvertently does not comply with the tax laws, which 
is a result of a non-deliberate decision (McKerchar, 2003a).  
The general definition of noncompliance, such as the one provided by Roth et al. (1989), 
clearly suggests that noncompliance can arise from both an underpayment and an 
overpayment of tax (Burton, 2008). Overpayment was found in a number of taxpayers‟ 
returns reviewed by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in the 1980s (Roth et al., 1989). 
Overpayment of tax (over-compliance) occurs when a person does not comply with a legal 
obligation which results in an advantage to the tax authority, whereas underpayment (under-
compliance) occurs when a person does not comply with a legal obligation which results in a 
12 
 
disadvantage to the tax authority (Burton, 2008). Bobek et al. (2007) offer some reasons as to 
why some taxpayers over-comply, including: uncertainties as to their tax obligations; 
reducing anxiety; and/or enjoyment of getting a refund.
22
 Some over-compliance may be the 
result of the IRD‟s Pay As You Earn (PAYE) deduction tables which are based on the income 
for a whole year. Overpayments may occur if during an income year a taxpayer moves from a 
higher income tax bracket to a lower tax bracket (or vice versa), or if a taxpayer derived 
salary and wages for only part of the year.
23
 
It therefore follows that noncompliant taxpayers are those who do not comply with all 
aspects of their tax obligations, either intentionally or unintentionally, and includes those who 
over-comply. Tax authorities (for example, the IRD) do not consider those who overpay what 
they legally owe in taxes as noncompliant taxpayers, which effectively penalises compliant 
taxpayers (Burton, 2008). A recent Taxation Bill‟s proposal would require taxpayers who 
choose to file a tax return (seeking a refund) to also file returns for the previous four tax 
years.
24
 This has the potential of reducing the number of taxpayers who may otherwise 
request a refund in the years they believe they have overpaid. For lower levels of tax offences, 
the CPR also does not differentiate between taxpayers who had intentionally underpaid their 
taxes with those who had underpaid their taxes unintentionally. For example, section 141A of 
the TAA 1994 (offence for not taking reasonable care) has the potential of imposing the same 
level of penalties on taxpayers irrespective of whether the „mistake‟ was deliberate or 
unintentional, due to the low level of threshold and the difficulty in proving that the shortfall 
was the result of a deliberate act (or otherwise).    
One of the earlier and more comprehensive definitions of tax compliance, which is widely 
cited in the literature, was developed by Roth et al. (1989, p.2), who defined tax compliance 
as:  
“Compliance with reporting requirements means that the taxpayer files all required tax 
returns at the proper time and that the returns accurately report tax liability in 
accordance with the Internal Revenue Code, regulations, and court decisions applicable 
at the time the return is filed.” 
The above definition seems to include taxpayers‟ reporting and filing responsibilities, the 
timing of the required actions, and the calculation of the correct amount of tax liability based 
                                                     
22 Taxpayers may get a refund only if they are aware they have overpaid and make a claim accordingly. 
23 The PAYE tables are based on salary levels earned in one income year.    
24 Taxation (Livestock Valuation, Assets Expenditure, and Remedial Matters) Bill (64-1), – First Reading as 
referred to the Finance and Expenditure Select Committee, 29/11/12, retrieved from http://www.parliament.nz/en--
NZ/PB/6/9/b//OODBHOH_BILL11625_1-Taxation-Livestock-Valuation-Assets-Expendituer.htm. 
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on the applicable tax laws. This definition appears to provide some clearer guidelines with 
regard to a taxpayer‟s responsibilities with respect to his or her tax obligations. The above 
definition, however, does not distinguish between intentional and unintentional compliance.  
James and Alley (1999) re-examined the meaning of tax compliance, and found the 
existing definitions to be too narrow for adequately capturing the concept of tax compliance, 
and offered a wider definition. Tax compliance was defined by James and Alley (1999, p.10) 
as:  
“The willingness of individuals and other taxable entities to act in accordance within 
the spirit as well as the letter of tax law and administration, without the application of 
enforcement activity.” 
The definition comprises compliance with the spirit as well as the letter of the law and 
voluntary compliance without the threat of enforcement. James and Alley (1999), however, 
did not consider the definition comprehensive enough, or an accurate description of 
compliance behaviour. Subsequently, James and Alley (2002, p.20) proposed a more 
comprehensive definition, in which tax compliance is viewed as a continuum of definitions, 
which: 
“…ranges from the narrow law enforcement approach, through wider economic 
definitions and on to even more comprehensive versions relating to taxpayer decisions 
to conform to the wider objectives of society as reflected in tax policy.” 
The above definition attempts to cover the wide range of noncompliant behaviour: degree 
of noncompliance; voluntary and compulsory behaviour; intentional and unintentional 
behaviour; a timing dimension (with respect to tax payments); and behaviour associated with 
the spirit as well as the letter of tax law and administered without any enforcement activity 
(James & Alley, 2002). Research also distinguishes between two types of compliance: those 
who voluntarily comply and those who comply because of compliance activities by the tax 
authorities (James & Alley, 1999). Arguably, if taxpayers comply only because of threats 
and/or harassment from the tax authority, this would not constitute proper compliance (James 
& Alley, 1999).
25
 According to this definition, taxpayers who comply out of fear of detection 
and punishment for noncompliance are not considered to be compliant taxpayers.   
The recent study by Wu (2012) provides a critical literature review on the concepts of tax 
compliance and the study also attempts to develop a „universal‟ definition that can be applied 
to each of the compliance concepts identified in the literature. The study concluded that 
                                                     
25 Refer to James and Alley‟s (1999) definition of compliance behaviour in an earlier paragraph.  
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despite the large volume of literature, based on the current state of that literature and case law, 
a universal definition still remains elusive, and recommends more research in this area. This 
view is supported by Long and Swingen (1991), McKerchar (2003a) and Devos (2004), who 
observe the lack of a universal definition or model of tax compliance despite the existing 
volume of literature.  
The current study attempts to focus on civil penalties,
26
 rather than criminal penalties, by 
ensuring that the hypothetical scenario that measures behavioural intention is based on a small 
sum of $1000, and does not involve any manipulation of records if respondents do not wish to 
report that income. Respondents were only required to indicate whether they intend to report 
or not report the hypothetical income, which does not constitute any of the crimes currently 
falling under the criminal provisions of the CPR. Further, the terms “compliance” and 
“noncompliance” will only refer to all intentional compliant or noncompliant behaviour. The 
behaviour intentionally undertaken by the taxpayer could result in both psychological 
consequences (such as guilt), and economic consequences (such as monetary fines), which in 
most cases the taxpayer may be aware of. Unintentional behaviour may lead to economic 
consequences, but is unlikely to lead to psychological consequences, and therefore is 
excluded from this study.  
In order to ensure that the behaviour captured for this study is intentional, the behavioural 
intention measures in the questionnaire (the scenario and following questions) refer to a 
specific concerted effort or intention or decision to report or not report a particular income. 
This ensures that the action or behaviour is voluntary and deliberate. Past behaviour, on the 
other hand, is based on self-reported past behaviour, which the person in most likelihood 
would be aware of (even if any unreported income has not been picked up by the tax 
authority). A respondent‟s past behaviour also relies on the respondent‟s honesty and accurate 
recollection on their self-reporting.  
1.4.2 Research Model 
The TPB, developed by Fishbein & Ajzen (1975), highlights the importance of 
behavioural beliefs, normative beliefs and control beliefs on successfully performing any 
desired behaviour. The TPB posits that an individual‟s intention (and subsequently behaviour) 
is influenced by an individual‟s attitude towards performing the behaviour, social pressures 
from important referents to conform, and an individual‟s perceived control in engaging in the 
target behaviour. 
                                                     
26 Civil penalties are defined as any offence committed under sections 141A to 141D of the TAA 1994, whereas 
criminal penalties are defined as any offence committed under section 141E, 143A and/or 143B. 
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Attitudes towards the behaviour refer to an individual‟s beliefs of the favourableness or 
unfavourableness of the behaviour of interest, and the evaluation of the outcomes from 
engaging in the behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; 2010). Extending the concept of attitudes 
to tax compliance behaviour, attitudes are measured by the perceived desirability of 
complying with the tax laws. Two different types of attitudes were used in developing the 
current research model: attitudes based on legal sanctions (probability of detection, 
probability of punishment and severity of punishment); and attitudes based on non-legal 
sanctions (tax morale, such as moral values, sense of civic duty and feelings of guilt).  
Subjective norms refer to beliefs about the normative expectations of important referents 
and the motivation to comply with these expectations. The norms are more narrowly defined 
and refer to the performance of a particular behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; 2010). 
Perceived behavioural control is defined as the extent to which an individual believes that 
the individual is capable of performing the target behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; 2010). 
This involves considering the presence or absence of factors that may facilitate or impede 
performance of the behaviour, and the individual‟s perceived control over these factors.  
Societal norms or perception of the prevalence of others’ tax paying behaviour refer to an 
individual‟s view of the tax compliance behaviour of the population at large (Kirchler, 2007). 
It is a measure of an individual‟s perception of whether the general public is compliant (or not 
compliant), leading to beliefs that compliance (or noncompliance) is the society norm.   
Perception of the tax authority refers to an individual‟s perception of the legitimacy of the 
tax authority, which in turn is considered to influence an individual‟s compliance behaviour 
(Tyler, 2010).  
Perception of the tax system refers to an individual‟s general view of the tax system, that 
is, whether the individual views the system in a positive or negative light (Kirchler, 1999).  
Procedural justice elements measure an individual‟s judgment of the procedural fairness 
of procedures applied by the tax authority under the CPR. These elements are based on the 
justice rules developed by Leventhal (1980). 
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Effectiveness of the penalties regime generally refers to an individual‟s perception of 
whether the CPR is effective in deterring noncompliance. The measures are based on general 
Deterrence Theory (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972).
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Motivational postures refer to the social distance an individual places between the 
individual and the tax authority when responding to regulations imposed by the tax authority 
(Braithwaite, 2003a; 2003b). 
1.5 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS RESEARCH 
During the last forty years or so the literature on tax compliance has provided a wealth of 
knowledge on compliance behaviour, but there are still many gaps in our understanding of 
how to measure, explain and control tax noncompliance (Alm, 2012). The large body of 
literature currently available provides varying definitions and theories of tax compliance 
behaviour; however, a universal definition of tax compliance or an optimal model of 
compliance is still elusive (Kirchler, 2007; McKerchar, 2010; and Wu, 2012). Further, the 
literature reveals the existence of a multitude of independent variables that could influence tax 
compliance behaviour, individually or in combination with other variables.  
There is a consensus among researchers that tax compliance behaviour is complex and no 
one variable is capable of influencing behaviour (McKerchar, 2010). Rather, a range of 
variables are involved in shaping the behaviour. However, including all possible variables 
identified as potential determinants of tax compliance is beyond the scope of this study. 
Instead, this study will contribute towards the current body of knowledge by addressing a few 
selected variables, and in the combination seldom applied, to illustrate the comparative 
contributions made by legal and non-legal sanctions in promoting voluntary compliance. This 
study also examines and compares the influence of personal, social and societal norms, in one 
causal model setting. This provides a useful insight into the effect of the various norms on 
compliance, and the comparative effects of legal and non-legal sanctions.  
Tax authorities have used a range of policy tools to increase tax compliance. The New 
Zealand tax authority‟s (IRD) key policy tool since 1997 has been to employ the CPR to deter 
noncompliance, and at the same time encourage compliance behaviour. The use of such legal 
sanctions comprises a range of penalties which can be manipulated by tax authorities in an 
attempt to modify tax compliance behaviour. However, the literature has provided equally 
                                                     
27 The CPR sets out two distinct regimes to penalise noncompliant behaviour, which comprise a civil penalties 
regime and penalties for criminal offences. The current study is based on civil penalties which excludes tax 
evasion (which comes under the criminal penalties regime). 
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compelling reasons for using tax morale and non-monetary sanctions to promote compliance.  
A large body of literature has provided evidence that informal sanctions or tax morale are 
more effective in modifying compliance behaviour than penalties (for example, Kornhauser, 
2007). Tax authorities therefore need to understand the influence of tax morale and other 
variables on taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour in order to encourage voluntary compliance. 
This study makes a positive contribution in identifying variables including beliefs and 
attitudes that could influence tax compliance behaviour.  
 Ritsema et al.‟s (2003) study found that various sub-groups of taxpayers were affected 
differently by the determinants of tax compliance. Their study suggests that researchers 
should start looking at the effects of various compliance variables on different sub-groups of 
taxpayers, and not treat all taxpayers as one generic or homogeneous group. Thus there is a 
need for research to examine and compare the effects of compliance variables on different 
groups or sub-groups of taxpayers.  This study makes a positive contribution through its 
attempt to examine the effects of some selected compliance variables on three distinct sub-
groups of New Zealand taxpayers: general taxpayers, tax agents, and tax lawyers. It is 
envisaged that this study will demonstrate that all variables do not uniformly affect the 
behaviours of all sub-groups of taxpayers equally, and that certain variables may affect one 
sub-group, but not other sub-groups.
28
    
To the best of the author‟s knowledge, this is one of the only studies publicly available and 
independent of the IRD, which examines the effectiveness and procedural fairness of the New 
Zealand CPR on attitudes and on behaviour, respectively. Further, this is also the first study to 
examine the views, experiences and the resulting behavioural changes of New Zealand 
taxpayers who have been penalised under the CPR. The IRD has control over managing the 
penalties process, and the potential to achieve the desired behavioural outcomes from 
taxpayers if the process is managed well. However, in order to achieve that, the IRD must 
understand the effects of the penalties on taxpayers who have been penalised. This study will, 
therefore, make a positive contribution towards increasing IRD‟s and policymakers‟ 
knowledge and understanding of these effects on taxpayers, and their future compliance 
behaviour.  
The combination of adopting the TPB as the underlying framework, analysing the survey 
data using SEM with PLS path modelling technique, and the application of a relatively new 
analytical tool (PLS-Graph), provides a useful contribution to the body of knowledge. The 
underlying theory used to develop the current research model for this study has been widely 
                                                     
28 For the purposes of this study, the terms “groups”, “sub-groups” and “sample groups” are used interchangeably. 
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used in a range of behavioural studies. However, the TPB has not been widely applied in tax 
compliance research. The improvement in the rigour of the research, and the detailed 
description provided on the application of the new methodological approach in the traditional 
field of tax compliance research, is a further contribution towards current compliance 
literature providing a basis for future researchers to develop further.   
Finally, this study may not only benefit other researchers attempting to understand New 
Zealand taxpayers‟ behaviour, but also help policy makers and the relevant tax authority to 
get a better understanding of tax compliance behaviours of New Zealand taxpayers, tax agents 
and tax lawyers. Any behavioural study into tax compliance will only improve the current 
knowledge of tax compliance behaviour, which has seen a dearth of studies originating from 
New Zealand, compared to the large volume of research carried out in other countries such as 
Australia and the United States. Applying economic and noneconomic variables in a single 
causal model illustrates how taxpayers‟ behaviour affects a tax system and how tax authorities 
can use current policy tools in conjunction with behavioural responses to improve voluntary 
compliance in New Zealand.
29
 The results of this study, which are grounded in widely 
accepted theories, can equally apply to taxpayer behaviour in other similar tax jurisdictions 
(such as, IRS, ATO and Canada Revenue Agency).    
1.6 STRUCTURE AND OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH 
The remainder of this thesis is set out as follows. Chapter 2 presents a review of selected 
literature related to tax compliance studies. The focus will be on literature that examines the 
relationships among the constructs incorporated in the research model, which are based on the 
TPB. Due to the sheer volume of literature available on tax compliance, this study will limit 
the review to published studies that are considered by the author to be the most relevant.  
Chapter 3 presents the main theories employed in this study, namely, the Theory of 
Planned Behaviour, Procedural Justice Theory, Deterrence Theory, and Motivational 
Posturing Theory. The discussion is only intended to provide the necessary background 
knowledge, and is not intended to serve as detailed analysis on the selected theories. 
Chapter 4 sets out the theoretical framework, and outlines the development of the 
proposed research model. It also sets out the theoretical justification for the hypotheses tested.  
                                                     
29 The New Zealand tax system is based on a voluntary self-assessment and dispute resolution system which relies 
on taxpayers to voluntarily report and pay the correct amount of taxes. Self-assessment was introduced into the 
legislation by the Taxation (Taxpayer Assessment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2001 with effect from 24 
October 2001, with application from the 2002/2003 and subsequent income years. Section 92 of the TAA 1994 
requires taxpayers to assess their taxable income and income tax liability.  
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Chapter 5 outlines and discusses the research methodology used to gather the required 
data, and the approaches taken to analyse and test the survey data. This chapter also provides 
a detailed discussion on the approach adopted in applying Structural Equation Modelling with 
Partial Least Squares, and justifications for using the methodology to test the research 
hypotheses.  
Chapters 6 and 7 set out the results from the analysis of the survey data. Chapter 6 presents 
the preliminary results of the various tests applied to determine the suitability of the data for 
further analysis, and includes addressing nonresponse bias, missing data and the 
representativeness of the survey data. Descriptive statistics are also presented in this chapter. 
Chapter 7 presents the results of the evaluation of the measurement models, and includes 
results of all reliability and validity tests carried out on the survey data. This is followed by 
the results from the evaluation of the structural model, which includes: path coefficients; 
variances explained for the various constructs; and the global goodness of fit indices 
validating the research model globally.  
Chapter 8 concludes the study with a summary of the results and the implications for tax 
authorities and other researchers. This chapter also emphasises the limitations of the study 
before concluding and providing suggestions for future extensions. Copies of all relevant 
supporting material, such as Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) and PLS-
Graph outputs, the survey instrument, and correspondence are attached as appendices to this 
thesis.  
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CHAPTER 2 
SELECTED BEHAVIOURAL TAX COMPLIANCE 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to present and review relevant literature on tax compliance 
behaviour. Given the large volume of literature on tax compliance, this study will limit the 
review to published studies that are considered to be the most relevant to this research.
30
 The 
review will focus on more recent studies while referring to relevant older studies that have 
provided useful contributions to the literature. There will be no discussions on perceptions of 
the tax authority and the tax system, given the minimal literature available on these two 
research variables.
31
 
The first section that follows, section 2.2, describes the tax compliance models commonly 
used in tax compliance research. This is followed by section 2.3 which presents a discussion 
of studies grounded in the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB). Due to the minimal use of the 
TPB in tax compliance research, this section will also include behavioural studies using the 
TPB in research carried out in other behavioural domains. Section 2.4 presents selected 
literature on sanctions, which include studies based on formal and informal sanctions.   
Studies and research grounded in Procedural Justice Theory (PJT) are presented in section 
2.5, while section 2.6 discusses the results of selected research examining the effects of 
societal norms, or the perceived prevalence of others‟ tax compliance behaviour on taxpayer 
compliance. Section 2.7 discusses the outcomes from studies that examine taxpayers‟ 
perceptions of the comparative seriousness of tax offences, as compared to other similar 
offences. Section 2.8 presents the limited studies available that are based on Motivational 
Posturing Theory (MPT or social distance). This chapter concludes with a summary presented 
in section 2.9. 
                                                     
30 Jackson and Milliron (1986); Cowell (1990); Andreoni et al. (1998); Alm (1999); Niemirowski et al. (2001); 
Richardson and Sawyer (2001); Slemrod & Yitzhaki (2002); and Kirchler (2007) provide excellent reviews of the 
tax compliance literature. 
31 Most studies on tax authority tend to focus on the impact of tax authority contact on tax compliance and not on 
the general perception of the tax authority, as this study proposes. Similarly, the majority of studies on tax system 
tend to focus on the fairness of the tax system, rather than on general views relating to the tax system.   
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2.2 MODELS COMMONLY USED IN TAX COMPLIANCE 
RESEARCH 
Over the past forty years, the traditional tax compliance models (Economic Deterrence 
Models) have been modified and improved upon by economists, psychologists and 
sociologists, each with the aim of trying to understand the complex behaviour of individuals 
in respect of tax reporting. While many theories and models have been developed over the 
years, tax compliance research has generally been based on three theoretical models: the 
Economic Deterrence Models; the Social Psychology Models; and the Fiscal Psychology 
Models. The Fiscal Psychology Models are hybrid models that incorporate elements from 
each of the Economic Deterrence Models and the Social Psychology Models. The following 
sections will briefly introduce these models in order to offer an understanding of the various 
economic and noneconomic variables used in the current research model.    
2.2.1 Economic Deterrence Models 
Since Becker‟s (1968) seminal work on crime and punishment, researchers have 
developed a large body of literature on criminal behaviour and law enforcement. The 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) Model is based on similar assumptions, with the emphasis on 
individuals making the choices of whether, and to what extent, to understate their income. 
Their Model further assumes that individuals are completely amoral and make choices of 
whether and how much income to report or suppress, in the same way they would approach 
any risky decision or gamble. Individuals will aim to maximise the expected utility of the 
choices made and are further influenced by possible legal penalties, in the same way they 
would be influenced by any other contingent cost (Slemrod, 2007). Tax evasion therefore 
depends on the probability of detection of unreported income and the threat of being 
penalised, the size of the penalty for not complying, and the individual‟s degree of risk 
aversion. Yitzhaki (1974) amended the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) formulation by basing 
the penalty for discovered evasion on the amount of tax underreported, rather than on the 
amount of understated income, as in the Allingham and Sandmo Model.    
In its simplest form, the formula assumes that an individual receives a fixed amount of 
income, and that (s)he then decides how much to report and how much to evade. The 
individual‟s real decisions are not considered. The individual‟s income from the individual‟s 
labour supply and from capital is taken as given (Sandmo, 2005). The Model assumes that the 
taxpayer receives a fixed amount of income I, and must decide how much to report and how 
much to suppress from the tax authority. The taxpayer is expected to pay tax at rate t for the 
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reported income R, while no taxes are paid on the suppressed income. If the understatement of 
income is not detected (IN) by the tax authority, the net income of the taxpayer is stated as:   
IN  = I – tR 
However, if the income suppression (ID) is detected through an audit with a fixed 
probability, and all understated income (I - R) is discovered by the tax authority, the 
individual is required to pay a penalty at rate θ on each dollar of the tax value of the shortfall. 
The taxpayer‟s income if penalised for underreporting is as follows:  
ID = I – tR – θ [ t (I - R)] 
Sandmo (2005) makes the point that some portion of the income will be unknown to the 
tax authority, whereas some portion is already known before filing (for example, through 
third party reporting). Therefore, the part of a taxpayer‟s income that could be evaded without 
the probability of detection (p) is income not subject to third party reporting and hence 
unknown to the tax authority. Taxpayers will choose the amount to evade in order to 
maximise their expected utility (EU), which is stated below: 
EU (I) = pU (ID) + (1 – p)U (IN)  
where EU is the expected utility of the evasion gamble, and where the utility is a function 
of the income level only.  
The Economic Deterrence Models of tax compliance consider the taxpayer to be a rational 
individual who will maximise his or her expected utility of the tax evasion gamble (Alm, 
2012). Alm (2012) further adds that the taxpayer will weigh the benefits of successful 
noncompliance against the probability of detection and punishment. Therefore, if the taxpayer 
does not want to be caught and penalised, then (s)he will report all income received.  
As discussed above, the Economic Deterrence Models‟ approach to understanding tax 
compliance behaviour is based on enforcement and punishment. These Economic Deterrence 
Models suggest that the level of reported income increases with an increase in the level of 
enforcement activities, and the resulting punishment if noncompliance is detected (Allingham 
& Sandmo, 1972). Increased perception of the audit probability and penalty rate is also 
deemed to increase the compliance level (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972). This is on the basis 
that taxpayers who believe there is a high probability of being detected for noncompliance 
will be deterred from not complying because of the fear of being penalised. This approach 
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concludes that taxpayers only comply because of the economic consequences of detection and 
punishment (Alm, 2012). 
Another assumption of the Economic Deterrence Models is that utility is considered to be 
a function of income only, while the effect of expenditure on compliance is ignored (Yong, 
2006). It is widely acknowledged in literature that income and expenditure provide taxpayers 
with the opportunity to either understate or overstate their taxable income. A number of 
studies identified understating income and overstating deductions as two most commonly 
used modes of evasion (Troutman, 1993; and Hasseldine et al., 1994).  Overstating deductions 
(although it may only be available to taxpayers earning business income), can be equally 
effective in reducing a taxpayer‟s income tax liability as understating income. Therefore, the 
above assumption (that utility is only a function of income) may only be applicable to 
taxpayers who earn their income from salaries and wages and those who are able to preclude 
cash jobs in the calculation of taxable income (Yong, 2006).  
Yitzhaki (1974) argued that the tax rate will have no effect on the terms of the tax evasion 
risk if the penalty (and any associated non-pecuniary cost) for detected noncompliance is 
proportional to the tax understated. Yitzhaki (1974) further argued that as the tax rate rises, 
the cost of a detected understatement of taxes rises in exact proportion to the reward from a 
successful understatement of taxes, so the reward-to-risk ratio is unchanged. Yitzhaki (1974) 
explained that in such situations, a higher tax rate only has an income effect and, if a 
taxpayer‟s level of risk aversion increases as after-tax income falls, a higher tax rate is likely 
to decrease tax evasion. This view was also supported by Alm (2012), who notes that whilst a 
higher tax rate may increase the return on the underreporting (which reduces reported income 
through a substitution effect), the higher tax rate also has an income effect. If the taxpayer 
exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion, then the lower income makes the evasion gamble 
less attractive. This means that in New Zealand and most other countries, where the penalty 
imposed is at a proportional rate on evaded taxes, the substitution effect disappears, resulting 
in a higher tax rate leading to increased reported income through the income effect.  
Finally, tax compliance behaviour is complex and involves the interaction of multiple 
elements of compliance behaviour, which is not reflected in the simplicity of the Allingham 
and Sandmo Model. The basic economics-of-crime approach does not capture the relevant 
elements that influence a taxpayer‟s compliance decisions (Alm, 2012). 
Over the years, a number of theoretical extensions have occurred with respect to the 
Economic Deterrence Models, which have involved the continued reliance on expected utility 
theory (Alm, 2012). These extensions are reviewed and discussed by a number of scholars 
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(Cowell, 1990; Andreoni et al., 1998; Slemrod & Yitzhaki, 2002; Sandmo, 2005; Devos, 
2007; Slemrod, 2007; and Torgler, 2007), and include: individual choices; alternative penalty 
tax and tax withholding functions; complexity and uncertainty about the relevant fiscal 
parameters; use of paid preparers; provision of government services; positive reward for 
honesty; and the inclusion of systematic audit selection rules in which the tax authority uses 
information from the tax returns in their audit strategy (Alm, 2012). These extensions were 
made in an attempt to add some realism into the Economic Deterrence Models, but at the 
same time they “also complicate the comparative statics32 of the compliance choice” (Alm, 
2012, p. 62).  Nonetheless, enforcement is still considered to be the key factor that motivates 
compliance. Further, the extensions do not change the compliance-tax rate response, which 
remains the same.  
Despite the extensions, the Economic Deterrence Models based on Allingham and 
Sandmo‟s (1972) deterrence theory model have faced increasing criticism. The main criticism 
relates to the assumption that individuals make tax paying decisions in a social vacuum and 
overlooks the human elements or traits involved in the decision-making process (Cullis & 
Lewis, 1997). Cullis and Lewis (1997) maintain that individuals draw their identity from 
belonging to a group and consequently the traits of the group may influence their decision-
making process. McKerchar (2001) identified a number of specific limitations in the 
application of the Economic Deterrence Models which include, not adequately addressing the 
issue of randomness (or uncertainty of the assessment of taxable income by an auditor) which 
requires quantification, and the presumption that all taxpayers respond identically to the same 
level of randomness. McKerchar (2001) further notes that despite the introduction of modified 
Economic Deterrence Models, the outcomes and limitations remain largely the same. That is, 
“they are theoretical in nature, sometimes conflicting, based on generally unrealistic 
assumptions, and appear to be without empirical validation” (McKerchar, 2001, p. 231).   
Further, the effects of tax morale, which includes values, norms, morals, beliefs and 
attitudes towards tax compliance behaviour, may be equally important in tax reporting 
decisions (Kirchler, 2007; Kornhauser, 2007; Torgler, 2007; and Cullis et al., 2012). 
Therefore, it seems obvious that the Economic Deterrence Models only explain part of the tax 
compliance problem. Noneconomic factors such as tax morale explain the other part of the 
compliance problem.  
                                                     
32 The term “comparative statics” is used by Alm (2012) to illustrate the equation of the economics-of crime model 
which gives the results that compliance depends upon enforcement, that is, declared income increases with an 
increase in the probability of detection or in the penalty rate.  
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The limitations identified with the Economic Deterrence Models have led researchers to 
integrate other elements related to compliance behaviour, in an attempt to better understand 
tax compliance behaviour (Cowell, 1990; Wallschutzky, 1993; and Alm, 2012). The 
criticisms or limitations identified in the Economic Deterrence Models led to the emergence 
of the fiscal psychology model of tax compliance which is outlined in section 2.2.3 of this 
chapter.    
2.2.2 Social Psychology Models 
The emergence of Social Psychology Models was the result of criticisms from 
psychologists and sociologists who emphasised the economic models‟ inadequacy in 
explaining compliance behaviour. Critics of the Economic Deterrence Models argue that 
decisions made by individuals are not always based solely on maximising economic utility, 
rather sociological and psychological factors were also considered to be relevant in any tax 
reporting decisions. The Social Psychology Models consider the influence of social 
motivations and interactions on individuals‟ decision-making process (McKerchar, 2003a). 
These Models also attempt to examine the process by which individuals form their 
expectations, which in turn influence individuals‟ decisions.  Assumptions are made that, by 
understanding individuals‟ behaviour, it may be possible to understand and predict taxpayer 
compliance behaviour.   
A number of Social Psychology Models have been developed over the years; however, 
only four of these models are considered to be relevant to tax compliance research: 
Compositional Modelling; Decompositional Modelling; Attribution Theory; and Equity 
Theory (McKerchar, 2003a). Each of these models will be briefly addressed in the following 
paragraphs.  
Compositional Modelling refers to methods that are based on individuals making a 
reasoned action, based on personal beliefs and attitudes. This is referred to as the Theory of 
Reasoned Action (TRA), and is based on the assumption that people generally make decisions 
to engage or not to engage in a particular behaviour, after considering their beliefs with regard 
to the behaviour, and the outcomes from engaging or not engaging in the behaviour. The TRA 
and its successor the TPB are discussed in detail in Chapter 3, and as such only a brief outline 
will be provided here.  
In brief, the TRA posits that behaviour is a function of intention; and intention, in turn, is a 
function of attitude towards the behaviour and subjective norms. According to the TRA, a 
person will engage in the target behaviour if the person‟s judgment of performing the 
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behaviour is favourable and the social pressure from important referents motivates the 
individual to perform the target behaviour. The strengths and weaknesses of applying the 
TRA in tax compliance research are discussed in Chapter 3. The TRA was extended into the 
TPB to include perceived behavioural control, which has a direct influence on behaviour, and 
an indirect effect on behaviour through intentions.    
Decompositional Modelling refers to a method which commences with the general 
preference or decision, and then works backwards to establish the reasons, and the trade-offs 
that the person made (which may not always be made consciously), in arriving at the decision 
(McKerchar, 2003a). Although Decompositional Modelling has been widely used in 
marketing research, especially in large-scale studies, the collection of data for this method can 
be time consuming (McKerchar, 2003a). This method is also considered to be less accurate 
due to its sheer breadth and volume; however, new hybrid Decompositional Models are now 
available.   
Attribution Theory deals with the processes by which attributions are derived from 
informational input (Kelley, 1972). Attribution Theory posits that most people are uninformed 
and try to understand the causes of events and actions around them (Kaplan et al., 1988). 
These causes of events and actions are attributed to either personal or situational factors 
(Kelley, 1972).  If a person behaves in a manner similar to others in a particular role, then the 
behaviour may be attributed to the role or the situation. Conversely, if a person acts in a 
different manner to how others would behave in a similar role, then the action cannot be 
attributed to the role or the situation, and therefore it must be attributed to the person (Kaplan 
et al., 1988). In summary, Attribution Theory is the study of how people explain or 
understand the behaviour or actions of others by attributing its cause to either personal or 
situational factors (McKerchar, 2003a). McKerchar (2003a) argues that Attribution Theory is 
also known to contribute towards the Fiscal Psychology literature.   
Equity Theory was developed from the Theory of Cognitive Dissonance which posits that 
individuals will attempt to reduce the level of internal dissonance they experience when their 
cognitions are in disagreement (Adams, 1965). Inputs and outcomes are considered to be the 
major components of an exchange relationship. Earlier studies focused on the reactions to pay 
inequalities (Adams, 1963). Adams (1963) analysed inequity in terms of the discrepancies 
between an individual‟s job inputs and job outputs, and the behaviour that may arise from 
these discrepancies. Equity Theory is therefore concerned with the perceptions of the social 
consequences of distributive injustice of unfair exchange within a social system. Later studies 
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applied Equity Theory to the distribution of a broad range of valued outcomes (Messick & 
Cook, 1983).   
This view of equitable social exchanges was extended by Thibaut et al. (1974) to include 
concepts of fairness and commitment. Equity Theory proposes that people are more likely to 
comply with rules if they believe the system that determines the rules to be equitable (Thibaut 
et al., 1974). In a tax context, Equity Theory is concerned with the fairness of exchange 
between the taxpayer and the government (Wallschutzky, 1984). Consistent with Equity 
Theory, inputs are the taxes paid by the taxpayer to the government, and outputs are the 
services provided by the government. If there are any perceived inequities in the exchange 
relationship, Equity Theory predicts that tax evasion could become more prevalent as the 
system is perceived as becoming more inequitable. This is because tax evasion is an attempt 
by taxpayers to restore equity in the system of trade conducted with the government (Spicer & 
Becker, 1980). Therefore, consistent with Equity Theory, perceived equity in the exchange 
relationship between government and taxpayers will enhance compliance behaviour.  
2.2.3 Fiscal Psychology Models 
The Fiscal Psychology Models of tax compliance behaviour are a combination of the 
Economic Deterrence and Social Psychology Models. These models assume that economic or 
financial factors, together with social and psychological factors, influence behaviour.  One of 
the earlier studies resembling the Fiscal Psychology Models is Schmölders‟ (1959) work on 
tax evasion, which introduced the concept of “tax mentality.” Tax mentality refers to attitudes 
regarding tax compliance (or non-compliance), and can differ widely between people from 
different countries (Schmölders, 1959). In other words, Schmölders (1959) argues that 
individuals have divergent views (based on their cultural differences) of their obligation to 
contribute to the community through their taxes; and this leads to different tax mentalities. 
These tax mentalities are closely related with people‟s community-mindedness, and are 
developed by personal experiences. Schmölders (1959) adds that when taxpayers are 
confronted with the obligation to pay, they are more likely to resist this pressure, leading to 
tax evasion. Schmölders (1959) was therefore one of the first to examine the relationship 
between people‟s attitudes and their compliance behaviour. Over the years the Schmölders 
Model has been supported by extensive empirical research, with scholars still referring to 
Schmölders‟ (1959; 1970) work on tax morale (for example, Alm and Torgler, 2006).    
A later study by Strümpel (1969) developed one of the earliest Fiscal Psychology Models 
of tax compliance (Hessing et al., 1988). This Model formalised the results from a 
multinational study on tax compliance into a simple three-variable model (Kinsey, 1992). 
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Strümpel‟s Model, which is presented in Figure 2.1, is based on two main elements: rigidity 
of assessment, and willingness to cooperate. Rigidity of assessment describes the level of 
confrontation between the tax authority and taxpayers, and is measured by the amount of tax 
and the level of fines, the assessment process and the level of „red tape‟ involved in engaging 
with the tax authority. This element captures aspects of tax enforcement that reflect a 
deterrence model of social control (Kinsey, 1992). The other element, willingness to 
cooperate, reflects individuals‟ attitudes and perceptions of the tax system. 
Whilst Strümpel‟s Model assumes that willingness to cooperate is positively related to tax 
compliance behaviour, rigidity of assessment on the other hand is assumed to have two 
competing effects. The first is a direct positive effect on tax compliance, which as stated 
previously is influenced by the tax rate, the amount of fines and other economic variables.  In 
contrast, the second effect exerts a negative influence through the intervening variable of 
willingness to cooperate, which involves the engagement process with the tax authority and 
other noneconomic variables.  
Figure 2.1: Strümpel‟s Model of Tax Compliance (1969)  
(Reproduced from Hessing et al., 1988, p.526) 
 
These earlier studies offer an interesting aspect of the traditional Economic Deterrence 
Models. The models imply that without the influence of any supporting norms, strict law 
enforcement may lead to negative responses from taxpayers, which may eventually 
undermine taxpayer compliance (Hessing et al., 1988). Hessing et al. (1988) further observed 
that resistance to tax law may be even more widespread if the legitimacy of laws is 
questioned and taxpayers do not consider themselves as obliged to obey the law. Subsequent 
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to the introduction of these earlier models, a number of theoretical models of tax cheating 
were introduced: the Song and Yarbrough Model (Song and Yarbrough, 1978); the Internal 
Revenue Service‟s Model of  Taxpayer Compliance (IRS, 1970); Westat‟s Model of Taxpayer 
Compliance(Westat, 1980); Lewis‟s Model of Income Tax Compliance (Lewis, 1982); 
Vogel‟s Model of Taxpayer Compliance (Vogel, 1974); Groenland and van Veldhoven‟s 
Model of Tax Cheating (Groenland & van Veldhoven, 1983); and Spicer‟s Model of Tax 
Cheating (Spicer, 1974).
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One aspect of the Fiscal Psychology Model is the emphasis on taxpayers‟ attitudes and the 
influence of attitudes on compliance behaviour (Schmölders, 1959; and Strümpel, 1969). 
Schmölders (1959) introduced the concept of tax mentality, which are measures of attitudes 
towards tax compliance, while Strümpel‟s (1969) concept of tax mentality reflects an 
individual‟s willingness to co-operate with the tax authority. Lewis‟s (1979) attempts to 
develop measures of tax mentality led to the conclusion that tax mentality was based on 
individual‟s self-interest (which is the premise of the Economic Deterrence Theory). A later 
study undertaken by Lewis (1982) attempted to understand taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour 
by examining taxpayers‟ attitudes and perceptions. Lewis (1982) contends that attitudes are 
linked to behaviour, and that a positive attitude will result in increased compliance. 
These earlier theoretical models provide a wealth of knowledge towards creating a more 
comprehensive theory of tax compliance, and offer a different aspect of tax compliance 
behaviour. Whilst the offer of a different aspect of compliance by the Fiscal Psychology 
Models was welcomed, several concerns were nonetheless raised (Cuccia, 1994). The key 
concern relates to the use of self-reports to capture compliance data, which is considered to be 
unreliable. These self-report concerns continue to exist to this day.
34
 Concerns were also 
raised with respect to the models‟ inability to identify the mechanisms through which 
relationships between various demographic and attitudinal variables, and compliance operate 
(Cuccia, 1994). 
Later studies of Fiscal Psychology Models tended to move away from deterring 
noncompliance and instead attempts were made to focus more on encouraging voluntary 
compliance (Pope & McKerchar, 2011). Pope and McKerchar (2011) attribute this shift to the 
increasing reliance placed on psychological theory and principles in an attempt to understand 
tax compliance behaviour. Further, over the years, the concept of „tax mentality‟, as employed 
in Schmölders‟ (1959) and Strümpel‟s (1969) Models, evolved and has gradually been 
                                                     
33 Comprehensive reviews of these models are presented in Kinsey (1986) and Hessing et al. (1988).  
34 This assumption is based on the a number of recent survey studies using self-reports that continue to highlight 
the limitations of self-reports (for example, Bobek & Hatfield, 2003; and Saad, 2009; 2011). 
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replaced with the term “tax morale” (Kirchler, 2007; Kornhauser, 2007; and Torgler, 2007). 
However, contemporary studies tend to define the term “tax morale” very widely, and 
encompass attitudinal variables such as: feelings of guilt; moral values; sense of civic duty; 
and other similar attitudinal variables.    
In summary, Fiscal Psychology Models which have their origins in Schmölders‟ (1959) 
work, tend to view tax enforcement as a behavioural problem, which can be addressed by 
cooperation between taxpayers and the tax authorities (Pope & McKerchar, 2011). Despite 
the large volume of research undertaken on tax compliance research since the introduction of 
Allingham and Sandmo‟s (1972) Model, there is still no consensus from scholars on an 
optimal tax compliance model (McKerchar, 2003a). The key challenge or obstacle in 
achieving this is because the data required for such an exercise is not available in most cases, 
and tax authorities are generally unwilling to provide actual compliance data to researchers. 
Therefore, the search for an optimal model may still carry on into the future, unless tax 
authorities are willing to co-operate with researchers.  
2.3 THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOUR 
The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB), which is an extension of the Theory of Reasoned 
Action (TRA), posits that attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioural controls are 
key elements in determining a person‟s intentions to engage in a target behaviour, and 
ultimately influences the performance of the behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; and Ajzen, 
1991). TPB is one of the most widely used social psychological models applied in 
behavioural research to explain and predict behaviour (Armitage & Conner, 2001). The TPB 
framework has been employed in numerous disciplines to understand antecedents to 
behavioural intentions and the resulting behaviour. The majority of the studies have validated 
the TPB in wide-ranging behaviours such as: exercise (Ajzen & Driver, 1991); recycling 
(Taylor & Todd, 1995); alcohol misuse (Marcoux & Shope, 1997); weight loss (Sparks et al., 
1995); and speeding (Conner et al., 2007). The application of the TPB in tax compliance 
behaviour is still in its infancy, therefore, the literature reviewed will include behaviours in 
other domains (including meta-analyses), in addition to the few studies based on tax 
compliance behaviour.  
Beck and Ajzen (1991) applied TPB to determine the theory‟s ability to predict and 
explain dishonest actions by college students. The self-reports of behaviour used in the 
questionnaire include: cheating on a test; shoplifting; and lying to get out of assignments.  In 
the first step, the TRA was evaluated, and the results indicate that it performed well in 
explaining between 33 and 61 percent of the variance in intentions. Most of the predictive 
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accuracy can be attributed to attitudes towards the behaviour. The only exception here was 
with respect to the lying behaviour, in which subjective norms make a significant contribution 
to the prediction of behaviour. In the next step, the perceived behavioural control (PBC) 
construct was added to the research model, which resulted in a substantial and statistically 
significant improvement in predictions. The results demonstrated the TPB to be superior to 
the more limited TRA, indicating that intentions to perform dishonest behaviour are also 
strongly influenced by beliefs about the potential obstacles and opportunities present.  
In the second phase of the study, with the addition of perceived moral obligations, the TPB 
was moderately successful in predicting self-reports of actual behaviour. The addition of 
perceived moral obligation improved the model but only in the case of lying, while the further 
addition of past behaviour improved prediction of lying as well as shoplifting. Overall, 
cheating, shoplifting and lying intentions were found to be strongly related to attitudes, 
subjective norms and PBC. In turn, intentions and PBC were found to be good predictors of 
self-reported behaviours. The outcome provides significant support for the TPB in predicting 
dishonest behaviour.  
Conner et al. (2007) undertook two studies: one examining the power of the TPB to 
predict objectively assessed speeding offences (violation) across four different situations; and 
the other study, while taking a similar approach, employed a discrete measure of speeding 
behaviour on the road. The results of the two studies support previous research on driving 
behaviour based on the TPB. Attitudes, subjective norms, PBC, moral norms, anticipated 
regret and past behaviour predicted 76 percent of the variance in intentions to speed. 
Attitudes, moral norms, anticipated regret and past behaviour were consistent predictors of 
intentions across both studies. The role of attitudes in predicting speeding intention is 
consistent with a number of prior studies investigating speeding behaviour (for example, 
Parker et al., 1992). 
Buchan (2005) employed an extension of the TPB to examine the influence of personal, 
social and organisational factors on ethical intentions. The study investigated the effects of 
attitudes, subjective norms, PBC, moral sensitivity and the ethical climate of accounting 
professionals. The results of the survey reveal a significant direct relationship between 
attitudes and ethical intentions, but the effect of subjective norms on ethical intentions was 
inconclusive. Interestingly, the study found a significant relationship between attitudes and 
subjective norms, leading to a strong but indirect relationship between subjective norms and 
ethical intentions. The relationship between PBC and intentions was not evaluated due to the 
measurement scale not achieving the required level of reliability. The outcome of this study 
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therefore supports the applicability of the TRA (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), instead of the TPB 
(Ajzen, 1991), in predicting ethical intentions of public accounting professionals.
35
 Consistent 
with a number of studies, attitudes appear to have comparatively stronger explanatory power.  
Mayhew et al. (2009) employed Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) in an attempt to 
empirically validate the TPB as a model for predicting student cheating. The study examined 
the effects of attitudes, subjective norms and PBC, together with moral reasoning, on college 
students‟ cheating behaviour. Two samples were developed for the study, including a third 
sample which is the sum (total) of the two samples. The results for the total sample displayed 
a good model fit, and provided validation for the selection and application of the TPB for 
predicting student cheating. The addition of moral obligation and high school cheating 
constructs produced a stronger model fit, indicating the importance of including these 
additional constructs in the TPB.  
In terms of individual constructs (for the total sample), high school cheating, subjective 
norms and moral obligations achieved statistically significant effects on intentions. 
Surprisingly, attitudes failed to achieve any significant link with intentions. PBC, on the other 
hand, did not display any significant effect on intentions, but was significant on its effect on 
cheating behaviour. Intentions were also found to be significantly related to cheating 
behaviour. One of the sub-groups displayed similar results, while the second sub-group 
displayed a significant relationship between attitudes and intentions, but failed to support the 
relationship between PBC and either intentions or behaviour. Overall, the study demonstrated 
the viability of employing the TPB as a framework for understanding the psychological 
means that students use when deciding to cheat. Relating this outcome to a tax context, the 
results suggest that the TPB can be a useful framework for understanding the psychological 
processes that taxpayers employ when making tax reporting decisions.  
Armitage and Conner (1999) evaluated the predictive validity of the TPB, which was 
extended to include self-identity in the context of health-related food choice. A related area 
examined was the effect of certain biases associated with self-reports on the findings. In 
particular, the authors assessed the effects of questionnaire format (random versus structured) 
and social desirability bias. The evaluation of the TPB research model demonstrated that 
intention was the key in determining food choices (behaviour). In turn, attitudes and 
subjective norms (and self-identity) were independently good predictors of intention. Further, 
contrary to predictions, the study failed to observe any significant effect of PBC on intention 
                                                     
35 The TPB Model (Ajzen, 1991) comprises attitudes, subjective norms and PBC, whereas the TRA Model 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) comprises two components: attitudes and subjective norms.   
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or behaviour. The authors explained that this outcome may be due to the measures used, and 
argue that the PBC construct‟s influence may be significant if the indicators measuring PBC 
were divided into self-efficacy and perceived control over behaviour. The findings also 
demonstrated that the effects of questionnaire format and social desirability have no impact 
on the results, suggesting that these factors may not be as much of a problem as previously 
assumed. The study concluded that the behavioural models based on the TPB are robust 
predictors of food choice intentions and behaviour, which may also suggest that the TPB 
Models may also be robust predictors for other behaviours. 
Armitage and Conner‟s (2001) meta-analytic review using a database of 185 independent 
studies revealed that TPB accounted for 27 percent and 39 percent of the variance in 
behaviour and intention, respectively. PBC accounted for large amounts of variance in 
intention and behaviour, independent of the TRA. In studies where the behaviour was based 
on self-reported measures, intentions and PBC accounted for 31 percent of the variance in 
behaviour (across 44 tests), whereas intentions and PBC only accounted for 20 percent of the 
variance in behaviour (across 19 tests). The authors attribute the differences between self-
reported and objectively assessed behaviour to a number of factors, including self-
presentation biases. Subjective norms were found to be weak predictors of intention. The 
authors attribute this outcome to a combination of poor measurement and the way normative 
pressures were conceptualised. The authors further note that the results are consistent with 
past meta-analytic reviews,
36
 thus providing evidence that the TPB is a useful framework for 
predicting a wide range of behavioural intentions and behaviours.      
In an attempt to illustrate that the TPB provides a useful conceptual framework for 
addressing the complexities of social behaviour, Ajzen (1991) conducted a meta-analytic 
review of 16 studies testing the application of the TPB in a range of behaviours. These studies 
include measures of attitudes, subjective norms and PBC. The analysis displayed an average 
multiple correlation of .71 for attitudes, subjective norms and PBC, with intentions, and an 
average multiple correlation of .51 for prediction of behaviour from intention and PBC. The 
analyses further revealed that regression coefficients for PBC were significant for all studies 
reviewed, clearly indicating that the PBC construct is a reliable and significant independent 
predictor of behavioural intentions across a wide range of behaviours. Further, despite some 
limitations,
37
 the author concluded that the theory “incorporates some of the central concepts 
in the social and behavioural sciences, and it defines these concepts in a way that permits 
                                                     
36 Prior meta-analytic reviews include: Ajzen (1991); Godin and Kok (1996); and Hausenblas, et al. (1997). 
37 Armitage and Conner (2001) argued that this study is limited in scope and sampling. Firstly, the study was based 
upon a limited data set which included unpublished studies, and secondly, the analyses only considered the direct 
antecedents of intentions and behaviour (Armitage & Conner, 2001). 
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prediction and understanding of particular behaviours in specified contexts” (Ajzen, 1991, 
p.206). 
Another meta-analytic appraisal conducted by Godin and Kok (1996) provides evidence of 
PBC‟s contribution towards predicting intentions and behaviour. The review found that PBC 
contributed a mean additional 13 percent of variance to the prediction of intentions and 12 
percent to the prediction of behaviour, which indicate the predictive capability of the TPB. 
However, as noted by the authors, one of the limitations of this study is that the review only 
considered health-related behaviours which are considered to be less complex than tax 
compliance behaviour, or behaviours that are not under full volitional control. The outcome of 
this study would therefore have some limited application to tax compliance behaviour.   
Hausenblas et al. (1997) evaluated the efficacy of the TRA (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) and 
TPB (Ajzen, 1991) in explaining and predicting exercise behaviour, using the statistical 
procedures of meta-analysis. The results provide strong general support for the validity of the 
TRA and TPB. The results further indicate that, based on the magnitude of correlations 
between PBC, intentions and behaviour, TPB is found to be more useful than TRA in 
predicting and explaining exercise behaviour.  
A large number of studies have demonstrated the power of the TPB in predicting a wide 
range of behaviours (Armitage & Conner, 2001). Although the TPB has been widely applied 
across a range of behaviours, there have been very few applications in the tax compliance 
domain. This also suggests that whilst the TPB has been well validated in a range of 
behaviours, the theory has not been well validated in tax compliance research. However, there 
is no reason to assume that the same success of application in other behavioural domains will 
not apply to the tax domain, as demonstrated by the few studies applying the TPB to tax 
compliance behaviour presented in the following paragraphs. 
One of the earlier tax compliance studies, Hanno and Violette (1996), applied the TRA 
(the predecessor of the TPB) to explain tax compliance behaviour of compliers and non-
compliers. The results indicate that attitudes and norms were positively related to tax 
compliance intentions and behaviour. In terms of behavioural beliefs that motivate attitudes, 
the results suggest that those who did not intend to comply with their tax obligations were less 
concerned with civic or moral responsibilities. The outcome of this study illustrates the 
predictive power of the TRA in explaining tax compliance intentions and behaviour. 
Research conducted by Bobek and Hatfield (2003) found evidence consistent with the 
TPB‟s prediction of tax compliance behaviour. The authors developed a model based on the 
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TPB that includes: attitudes, subjective norms, PBC, and moral obligations. The developed 
model was tested with three specific tax compliance scenarios.
38
 Attitude and subjective 
norms were both positive and highly significant in all three scenarios. In contrast, PBC was 
found to be positive and highly significant for only the tip scenario, and marginally significant 
in the charitable contribution scenario.  
The findings also highlighted the important role of moral obligations in tax compliance 
behaviour. However, the study further revealed that high levels of moral obligation alone 
have no effect on eliminating cheating; it is when the opportunity to cheat is reduced that high 
levels of moral obligation reduce cheating. Overall, the authors conclude that the TPB is a 
suitable framework to consider variables that influence tax compliance behaviour.   
Efebera et al. (2004) developed and tested a predictive model of tax compliance behaviour 
based on the TPB. The study investigated the compliance intentions of low-income individual 
taxpayers, by examining the effects of perceived tax equity (attitudes), normative expectations 
(subjective norms) and legal sanctions (PBC) on tax compliance intentions.  Consistent with 
the TPB, their results indicate a significant positive relationship between compliance 
intentions and equity perceptions of the tax system, normative expectations and legal 
sanctions (or magnitude of penalties). The ability of the TPB to predict tax compliance 
intentions provides further support for the use of TPB in other tax compliance research.      
Trivedi et al. (2005) examined the application (or suitability) of the TPB on tax 
compliance behaviour. The key purpose of the study was to test the predictions of economic 
and psychological theories (underlying the TPB) on why taxpayers might comply or fail to 
comply. The key hypothesis tested the premise that tax compliance behaviour is determined 
by three factors: tax compliance intentions, perceived behavioural control, and ethics. Tax 
compliance intentions, in turn, are determined by four factors: attitudes, subjective norms, 
perceived behavioural control, and ethics. Two measures of intentions were used: intention to 
comply (compliant behaviour); and intention to overstate deductions (noncompliant 
behaviour). Attitudes displayed significant relationship with compliant and noncompliant 
behaviour, whereas subjective norms were significant for the compliant behaviour but not for 
the noncompliant behaviour. PBC, however, did not display any significant influence on 
either behaviour.  Nonetheless, overall, the results confirm the predictions of the TPB and 
highlight the important role of attitudes and intentions in tax compliance behaviour, over and 
above pure economic considerations. 
                                                     
38 They include: the home office scenario (involving a deduction which should not be allowed); the tip scenario 
(involving tips received but not reported as income); and the charitable contribution scenario (deducting a 
charitable contribution that was greater than US$250 without any supporting documentation).  
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Drawing upon the TPB, Bobek et al. (2007) examined the underlying reasons why 
taxpayers overpay their taxes which would result in a tax refund. The study also employed the 
belief elicitation process recommended by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) for identifying beliefs 
that taxpayers hold, with respect to lowering their withholding when faced with the possibility 
of a tax refund. Data collected from the online survey was analysed using SEM. The results 
suggest that taxpayers overpay because of their attitudes (a desire to avoid underpayment or 
uncertainty) and subjective norms (perceptions of friends‟ likely advice) influence their 
withholding decisions. The results were consistent with prior research, indicating the 
predictive ability of the TPB in tax compliance studies. It was also reported that the attitudes 
measure was twice as influential as their subjective norms in predicting withholding 
decisions. 
In a study conducted by Saad (2009; 2011),
39
 the TPB was used as the core theory to 
examine the effects of multiple dimensions of fairness, including tax knowledge and tax 
complexity, on individuals‟ behavioural intentions. The data was collected from a survey 
distributed to Malaysian and New Zealand taxpayers. The results from the SEM analysis with 
respect to the Malaysian taxpayers indicate that attitudes and subjective norms have 
significant effects on intentions (Saad, 2009). In contrast, the effect of PBC on intentions was 
inconclusive. The results for the New Zealand taxpayers displayed similar results and were 
reported in a separate publication (Saad, 2011). The findings from both groups of taxpayers 
demonstrated the applicability of the TPB in predicting and explaining tax compliance 
behaviour. 
Although the next study is not directly related to tax compliance behaviour, the study is 
nonetheless associated with tax compliance, in that it involves tax filing behaviour. TPB and 
the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) were employed to investigate the determinants 
influencing on-line tax filing behaviour (Lu et al., 2010). The results showed that attitude was 
the key factor affecting on-line tax filing behaviour. Attitude was also found to be affected by 
perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use, tax equity, social norm, and moral norm. The 
results indicate that on-line tax filing intention is determined by attitudes, subjective norms, 
and PBC, although attitude was found to have the strongest influence on individuals‟ on-line 
tax filing decisions. The study therefore supports the use of the TPB (together with TAM) in 
examining on-line tax filing behaviour.  
                                                     
39 The results of the study were reported in two parts (the first part was published in 2009 followed by the second 
part in 2011).  
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In summary, there is overwhelming evidence which clearly demonstrates the applicability 
of the TPB in predicting a wide range of behaviour. At the conceptual level, the TPB has been 
used in explaining a range of behaviours in a variety of contexts, without having to develop a 
separate set of assumptions about the applicability of these paradigms. Although the research 
evidence on the applicability of the TPB in predicting tax compliance behaviour is currently 
limited, it nonetheless provides sufficient support for the TPB‟s application in tax compliance 
research. Overall, the results of the empirical studies reviewed in this sub-section provide 
support for the use of the TPB in explaining the behavioural process of people engaged in tax 
reporting decisions.  
2.4 SANCTIONS (FORMAL AND INFORMAL) 
The classical tax compliance models (Economic Deterrence Models) predict that audit 
probability, detection probability, probability of punishment, and severity of punishment are 
some of the economic factors that influence tax compliance behaviour. For the purpose of this 
study, these economic constructs or variables will be referred to interchangeably as legal 
sanctions or formal sanctions. Studies in criminal behaviour generally indicate that the 
probability of apprehension is more important than the sanctions imposed (Tittle & Logan, 
1973; and Lempert, 1982). In a tax context, Andreoni et al. (1998) provide evidence that the 
subjectively perceived probability of legal sanctions is more important in influencing tax 
compliance behaviour, than the objective probability of legal sanctions. 
Later tax compliance models (Social Psychology and Fiscal Psychology Models) tend to 
predict that tax morale and other noneconomic variables are better predictors of tax 
compliance behaviour. Alm (1991, p.584) states that “some individuals pay taxes because 
they believe that cheating is wrong.” This suggests that informal sanctions (or non-legal 
sanctions) have an influence on an individual‟s compliance behaviour, rather than attributing 
compliance to the deterrent effects of economic sanctions. A number of researchers have 
suggested that the inhibiting effects of economic variables are smaller than the effects from 
tax morale, highlighting the importance of informal sanctions in compliance behaviour (Alm, 
1991; Wenzel, 2004; Kirchler, 2007; and Torgler, 2007). Erard and Feinstein (1994) contend 
that noneconomic variables (in this case moral sentiments) will provide a more reasonable 
explanation of actual compliance behaviour, thus providing support that informal sanctions 
are equally effective in influencing compliance behaviour.  
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2.4.1 Formal Sanctions (Legal Sanctions) 
The measures assessing legal sanctions are structured around three issues that have 
dominated the tax compliance literature, and are grounded in economic theory: probability or 
certainty of detection; probability or certainty of punishment; and severity of punishments. 
While probability of detection and probability of punishment may seem to overlap to a 
degree, they are in fact quite distinct from each other. Probability of detection refers to the 
perception of the level of certainty a person holds that his or her noncompliant behaviour will 
be discovered, while certainty of punishment refers to the perception that the detection will 
result in a monetary fine.
40
  These economic elements are predicted to increase the expected 
cost of engaging in noncompliant behaviour. Accordingly, much of the literature assumes that 
legal sanctions increase compliance behaviour. 
Research conducted by Christensen and Hite (1997) provides evidence that a taxpayer‟s 
perceptions of the likelihood of an audit, the likelihood an error would be detected, and the 
severity of the penalty imposed for the error, are likely to influence the taxpayers‟ tax 
reporting decisions. The study further found that these perceptions were all significantly 
greater for underreported income than for overstated deductions. 
Witte and Woodbury (1985) empirically tested Deterrence Theory on Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) data, and the results showed that increased audit rates and more severe penalties 
are positively related to increased compliance. This is consistent with Deterrence Theory. The 
probability of sanctions, on the other hand, was not significant. This view is supported by the 
results of another empirical study which also used IRS data (Dubin, 2012). Dubin‟s (2012) 
study found that noncompliance increased over the last thirty or forty years as a result of a 
decline in IRS tax enforcement, and in particular the limited audit activities. This clearly 
suggests that enforcement based on legal sanctions could effectively increase tax compliance. 
In contrast, Webley et al (1991) found only limited evidence to suggest that increased 
penalties will lead to increased compliance. By way of an explanation, Klepper and Nagin 
(1989) argue that in some instances even low levels of penalties can be considered to be 
severe. The severity of penalties may depend on an individual taxpayer‟s financial 
circumstances. A low penalty may be considered too severe for one taxpayer while another 
taxpayer may not have any difficulty with the same amount of penalty.  
                                                     
40 Under the old Penal System of penalties in New Zealand, penal tax was seldom imposed for detected 
underreporting unless culpability was strongly evident, which in most cases would be problematic. Under the new 
Compliance and Penalties Regime in New Zealand, all shortfalls are initially penalised, and then abated by any 
applicable provisions, thereby providing comparatively more certainty with respect to punishment (monetary 
fines).   
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Research undertaken by Spicer and Lundstedt (1976) investigated the relationship between 
perceived severity of sanction and probability of detection and its effect on tax evasion. The 
study did not find any significant relationship between perceived severity of sanctions and tax 
resistance, nor between probability of detection and evasion.  
Carnes and Englebrecht (1995) tested the influence of detection risk, increased magnitude 
of penalties, and income visibility on tax compliance behaviour. The magnitude of penalties 
and the perceived detection risk were found to be significantly related to compliance. The 
study also found that low levels of penalties are capable of influencing compliance behaviour, 
which suggests that even small increases in penalty levels could result in a significant 
increase in the compliance level.   
Jackson and Milliron‟s (1986) review of the effects of the probability of detection on 
taxpayer compliance found that most of the studies reviewed indicate that noncompliant 
behaviour is associated with lower perceived detection probability. Their review also found 
that noncompliant taxpayers tend to perceive their chances of being detected as being lower 
than compliant taxpayers. Song and Yarbrough‟s (1978) analysis included attitudes as the tax 
evasion measure (rather than measuring actual behaviour), due to doubts about whether 
respondents will truthfully report their own tax evasion behaviour. Their study revealed that 
the probability and subsequent fear of detection by the tax authority were key factors 
influencing tax compliance behaviour. 
Mason and Calvin (1978) discovered a significant relationship between perceived 
detection probability and compliance. They suggest that noncompliers tend to perceive a 
lower probability of detection than others, while generally most people tend to overestimate 
the probability of detection. Sheffrin and Triest‟s (1992) study established that those who 
perceive a higher probability of detection are more likely to report significantly less evasion.   
Research carried out by Schauer and Bajor (2007) provides evidence supporting the 
relationship between detection risk and its associated penalties, and taxpayer compliance. 
However, the results also suggest that the magnitude of the effect of detection risk may not be 
very important, on the basis that a significant portion of the population question the tax 
authority‟s ability to detect tax underreporting. The study further found evidence suggesting 
that compliance is influenced more by the moral values of the taxpayer and the role (s)he 
plays in society, and his or her view of the government, than the effect of detection risk.   
Warneryd and Walerud (1982), using interview data, failed to observe any significant 
relationship between perceived probability of detection and tax evasion. The results, however, 
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indicated a significant relationship between perceived probability of detection and attitudes 
towards tax resistance (attitudes towards noncompliant behaviour).  
A review of the experimental research by Fischer et al. (1992) illustrated the 
inconsistencies of the reported findings. A number of studies reviewed failed to observe any 
significant positive relationship between the probability of detection and tax compliance 
behaviour (for example, Friedland et al., 1978; and Spicer & Thomas, 1982). Among studies 
reviewed that compared the relative effectiveness of increased probability of detection with 
monetary fines, three studies provided weak evidence that fines are more effective than 
detection probability (Friedland et al., 1978; Jackson & Jones, 1985; and Chang et al., 1987), 
with one study (Friedland, 1982) indicating detection probability to be more influential in 
increasing compliance than increased monetary fines.  
Fjeldstad and Semboja (2001) found that compliance is positively related to perceived 
probability of being prosecuted (including the number of tax evaders known personally to the 
participants) and the ability to pay. Severity of sanctions, which was also examined in this 
study, appears to lead to more resistance towards paying tax.  
 Varma and Doob (1998) explored the utility of Deterrence Theory by examining survey 
data in order to determine the effect of sanctions on tax evasion. The findings from their study 
indicate that perceived penalties are not as important to decisions about evading as are 
perceptions of the possibility of being apprehended (or caught) for the noncompliant act. The 
study suggests that strategies of deterrence based upon penalty size may not be effective if 
taxpayers perceive there is no risk of being apprehended; therefore, harsher penalties will not 
deter people from evading taxes.   
Punishments can refer to anything from formal warnings to imprisonment. In Economic 
Deterrence Models, penalties are assumed to deter undesired behaviour, such as tax 
noncompliance (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972). In the current study punishment refers to 
monetary fines imposed on a range of noncompliant behaviour. 
The pioneering experimental work of Friedland et al. (1978) used variables such as 
punishment rate, audit probability, and tax rates to determine compliance level. The results 
show that higher punishment rates seem to be more efficient in limiting evasion than higher 
audit rates. In contrast, a follow-up experiment did not find the effect of punishment or fines 
to be more influential than the effect of audit rates on compliance behaviour (Friedland, 
1982). Two decades later Park and Hyun (2003) undertook a similar study. Consistent with 
the findings of Friedland et al. (1978), the results of this study found that compliance 
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increased both with an increase in audit rate and increased fines. However, elasticity of fines 
was much higher than the elasticity of audit rates.    
In another experiment, Webley et al. (1991) investigated the effects of severity of fines 
and audit rates on compliance. Severity of fines had no effect on the frequency of income 
underreported, although the frequency of underreported income was higher when the audit 
probability was low. In terms of the mean percentage of income not declared, both audit 
probability and severity of fines had some influence on compliance. In contrast to Friedland et 
al.‟s (1978) experiment (which found penalties to be more effective than audit rates), Webley 
et al.‟s (1991) study found the audit effects to be more influential than the effects of penalties 
or fines. Alm et al. (1995) conducted an experiment to investigate the impact of fines and 
audit rates on compliance behaviour. Consistent with prior experiments, their study found fine 
rates together with audit rates to significantly influence tax compliance behaviour. Further, 
the results also indicate fine rates to be more effective than audit rates in influencing 
compliance.  
Whilst the main purpose of the experimental research by Maciejovsky et al. (2001) was to 
investigate whether traders on an experimental asset market form different and separate 
mental accounts for sales revenues and dividend earnings, the secondary objective of the 
study was to investigate the effect of an increase in tax penalty as well as an increase in audit 
rates on tax compliance. The results establish tax penalties to be positively related to tax 
compliance behaviour. The results further suggest that the higher the tax penalty and the audit 
frequency, the higher the relative frequency of declared income.  
Jackson and Milliron‟s (1986) comprehensive review of literature found the influence of 
severity of punishment on tax compliance level to be inconclusive. Another comprehensive 
review carried out over a decade later found that despite numerous findings providing 
evidence of positive relationships between the threat of penalties and tax compliance 
behaviour, a significant number of studies continued to observe no relationship between these 
two variables (Richardson and Sawyer, 2001).  
Some taxpayer surveys found no significant relationship between tax penalties and 
taxpayer compliance (for example, Spicer & Lundstedt, 1976; Mason & Calvin, 1984; Brooks 
& Doob, 1990; Collins et al., 1992; and Hasseldine et al., 1994). Other studies found 
increased compliance as penalties increased (De Juan et al., 1994; and Carnes & Englebrecht, 
1995), but this applied only for certain groups of taxpayers (Schwartz & Orleans, 1967; and 
Witte & Woodbury, 1985). In contrast, results from other survey studies displayed a negative 
link between penalties and tax compliance, that is, the level of compliance decreased as the 
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perception of penalties increased (Grasmick & Green, 1980; Richards & Tittle, 1981; and 
Devos, 2009).  
In a study that compared economic with noneconomic factors, Schwartz and Orleans 
(1967) examined the influence of the threat of penalties and moral appeals. The results clearly 
demonstrate that moral appeals have a significant effect on compliance, and are more 
effective than threats of penalties. This outcome highlights the importance of noneconomic 
variables in tax compliance research. 
A study by Van Prooijen et al. (2008) incorporated procedural fairness elements into the 
sanctions variables. Whilst the study found the effectiveness of sanctions are contingent upon 
the presence of procedural fairness, the results also suggest that the type of sanction system is 
an important determinant, of whether people will comply with the authority‟s decisions. They 
argue that severity of the sanction upon getting caught is an important variable that defines 
differences between sanction systems. This is consistent with Procedural Justice Theory (PJT) 
(Tyler, 2010), which contends that taxpayers will accept the fines imposed through a system 
that was perceived to be procedurally fair. 
2.4.2 Informal Sanctions (Non-Legal Sanctions) 
To address the criticism levelled at the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) Model, several 
researchers have argued that tax morale, which is seen as the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes, 
could play a part in explaining the high degree of tax compliance (Schwartz & Orleans, 1967; 
Lewis, 1982; Roth et al., 1989; Pommerehne et al., 1994; Frey, 1997; Frey & Feld, 2002; Feld 
& Tyran, 2002; Frey & Torgler, 2002; and Frey, 2003). Although the importance of tax 
morale has been highlighted in literature, the concept of tax morale has not been explicitly 
defined and operationalised, and measures used in empirical work are rather varied (Kirchler, 
2007). This view is supported by Feld and Frey (2002) who observed that most studies treat 
tax morale as a black box, and these studies have failed to discuss the concept of tax morale 
or how tax morale may arise. Kirchler (2007) is often critical of studies which group 
unknown influences on tax evasion under the concept of tax morale.   
One of the earlier studies of tax morale is by Schmölders (1959), which used the 
subjective tax burden as an indicator of the level of tax morale, and found that self-employed 
people had lower tax morale than employees. Tax morale was analysed together with the tax 
system, which revealed that treating taxpayers with care helps to cultivate tax morale and 
reduce tax compliance costs (Strümpel, 1969). However, it was only in the last decade that an 
increase in interest in tax morale emerged (Torgler, 2007). This is partly triggered by the need 
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to find out why people pay their taxes although fines and the probability of an audit are low. 
The results of an experimental study conducted by Alm et al. (1992) reveal that the 
economics-of-crime approach does not necessarily explain taxpayer compliance. Their study 
found a diversity of compliance behaviour, and a range of reasons why some comply while 
others do not. Compliance seems to exist even when there is no possibility of detection, and 
conversely, some evasion exists when the expected value of the evasion gamble is negative. 
Erard and Feinstein (1994) suggested adding moral sentiments into the tax compliance 
models to provide a reasonable explanation of actual compliance behaviour.  Andreoni et al. 
(1998, p.852) caution that adding moral and social dynamics to tax compliance models is “as 
yet a largely undeveloped area of research.”   
In one of the earliest comprehensive reviews of tax literature, moral principles or values 
(also referred to as tax ethics) about tax compliance were found to be relatively weak 
(Jackson and Milliron, 1986). The review found taxpayers were generally uncertain about 
whether tax cheating, especially if it involves small amounts, is morally wrong.   
In a study regarded by many as the seminal work in this field, Schwartz and Orleans 
(1967) applied an experimental design to examine the taxpaying behaviour of upper and 
middle income earners. The study compared the effects of appeal to moral conscience and an 
increased threat of legal sanction on compliance behaviour. While both mechanisms 
improved compliance, appeal to conscience (or tax morale) proved more effective than legal 
threat. This is perhaps the earliest evidences of the importance of noneconomic variables in 
tax compliance research. 
In studies grounded in the TPB, Beck and Ajzen (1991) and Trivedi et al. (2005) 
empirically tested the predictive power of moral obligations. Beck and Ajzen (1991) found 
the addition of moral obligations into their research model increased the predictive power of 
their research model. Additionally, moral obligations and attitude were found to be 
significantly correlated. Trivedi et al. (2005) tested the relationship between ethics (grounded 
in the Theory of Moral Reasoning (TMR)),
41
 and behavioural intentions and behaviour. 
However, no significant effects were observed for both of the relationships (that is, the link 
between ethics and behavioural intentions, and between ethics and behaviour). Interestingly, 
the outcome seems to suggest that moral values have no effect on taxpayers‟ intentions to 
comply (or not comply), nor on tax compliance behaviour.  
                                                     
41 Kohlberg, L. (1969) Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Development Approach to Socialization. In D. Goslin. 
(eds.), Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research, (pp. 345-480). Chicago: Rand McNally.  
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Studies by Roberts (1994) and Hite (1997) examined the influence of moral appeal 
messages on tax compliance behaviour. Both studies demonstrated the effectiveness of moral 
appeals in increasing tax compliance. Trivedi et al.‟s (2003) study explained why Canadians 
and Americans comply with their tax obligations despite low audit and penalty rates. The 
study demonstrated that tax compliance is a complex decision, influenced not only by 
economic considerations but equally influenced by a number of personal conditions, such as 
moral reasoning. Hasseldine and Kaplan (1992) measured respondents‟ hypothetical tax 
evasion behaviour after exposing them to some moral appeals messages. Although subjects 
exposed to the moral messages believed tax evasion was immoral, the results indicate that the 
relationship between tax compliance and moral appeals was inconclusive. McGraw and 
Scholz (1991) examined the effect of moral messages on attitudes and compliance behaviour 
and found mixed results. Although the messages had an impact on tax-specific attitudes, it did 
not display any direct effect on compliance levels. A number of later studies on the effect of 
moral persuasion on tax compliance behaviour did not achieve any significant results (for 
example, Hasseldine et al., 2007). Weck (1983, quoted in Torgler, 2007), on the other hand, 
found a negative correlation between tax morale and the size of the shadow economy (which 
also reflects noncompliant activities). 
Richardson (2006) examined data from 45 countries to determine the effects of a number 
of key determinants of tax compliance identified by Jackson and Milliron (1986). The results 
indicate that noneconomic determinants exert the strongest impact on tax evasion in 
comparison with economic determinants. Although complexity was found to be the most 
important determinants, tax morale (or moral values) was also found to be significant across 
the 45 countries. Tax morale was defined as “the moral principles or values individuals hold 
about paying taxes” (Torgler & Murphy, 2004, p. 301, quoted in Richardson, 2006). 
Feelings of guilt, also referred to as tax morale, may influence taxpayers‟ reporting 
behaviour and reduce the perceived benefits of cheating (Torgler, 2007). Lewis (1971) adds 
that individuals experience feelings of guilt when they realise that they have acted 
irresponsibly and in violation of a rule or social norm that they have internalised. If the 
obligation of complying with an individual‟s tax obligations is an accepted social norm, 
individuals who decide not to comply may feel guilty as a result (Torgler, 2007). A study by 
Aitken and Bonneville (1980) found that more than half of the respondents surveyed agreed 
that their consciences would be affected if they engaged in noncompliant behaviour. 
Data from a survey conducted by Grasmick and Scott (1982) indicated that approximately 
one quarter of the sample had engaged in noncompliant behaviour, while a third indicated 
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intentions to not comply in the future. The study found that whilst the relationship between 
the threat of legal punishment (detection probability) and intentions to evade taxes in future 
were statistically significant, anticipated feelings of guilt and social stigma related to the 
noncompliant behaviour were more strongly related to deterrence. The study also provided 
evidence that feelings of guilt can be a powerful form of self-sanctioning. 
A later study by Grasmick and Bursik (1990) provided evidence supporting the effects of 
feelings of guilt and shame in tax compliance decisions. The findings from these studies 
suggest that taxpayers who experience guilt feelings towards tax evasion tend to be more 
compliant. The findings also illustrate that guilt is associated with committing tax evasion, 
and acts as a stronger deterrent than the perceived threat of legal sanctions. This follows that 
when people engage in noncompliant behaviour, they are more likely to feel a sense of shame 
and guilt (self-imposed), which prevents further noncompliant behaviour. A similar outcome 
was found by Stalans et al. (1989). Their study discovered that taxpayers‟ perceived 
likelihood of feeling guilty was the largest predictor of future intentions, although further 
analysis found taxpayers with high structural opportunity to cheat were less likely to feel 
guilty if they engage in tax cheating compared to taxpayers with lower structural 
opportunities. In contrast, Thurman‟s (1991) study yielded inconclusive results. The study 
examined the effects of guilt feelings on tax compliance behaviour, but failed to observe any 
significant effect. 
Kinsey (1992) added a guilt variable measured as „the likelihood the respondent would 
feel guilty if he or she underreported income or overstated deduction‟. The guilt variable was 
found to have a significant effect on the likelihood of future cheating. Erard and Feinstein 
(1994) introduced measures of shame and guilt into their study, which are supposed to reduce 
peoples‟ perceived gains from not complying. The premise is that taxpayers feel guilty when 
they underreport and the underreporting was not detected, and also feel ashamed when they 
get caught for underreporting. Bobek and Hatfield (2003) examined the effect of guilt feelings 
within the TPB framework. Beliefs about feeling guilty (together with engaging in illegal 
behaviour) were consistently related to compliance intentions across the three scenarios used 
for the study. 
Tax morale is also linked to the concept of civic duty (Orviska & Hudson, 2002). Civic 
duty relates to individuals‟ motivation to comply, based on a sense of responsibility and 
loyalty to the nation or society, and not simply based on the need to maximise their own self-
interest. This follows that an individual with a strong sense of civic duty will tend to be 
compliant and will co-operate with the authority, even when the system provides 
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opportunities for noncompliance. Taxpayers with high levels of civic duty are therefore not 
regulated by external factors such as audits and sanctions, but by internal factors, such as their 
concern for society. Therefore willingness to comply can be attributed to a strong sense of 
civic duty.  
Empirical findings from Scholz and Pinney (1995) demonstrate that taxpayers‟ sense of 
duty to comply with their tax obligations significantly influences the perceived probability 
and risk of being caught for cheating.  The findings suggest that the subjective risk of getting 
caught is more closely associated with a sense of duty than with objective risk factors.  
Interestingly, duty and fear were found to significantly increase when taxes decrease, and 
decrease when taxes increase (Scholz & Lubell, 1998).  This suggests that a person‟s “attitude 
towards compliance with a collective obligation and his or her fear of retribution varies 
according to changes in costs or benefits associated with the collective” (Torgler, 2007, 
p. 69).  
A survey carried out by Orviska and Hudson (2002) empirically examined attitudes 
towards tax evasion. The analysis of the survey data suggests that evasion is condoned by a 
large proportion of the population. The results also indicate that the consequences of being 
caught appear to deter some from not complying. Evidence is also provided which highlights 
the importance of civic duty and „law abidance‟ in deterring tax evasion.   
In summary, conceptually, both the formal and informal sanctions approaches have been 
used in prior research to explain tax compliance behaviour in various situations, based on the 
deterrence assumptions. The deterrence doctrine is based on Perceptual Theory (that is, 
perception). Whether the threat of punishment deters depends not on the certainty, or severity 
of punishment in any objective sense, but on the potential offender‟s perception of these 
deterrent factors (Gibbs, 1986). Similarly, the threat of being punished for violating normative 
rules (personal, social and societal norms) or tax morale depends on the perception of the 
punishment imposed if the individual does not conform to personal, important referents‟, or 
society‟s expectations, or norms. The experience of being deterred from evasion is real but 
private, that is, it is known only to the taxpayer, and is not observable or known to others 
(unlike a traffic offence which is highly visible).
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 Under the naming and shaming principle, 
the New Zealand and Australian tax authorities previously provided for the publication of 
names for certain tax offenders; however, these provisions have since been repealed.  
                                                     
42 Tax noncompliance behaviour is not observable and penalties imposed (monetary and non-monetary) are only 
known to the taxpayer who was penalised, and therefore these activities remain private (unless the case was 
litigated through the courts). 
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Consistent with other studies (for example, Alm et al., 1995), the current literature 
demonstrates that the economic variables do not go very far in explaining tax compliance 
behaviour. Instead, psychological factors appear to offer some promising areas for future 
research on compliance behaviour. While the empirical research is inconclusive, it does 
appear to support the hypothesis that noneconomic variables, or tax morale such as feelings of 
guilt, sense of civic duty, and moral values are emerging as important determinants of tax 
compliance behaviour. However, it is still obvious that deterrence based on both formal and 
informal sanctions is equally important for any successful strategy to encourage and manage a 
high level of compliance from taxpayers.  
2.5 PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
The PJT concept refers to people‟s perception or evaluation of whether the procedures and 
the enactment of procedures by authorities when making decisions are fair (Thibaut & 
Walker, 1975; Leventhal, 1980; Lind & Tyler, 1988; and Tyler, 2010).  
Although PJT was developed in the 1970s, it was not used in the tax compliance domain 
until the late 1980s. McGraw (1989) was the first researcher to apply PJT to examine tax 
compliance behaviour. The survey examined taxpayers‟ perceptions of procedural justice, 
with regard to the treatment and services received from the IRS. The study found significant 
correlation between perceptions of procedural justice and evaluation of the performance of 
the IRS. Although McGraw‟s (1989) study did not examine any direct effects of procedural 
justice on tax compliance behaviour, the study demonstrated that procedural justice concerns 
are also important in tax compliance research.   
Another study predicted that taxpayers would respond to positive treatments by becoming 
more compliant (Smith, 1992). Although no direct relationship was found between procedural 
fairness and tax compliance behaviour, the findings support the prediction that reciprocity is 
related to taxpayers‟ perceptions of procedural justice, which in turn is found to be 
significantly related to taxpayers‟ acceptance of noncompliance. That is, an increase (or 
decline) in perceived procedural fairness of the IRS results in noncompliance becoming more 
unacceptable (acceptable), which supports the premises of the PJT.  
Wenzel (2002a) used survey data to examine the influence of justice perceptions (based on 
PJT) and self-interest (based on Distributive Justice Theory) on self-reported tax compliance. 
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The Self-Categorisation Theory (SCT)
43
 (which complements the group-value approach
44
 to 
PJT), contends that taxpayers are more concerned about justice and less about personal 
outcomes when they identify strongly with the nation within which the procedures and 
distributions apply. Consistent with the PJT (and SCT), the survey results demonstrate that 
respondents who identify themselves as Australians and experience fair and respectful 
treatment from the Australian Tax Office (ATO) tend to be more concerned about procedural 
justice and less about their own personal outcomes. However, this effect was displayed for 
only two out of the four forms of tax compliance used for this study.  
A further study by Wenzel (2002b) explored the effectiveness of procedural fairness on 
taxpayers‟ filing obligations. All subjects in the study had failed to file their tax returns within 
the required timeframe, and therefore, for the purposes of the study were deemed to be non-
compliers. Three different types of reminder letters were issued on subsequent lodgement 
compliance. The first letter was the tax authority‟s standard letter, whereas the other two 
incorporated aspects of procedural fairness, which included: consideration and respect; and 
information about respondents‟ obligations and justification for the tax authority to pursue 
them to file their returns. The results indicate an increase in filing compliance from taxpayers 
who received reminder letters based on procedural fairness, as compared to those who 
received the standard reminder letter.  
A number of studies found that sanctions or punishments applied without ensuring the 
process is procedurally fair can undermine the regulator‟s (or tax authority‟s) legitimacy, 
resulting in resistance towards the regulator leading to noncompliance. In Murphy‟s (2003a) 
study, data was collected from the general taxpayers and tax scheme investors. Results found 
that the wide-spread resistance by scheme investors was attributed to how the ATO dealt with 
the schemes issue. Those who invested were: more disillusioned with the tax system; more 
hostile and resistant towards the ATO; and more likely to resent paying tax as a result. This 
could be attributed to the investors‟ perception that the procedures used to handle the situation 
were unfair, which in turn may have resulted in the negative attitude towards the tax 
authority. The results of the study suggest that procedural justice is an important factor in the 
perceived legitimacy of the tax authority, which in turn will positively influence taxpayers‟ 
attitudes towards the tax authority and tax compliance, and ultimately influence their tax 
reporting behaviour.  
                                                     
43 Self-Categorisation approach assumes that distributive justice involves categorisation processes on various 
levels of abstraction. Central to this is the inclusive category of all those considered potential recipients of the 
distribution (Wenzel, 2002a, p. 631). 
44 Group-Value Model contends that the degree of identification with a group shapes the degree to which 
individuals develop supportive attitudes, values, and consequently behaviour (Hartner et al., 2008, p.140). 
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In a further study, using data from in-depth interviews with 29 investors of the mass-
marketed schemes, Murphy (2003b) explored the investors‟ perceptions of the way the ATO 
handled the mass-marketed tax effective schemes, and the reasons why the majority of 
investors resisted the ATO‟s demands that the investors pay back taxes. The findings reveal 
that the reason many of the investors defied the ATO‟s demands was because of the perceived 
unfair procedures adopted by the tax authority in addressing the tax situation. This study 
clearly demonstrates that the use of enforcement strategies (such as sanctions and 
punishments) to achieve compliance can weaken the tax authority‟s legitimacy if it is 
perceived to be procedurally unfair.   
Using longitudinal survey data, Murphy (2005) examined the ATO‟s approach in 
regulating and punishing taxpayers involved in aggressive tax planning, and its effects on the 
long term voluntary compliance behaviour of the tax offenders. The aim was to empirically 
explore whether procedural justice and legitimacy influence future cooperation and 
compliance. Subjects were participants of Australian mass-marketed tax schemes, who had 
been accused by the ATO of aggressive tax planning.
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 Overall, the results indicate that 
taxpayers‟ perceptions about their treatment by the ATO appear to influence their views about 
the legitimacy of the tax authority, followed by their judgments about gain or loss. The 
findings provide general support for the PJT (Tyler, 1997) in that perceptions of procedural 
justice influence views about legitimacy more than judgments about gain and loss. The results 
also indicate that legitimacy views can affect attitudes towards compliance, as well as 
compliance behaviour, more than judgments about gain and loss.   
Perceptions of procedural injustice can also create disputes and resistance between 
authorities and regulatees. Murphy (2004) found that during disputes with the tax authority, 
taxpayers who perceived that the tax authority had handled their cases in a procedurally unfair 
manner were more likely to increase their resistance, compared to other taxpayers. Murphy 
(2004) also found that these perceptions seem to overshadow the influence of the economic 
self-interest factors. The findings demonstrated that the use of threats and legal coercions as 
regulatory tools are ineffective in encouraging compliance. Murphy (2004) suggests that if 
regulators are seen to be acting fairly, regulatees will defer to the regulators‟ decisions 
voluntarily. 
                                                     
45 Many taxpayers not involved in the scheme felt that the situation was handled in a procedurally unfair manner 
by the ATO (Murphy, 2005). 
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Van Dijke and Verboon (2010) examined the effect of procedural fairness of the tax office 
on voluntary tax compliance.
46
 Their study also explored the moderating effect of trust in 
authorities on procedural fairness. Whilst the results did not reveal any direct relationship 
between procedural fairness of the tax office and tax compliance behaviour, the results, 
nonetheless, demonstrated that general trust in the tax authority has to be present, and it is this 
trust which then determines the effectiveness of the fair enactment of procedures of the tax 
office.  
One of the few studies that failed to find an increase in tax noncompliant behaviour, when 
taxpayers were subjected to procedural injustice in relation to the tax authority, was that of 
Worsham (1996). This study, based on an experimental design, examined the effect of the 
accuracy and consistency rules on tax compliance, and found that the procedural injustice 
experienced personally did not lead to increased noncompliance. In contrast, knowledge of 
procedural injustice of the treatment experienced by others resulted in increased self-reported 
noncompliant behaviour.  
Porcano‟s (1988) research also did not find any significant relationship between 
procedural justice and intentions to comply. The study operationalised procedural justice as 
having some involvement in formulating tax law and in enforcement procedures applied by 
the tax authorities. While procedural fairness was not significantly related to future intentions 
(to comply or not to comply), procedural fairness was found to be significant for past 
behaviour. This may perhaps suggest that past noncompliant taxpayers may use procedural 
injustice to rationalise their noncompliant behaviour, or as suggested by Kirchler (2007), the 
outcome could be attributed to the possible effect of the additional variables examined by 
Porcano (1988) on the self-reported tax evasion.   
The study by Braithwaite et al. (1994) examined the effects of poor treatment of nursing 
home managers by authorities. Inspectors visited the nursing homes over a 20-month period 
to determine whether or not the managers complied with certain nursing home standards. The 
study found that the compliance level of the managers who were treated with trust and respect 
appeared to improve in the two years following the initial inspection. Although this study 
does not relate to tax compliance behaviour, it nonetheless demonstrates the role of 
procedural justice in regulating general compliance behaviour.   
In other studies, aspects of procedural justice were also found to influence compliance 
intentions (for example, Kirchler et al., 2006). In this study procedural justice refers to 
                                                     
46 The study was conducted in the Netherlands and therefore the study was based on the perceived procedural 
fairness of the Dutch tax office.   
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perceived supportiveness of advice by tax officers which they found correlated with self-
reported compliance, which in turn influenced compliance behaviour. Some studies illustrated 
the indirect effect of procedural fairness on tax compliance behaviour. For example, Murphy 
(2003c) found procedural injustice to indirectly influence tax noncompliance, through the 
mediating effects of shame displacement and disengagement. Although Murphy (2003c) does 
not advocate abandoning the use of sanctions and penalties, recommendations were made for 
the use of a regulatory strategy based on mutual respect and cooperation together with the 
threat of punishment. 
In summary, tax compliance research based on aspects of procedural justice is still 
relatively in its infancy (Franzoni, 2000).
47
 The few tax studies based on PJT have identified 
procedural justice or fairness as important factors in the tax authority‟s relationship with the 
taxpayers. The literature also seems to suggest that taxpayers are more concerned about being 
treated fairly by the authority, rather than what they do or do not receive from the authority. It 
is therefore clear that the fair procedures and processes will secure legitimacy for the tax 
authority, which will lead to taxpayers being willing to accept the tax authority‟s rules and 
decisions (Tyler, 2010). Overall, the literature review on studies applying PJT 
overwhelmingly demonstrate that procedural fairness is an important element in an 
individual‟s attitude towards tax compliance and also plays an important role in an 
individual‟s tax compliance behaviour.   
2.6 SOCIETAL NORM (OTHERS’ TAX COMPLIANCE BEHAVIOUR) 
For the purpose of this research societal norms refer to injunctive norms; that is, normative 
prescriptions regarding tax compliance (or the normative acceptability of noncompliance), 
and perceptions of what other people believe is appropriate or inappropriate (Cialdini et al., 
1991). The premise is that perceived prevalence of tax noncompliance among a reference 
group could influence individuals‟ taxpaying behaviour. 
One of the earlier studies to examine societal norms was a Swedish study by Vogel (1974). 
The study attempted to find out the reasons why people evade taxes. Approximately 74 
percent of respondents who admitted to past noncompliance agreed with the statement “since 
tax fraud is so common one cannot be blamed for evading taxes” (Vogel, 1974, p.505). The 
findings indicate that one of the reasons why people do not comply with their tax obligations 
is because of their perception that tax cheating is common, and therefore believe that the 
                                                     
47 The literature review undertaken for this study found a dearth of tax compliance studies grounded in procedural 
justice theory, leading to the assumption that there has not been much progress in this area. 
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majority of taxpayers are noncompliant. This perception allows taxpayers to rationalise their 
own noncompliant behaviour.
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Findings from Song and Yarbrough‟s (1978) survey reveal that perceptions of others‟ 
honesty were directly related to taxpayers‟ ethics (which in turn influenced tax compliance 
behaviour). The study found that 74 percent of people felt that some or most taxpayers 
intentionally over-claim deductions. Furthermore, 64 percent of respondents believed that 
some or most people do not fully report all their taxable income. The findings indicate that tax 
evasion by individuals is influenced by a person‟s perception of the tax evasion of others.   
Kinsey (1984) reviewed seven studies which examined the relationship between reported 
noncompliance and knowledge of others not complying with their tax obligations. The 
findings across all seven studies indicate that noncompliant taxpayers have knowledge of 
others who evade taxes. In some cases, Kinsey found evidence of networks of noncompliant 
taxpayers. The findings suggest that the knowledge that others do not comply may result in 
the perception of noncompliance being the norm. This may lead to increased noncompliance.    
Thurman et al. (1984) maintain that perceptions of prevalence of tax cheating in the 
community may lead compliant taxpayers to question their own continued compliance. Their 
study provides evidence that individuals will use their perceptions about the prevalence of 
noncompliance by the general public to justify their own future noncompliance. This is 
achieved by reducing the guilt feelings associated with tax noncompliance by adopting a 
neutralisation strategy.
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A review of tax compliance literature carried out by Sheffrin and Triest (1992) provides 
further support to the relationship between the perceived prevalence of tax noncompliance 
and noncompliant behaviour. A number of studies reviewed demonstrated that if taxpayers 
perceive higher noncompliance by others, their own noncompliance will be higher too. This is 
because any guilt or stigma arising from the noncompliant behaviour is reduced or mitigated, 
when a large number of other taxpayers are perceived to not comply with their tax 
obligations. 
Kaplan and Reckers (1985) included a further factor in their study of societal norms, 
which was the taxpaying behaviour of taxpayers with high moral character. The study 
examined the effect of tax noncompliant behaviour by people who were considered to have 
                                                     
48 This rationalisation behaviour is explained by Neutralisation Theory (refer to, Richardson & Sawyer, 2001). 
49 Neutralisation Theory predicts that guilt feelings can be minimised by neutralisation strategies which allow the 
individual to justify guilt-producing behaviour (Thurman et al., 1984). 
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high moral standing in society on other taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour. The results reveal 
that taxpayers who observed the tax evasion behaviour of taxpayers of high moral standing 
were more likely to not comply with their own tax obligations. The results suggest that 
taxpayers may have viewed the behaviour of people with such high moral standing as the 
social or societal norm, or as a reference for their own behaviour. The outcome may also be 
the result of taxpayers rationalising their own noncompliant behaviour.   
Spicer and Hero (1985) tested the hypothesis that a taxpayer‟s own level of evasion will be 
positively related to what (s)he perceives as the levels of evasion by others. The study also 
examined whether taxpayers who have been audited in the past are likely to evaluate the 
probability as higher, leading to a decrease in the levels of noncompliance. However, the 
experiment did not provide any evidence to demonstrate that a taxpayer‟s tax evasion 
behaviour is significantly influenced by knowledge of other taxpayers not complying. The 
authors attribute this outcome to the lack of any stigma effects in the experimental setting. 
Arguably, the behaviour depends on the presence or absence of „social stigma‟ attached to tax 
evasion behaviour.  
De Juan et al. (1994) provide evidence of the relationship between individuals‟ own tax 
noncompliance and the perceived noncompliance by others. Their study found that 
individuals who believe that noncompliance is widespread among their peers or colleagues 
tend to have more favourable attitudes towards noncompliance, and are also more likely to 
cheat on taxes themselves. These findings suggest that taxpayers‟ compliance behaviours may 
be influenced by perceived social norms.  
Welch et al. (2005) examined the effects of perceived community levels of tax evasion on 
intentions to evade taxes in the future.
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 The results provide empirical evidence that 
individuals who perceive that many members in the community cheat on their taxes are likely 
to not comply with their tax obligations. The results also reveal that individuals who believe 
that tax cheating is morally wrong, and those who fear the social disapproval that cheating 
might produce, appear to be less predisposed to cheat on their taxes.  
A study to determine whether tax ethics and social norms constitute motivation for tax 
compliance or whether they are rationalisations for self-interested behaviour, was carried out 
by Wenzel (2005a). Perceived social norms refer to injunctive norms; that is, normative 
prescriptions regarding tax compliance (or the normative acceptability of noncompliance), 
                                                     
50 The study also examined the effects of perceived prevalence of tax evasion on individuals‟ evaluation of the 
wrongfulness of tax evasion, and the inhibitory effects of informal sanctions directed at it.  
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and perceptions of what other people believe is acceptable behaviour.
51
 One of the objectives 
of this study was to determine whether social norms causally affect taxpayers‟ compliance 
levels, when taxpayers identify strongly with the relevant social group (that is, identifying 
with Australians). The study provides evidence that perceived social norms causally 
influenced the tax ethics of respondents who identified strongly with the social group. The 
study also revealed that individuals‟ personal ethics influenced the perceived normative 
beliefs of the social group, and that perceived norms causally influenced tax compliance. 
Conversely, tax compliance appeared to affect the perception of norms. The results illustrate 
the complex influence of tax ethics and social norms on compliance behaviour.  
A common justification for tax cheating and tax evasion is because of individuals‟ 
perceptions or beliefs that everyone does it, and so they are able to rationalise their own 
noncompliant behaviour (Bardach, 1989). This widespread perception of others cheating on 
their taxes may lead taxpayers to follow that particular social norm (of tax cheating), even if 
they might personally think that everyone should comply with their tax obligations (Wenzel, 
2005b). In contrast, an Australian study appears to indicate that taxpayers are compliant even 
if they believe others are not compliant (Braithwaite et al., 2001).  
Sandmo (2005) argues that tax evasion decisions may be influenced by the individual 
taxpayer‟s perception of the tax compliance behaviour of others. The more widespread they 
perceive noncompliance is, the more socially acceptable noncompliance may become, and the 
subjective probability of noncompliance being detected will probably be low. This may 
encourage compliant taxpayers to attempt to evade some of their taxes or noncompliant 
taxpayers to evade more.  
To sum up, the limited amount of empirical evidence suggests that societal norms have an 
important influence on taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour. The shared belief of how people 
should behave reflects society‟s social norms (Torgler, 2007), and the perceived norms of 
society influence the way members of the society behave. In a tax context this means that 
people will comply and pay taxes as long as they believe that complying with their tax 
obligation is the expected norm (Alm et al., 1999). The limited literature reviewed is 
consistent with the observation that society‟s tax compliance norm will influence individual‟s 
tax compliance behaviour.  
                                                     
51 Injunctive norm refers to the perceived behaviour, of which, most people approve (or disapprove). In contrast, 
subjective norms refer to perceptions of injunctive norms held by referents (Bobek et al., 2007b).   
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2.7 PERCEPTIONS OF TAX OFFENCES 
A large number of prior studies have examined the relationship between perceived severity 
of noncompliance and taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour, but only a few studies have 
examined taxpayers‟ perceptions of the seriousness of tax noncompliance, relative to other 
similar civil offences. The general view is that tax evasion is not seen as a serious offence.   
Song and Yarbrough‟s (1978) study was one of the earlier studies which examined the 
respondents‟ view of the severity of tax offences compared to eight other crimes/offences. 
The findings revealed that 87 percent of respondents agreed that tax noncompliance is an 
offence. At the same time, most also agreed that noncompliance does not hurt anyone except 
the government. The majority of respondents did not rank tax evasion as being particularly 
serious, compared to other crimes/offences listed in the questionnaire. Respondents seemed to 
view tax evasion more like a violation than a crime (violations are punishable by fines, and 
crimes are generally punishable by jail sentences). Song and Yarbrough (1978) concluded that 
respondents viewed tax evasion only slightly more seriously than stealing a bicycle. Wilson et 
al. (1986) based their study on Song and Yarbrough‟s (1978) research, and provided further 
support that tax evasion is not considered to be a serious crime. Respondents were asked to 
compare the seriousness of 13 offences with the offence of „stealing a bicycle‟. The findings 
indicate that tax evasion was viewed to be six times more serious than stealing a bicycle, and 
about the same level of seriousness as committing medical fraud, but less serious than social 
security fraud.   
The first New Zealand study to compare the perceived seriousness of tax noncompliance 
was undertaken by Oxley (1993). The study surveyed female taxpayers in order to determine 
how they view the seriousness of committing a tax crime. The findings indicated that ten 
percent of women respondents viewed tax evasion as an extremely serious offence, in 
comparison to cashing a stolen cheque, theft from an employer, shoplifting, welfare fraud, 
and insurance fraud. The rest did not consider tax evasion as an extremely serious offence. 
Another New Zealand study surveyed tertiary students to examine the students‟ perception 
of the seriousness of evading tax, compared to five other similar crimes (McIntosh & Veal, 
2001). The results revealed that 16 percent of respondents felt that tax evasion was totally 
acceptable, with 30 percent of the respondents indicating that tax evasion was totally 
unacceptable, compared to cheque fraud, theft from an employer, shoplifting, welfare fraud 
and insurance fraud. The results of this study further revealed that a large number of 
respondents believe that noncompliance has increased over the years in New Zealand. 
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McIntosh and Veal‟s (2001) research was adapted for use in another New Zealand study 
by Birch et al. (2003). This research also surveyed tertiary students, and the findings were 
consistent with McIntosh and Veal (2001). The study found 14 percent of the respondents 
considered tax evasion to be totally acceptable, with 25 percent who believed tax evasion to 
be totally unacceptable, compared to the same list of offences listed in the previous two New 
Zealand studies. The above outcomes clearly indicate that New Zealand respondents do not 
believe that tax evasion is a very serious crime. Devos (2005) examined Australian tertiary 
students‟ attitudes toward tax evasion, and found that about 65 percent were undecided as to 
whether tax evasion was a serious offence.  
A US study by Eicher et al. (2002) investigated the perception of tax evasion against four 
non-violent offences. Respondents rated driving while intoxicated as the most serious offence, 
followed by running a red light, shoplifting, and speeding, in that order. The tax offence was 
rated as equal in seriousness with shoplifting, indicating general acceptance that committing a 
tax offence is not a comparatively serious crime. Karlinsky et al. (2004), in another US study, 
examined the perceived seriousness of tax evasion relative to other crimes. Their study 
included violent crimes (such as murder, rape and child molestation), blue collar crimes (such 
as shoplifting, carjacking and bicycle theft), and white collar crimes (such as accounting 
fraud, welfare fraud and insider trading). The most serious offences rated were the violent 
crimes. In terms of tax evasion, consistent with Eicher et al. (2002), respondents did not 
perceive tax evasion as a particularly serious crime.  
A later New Zealand study (Gupta, 2006) examined the seriousness of a tax offence, 
against a number of criminal offences (such as murder, rape and child molestation) and a 
number of other offences. Consistent with the US studies (for example, Karlinsky et al., 
2004), the most serious offences rated were the violent crimes. In terms of the non-violent 
offences, tax evasion was rated the third most serious crime, behind driving under the 
influence of alcohol and welfare fraud, but ahead of speeding, bicycle theft and drug offence 
(Gupta, 2006; 2007). 
Overall, the results from prior studies consistently demonstrate that tax evasion is 
considered by most as a comparatively less serious offence compared to other similar 
offences. Some respondents even believe that other civil offences should attract harsher 
penalties than tax evasion (Vogel, 1974). Results from New Zealand and other tax 
jurisdictions overwhelmingly indicate that tax evasion is not totally unacceptable, compared 
to other minor offences, indicating that this is a universal problem and is not based on culture 
or nationality. Taxpayers clearly consider violent crimes to be more serious than tax offences; 
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however, it remains a concern for the tax authorities that tax offences are also ranked lower 
than other similar crimes.
52
 Porcano (1988) concluded that the individuals who perceive 
noncompliance to be an insignificant crime tend to be less compliant, which is a highly 
relevant finding when examining tax compliance behaviour. 
2.8 MOTIVATIONAL POSTURES (SOCIAL DISTANCE) 
Motivational postures are stances that individuals, who are subjected to regulatory 
requirements by a regulatory authority, adopt in order to protect themselves from threats to 
comply (Braithwaite, 2003b). At the individual taxpayer‟s level, motivational postures are 
influential factors of compliance and noncompliance, while at the national level, tax morale 
and civic duty are the motivational forces leading to, or deterring, taxpayers engaging in 
noncompliant behaviour (Kirchler, 2007). Motivational postures reflect the social distance 
that individuals place between themselves and the tax authority (Braithwaite, 2003b). 
Taxpayers who dislike the tax authority tend to place increasing social distance between 
themselves and the tax authority, and a lowering of the status attributed to that authority.  
Braithwaite (2003a) carried out a survey to examine the influence of motivational postures 
that people adopt, in relation to the tax authority, on compliance behaviour. Correlations were 
calculated between motivational postures and two compliance-related activities (evasion 
related and avoidance related). The results suggest a correlation between some evasion-
related activities and postures of resistance to, and disengagement from, the tax system. Those 
who indicated postures of deference (for example commitment and capitulation), however, 
did not refrain from engaging in behaviour that could get them in trouble with the tax 
authorities.  
In terms of the avoidance-related activities, the deference posture (commitment) did not 
deter individuals from investing in tax-minimising activities. Individuals who are committed 
to paying taxes are less likely to be involved in the more aggressive forms of tax 
minimisation. Two postures, resistance and game playing, were most strongly related to 
aggressive tax minimisation. The results suggest that individuals, who dislike taxation but can 
be defiant within the letter of the law, prefer to engage in avoidance, whereas those who 
dislike taxation and have located themselves outside the reach of the law prefer to engage in 
evasion.  
                                                     
52 Tax offences are considered by many to be a victimless crime (quoted in Gupta, 2007) and that may explain 
some of the outcomes from these studies. 
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In a study conducted by Taylor (2003), one of the hypotheses tested the influence of 
perceived representation of government and the tax authority on motivational postures. The 
premise is that if the government and the tax authority are perceived to be representative of 
the regulatees they are attempting to regulate, the regulatees will be more likely to adopt 
compliant motivational postures. The findings supported the hypothesis that the more 
representative the government and the tax authority are perceived to be (of individual 
respondents), the less resistant and more compliant are taxpayers‟ motivational postures.  
Studies carried out by Braithwaite et al. (2007) have attempted to establish how taxpayers 
manage the threat of taxation,
53
 not only in circumstances where taxation is a routine affair, 
but also where conflict is occurring between the taxpayer and the tax authority. The study also 
examined how well the key components of posturing (the coping sensibility that individuals 
adopt in response to threats from the authority) are used to manage taxation threat from the 
authority. The two sample groups used were: a group representing normal levels of 
interaction and regulatory pressure from the tax authority; and one representing conflict 
between the regulator and regulatees.  
The results show that for both groups, three coping sensibilities influence taxpayers‟ 
motivational posturing, although all three coping sensibilities are significantly higher in the 
group in conflict with the tax authority.
54
 The results further suggest that the most effective 
regulatory outcome is achieved when the process can minimise the „taking control‟ and 
„feeling oppressed‟ sensibilities, and strengthen the „thinking morally‟ sensibility. The 
findings demonstrate that taxpayers, in addition to other factors, construct motivational 
posturing when they are confronted with the demands of authority. This is motivated by the 
need to live comfortably within the life space that is inhabited by themselves and the tax 
authority. Overall, the results indicate that coping sensibilities (based on how people deal with 
life events) contribute to the motivational postures taxpayers adopt in relation to managing 
any threat from the tax authority. 
Studies conducted by Hartner et al. (2008) used data from two previous studies to examine 
the relationship between government, tax authorities and taxpayers, applying procedural 
justice and identity judgments.
55
 Resource judgments were used to evaluate outcomes, while 
behavioural engagements measured actual tax compliance (or noncompliance). The research 
                                                     
53 Taxation involves government extracting money from individuals, who are unable to refuse to pay, and therefore 
taxation is considered to be a threat (Kirchler, 1998).  
54 The three coping sensibilities are: „thinking morally‟, „feeling oppressed‟ and „taking control‟, and they are all 
based on how people deal with life events.  
55 Data for this study was from the Community, Hopes, Fears, and Actions Survey (Braithwaite, 2001; Braithwaite 
et al., 2001), and the Australian Tax System – Fair or Not Survey (Braithwaite & Reinhart, 2005). 
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model was then extended by the addition of motivational postures.  The results indicate a 
clear direct influence of procedural justice on motivational postures, suggesting that when 
taxpayers perceive fair treatment from the tax authority (who employs procedurally fair 
decision rules), motivational postures of deference (commitment and capitulation) increase, 
and motivational postures of defiance (resistance and disengagement) decrease. The results 
also establish that defiance-oriented motivational postures are associated with tax 
noncompliance, although there was no indication of the assumed negative influence of 
deference-oriented motivational postures on tax noncompliance. The authors attribute this 
unexpected outcome to the possibility that unfavourable attitudes towards taxation may have 
a stronger effect on behaviour than favourable attitudes.   
To sum up, the limited tax compliance literature incorporating motivational postures (or 
social distance) yields an inconclusive outcome. The findings also indicate that different 
motivational postures can be held at the same time by taxpayers, and these postures do not 
represent stable individual characteristics, but rather represent positions that taxpayers can 
shift between (Taylor, 2003). Consistent with Kirchler‟s (2007) argument that most taxpayers 
are compliant, the studies reviewed here provide evidence that the most common posture 
adopted by taxpayers tends to be commitment, followed by capitulation. The least common 
postures include resistance and disengagement. Furthermore, the inconclusive outcomes can 
also be attributed to the argument that these postures are dynamic; that is, taxpayers tend to 
move between the various postures.  
2.9 SUMMARY 
This chapter presented a discussion on the three main tax compliance models commonly 
used in tax compliance research, and reviewed selected literature concerning tax compliance 
behaviour that is relevant to this study. The three main tax compliance models are: the 
Economic Deterrence Models; the Social Psychology Models; and the Fiscal Psychology 
Models. The literature reviewed in this chapter includes studies that relate to: the Theory of 
Planned Behaviour (TPB); Procedural Justice Theory (PJT); threat of sanctions; societal 
norms; perception of tax offences; and motivational postures (or social distance). 
The Economic Deterrence Models assume that taxpayers‟ behaviours are motivated by 
self-interest (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972). The models are based on the assumption that 
effective threats of detection and punishment for noncompliance will increase compliance 
behaviour. Taxpayers are assumed to calculate the potential costs and benefits of their tax 
reporting decisions and, if the potential cost of noncompliance is perceived to be high, 
compliance will increase (and vice versa). The Social Psychology Models are concerned with 
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encouraging normative support for compliance without the need to deter with threats of 
punishment. Taxpayers are assumed to be motivated by their moral and social obligations, 
and not by any attempts to maximise their economic utility. The threat of social sanctions or 
sanctions imposed by self is considered to influence their tax reporting decisions. The Fiscal 
Psychology Models are a combination of the elements of the Economic Deterrence Models 
and the Social Psychology Models. Despite the development in tax compliance research, there 
is still no widespread consensus as to the optimal model for tax compliance research. 
This chapter also reviewed some relevant studies applying the TPB to predict a range of 
behaviours. The review included the limited numbers of tax compliance studies that employed 
the TPB. The majority of studies that examined tax compliance behaviour and behaviours in 
other domains provide overwhelming support for the use of the TPB in predicting and 
explaining behaviour. Whilst the use of the TPB in other areas of behavioural research has 
been well validated, the limited research relating to tax compliance research means that only 
with increased use of the TPB in tax compliance research will the required level of validation 
be achieved.  
The PJT has received less attention than the widely used Distributive Justice Theory in tax 
compliance research. Procedural justice plays a key role in enhancing the legitimacy of an 
authority, which in turn supports the system under review. The majority of studies reviewed 
provide overwhelming evidence of the important role of procedural justice rules in tax 
authorities‟ processes and procedures when administering the tax rules or dealing with 
disputes. The outcome of a procedurally fair process will usually be accepted by the taxpayer 
even if the outcome was unfavourable to the taxpayer (Tyler, 2010). Overall, the literature on 
the PJT in the tax compliance domain is minimal and is still at the early stages of 
development. As such, the findings have not been sufficiently validated in this area of 
research.    
A large volume of literature is available on both formal and informal sanctions. While it is 
clear that formal sanctions have a role in taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour, there is evidence 
that indicates the increasingly important role of informal sanctions (or tax morale) in tax 
compliance research. An increasing number of studies have provided evidence that informal 
sanctions are more effective than formal sanctions in increasing the level of compliance. The 
overall outcome does not suggest that formal sanctions should be abandoned; rather, it 
reinforces the fact that an optimal compliance strategy should include deterrence tools based 
on both formal and informal sanctions.   
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The majority of prior research indicates that tax evasion is generally not considered to be a 
serious offence. Respondents in the studies believe that other offences should attract harsher 
penalties than tax evasion. The results also indicate that respondents consider that the tax 
authority should be lenient on taxpayers evading smaller amounts of taxes; while some even 
felt that small scale evasion should not attract any penalties. Most challenging for the tax 
authorities (especially the New Zealand tax authority) is the number of people who believe 
that noncompliance has increased over the years in New Zealand. 
The Motivational Posturing Theory has not been widely used in tax compliance research, 
resulting in the availability of very few studies. The review suggests that the commitment 
posture (reflecting fully compliant taxpayers) is the most common posture adopted by 
taxpayers, followed by the capitulation posture (these are deference positions). However, 
results from most of the available studies appear to be inconclusive, and results from the 
limited literature reviewed indicate that the role of motivational postures in influencing tax 
compliance behaviour is uncertain.   
In summary, the review of selected literature carried out for this study concludes that there 
are still some gaps of knowledge with respect to understanding taxpayers‟ compliance 
behaviour, and as of yet there is still no universal consensus on the optimal compliance 
theory, research model, research method, or research variables for tax compliance research. 
The next chapter introduces and presents the discussion on several selected theories that 
underpin the research models and the research variables.   
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CHAPTER 3 
SELECTED BEHAVIOURAL THEORIES 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Tax compliance research was traditionally based on the economics-of-crime theory; 
however, due to the limitations in capturing the relevant behavioural aspects of tax 
compliance behaviour, researchers have experimented with noneconomic models based on 
behavioural theories. This chapter presents selected behavioural theories applied in prior tax 
compliance research, and describes the contributions, strengths and weaknesses of the 
selected theories. 
This chapter is organised according to the emphasis of the theories used in the current 
research. The introduction to this chapter is followed by section 3.2 with a description and 
discussion on the development of the underlying theory used to develop the research model, 
that is, the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) and its predecessors. Section 3.3 provides an 
in-depth analysis of the TPB, including discussions on the theory‟s contributions, strengths 
and weaknesses, and its application to tax compliance research. Section 3.4 presents 
Deterrence Theory, and discusses the theory‟s contribution towards the development of the 
first economic model of tax compliance. Procedural Justice Theory (PJT) is introduced in 
section 3.5, together with an analysis of each of the justice rules that are used to evaluate the 
fairness of allocative procedures. This is followed by section 3.6, which presents the 
Motivational Postures Theory (MPT), which refers to the approach individuals take to 
position themselves in relation to regulatory authorities. Finally, this chapter concludes with a 
summary of the discussions presented.  
3.2 DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOUR 
The most widely researched integrated models of behaviour are the Theories of Reasoned 
Action (TRA) and Planned Behaviour (TPB). The TPB (Ajzen 1985; 1988) is an extension of 
the TRA (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; and Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) that includes perceived 
behavioural control, an additional determinant of behavioural intention and behaviour (in 
addition to attitudes and subjective norms). The TPB has its genesis in the Expectancy-Value 
Theory (EVT), which developed into the TRA, and then was extended into the TPB. 
The TPB has been applied to a wide range of behaviours, and is one of the best supported 
social psychological theories in terms of predicting behaviour. The TPB‟s popularity is based 
on the amount of variance explained in behavioural intention and behaviour. A review of 185 
separate studies applying the TPB model provides evidence that the theory accounted for an 
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average of 27 percent variance in actual behaviour, and 39 percent in behavioural intentions 
(Armitage & Conner, 2001). Despite its success in a range of behavioural studies, few 
attempts were made in the past to use TPB to examine tax compliance behaviour. As such, 
most of the literature supporting the use of the TPB model tends to be in other areas of 
behavioural research. The theory also enables the building of an integrated model using 
multiple factors associated with tax compliance behaviour. 
The conceptual model (TRA) developed by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) was first 
introduced as the Expectancy Value Theory (EVT). The earlier Expectancy-Value Models 
were developed in the 1950s by a group of social psychologists at the University of Michigan 
(Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), although one of the first and most complete statements of the 
Expectancy-Value Model was by Fishbein (1963) and Fishbein and Ajzen (1975).  
3.2.1 Expectancy-Value Theory 
EVT provides a framework for understanding the relationship between attitudes and the 
evaluative meaning of beliefs (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Fishbein (1963) introduced the 
Expectancy-Value Model, which asserts that a person‟s attitude, as understood in the abstract 
sense of evaluation, is a function of that person‟s beliefs. Beliefs are depicted as the sum of 
the expected values of the attributes ascribed to the attitude object. Expected values comprise 
both expectancy and a value component. The expectancy component of each attribute‟s 
expected value is the belief that a given behaviour will lead to (or will not lead to) a given 
outcome, whereas the value component is the person‟s evaluation of the subjective value 
placed on that outcome (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; and Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). When 
predicting an attitude, the expectancy and value terms associated with each attitude are 
multiplied, and then added together.  Evaluation of an attitude object is therefore a summation 
of the evaluations associated with the particular attributes that are ascribed to the attitude 
object. The basic structure of the Expectancy-Value Model, as applied to behaviour, can be 
algebraically represented in the equation below:    
                               
The Expectancy-Value Model assumes that an individual is more likely to be motivated to 
perform a target behaviour that will result in an outcome that is highly valued. Conversely, 
when an individual does not believe the target behaviour will lead to a specific outcome, or 
the resulting outcome is not valued, the individual will be less likely to be motivated to 
perform the target behaviour. Attitudes, together with the beliefs and valuations on which 
these attitudes are based, are measured directly. Attitude towards behaviour can be measured 
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by any standard attitude scaling procedure, such as Likert, Thurstone, or Guttman scaling, or 
semantic differential (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2008). 
3.2.2 Theory of Reasoned Action 
Whilst the Expectancy-Value Model is still relevant in behavioural research, much of the 
recent work with the Expectancy-Value Model was conducted in the context of the TRA 
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980), and its successor, the TPB (Ajzen, 1988; 1991). Based on the large 
volume of literature, the TRA and the TPB appear to be the two most widely used social 
psychological models currently used to predict intention and behaviour. The TRA proposes 
that intentions are the immediate precursors of behaviour, and that intentions, in turn, are a 
function of attitudes toward the behaviour and the sum of the normative beliefs weighted by 
motivation to comply. The TRA was developed to provide a better understanding of the 
relationships between attitudinal beliefs, normative beliefs, intentions and behaviours 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Given that the elements or constructs of the TRA are identical to 
the TPB, the individual constructs of the current research model will be discussed in detail, 
under the TPB Model, in the later part of this chapter.   
The TRA Model (a term used for the purposes of this study to describe a behavioural 
model based on the TRA) was developed and designed to predict and explain behaviour in 
specific contexts, and provides a parsimonious explanation of behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 
1975; and Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). The graphical presentation of the TRA model is 
displayed in Figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.1: Theory of Reasoned Action  
(Reproduced from Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980, p.100) 
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In brief, the TRA Model is based on an individual‟s intention,
56
 or motivation, to engage 
in the target behaviour. According to the TRA, behavioural intentions are arguably the best 
predictor of a person‟s behaviour. The stronger the intention to undertake the target 
behaviour, the greater the likelihood of engaging successfully in that behaviour. Ajzen and 
Fishbein (1980, p. 181) added that “intentions are assumed to capture the motivational factors 
that influence a behaviour; they are indications of how hard people are willing to try, of how 
much of an effort they are willing to exert in order to perform the behaviour.”  
Behavioural intention, in turn, is a function of attitudes towards the behaviour and 
subjective norms. Attitude towards the behaviour reflects an individual‟s perception of the 
desirability of performing a target behaviour, which is in turn a function of a cognitive belief 
structure that comprises two sub-components: salient beliefs that performing the target 
behaviour will lead to a specific outcome, and the evaluation of that outcome. Subjective 
norms refer to an individual‟s perception of whether relevant others think that the individual 
should or should not perform the behaviour. This perception in turn is a function of a person‟s 
perceived expectation that one or more referents think the individual should perform (or 
should not perform) the target behaviour, and the level of the individual‟s motivation to 
comply (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). Based on the TRA, if an individual believes that a positive 
outcome will result from performing a target behaviour, and that important referents would 
encourage and approve of such a behaviour, then positive intentions would likely result in 
terms of the target behaviour.  
Empirical evidence from prior studies demonstrates the applicability of the TRA in a 
variety of experimental and naturalistic settings, covering a wide range of behaviours (Beck 
& Ajzen, 1991). Further, a meta-analytic review of prior research on the TRA concluded that 
the predictive utility of the TRA was strong across a range of behavioural conditions 
(Sheppard et al., 1988; Sheeran & Taylor, 1999; and Landridge et al., 2007). Intentions to 
perform the target behaviour can be predicted from attitudes towards the behaviour and from 
subjective norms, and the intentions in turn correlate well with observed actions.  
The key hypotheses of the TRA are that behavioural decisions involve a reasoned process, 
in which the behaviour is influenced by attitudes and norms. These factors influence 
behaviour through their effect on intention. However, despite its wide use, the TRA‟s 
predictive ability is only optimal when the behaviour of interest is under complete volitional 
                                                     
56 For the purpose of this study, „intent‟, „intention‟ and „behavioural intention‟ are used interchangeably, and refer 
to the same construct. 
67 
 
control of the individual (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; and Ajzen, 1988).
57
 Intentions and 
behaviours that are not completely under volitional control are not adequately served by the 
TRA. Further, the TRA asserts that external variables do not directly influence behaviour, and 
that they are only related to behavioural intentions and behaviour, through their impact on the 
behavioural and normative beliefs (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). However, subsequent studies 
have disputed this claim by demonstrating that some external variables are able to influence 
behaviour directly (Ajzen, 2010).  
Recognising that some of the behaviours under study may not be under complete volitional 
control, Ajzen (1985; 1988) introduced perceived behavioural control (PBC), as an additional 
construct to predict both intention and behaviour. PBC is defined as the belief of how easy or 
difficult performing the target behaviour is likely to be (Ajzen, 1985; 1988). The PBC 
element was added to deal with factors that may serve as opportunities, obstacles or 
impediments towards achieving the desired outcome. Beliefs about the availability and 
opportunity to effectively employ the required resources, and having the right skills to engage 
in the target behaviour, will determine the level of perceived behavioural control. Whilst the 
TRA was considered adequate for predicting behaviours that were relatively straightforward 
(that is, under complete volitional control), the TRA Model was found to be inadequate when 
there were constraints on the proposed actions. This has led to some failures in predicting 
behaviour, because in situations where resources or ability is lacking, no matter how strong 
the intention, it will not lead to the target behaviour. Arguably, the PBC construct provides 
the necessary information about the potential constraints on action as perceived by an 
individual, and further explains why intentions do not always predict behaviour (Armitage & 
Conner, 2001). 
Comparative research undertaken by Madden et al. (1992) compared the precision in the 
prediction of intentions and target behaviour of the TRA with the TPB, across ten behaviours. 
These behaviours were chosen to represent a range of volitional control over the proposed 
performance of the behaviours. The results demonstrate that the TRA was adequate when the 
behaviours are under volitional control. However, when the behaviours are not under full 
volitional control, the TPB was found to be superior to the TRA in the prediction of the target 
behaviour. Further, Ajzen (1988, p. 127) acknowledged that the TRA “was developed 
explicitly to deal with purely volitional behaviours.” This means that the TRA is only suitable 
                                                     
57 Full volitional control means that the individual has complete freedom to choose whether or not to perform a 
target behaviour.  
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when predicting simple behaviours, where success of performing the target behaviour 
requires only the formation of an intention.  
3.3 THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOUR 
Ajzen‟s TPB (1988; 1991) is a well-received social cognition model, which has become 
the dominant social psychological model for relating attitudes to behaviour (Conner & 
Sparks, 1996; and Armitage & Conner, 1999). That is, the more a person intends to engage in 
a target behaviour, the more likely (s)he is to actually engage in that behaviour. Underlying 
behavioural intentions are attitudes towards the behaviour (beliefs about the consequences of 
the behaviour), subjective norms (beliefs about the normative expectations of other people), 
and perceived behavioural control (beliefs about the presence of factors which may facilitate 
or impede performance of the target behaviour), which determine both behavioural intention 
and behaviour. The TPB maintains that attitudes, together with subjective norms and 
perceptions of control, lead to the formation of behavioural intention (Ajzen, 1985; 1991). 
Behavioural intention enables the prediction of behaviour. Further, in addition to contributing 
towards the formation of behavioural control, perceived control is also capable of influencing 
behaviour directly (Ajzen, 1985; 1991). Figure 3.2 illustrates the theoretical relationship 
between the various elements of the TPB Model (for the purposes of this study the term “TPB 
Model” describes a behavioural model based on the TPB). 
Figure 3.2: The Theory of Planned Behaviour  
(Reproduced from Ajzen, 2004, p.1) 
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The TPB Model depicts each of the determinants of behavioural intention as a function of 
an individual‟s salient beliefs. The TPB Model therefore posits that attitude is a function of a 
person‟s outcome beliefs; subjective norms are a function of a person‟s referent beliefs or 
normative beliefs; and perceived behavioural control is a function of a person‟s control 
beliefs. The TPB Model further illustrates that PBC can have a direct effect on behaviour, as 
well as an indirect effect on behaviour through its effect on behavioural intention.   
Prior literature indicates that the TPB has been successfully applied to a variety of 
situations in predicting the performance of behaviour and intention, such as: predicting the 
intention to quit smoking and quitting behaviour (Rise et al., 2008); predicting blood donation 
behaviour (Holdershaw et al., 2011); predicting gambling behaviour (Martin et al., 2010); and 
predicting the intention to avoid caffeine (Madden et al., 1992). Madden et al. (1992) found 
that the TPB has a better predictive power than the TRA although both theories are well used 
in behavioural research. The components of the TPB are presented and discussed in sub-
sections 3.3.1 to 3.3.5, followed by the rationale for applying the TPB as the underlying 
theoretical framework. 
3.3.1 Self-Reported Past Behaviour 
The TPB suggests that the key factor in determining whether a person will engage in 
certain behaviour is the intention to perform the target behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975).  
The greater the intention to perform the behaviour, the more likely a person will actually 
engage in the target behaviour. The ability of the TPB Model to predict behaviour depends on 
the degree of behavioural intention and the direct effect of PBC (Beck & Ajzen, 1991). Beck 
and Ajzen (1991) add that past behaviour is considered to be the best predictor of future 
behaviour. Behaviour is depicted by the TPB Model as a linear regression function of 
behavioural intention and perceived behavioural control, as expressed in the following 
equation:  
               
where B is the target behaviour, BI is the behavioural intention, PBC is perceived 
behavioural control, and    and    are the regression weights (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; 
and Conner & Sparks, 2005).  
Past behaviour is widely accepted by some researchers to be a good predictor of later 
action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005 and Ajzen, 2010). This is based on the assumption that, with 
past repeat performance, behaviour is said to habituate, and it is habit strength that is assumed 
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to influence later behaviour. Tittle (1980) argues that people develop patterns of responses to 
various situations over time, which suggests that past behaviour will develop into a pattern of 
future behaviour. Burnkrant and Page Jr (1988) note that prior research supports the view that 
past behaviour contributes to the prediction of future behaviour, over and above the effect it 
has on other variables of the TRA. However, Ajzen (2010) opposes the use of past behaviour 
(as an independent variable) to predict future behaviour on the basis that it does not meet the 
criterion of causality. Ajzen (2010) explains that unlike attitude, perceived norm, perceived 
behavioural control, and intention; frequency of past behaviour cannot readily be used to 
explain performance of subsequent action. Based on the two line of research on the predictive 
power of past behaviour the current study will not include past behaviour as an independent 
variable to predict tax compliance behaviour. Past behaviour will instead be used as a proxy 
for future behaviour.  
3.3.2 Behavioural Intention 
The objective of the TPB Model is to predict and understand a person‟s behaviour (Ajzen 
& Fishbein, 1980). The influence of attitude, social pressure and PBC on behaviour is 
mediated through behavioural intention. An individual‟s behaviour is determined by the 
individual‟s intention (behavioural intention) to perform a given behaviour. The intention to 
perform the behaviour is an immediate antecedent of actual behaviour, and represents a 
person‟s motivation or decision to exert the necessary effort to perform the behaviour (Ajzen, 
2002a). The TPB suggests that intentions capture the motivational factors that influence a 
given behaviour (Beck & Ajzen, 1991). Intentions therefore measure how hard people are 
willing to try, and how much of an effort they would exert to perform the behaviour (Ajzen, 
1991), or the self-instructions individuals give themselves to act (Triandis, 1977). Therefore, 
the stronger a person's intention to engage in a particular behaviour, or to achieve their 
behavioural goals, the more successful they will be in performing that particular  behaviour or 
achieving the behavioural goal.   
The TPB posits that a person‟s intention is determined by three conceptually independent 
determinants: a person‟s attitude towards the behaviour of interest; subjective norms; and 
PBC. This relationship can be stated algebraically as presented in the equation below: 
                       
where B is the behaviour of interest, BI is the behavioural intent, A is attitude towards 
performing the behaviour, SN is the subjective norm, PBC is the perceived behavioural 
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control,   , w2 and    are the relative weights of attitudes, subjective norms and PBC 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975).  
The above equation illustrates that behaviour is a function of an individual‟s intention to 
engage in the behaviour of interest, which in turn is a function of: the individual‟s evaluation 
of performing the behaviour and its outcome; their perception of how referents would want 
them to behave and the motivation to conform to referents‟ expectations; and the perceived 
control the individual has over the behaviour. Further, the TPB identifies three key factors 
that can influence the magnitude of the relationship between intention and behaviour: the 
degree to which intention and behaviour correspond in their levels of generality or specificity; 
the stability of the intention; and the degree of volitional control available to the individual in 
undertaking the intended behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; and 
Ajzen, 2010). Tests of the TPB Model have confirmed the predictive validity of intentions. A 
number of meta-analytic reviews in various other areas of social behaviour have provided 
support to this relationship (Armitage & Conner, 2001).  
Warshaw and Davis (1985) distinguish between two measures of intentions: measures of 
behavioural intentions (measured as the intention to undertake a behaviour); and measures of 
self-predictions (measured as the likelihood of performing a behaviour). The Warshaw and 
Davis (1985) study found measures of self-prediction to be a better predictor of behaviour 
than measures of behavioural intention. However, this seems to apply only when the 
behaviour is not under volitional control. When predicting volitional behaviour, there is little 
difference between the two measures in predicting behaviour (Warshaw & Davis, 1985). 
Sheppard et al.‟s (1988) meta-analysis revealed measures of self-prediction to be a better 
predictor of behaviour, whereas Armitage and Conner‟s (2001) meta-analysis, which 
considered the role of intentions, desires, and self-predictions within the framework of the 
TPB, found intentions and self-predictions to be better predictors of behaviour than desires.  
Armitage and Conner‟s (2001) analysis further observed that intentions and PBC have the 
most explanatory powers. Also, Armitage and Conner (2001) observed that the majority of 
the studies reviewed tend to use mixed measures of intentions, which include a combination 
of three measures (intention, self-prediction and/or desire).  In most of these studies, all three 
measures were found to be highly correlated (Conner & Sparks, 2005). Consistent with the 
outcome of the above analysis, the present study used both measures; that is, measures of 
intentions and measures of self-predictions together in the research model. 
In addition to holding a strong intention, there are other non-motivational factors which 
may assist or impede the performance of the behaviour. These non-motivational factors, 
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collectively referred to as „actual control‟ over the behaviour, could include lack of 
opportunities or the lack of the necessary resources or skills required to perform the target 
behaviour (Ajzen, 1985; and Beck & Ajzen, 1991). Therefore, if a person has a strong 
intention to engage in the target behaviour, and that person also has the opportunity or 
necessary skills and resources to perform that behaviour, then that individual should succeed 
in behaving as intended. The direct path from PBC to behaviour will therefore emerge when 
there is some agreement between perceptions of control and the person‟s actual control (Beck 
& Ajzen, 1991).   
Beck and Ajzen (1991) acknowledged that in some situations, an individual may not be 
fully aware of what resources or skills may be needed to perform certain behaviour. However, 
the TPB is based on perceived, rather than actual behavioural control; it is this perception that 
is used to predict future behaviour. Therefore, if a person perceives that performing a target 
behaviour requires certain expertise and that person also believes that (s)he has that expertise, 
then that person will attempt the target behaviour. In summary, intention is a measure of a 
person‟s subjective probability that the person will engage in the behaviour, although it 
should be noted that the behaviour may be moderated by the direct effect of PBC. 
3.3.3 Attitude Towards the Behaviour 
The TPB postulates that attitude towards the behaviour is based on a person‟s underlying 
behavioural beliefs, and refers to the degree to which the person has a favourable or 
unfavourable evaluation of the behaviour of interest (Beck & Ajzen, 1991). The Expectancy-
Value Model, introduced in the earlier part of this section, provides a framework for 
understanding the relationship between the attitude a person holds and that person‟s 
underlying behavioural beliefs. The outcome expectancy is the belief that performing a 
certain behaviour will result in a certain outcome. The outcome value is the subjective value 
placed by an individual on that outcome. This suggests that an individual will be more 
motivated to perform a certain behaviour, when the individual perceives that behaviour to 
result in a positive or favourable outcome that is highly valued by the individual (Armitage & 
Christian, 2004). Therefore, it is apparent that only those outcomes that are valued are likely 
to impact on individuals‟ attitudes.  
Attitude towards behaviour is a function of the product of an individual‟s salient beliefs, 
which represent perceived outcomes or other attributes of the behaviour (Conner & Sparks, 
2005). Based on the expectancy-value conceptualisation, outcomes are composed of the 
multiplicative combination of the perceived likelihood that performance of the behaviour will 
lead to a particular outcome, and the evaluation of that outcome. These expectancy-value 
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components are subsequently summed over the various salient outcomes, which is 
algebraically displayed in the equation below:  
  ∑       
    
     
 
 
where A refers to the attitude towards the target behaviour,    is the behavioural belief 
associated with performing the target behaviour which leads to some consequence i (thus  
   is the subjective probability that the behaviour has the consequence i),    is the 
evaluation of consequence i, and p is the number of salient t consequences over which 
these values are summed (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Conner & Sparks, 2005; and Ajzen, 
2012).  
Conner and Sparks (2005) note that no assumptions are made that an individual performs 
the above calculation when faced with a decision about performing the target behaviour. 
Rather, the individuals are more likely to store the results of such considerations in their 
memory, which is then retrieved when required (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Ajzen (2012) notes 
that the assumption that attitudes are based on information accessible in memory suggests a 
degree of reasonableness. Whilst the Expectancy-Value Model considers beliefs to be quite 
accurate, the TPB Model also acknowledges that beliefs can be biased by a number of 
cognitive and motivational processes, and may be based on invalid or selective information, 
be self-serving or otherwise fail to reflect reality (Ajzen, 2012). Nonetheless, a set of beliefs 
once formed is accessible and offers the cognitive foundation from which attitudes are 
assumed to follow automatically in a reasonable fashion.   
Individuals are considered to hold a sizeable number of beliefs about a particular 
behaviour or object; however, only a small subset is likely to be salient at any one time 
(Fishbein, 1967a; 1967b; and Ajzen, 2012). Therefore, despite possessing a large number of 
beliefs, it is mainly the salient beliefs that are considered to influence attitude. This leads to 
the issue of measuring salient beliefs. The TPB prescribes the use of individually generated 
salient beliefs, which involves asking respondents to describe the attitude object using a free-
response format (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). Conner and Sparks (2005) discovered that most 
studies tend to use modal salient beliefs based on pilot work, following the procedures 
outlined by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980). Studies examining the effect of individually generated 
and modal beliefs found a moderately strong correlation between modal behavioural beliefs 
and attitudes, compared to only a marginally significant correlation between individually 
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generated beliefs and attitudes (Rutter & Bunce, 1989; and Agnew, 1998; cited in Conner & 
Sparks, 2005). Whilst the use of individually generated beliefs is consistent with the TPB, the 
results suggest that its use does not appear to reduce measurement errors sufficiently in order 
to increase predictability of the behavioural model. Conner and Sparks (2005) conclude that 
the outcome of the study suggests that the extra effort used for the additional data collection 
required when using individually generated beliefs (as opposed to modal beliefs) is therefore 
not justified.    
In terms of the current research, prior literature and related compliance theories were used 
to develop beliefs underlying attitudes towards tax compliance, instead of the recommended 
pre-testing prescribed by the TPB to elicit salient beliefs.
58
 The author considers that modal 
beliefs are not too dissimilar to beliefs identified in the prior literature (which are also 
grounded in theory). Further, a number of tax compliance studies based on the TPB 
demonstrated the successful use of beliefs based on prior literature and theory (Hanno & 
Violette, 1996; Trivedi et al., 2005; and Saad, 2009; 2011).   
Another issue commonly raised, concerns the merits of using measures of instrumental (or 
cognitive) and affective (or experiential) attitudes. Ajzen (2002b) suggests the inclusion  
of both instrumental (for example, beneficial/harmful) and affective (for example, 
enjoyable/unenjoyable) attitude measures. However, in their earlier work, Ajzen and Fishbein 
(1980, p.55) maintain that attitudes may also be assessed by direct measures of attitudes (for 
example, by simply asking the respondent more direct questions about their attitudes).  Lewis 
(1982) argues that the distinction between cognitive and affective attitudes are negligible, and 
maintains that the distinction between the two types of attitude “are even more blurred than 
those between tax evasion and tax avoidance.”  Lewis (1982) further adds that the two terms 
need to be considered only as useful descriptive items, and not considered as hard and fast 
elements, although both terms need to be covered in comprehensive assessments of tax 
attitudes. This approach was also favoured by Zanna and Remple (1988, quoted in Conner 
and Sparks, 2005), for measuring attitudes. In their study, participants were provided with an 
opportunity to express their general evaluation of a particular behaviour without the 
researchers prejudging what the bases (for example, cognitive or affective) of that attitude 
might be.  
                                                     
58 Most tax compliance studies using the TPB developed beliefs based on prior literature or beliefs grounded in 
relevant compliance theories (Hanno and Violette, 1996; Trivedi et al., 2005; and Saad,  2009; 2011), while only 
one study used the prescribed elicitation process to determine the outcome beliefs that underlie taxpayers‟ attitudes 
(Bobek & Hatfield, 2003).    
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Ajzen (2001) considered the merits of using two distinct constructs, or whether these two 
constructs should be aggregated. Ajzen (2001, p.35) concludes that “individuals differ in their 
reliance on cognition versus affect as determinants of attitude, and that the two components 
also take on different degrees of importance for different attitude objects.” Based on the 
above discussion, the distinction between the two measures of intentions was ignored, and 
both affective and cognitive attitude measures were included in the behavioural intention 
construct in the current research model.  
3.3.4 Subjective Norms (Perceived Social Pressure) 
Subjective norms refer to the perceived social pressure to perform or not to perform the 
behaviour of interest (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; and Beck & Ajzen, 1991). Subjective norm is 
defined as an individual‟s perception of whether important referents would expect the 
individual to perform or not perform the behaviour of interest, and the extent to which the 
individual is motivated to conform to the important referents‟ expectation, in respect of that 
behaviour (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980).  
Normative beliefs refer to the perceived behavioural expectations of important referents. 
Salient normative beliefs underpin subjective norms, which comprise two components: 
referents‟ beliefs and motivation to comply. Referents‟ beliefs refer to an individual‟s 
perception of the social pressure to conform to the expectations of important referents (Ajzen 
& Fishbein, 1980). Some commonly identified referents include: spouses or partners; family 
members; close friends; and depending on the behaviour under study, these may include 
business associates, peers, and tax agents. The normative beliefs, in respect of the important 
referents, may result in an overall perceived social pressure or subjective norms (Ajzen, 
2012).  Motivation to comply refers to an individual‟s determination or willingness to comply 
with the specific wishes or expectations of an important referent. The TPB assumes that the 
individual will be willing to engage in the target behaviour, to the extent that the individual 
believes an important referent thinks they should engage in the target behaviour (Ajzen & 
Fishbein, 1980).   
Subjective norm is a function of two factors, an individual‟s normative beliefs, and the 
individual‟s motivation to comply with specific referents‟ expectations. Consistent with the 
EVT, each measure of normative belief is multiplied by a person‟s motivation to comply. 
This is on the basis that an individual will experience social pressures to behave in a certain 
way from particular referents, but only if the individual is motivated to comply with those 
particular referent(s). The subjective norm is expressed algebraically, as set out in the 
following equation:   
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where SN is the subjective norm in relation to a target behaviour, nbj is the normative 
belief (that is a subjective probability) that some referent j thinks one should perform the 
behaviour, mcj is the motivation to comply with referent j, and q is the number of salient 
referents (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; and Conner & Sparks, 2005).  
Subjective norms capture the perceived opinions of important referents. Individuals who 
are highly concerned that important referents will disapprove of them might be more 
influenced by subjective norms than those who are less concerned with what others think of 
them. 
  A number of tests applied to examine the predictive power of the TRA frequently found 
that subjective norms contribute less to the prediction of intention than attitude. This outcome 
suggests that most behaviour are under greater attitudinal control than social influence (Ajzen 
& Fishbein, 1980; and Ajzen, 1991). A study undertaken by Trafimow and Finlay (1996) 
found that behaviour, as well as people, can be under attitudinal and/or normative control. 
Trafimow and Finlay‟s (1996) results also found attitudes to be more important predictors of 
intentions across 29 of the 30 behaviours examined for the study. For the attitudinally 
controlled group, the results reveal that subjective norms had little independent effect on 
intentions to perform most of the behaviours. Similarly, for the normatively controlled group, 
the degree to which intention was attributable to attitude was much smaller than it was for the 
attitudinally controlled group. Their results suggest that attitudes and subjective norms exert 
varying influence on behavioural intentions depending on the behaviour in question, and 
whether the sample group is made up of predominantly attitudinally controlled or normatively 
controlled individuals. 
Another reason frequently provided for the consistently weak explanatory power of 
subjective norms is that this component does not adequately measure normative pressure. 
Evidence suggests that the narrow conceptualisation of the normative measures may be 
responsible for this (Sheeran & Orbell, 1999; and Armitage & Conner, 2001). Fishbein and 
Ajzen (1975) maintain that subjective norms are intended to measure the influence of the 
social environment, while Turner, (1991, p.1) defined social influence as “the process 
whereby people directly or indirectly influence the thoughts, feelings, and actions of others.” 
It is therefore important to distinguish between social influence, injunctive norms (that is, 
77 
 
what important referents think the individual ought to do), and descriptive norms (what 
important referents themselves do), because these are considered to be separate sources of 
motivation (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). The subjective norm components are considered to be 
an injunctive social norm because they are concerned with perceived social pressure (that is, 
the personal potential to gain approval or suffer sanctions from significant others for 
engaging, or not engaging in the target behaviour). Descriptive norms refer to perceptions of 
significant others‟ „own attitude‟ and behaviour in the domain. Individuals use the options 
and actions of important referents to decide what to do themselves (Cialdini et al., 1991; and 
Ajzen, 2012). 
Donald and Cooper (2001) argue that the definition of social influence appears to suggest 
the existence of two social processes that influence behaviour or intention: the overt approval 
of others, and the less direct normative influences. Donald and Cooper (2001) add that the 
TPB‟s social components seem to be operationalised much narrower than suggested by the 
definition, being expressed in terms of the perceived behavioural expectations of important 
others.  
In an attempt to widen the operationalisation of the social influence, a number of 
researchers have suggested the inclusion of perceptions of significant others‟ behaviour, or 
behavioural norms, in the model (for example, Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). This suggests that an 
individual‟s observation of an important referent performing the target behaviour is a more 
powerful influence on his or her intentions to behave in a similar manner, compared to 
behaving based on the perceived expectations of important referents. The importance of using 
behavioural norms to measure the normative component is reflected in a number of studies 
(Donald & Cooper, 2001). The subjective norm construct used for this study includes a 
measure which captures an individual‟s observation of the behaviour of important referents. 
Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) proposed that the important referents should be elicited by 
asking the participant to identify individuals and/or groups whom they think would approve 
or disapprove of them performing the target behaviour. However, this procedure was 
criticised on the basis that it will lead to the inclusion of a number of referents whose views 
are irrelevant to the target behaviour (Donald & Cooper, 2001). It is therefore important to 
identify and select referents that are relevant to the behaviour under examination. Subjective 
norms, for the purposes of this study, will be based on the expectations and behaviour of 
respondents‟ most important referent(s).  
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3.3.5 Perceived Behavioural Control 
PBC is an extension of the TRA, and is the third determinant of intention in the TPB 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). PBC was added to explain behaviours that are not under full 
volitional control, and refers to the perceived ease or difficulty involved in performing the 
behaviour of interest (Ajzen & Madden, 1986; Ajzen, 1991; and Beck & Ajzen, 1991). 
Behavioural intention is also guided by beliefs about the presence of factors which may 
facilitate or impede performance of the behaviour. PBC is considered to influence behaviour 
both directly and through behavioural intentions, and includes all anticipated impediments 
and obstacles with respect to performing the behaviour of interest. This may include the 
availability of resources, skills, confidence and the ease or difficulty of performing or 
refraining from the behaviour and anticipated obstacles. 
The TPB assumes that the control component will predict behavioural intention, and in 
situations where the amount of actual control an individual has over the behaviour can be 
correctly predicted, it will also predict behaviour directly. The path from PBC to behavioural 
intention reflects the motivational influence of control on the target behaviour, through 
intentions (Madden et al., 1992). The direct path between PBC and behaviour reflects the 
actual control a person has over performing the target behaviour (Madden et al., 1992). If 
people perceive that they have limited control over the behaviour of interest, then their 
intention to perform that behaviour may be low, even if attitude towards the behaviour and 
subjective norms are favourable. This suggests that if attitudes and normative influences are 
strong, PBC may be less useful in predicting intentions (Ajzen, 1991). Ajzen (1991) further 
adds that the magnitude of the relationship between PBC and behavioural intention is 
dependent upon the type of behaviour and the nature of the situation. Generally, if individuals 
believe that the target behaviour is achievable, they are more likely to attempt to engage in 
that behaviour.  
 Individuals who believe that they have the necessary skills and resources, and the 
necessary opportunities (or lack of obstacles) to perform the behaviour, will perceive a high 
degree of behavioural control (Ajzen, 1991). Ajzen (1991) explains that each control variable 
is weighted by its perceived power to facilitate or impede performance of the behaviour of 
interest. The TPB computes these beliefs by multiplying the frequency or likelihood of 
occurrence of the factors by the subjective perception of the power of the factor to facilitate or 
inhibit the performance of the behaviour (Conner & Sparks, 2005). PBC is algebraically 
expressed as presented in the following equation:  
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where PBC is the perceived behavioural control, ck is the perceived frequency or 
likelihood of occurrence of factors k, pk is the perceived facilitating or inhibiting power of 
the factor k, and r is the number of control factors.   
Numerous studies have provided evidence that this additional component has the added 
power to predict behavioural intention and behaviour (Ajzen, 1991; and Armitage & Conner, 
2001). However, concerns have been raised regarding the conceptualisations of the control 
variables. Critics argue that the concepts of self-efficacy and perceived control should be 
clearly defined (Giles et al., 2004). This is on the basis that assumptions cannot be made that 
an individual‟s perceptions of the extent to which the target behaviour may be compromised 
by external factors will necessarily reflect their judgments as to how easy that behaviour 
would be to perform (Terry & O‟Leary, 1995). For example, an individual may consider there 
to be few barriers to performing the target behaviour, and may therefore consider the 
behaviour to be under the individual‟s control. At the same time, the individual may also 
believe that the target behaviour is difficult to carry out (Manstead  & Van Eeklen, 1998; and 
Armitage & Conner, 1999a). 
The existing literature does not provide any clear guidelines in terms of which is the 
preferred measure of control. Nonetheless, evidence is accumulating to indicate that self-
efficacy is not only an important addition to the TPB, but it also frequently emerges as the 
most significant predictor of both intentions and behaviour (Armitage & Conner, 2001a). 
Most researchers consider perceived behavioural control and self-efficacy to be 
conceptually similar or equivalent, whereas others have highlighted the subtle differences 
between the two (Sheeran et al., 2001). While both constructs refer to individuals‟ evaluation 
of their ability in the performance of a particular behaviour, one measure is based on the 
perceived difficulty of performing the behaviour, whereas the other is based on the perceived 
confidence in performing the behaviour. PBC is commonly measured in terms of the 
perceived difficulty or ease of performing that particular behaviour. In contrast, self-efficacy 
is frequently measured in terms of an individual‟s confidence in their ability to perform the 
behaviour (Garcia & Mann, 2003). Consistent with most studies, the current research model is 
based on the PBC measures and not on self-efficacy measures  
Several meta-analytical reviews of the TPB demonstrated the significant contribution 
made by the PBC construct towards the prediction of behavioural intention and behaviour 
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(see Ajzen, 1991; and Armitage & Conner, 2001). Armitage and Conner‟s (2001) review, 
which included 185 studies, found that the TPB accounted for 27 percent of the variance in 
subsequent behaviour, and 39 percent of the variance in behavioural intention.  The review 
also found that PBC added significantly to the prediction of intention and behaviour, even 
after controlling for the effects of attitude or subjective norms (which are components of the 
TRA).  
3.3.6 Rationale for Applying the Theory of Planned Behaviour 
In summary, the TPB accounts for a significant proportion of the variance in intention and 
behaviour. The TPB is also arguably one of the dominant models of attitude-behaviour 
relations (Armitage & Christian, 2004). In terms of tax compliance behaviour, the TPB can be 
used with confidence to predict tax compliance behaviour; from taxpayers‟ behavioural 
beliefs, normative beliefs and perceived control of performing the target behaviour 
(complying or not complying with the taxpayers‟ tax obligations). Specifically, if a taxpayer 
holds a positive attitude towards complying with the tax rules, positive expectations from 
important referents that the individual should comply, and if the individual perceives having 
full control of performing the intended behaviour, then it is more likely that the taxpayer will 
comply fully with his or her tax obligations. Conversely, if a taxpayer expects the outcome of 
complying with the tax rules to be unfavourable or negative, and believes that the social 
pressures from important referents is for the individual to not comply, and if there are no 
perceived barriers to noncompliance, then noncompliant behaviour is likely to occur.  
In terms of control over tax compliance behaviour, whilst the New Zealand income tax 
system is based on voluntary compliance, most taxpayers may not have any real choice with 
regard to their tax obligations. The majority of taxpayers, who are salary and wage earners, 
and those who derive income from sources subject to third party reporting (with income 
generally deducted at source), have limited choices when making tax reporting decisions. 
Further, the tax compliance activities of individuals are usually private and not known to 
important referents. As such, whilst the perceived social pressure to comply (or not comply) 
with the referents‟ expectations may be present, important referents may not have the 
knowledge to impose any social sanctions on the individual taxpayer for not conforming to 
their expectations. Nonetheless, a large body of literature has provided overwhelming 
evidence that the TPB is suitable for application to most behavioural research, and the theory 
should therefore benefit tax compliance research. Further, to date far too few studies have 
applied the TPB to examine tax compliance behaviour; therefore, the use of the TPB as the 
underlying framework for the current research model is justified. 
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While the main elements of the TPB are generally accepted, on many occasions 
suggestions were made that a research model based on the TPB would benefit by the 
inclusion of more constructs in order to improve its explanatory quality (Lutz, 2011). Ajzen 
(1991) supports research that addresses the role of additional variables in TPB models. Prior 
studies have demonstrated that the addition of other constructs will enhance the prediction of 
intention and behaviour (Manstead & Parker, 1995; Sheeran & Orbell, 1999; and Bobek & 
Hatfield, 2003). This is another reason for using the TPB in the current study, given that other 
compliance variables identified by prior research can be successfully added to the research 
model. 
3.4 DETERRENCE THEORY 
Deterrence Theory has been widely applied as the theoretical framework in tax compliance 
research (Andreoni et al., 1998; Slemrod et al., 2001; Devos, 2004; Schauer & Bajor, 2007; 
and Nussim & Tabbach, 2009). Deterrence Theory posits that taxpayers make tax paying 
decisions after weighing up the positives and negatives of noncompliance, which are based on 
the probability of detection and the severity of punishment. Deterrence Theory highlights the 
certainty of detection, certainty of being punished, and the severity of the punishment 
imposed for noncompliance with the laws or for criminal or unlawful activities. Deterrence 
Theory combines two research approaches: the economic approach; and the sociological 
approach. The link between Deterrence Theory and the economic model of rational choice is 
well known (Becker, 1968), whereas its link to sociological concerns is less apparent 
(Parsons, 1951).   
Over the years the separation of factors into economic deterrence and fiscal psychology 
categories in tax compliance research has become less distinct (Milliron & Toy, 1988), and 
has now become a matter of degree of emphasis rather than an absolute dichotomy. For 
example, some research may include variables such as tax rates and tax complexity in the 
Economic Deterrence Models, whereas some studies adopting the Fiscal Psychology Models 
have included audits and penalties. Nevertheless, there is still a distinction when it comes to 
the approach adopted in encouraging compliance. The Economic Deterrence Models focus on 
legal sanctions imposed by the tax authority to improve compliance, whereas, the Fiscal 
Psychology Models tend to emphasise taxpayer attitudes and beliefs. However, despite these 
differences most models have their genesis in the early deterrence model developed by 
Becker (1968). 
Deterrence Theory is grounded in the utilitarian paradigm and is influenced by the Utility 
Theory in economics, and Exchange Theory in sociology (Grasmick & Green, 1980). 
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Consistent with economists‟ views of criminal activities, the approach used by Deterrence 
Theory is to view crime as a rational act undertaken by individuals who first evaluate the 
expected utility of both criminal and non-criminal opportunities, before choosing the 
alternative with the highest utility (Reckers et al., 1994).  
The criminal deterrence literature posits that the cost of punishment depends on the 
combination of three elements: the probability of arrest; the probability of conviction; and the 
severity of punishment (Mendes, 2004). This follows that authorities will be able to reduce 
crime by either increasing the probability of arrest, and/or conviction of those arrested, and 
the severity of the punishment through extended prison terms. The theoretical logic is that the 
deterrent effects are achieved by setting the cost of committing a crime high enough to 
dissuade criminal or unlawful activities.    
Becker (1968) was credited for using Deterrence Theory to determine optimal levels of 
law enforcement, and provide an important insight into the analysis of the criminal behaviour 
of individuals. Analysing individual‟s responses to individual elements of deterrence 
increases the knowledge of how or whether certainty of punishment or severity of punishment 
influences the individual‟s decision to engage in criminal or unlawful activities. Becker 
(1968) contends that the deterrent tools for use against unlawful activities (the probability of 
detection and the resulting punishments) are all within the control of the authorities. Becker 
(1968) adds that crimes will be committed if the expected utility of committing the crime 
exceeds the utility derived from allocating the person‟s energies elsewhere. This suggests that 
enforcement can become uneconomical at a point in time, at which stage the social loss of the 
criminal activity becomes apparent.    
Becker‟s (1968) formalisation of Deterrence Theory has withstood the test of time 
(Mendes & McDonald, 2001), with the principal component of Becker‟s (1968) theory being 
based on the certainty and severity of punishment (Becker, 1968). Becker‟s Model,59 
algebraically illustrated in the equation below, states that the number of offences O is a 
function of the average probability of being convicted ( ), average punishment ( ), and a set 
of average socioeconomic forces (u): 
                               
The first two elements,   and  , are the key components of Deterrence Theory (that is, 
certainty of punishment and the severity of punishment). The formula suggests that when 
individuals face a choice of whether or not to commit a crime, they will opt to commit the 
                                                     
59 Reproduced from Mendes and McDonald (2001, p.590). 
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crime if the expected gain exceeds the expected cost. However, if either the certainty or 
severity of punishment is increased, while the other is held constant at a non-zero value, the 
expected utility associated with the crime will decrease (Mendes & McDonald, 2001). 
Becker‟s Model appears to ignore the potential offenders‟ attitude towards risk, given that any 
perceived gains or losses associated with the unlawful behaviour will depend on whether the 
behaviour was punished or not.  
Criminologists maintain that effective communication to establish the credibility of 
punishment threats for illegal behaviour is needed to deter criminal or unlawful behaviours. 
The perception of getting caught (sanction fear) depends on how this message is conveyed to 
individuals. The deterrence literature differentiates threats that are conveyed through the 
media, from those communicated through personal communications. Reliance on the media 
tends to enhance the credibility of the threat of punishment because of the likelihood of 
overestimating the risk of getting caught. Conversely, reliance on personal communication or 
word-of-mouth weakens the credibility of the threat of deterrence because this form of 
communication tends to provide the individual with more accurate assessment about the risk 
of being caught and punished (Zimring & Hawkins, 1973; and Geerken & Gove, 1975).
60
  
Geerken and Gove (1975) consider the success of any deterrence process to be determined by 
the degree to which the deterrence message is successfully conveyed to potential 
noncompliers. Threats of certain and severe legal punishment would not be a deterrent against 
deviant behaviour, unless individuals perceive the threat of punishment to be certain and 
severe. 
Since the introduction of Becker‟s (1968) Model, researchers and scholars have debated 
the differential effects of each of the elements of deterrence on the expected cost of 
punishment (Mendes, 2004). A number of empirical studies examining the effects of different 
components of the Deterrence Theory produced ambiguous results (Mendes & McDonald, 
2001). On the one hand, some researchers argue that severity of punishment has an 
inconsequential effect on the cost of punishment (for example, Decker & Kohfeld, 1990; 
Eide, 1994; Richardson & Sawyer, 2001; and Devos, 2007). In contrast, a number of 
researchers consider severity to be relatively less important than certainty of punishment 
(Becker,1968; and Ehrlich, 1973); while others consider all three elements to be equally 
important (Gibbs, 1968;  Tittle, 1969; Grasmick & Bryjak, 1980; and Mendes & McDonald, 
2001). More recent literature supports the certainty of punishment over the severity of 
                                                     
60 Zimring and Hawkins (1973) distinguished four aspects of criminal deterrence: beliefs regarding the operation 
of deterrence; ethical or moral consideration regarding the use of criminal sanctions for deterrent purposes, the 
economic implications of official deterrence policy, and the political aspect of the use of deterrents in crime 
control policies. 
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punishment, as a deterrent measure for reducing criminal or unlawful behaviour (von Hirsch 
et al., 1999), or at the least, that certainly of punishment is likely to be as effective as the 
severity of punishment (Devos, 2007). Mendes (2004) algebraically and empirically explored 
the statistical formulations of Economic Deterrence Models, and provided support for the 
view that all three elements are equally important. Although Becker (1968) introduced risk 
into the Deterrence Theory, Mendes (2004) questions the relevance of risk in influencing 
behaviour.
61
  Mendes (2004) demonstrated that potential criminals mentally combine the three 
deterrence elements, irrespective of whether they are risk neutral, averse, or acceptant, and 
therefore considers that the risk component is not relevant to the Economic Deterrence 
Models.    
In a tax context, this suggests that the probability of detection, the certainty of the 
punishment and the severity of punishment, are equally important in a tax compliance model 
based on Deterrence Theory. Deterrence Theory posits that individuals behave rationally and 
will choose among competing lawful and unlawful alternatives in order to achieve maximum 
utility of their choices, subject to various constraints. Unlawful or criminal behaviour can be 
considered to be risky. Taxpayers will make choices as to how much of their income to report 
and how much to suppress, and will make their decisions based on the perceived probability 
of the underreporting being detected, the perceived certainty of being punished for the 
underreporting, and the certainty and severity of the penalties imposed (Allingham & 
Sandmo, 1972).  
The sociological approach of Deterrence Theory posits three inhibitory elements of social 
control which controls norm violations: fear of legal punishment, which is imposed by the 
state; fear of social disapproval, which is imposed by peers; and the influence of moral 
conscience, which is imposed by the individual (Grasmick & Green, 1980; Violette, 1989; 
Kaplan et al., 1997; and Bobek & Hatfield, 2003).
62
 The emphasis is on individuals‟ 
perceptions of the perceived certainty and severity of sanctions (legal and non-legal), rather 
than the actual certainty and severity of sanctions. 
3.4.1 Fear of Legal Punishment (Imposed by the State) 
The key element in Deterrence Theory is the threat of legal sanctions, which refers to the 
threat of one form of physical and material deprivation (Grasmick & Green, 1980). Gibbs 
                                                     
61 Becker (1968) contends that the certainty and severity of punishment is conditional upon criminals‟ attitudes 
towards risk. 
62 Fear of social disapproval and moral conscience are also referred to as informal sanctions, extralegal sanctions 
or non-legal sanctions. 
85 
 
(1979) contends that the certainty, severity, and celerity of legal punishment have a direct 
influence on taxpayers‟ perceptions of punishment.63 These perceptions (of punishment) in 
turn activate the operation of deterrence, which constrains unlawful or criminal activities. 
Within this framework, deterrence operates through the fear of punishment, which is 
stimulated by the perceived threat of legal punishment by the authorities. The decision-
making process leading to the decision not to commit a crime is in fact not observable 
because it relates to activities not undertaken (Geerken & Gove, 1975). The specific 
deterrence mechanism is the threat of detection, apprehension and punishment for unlawful or 
criminal behaviours. Deterrence thus occurs when a threat prevents an individual from 
committing the threatened behaviour (Zimring & Hawkins, 1973).  
Among the three elements of control, the use of legal punishment for engaging in unlawful 
or criminal behaviour, in the form of fines or imprisonment, is the easiest and most common 
form of control by authorities. Penalties or legal sanctions are effective if the threat of the 
penalty changes behaviour, or if the expected cost of the penalty exceeds the expected 
benefits of undesirable behaviour. Further, the threat of legal punishment would be more 
effective in deterring unlawful or criminal behaviours, if the potential offender is likely to be 
stigmatised as a result of being legally punished for violating the law (Grasmick & Appleton, 
1977). This suggests that formal punishment may not be the real source of deterrence against 
criminal or unlawful behaviour. Instead, it is the threat of being exposed as an offender to his 
or her peers and the resulting stigmatisation from his or her peers that actually serves as a 
deterrent of legal punishment. This also suggests that to be effective, any legal punishments 
imposed must be visible to others.  
Grasmick and Bryjak (1980) demonstrate that measuring perceived severity using 
respondents‟ subjective personal cost of the penalty expected by them (as opposed to using a 
particular amount of penalty) is a better predictor of deviant behaviour than previous 
measures of perceived severity using a specific amount of penalty. This is because a given 
amount of penalty may be considered severe and costly by some individuals, thereby acting as 
a deterrent against deviant behaviour. Conversely, others may regard that particular amount of 
penalty as insignificant, and therefore the penalties imposed may not be considered severe 
enough to act as a deterrent against deviant behaviour.    
Although a majority of studies on deterrence include some measures of moral commitment 
or threat of social disapproval, in certain situations where the deviant motivation is high, 
                                                     
63 Celerity refers to “the promptness with which punishment is administered following the offense” (Howe & 
Brandau, 1988, p.797). 
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individuals may be willing to incur the cost of „feelings of guilt‟, in order to continue to 
engage in the deviant behaviour (Grasmick & Green, 1980). In such situations, legal 
punishment will have a strong deterrent effect regardless of the level of moral commitments.   
3.4.2 Fear of Social Disapproval (Imposed by Peers) 
The fear of social disapproval, from engaging in an unlawful or criminal activity, is also 
considered to be a deterrent. The key objective of the threat of social disapproval is the 
implicit threat that, through legal sanctions, the individual would be exposed as an offender to 
important others. The important referents would, in turn, impose informal sanctions for 
undertaking the deviant behaviour (Grasmick & Scott, 1982). This suggests that the threat of 
legal sanctions will deter individuals from engaging in deviant behaviour only if the 
punishment is followed by a threat of social disapproval. However, if there is a lack of 
normative consensus, legal sanctions may have a greater deterrent effect on unlawful or 
criminal activities than the threat of social disapproval. Wrong (1961) argues that individuals 
are not only motivated by personal gains and costs, but are equally motivated by approval and 
disapproval from their peers. The deterrent effect from the perceived threat of social 
disapproval lies in individuals‟ anticipation of negative evaluations by important others, if 
they engage in unlawful or criminal behaviour. Wrong (1961) argues that the theoretical 
acceptance of the threat of social disapproval control is based on the assumption that 
individuals are motivated by a desire to achieve a positive image of self by gaining 
acceptance or status in the eyes of others. 
An important aspect of social approval or disapproval is whether the important referents 
(whose approval is desired) are themselves involved in unlawful or criminal behaviour 
(Grasmick& Green, 1980). It follows that, if an individual socialises with others who do not 
violate the law, the social disapproval would be high if the individual violates the law. 
Conversely, if important others engage in unlawful or criminal activities, the threat of non-
legal sanctions (by way of social disapproval) is low or inconsequential. A number of studies 
found a relatively strong positive zero-order relationship between important referents‟ 
involvement in unlawful or illegal activities, and respondents‟ involvement in such activities 
(Grasmick & Green, 1980; Cialdini et al., 1991; and Ajzen, 2012). Conversely, these studies 
also suggest the existence of a strong inverse zero-order link between the threat of social 
disapproval and unlawful and criminal behaviour. 
Blake and Davis (1964) are critical of researchers who focus too heavily on the need for 
social approval in explaining deviant behaviour. Although social approval is enjoyable and 
necessary, it is also “frequently simply instrumental to other competing ends and interests, 
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which limit how much an individual, can invest in approval” (Blake & Davis, 1964, p. 479). 
Instead, it is more realistic to assume that an individual would wish to optimise his or her 
satisfaction, including resistance to social opinions. Blake and Davis (1964) conclude that 
although there is widespread sensitivity to social opinions, it may not reflect a need for social 
approval, rather, it may be interpreted as sensitivity to hints of possibly more severe 
consequences.   
The above argument implies that the perceived threat from legal sanctions, together with 
the threat of social disapproval, have an inhibitory effect on unlawful behaviour. Further, the 
threat of legal punishment is not dependent upon the level of threat of informal sanctions, 
rather, both types of sanctions are considered to be equally effective in deterring unlawful 
activities.  
3.4 3 Influence of Moral Conscience (Imposed by Self) 
An individual‟s personal moral conscience, or moral commitment to obeying the law, is an 
important motivator to obeying the law. However, traditional economic models, based on 
utility maximisation, have ignored the ethical or moral dimensions of economic decision 
making. These models have ignored behaviours, such as when individuals forego 
opportunities for unlawful or criminal gains, even when the expected penalties are negligible. 
The economic model of crime tends to simply regard this as anomalous behaviour that cannot 
be easily explained (Eisenhauer, 2006).    
Eisenhauer (2006) examined the role of conscience in deterring unethical behaviour, and 
concluded that those individuals who anticipate remorse over wrongdoing will consider this 
in their economic choices. Empirical evidence from transitional economies indicates that 
moral sentiments are not only effective deterrents, but also have a significant influence on 
economic outcomes by discouraging tax evasion.
64
 Results suggest that individuals‟ 
consciences could deter unethical conduct in a wider variety of economic contexts in which 
opportunities exist for illicit gain, including tax evasion.  
Grasmick and Scott (1982) argue that moral commitment forms part of sanctions, and they 
view feelings of guilt as a form of self-sanctioning. Grasmick and Scott (1982) also found the 
effect of moral commitment on intended tax cheating to be much stronger than the effects for 
legal sanctions. In contrast, evidence provided by Tittle and Rowe (1973) suggests that 
attempts to increase the level of moral obligation towards tax compliance, by increasing 
                                                     
64 There is no evidence to suggest that the outcome of the research is unique to transitional economies, rather, the 
outcome should equally apply to other countries (Eisenhauer, 2006). 
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feelings of guilt, may have the opposite effect. This is on the basis that any attempts to 
increase individuals‟ moral commitment may signal to them that tax evasion is widespread, 
resulting in the norm against noncompliance losing its moral appeal. 
A number of scholars have argued that morally committed individuals cannot be deterred 
by any form of sanctions, because these individuals never contemplated violating any norms 
of laws (Kinsey, 1986). Grasmick and Green (1980) consider moral commitment or 
internalisation to be such a powerful inhibitor that it precludes the possibility of an individual 
being motivated to deviate, even if the perceived threats of legal punishment are unlikely to 
occur or are minimal. This line of argument suggests that the degree of the effect of perceived 
threat of legal sanction is reliant upon the levels of moral commitment of the individual.   
In summary, literature based on the sociological theory of deterrence indicates that the 
three independent mechanisms of control outlined previously make an independent and 
significant contribution in deterring individuals from engaging in unlawful or criminal 
behaviour. And in a tax context, the three mechanisms of control include: the threat of 
penalties imposed on any tax shortfall detected; the threat of social disapproval from peers 
whose norms would be to fully comply with their tax obligations; and the threat of feelings of 
guilt subsequent to violating an internalised norm, which in this case is complying fully with 
the tax laws. 
3.5 PROCEDURAL JUSTICE THEORY 
Social psychology comprises three key areas of justice: Distributive Justice; Retributive 
Justice and Procedural Justice (Kirchler, 2007). Distributive Justice refers to the exchange of 
resources, which includes all benefits and costs.  
Retributive Justice refers to the perceived appropriateness of sanctions in cases of norms 
breaking (Tyler, 2000, quoted in Kirchler, 2007). It is concerned about attribution of 
responsibility to individuals who are guilty of breaking the norms/wrong-doing, the 
restoration of damages to the wronged party and the punishment a norm-breaker deserves.   
Procedural Justice refers to individuals‟ subjective evaluations of the justice or fairness of 
the decision-making process during any disputes resolution (Tyler, 2007). The evaluation 
process determines whether the procedures were fair or unfair, ethical or unethical, and 
otherwise accord with individuals‟ standards of fair processes for interaction and decision 
making. Procedural Justice can be easily distinguished from subjective assessments of the 
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fairness of outcomes (Distributive Justice) and the degree to which individuals feel they are 
gaining or losing resources in the group (outcome favourability).  
Two main bodies of theory and research have independently examined the criteria 
individuals use to evaluate the fairness of a procedure, which include the efforts of Thibaut 
and Walker (1975) and Leventhal (1980). Thibaut and Walker (1975) developed Procedural 
Justice Theory (PJT) from their pioneering work on disputes resolution procedures. The 
findings from this study demonstrate that individuals‟ evaluations of the fairness of the 
authorities‟ decision-making processes and procedures will influence their acceptance of the 
outcome from any dispute resolution. This hypothesis has been strongly supported by a 
number of subsequent studies on the resolution of legal disputes (Tyler, 1988). The findings 
suggest that disputants who are given control of the disputes resolution process, or process 
control, will be more likely to consider the verdict to be fair, even when the outcome is 
unfavourable. Process control refers to control over the opportunity to be able to present 
evidence to support an individual‟s arguments in respect of the dispute.  
Thibaut and Walker (1975) further contend that decision control, which refers to control 
over the outcome of the dispute, also affects an individual‟s perception of the fairness of the 
procedure or procedural fairness. PJT, therefore, asserts that perceptions of procedural 
fairness, in respect of a disputes process, will increase an individual‟s level of acceptance of 
the outcome, even when the outcome is negative or unfavourable to the individual. 
Leventhal (1980, p. 36) examined PJT and defined the concept of procedural fairness “as 
an individual‟s perception of the fairness of procedural components of the social system that 
regulate the allocative process.” Procedural Justice is considered to be a function of the extent 
to which a number of procedural justice rules are complied with, or compromised. Leventhal 
(1980) identified six justice rules, and contends that most people use these rules to evaluate 
the fairness of the allocative procedures. Individuals will consider the allocative procedures to 
be fair when certain criteria are satisfied, which include: consistency, accuracy, bias 
suppression, correctability, representation and ethicality (Leventhal, 1980).  
3.5.1 Consistency 
The consistency rule concerns treating all individuals equally over time. The rule 
prescribes that allocative resources should be distributed across persons and over time. 
Leventhal (1980) argues that individuals may believe that procedural fairness is being 
violated if the procedures appear to lack any consistency. Tyler (2007) adds that individuals 
would tend to seek a level playing field in which no one is disadvantaged, including them. 
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Individuals would therefore expect the authorities to base their decisions on the consistent 
application of the rules and the objective facts.  
In order for the taxpayer to accept any outcome from a disputes process, the tax authority 
must be seen to be consistent in their treatment of all individuals in disputes with the tax 
authority. Taxpayers who perceive that they are treated in a similar manner to others, and 
having the tax rules applied in a consistent manner, will tend to be more accepting of the 
outcome than if they perceive that the disputes process was being applied inconsistently 
across taxpayers.  
3.5.2 Accuracy 
The accuracy rule refers to the correctness and quality of the decision-making process. 
The accuracy rule prescribes that the allocative process should be based on good information 
and an informed opinion. Leventhal (1980) maintains that procedural fairness will be violated 
if inappropriate information was provided, or information required for the decision making 
was provided by incompetent observers. It is, therefore, important to ensure that accurate 
information is provided by competent observers in order to ensure that the procedural fairness 
of the process will not be perceived to be violated.  
The accuracy rule requires the tax authority to ensure correct and accurate information is 
gathered and used in making decisions relating to the imposition of penalties. Further, the tax 
authority should ensure that the person who makes the decision (to impose penalties, or the 
quantum of penalties), must be properly qualified to undertake the task and make the correct 
decision.  
3.5.3 Bias Suppression 
The bias suppression rule refers to not allowing any favouritism or external bias to enter 
into the disputes process. Leventhal (1980) maintains that procedural fairness may be 
perceived to be compromised when there is unrestrained self-interest or devotion to doctrine. 
Tyler (2007) adds that people are influenced by judgments about neutrality, and that 
individuals expect the authorities to deal honestly, impartially and objectively, and not to 
allow their personal values and biases to influence their decisions.  
For the tax authority, the bias suppression rule means that any process carried out under 
the penalties regime, or any other disputes process, should be perceived to be free from any 
institutional bias, and bias from individual officers. Taxpayers would expect the tax authority 
to treat them fairly, impartially and objectively during any disputes process.   
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3.5.4 Correctability 
The correctability rule is concerned with the flexibility to amend unfair or inaccurate 
decisions made. Leventhal (1980) contends that the availability of formal or informal appeals 
procedures at various stages of the allocative process will increase the perceived level of 
fairness towards the procedure. Individuals are more likely to accept an unfavourable 
outcome if they perceive that there is an opportunity available for the individual to correct any 
incorrect decision that may have been made based on incorrect information or assumptions.    
Consistent with the PJT, the availability of an appeals procedure in any tax disputes 
resolution process will enhance taxpayers‟ perception of the fairness of the process. The tax 
authority should therefore provide a process, whereby taxpayers can dispute the tax (or 
penalties) position adopted by the tax authority. Taxpayers‟ perceptions of procedural fairness 
will increase if the tax authority provides legitimate avenues for disputing the decisions made 
by the tax authority, such as, an independent appeals and review unit.
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3.5.5 Representation 
The representation  rule refers to the opportunity given to the disputant to be involved in 
the disputes process. Leventhal (1980) contends that those who are affected by the proposed 
decisions should be represented in all phases of the disputes process. Leventhal (1980) adds 
that individuals will attribute greater fairness to allocative procedures when the individuals 
are involved in the decision-making process. Tyler (2007) adds that individuals will perceive 
a process to be fair if they are allowed to participate in the resolution of their problems  
and conflicts. Tyler (2007) maintains that the positive effects of giving respondents the 
opportunity to participate have been widely supported. 
From a tax perspective, the representation rules should ensure that taxpayers‟ views are 
included in any tax disputes they may have with the tax authority. Further, the taxpayers‟ 
perception of procedural fairness will be compromised if the tax authority does not involve 
the taxpayer in the disputes process involving the individual.  
3.5.6 Ethicality 
The final justice rule, ethicality, prescribes that allocative procedures must be consistent 
with basic moral and ethical values of individuals.  Leventhal (1980) contends that perceived 
fairness will be reduced when allocative procedures violate personal standards of ethics and 
                                                     
65 The Adjudication Unit in the IRD, which operates impartially and independently, provides taxpayers with a 
legitimate platform to dispute the tax authority‟s decisions.  
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morality. Leventhal (1980) further adds that another important aspect of ethicality is that the 
procedures used should also support individuals‟ self-respect. This suggests that the 
authorities should treat individuals politely and with respect. Support for the ethicality rule is 
provided by a number of researchers who considered the importance of recognising 
individuals‟ need to be treated politely and with respect (for example, Tyler & Folger, 1980; 
and Tyler, 2007).    
The ethicality rule should also apply in any tax disputes process. Taxpayers will expect all 
aspects of any disputes process to be consistent with the taxpayers‟ moral and ethical values. 
If the disputes process adopted by the tax authority is perceived to violate the taxpayers‟ 
personal standards (which can differ for different taxpayers), perceived fairness of the 
procedure will be reduced. This will lead to taxpayers not accepting the outcome of the 
disputes process.  
Whilst Thibaut and Walker‟s (1975) research focuses on judgments of process control, 
which are used to evaluate the fairness of procedures applied in resolving disputes, 
Leventhal‟s  (1980) focus was on the use of justice rules to evaluate the fairness of allocative 
procedures. The six justice rules identified above posit that the relevant defined criteria must 
be satisfied for a procedure to be perceived as fair.  
PJT suggests that the basic criteria used to evaluate the fairness of procedures may change 
with circumstances, so that an individual can apply procedural rules selectively and follow 
different rules at different times, based on circumstances (Leventhal, 1980). Leventhal (1980) 
adds that in some situations, one justice rule may be more relevant than others, resulting in 
judgments of procedural fairness being dominated by that particular rule. Conversely, in other 
situations, several justice rules may be relevant, which jointly influence the judgments of 
procedural fairness. Further, the influence of a justice rule on individual‟s judgments of 
procedural fairness is expressed as its weight. Justice rules with greater weights are 
considered to have greater impact on judgments of procedural fairness, and vice versa.       
Murphy (2003) observes that concerns about fairness of procedures remain high, despite 
criticism from opponents of the theory, who suggest that individuals are more concerned 
about the favourability of their outcomes, and less concerned about the fairness of procedures 
(Casper et al., 1988; and Lind et al., 1993). Tyler and Smith (1998) maintain that most 
individuals‟ behaviours are strongly associated with perceptions about justice and injustice. 
Further, procedural justice literature provides evidence to support the view that individuals‟ 
experiences with the authorities influence their evaluations of the fairness of the procedures 
adopted by these authorities (Lind & Tyler, 1988; and Tyler, 2000; 2001).  In a tax context, if 
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individuals perceive a procedure adopted by the tax authority to be unfair, they are more 
likely to challenge the authority‟s decisions.  
3.6 MOTIVATIONAL POSTURES (SOCIAL DISTANCE) 
Motivational Posturing Theory (MPT) was derived from empirical analysis of regulatees 
and how they perceive those (authorities or regulators) who try to regulate them (Braithwaite 
and Job, 2003).
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 MPT draws on three bodies of research; first Merton‟s (1968) Theory of 
Modes of Adaptation, which acknowledges that socially valued goals can be obstructed, and 
how individuals will use any means to achieve these goals. The second contributor is PJT and 
Distributive Justice Theory (DJT), which recognises the importance of social bonds in 
determining regulatory effectiveness. Finally, Attitude Theory (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) 
and Stress Theory (Rokeach, 1973) links the goals and relationships together.  
Arguably, anything that jeopardises an individual‟s sense of self (for example, an 
obstructed goal) will result in the evaluation of the threat, and the coping responses, in order 
to protect the self (Rokeach, 1973; and Lazarus & Folkman, 1984 – cited in Braithwaite and 
Job, 2003).  The coping responses in MPT allows social distancing from the authority, so that 
any „pro-compliance messages‟ cannot be heard, or not processed in relation to the protection 
or promotion of one‟s sense of self-worth. The objective for those using response regulations 
is therefore to reduce the social distance between the regulator and the regulatees, in order to 
increase the regulator‟s ability to influence the regulatees. 
Prior research has used motivational postures to capture the “way regulatees position 
themselves in relation to regulatory authority” (Braithwaite, 2003a, p.17). Braithwaite 
(2003a) contends that while authorities have legal legitimacy, they may not have 
psychological legitimacy. Authorities tend to be evaluated in terms of what they represent and 
their performance. Individuals and groups tend to develop positions in relation to the 
authority, based on these evaluations. The psychological concept of this positioning is 
referred to as social distance (Bogardus, 1928- cited in Braithwaite, 2003a). This term is used 
to describe the stances that taxpayers openly express in their relationship with the tax 
authority.  
In terms of tax compliance behaviour, the social distance or motivational postures are 
considered to account for the self-positioning of taxpayers relative to the tax authority 
(Braithwaite, 2003a). These postures reflect the underlying beliefs and attitudes, which are 
shared, borrowed, challenged, and elaborated through social communication. Five 
                                                     
66 MPT is summarised from Braithwaite and Job (2003). 
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motivational postures, ranging from deference-oriented postures to defiance-oriented 
postures, were identified as being relevant to tax compliance behaviour: commitment, 
capitulation, resistance, disengagement, and game playing (Braithwaite, 2003a).  
Commitment represents beliefs about the desirability of tax systems and moral obligations 
to act in the interest of society at large, and pay one‟s tax willingly. Capitulation reflects 
acceptance of the tax authority as the legitimate authority that will use its power if necessary. 
Resistance refers to a sense of apprehension towards the tax authority‟s intentions, and to 
resist the tax authority‟s power. The disengagement posture represents taxpayers who display 
contempt for the tax authority, and who have decided to disengage from the tax system, thus 
putting the most social distance between themselves and the tax authority. This is the most 
difficult posture for the tax authority to deal with (Braithwaite et al., 1994). The last 
motivational posture, game playing, described as attitude towards the legal rules was a later 
addition (Braithwaite, 2003a).
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Braithwaite (2003a) contends that motivational postures are not directly related to 
behaviour, on the basis that they are fairly broad and attitudinal, rather than specific and 
behavioural.  However, whilst they may not lead directly to certain behaviour, they may 
precede behaviour. The research model in the current study is based on the TPB, which uses 
attitudinal variables to predict compliance behaviour. Accordingly, it should be acceptable to 
include measures of motivational postures to extend the research model proposed for this 
study. In a tax context, motivational postures or the social distance are considered to account 
for the self-position in relation to the tax authority (Hartner et al., 2008). 
3.7 SUMMARY 
This chapter presented and described the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) and selected 
theories underpinning some of the constructs used in the TPB Model.  A more comprehensive 
review of the TPB was provided because the TPB Model is used as a theoretical framework to 
develop the research model.  
The TPB and its predecessors were developed from Expectancy-Value Theory, which 
provides a framework for understanding the relationship between attitudes and beliefs, and its 
influence on motivation to engage in the behaviour of interest. The TPB Model provides an 
insight into factors that motivate people‟s behaviour, by examining their beliefs about the 
outcome from performing the target behaviour, and how this outcome results in attitudes 
towards the behaviour.  The key elements of the TPB were discussed in depth, which include, 
                                                     
67 This study only examines the four motivational postures and excludes game playing. 
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attitudes toward the behaviour, subjective norms, and perceived behavioural control. The 
effect of behavioural intention on behaviour was also discussed. A large body of empirical 
research, some cited in this study, provides support to the predictive validity for the TPB, thus 
providing justification for its use in the current tax compliance research.     
This chapter then introduced Deterrence Theory and its development from the original 
work of Becker (1968). Deterrence Theory is based on the rational person, who seeks to 
maximise utility. Criminal behaviours are deterred by either increasing the probability of 
arrest, the certainty of conviction of those arrested, or the severity of the punishment. From a 
tax perspective, the increased probability of detection for noncompliance, together with the 
increased certainty of punishment and the severity of the punishment, will act as a deterrent. 
In addition, this chapter discussed the three inhibitory elements of social control considered to 
control norm violations: fear of legal punishment, which is imposed by the state; fear of social 
disapproval, which is imposed by peers; and the influence of moral conscience, which is 
imposed by the individual.   
Procedural Justice Theory (PJT) was then presented and was described as a process by 
which individuals apply one or multiple justice rules to determine the allocative fairness of a 
process. If the process is perceived to be procedurally fair, the authority will have legitimacy, 
and any decisions made by the authority are more likely to be accepted, even if the outcome is 
unfavourable. 
The final section of this chapter described the social distance, or motivational postures, 
which were incorporated into the research model. Motivational postures are used by taxpayers 
to express their relationship with the tax authority. The postures range from compliance 
oriented attitudes (or deference) to noncompliance oriented attitudes (defiance), and 
individuals adopt different postures in response to different signals from authority. The more 
social distance individuals place between themselves and the tax authority, the more difficult 
it is for the authority to deal with this group. Conversely, those who place the least distance 
between themselves and the authority tend to accept the legitimacy of the authority, making it 
easier for the authority to regulate this group.   
The present research draws upon the theories discussed in this chapter and builds these 
into the research model, which will be used to study tax compliance behaviour of New 
Zealand taxpayers. The next chapter of this study outlines the development of the research 
model (which includes the key variables based on theories discussed in this chapter), and the 
hypotheses, including the theoretical justification for the hypotheses tested.   
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CHAPTER 4 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the research hypotheses of the current study. The key objective of 
this research is to examine the influence of the beliefs and attitudinal elements of the Theory 
of Planned Behaviour (TPB) on tax compliance behaviour. Further, a selected number of 
other constructs incorporated into the current research model were also examined, and their 
effects on compliance behaviour were also tested. Section 4.2 of this chapter presents the 
theoretical frameworks, which include: the TPB; Procedural Justice Theory (PJT) and the 
Process Model of Regulation (PMR) which is based on PJT (with brief references made to 
Deterrence Theory and Motivational Posturing Theory). Section 4.3 describes the 
development of the hypotheses in respect of the research model, and the final section 4.4, 
concludes by providing a summary of this chapter. 
4.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This study draws upon four main theoretical frameworks to guide the current research. The 
first, Ajzen‟s (1991) TPB, posits that individuals make rational choices to engage (or not 
engage) in the behaviour of interest.
68
 The choices made are influenced by individuals‟ own 
beliefs about the outcome and the evaluation of the favourableness (or unfavourableness) of 
the outcomes from engaging in the target behaviour. These beliefs and expected outcomes 
underlie three conceptually distinct salient beliefs, which are central to the TPB Model: 
behavioural beliefs (perceived beliefs about the likely outcomes from engaging in the target 
behaviour and the evaluation of the desirability of these outcomes); normative beliefs 
(perceived social pressure); and control beliefs (perceived ease of engaging in a desired 
behaviour). Collectively, these elements influence individuals‟ intentions to engage in 
behaviour.  
Since its development some twenty years ago, the TPB has been widely used to explain 
human behaviour. The literature suggests that the TPB is one of the most influential models in 
predicting behavioural intentions and behaviours, and it has been comprehensively validated 
in the behavioural domain (Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen & Driver, 1991; Madden et al., 1992; and 
Parker et al., 1995).  Further, the TPB provides a comprehensive theory of the antecedents to 
behaviour and a structure for extending prior research of the model (Bobek et al., 2007). 
                                                     
68 A detailed description of the TPB is presented in Chapter 3 of this study. 
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Despite the successful use of the TPB in behavioural research, only three studies (Bobek & 
Hatfield, 2003; Trivedi et al., 2005; and Saad, 2009; 2011) have successfully adapted the 
theory to examine tax compliance behaviour.
69
 Although there is overwhelming support for 
the TPB Model to predict behaviour, researchers continue to call for additional variables to be 
added to the Model, in an attempt to further enhance the Model‟s predictive capability 
(Conner & Armitage, 1998; and Lutz, 2011).   
In response to this call, a number of constructs that are supported in prior literature as 
having an influence on tax compliance behaviour were added to the current research model: 
societal norms; tax system; tax authority; and motivational postures. Two further constructs 
were also added which are hypothesised to influence attitudes toward performing the target 
behaviour and compliance behaviour: justice elements of the Compliance and Penalties 
Regime (CPR), and effectiveness of the CPR. All the components incorporated into the TPB 
based research model, which are used to predict compliance behaviour, are presented and 
described in section 4.2 of this chapter. This includes all the hypotheses developed for this 
research.    
The second theoretical framework that underpins this study is PJT, developed by Thibaut 
and Walker (1975) and Leventhal (1980).
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 Procedural Justice concerns the perceived fairness 
of the procedures adopted during decision making, and the perceived treatment an individual 
receives from the authority or the decision maker.  PJT predicts that individuals‟ assessments 
of any perceived injustice of a procedure may result in disobedience, or result in the 
authority‟s decisions not being accepted by these individuals. Conversely, perceived fairness 
of a procedure will result in individuals accepting even unfavourable outcomes. Thibaut and 
Walker (1975) demonstrate that individuals‟ assessments of the fairness of the decision-
making procedures lead to the acceptance of the legitimacy of the authority making the 
decisions, and will positively influence their satisfaction with the authority‟s decisions or 
outcomes.  
 Evaluations of procedural injustice are related to the perceived unfairness of the 
methods and procedures used to determine the outcomes (Procedural Justice). If the 
approaches by which outcomes are distributed are seen to be fair, then discrepancies in 
outcomes may also be judged to be fair (Tyler, 2001). Consistent with Tyler‟s argument, 
evaluations of the fairness of decisions made by the tax authority when deciding to impose 
penalties may lead to taxpayers accepting the outcomes, provided the process is also judged to 
                                                     
69 To the best of the author‟s knowledge, these are the only four published studies that applied the TPB to examine 
tax compliance behaviour. Hanno & Violette (1996) used the TRA, which is the predecessor of the TPB.  
70 PJT was discussed in detail in Chapter 3 (section 3.5). 
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be fair. Murphy (2005) cautions that the use of intimidation on taxpayers to comply may 
undermine the legitimacy of the tax authority. Leventhal (1980) contends that the fairness of 
most procedures are judged by their perceived adherence to one or more of the six justice 
rules: consistency of application; bias suppression; use of accurate information; correctability 
of decisions based on incorrect information; adequate representation of the concerns of those 
affected; and the ethicality of the decision maker. This study will focus on four of the six 
justice rules of PJT: accuracy; consistency; bias suppression; and representation, which will 
be used to test the relationships between tax enforcement procedures and attitudes towards 
compliance, and also, between tax enforcement procedures and compliance behaviour. The 
author considers these four justice rules to be the most relevant for evaluating the influence of 
the perceived fairness of the CPR on compliance. Leventhal (1980) confirms that it is not 
necessary to use all six criteria or justice rules to evaluate the fairness of a procedure. 
The research model also includes Tyler‟s (2010) PMR, which was developed from PJT. 
PJT
71
 has important implications for legal authorities. The authorities are entrusted with 
establishing a law-abiding society by securing citizens‟ voluntary compliance with the legal 
authorities‟ decisions, and long-term compliance with the law (Tyler, 2010). Similarly, the 
PMR may have important implications for the tax authority, whose role is to ensure all 
taxpayers voluntarily comply with the tax laws.  
The PMR takes into consideration the limited effectiveness of criminal sanctions in 
encouraging compliance and cooperation (Tyler, 2010). Tyler (2010) added that, although 
authorities may employ deterrence policies based on sanctions and threats, effective social 
control or regulation is reliant upon individuals‟ voluntary self-regulation. The process-based 
model of regulation, proposed by PJT, emphasises the procedural justice of legal authorities, 
rather than the deterrent effects of sanctions. The PMR posits that “the effects of procedural 
justice during interactions with legal authorities can continue over time and eventually lead to 
voluntary cooperation of and support for legal authorities in one‟s daily life” (Tyler, 2010, p. 
974). This suggests that the effects of frequent interactions involving positive justice 
judgments influences individuals‟ evaluation about the legitimacy of the legal authority.  The 
perceived legitimacy in turn will lead to feelings of obligation to observe the laws.  
Thus, the PMR emphasises the key role of procedural justice judgments in influencing 
individuals‟ current and future compliance behaviour. The tax authority uses a range of 
enforcement and administrative tools to deter noncompliance with the tax legislation. Based 
on the success of the PMR in encouraging voluntary compliance with legal laws, the PMR 
                                                     
71 A description of the PJT is presented in Chapter 3. 
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can also be successfully applied by the tax authority to influence compliance behaviour. This 
can be achieved by increasing the individuals‟ perceptions of the legitimacy of the tax 
authority, which in turn will encourage taxpayers to voluntarily comply with their tax 
obligations. This study will therefore focus on the perceptions of the taxpayer towards the tax 
authority, and examine the relationships between the tax authority and taxpayers‟ compliance 
behaviour.    
The third and fourth theoretical frameworks used to develop the hypotheses which were 
discussed in detail in Chapter 3 include: Deterrence Theory (to measure attitudinal beliefs and 
effectiveness of the CPR); and Motivational Posturing Theory (MPT) (to measure the social 
distance between taxpayers and the tax authority). In brief, Deterrence Theory is based on the 
premise that taxpayers will be deterred from noncompliance by the threat of legal and/or non-
legal sanctions, whereas MPT is based on the assumption that taxpayers who place the most 
social distance between themselves and the tax authority are less compliant than those with 
the least social distance between themselves and the tax authority.   
4.3 DEVELOPMENT OF THE HYPOTHESES 
The preceding sections provide evidence in support of the propositions that attitudes 
(based on both legal and non-legal sanctions), subjective norms, and perceived behavioural 
control collectively influence taxpayers‟ intentions to comply (or not comply) with their tax 
obligations. Further, in terms of the current research model, the previous section and the next 
ten sections also support the propositions that: societal norms; perceptions of the tax 
authority; perceptions of the tax system; and the social distance between taxpayers and tax 
authority; together with the TPB constructs, collectively influence taxpayers‟ intentions to 
comply (or not comply) with the tax laws. Support is also provided for the propositions that 
the justice elements of the CPR and the perceived effectiveness of the CPR contribute 
towards influencing the attitudes of taxpayers, and also compliance behaviours. These 
propositions and hypotheses are reflected in Figure 4.1. The supporting hypotheses are 
outlined in the remainder of this section.   
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Figure 4.1: Research Hypotheses 
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4.3.1 Influence of Behavioural Intentions 
Behavioural intention is an antecedent to actual behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). The TPB posits 
that behavioural intention is the most influential predictor of behaviour. A positive intention 
to comply with the tax laws will positively influence tax compliance behaviour. This 
prediction is reflected in the following hypothesis, which proposes to test the relationship 
between behavioural intention and behaviour:  
H1:   POSITIVE BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS TO COMPLY WILL POSITIVELY 
INFLUENCE TAX COMPLIANCE BEHAVIOUR.   
4.3.2 Influence of Attitudes 
Attitudes can influence a person‟s intention by increasing the person‟s motivation to 
engage in a particular behaviour. That is, individuals are more likely to engage in behaviours 
that are perceived to have favourable outcomes for them, and are less likely to engage in 
activities that are associated with unfavourable outcomes.
72
 
Attitudes based on non-legal sanctions include measures of guilt feelings, sense of civic 
duty and moral values. These are collectively referred to as tax morale, and are considered to 
have significant influence on tax compliance behaviour (Hanno & Violette, 1996; Kirchler, 
2007; Kornhauser, 2007; and Torgler, 2007).  
Attitudes based on legal sanctions include measures of perceived probability of detection, 
perceived certainty of punishment and perceived severity of penalties. A majority of the 
available literature on tax compliance, based on the economic models of tax compliance, 
report a significant relationship between these elements of legal sanctions and tax compliance 
behaviour (Jackson & Milliron, 1986; Carnes & Englebrecht, 1995; Maciejovsky et al., 2001; 
and Richardson & Sawyer, 2001). However, an increasing number of studies indicate the lack 
of this predicted effect on tax compliance (Kirchler, 2007; Kornhauser, 2007; and Torgler, 
2007).  
The prediction is that taxpayers with a positive attitude (based on informal or non-legal 
sanctions) towards tax compliance are more likely to develop strong intentions to comply 
with their tax obligations. Conversely, taxpayers with a positive attitude based on effects of 
formal (or legal) sanctions will not have any significant effect on behavioural intentions. This 
is reflected in the following two hypotheses, which propose to test the relationships between 
attitudes and intentions to comply:    
                                                     
72 Two constructs measure attitude, one is based on legal sanctions and the other based on non-legal sanctions.  
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H2a: POSITIVE ATTITUDES (BASED ON INFORMAL SANCTIONS) TOWARDS 
TAX COMPLIANCE WILL HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT ON BEHAVIOURAL 
INTENTIONS.  
H2b:  POSITIVE ATTITUDES (BASED ON FORMAL SANCTIONS) TOWARDS TAX 
COMPLIANCE WILL NOT HAVE ANY EFFECT ON BEHAVIOURAL 
INTENTIONS.  
4.3.3 Influence of Subjective Norms 
The TPB predicts that subjective norms, which comprise of normative beliefs and 
motivation to comply, will influence individuals‟ intentions to engage in target behaviours 
(Ajzen, 2010). Normative beliefs, for the purpose of this study, were operationalised with 
three measures: perception of important referent‟s expectations, perception of important 
referent‟s own behaviour, and perception of the threat of losing important referent‟s respect.   
 Individuals who believe that important referents think they should engage in the target 
behaviour, and who are motivated to conform to important referents‟ expectations, will hold a 
positive subjective norm (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). Conversely, if the individual perceives 
that important referents think that the individual should not engage in the behaviour, a 
negative subjective norm will result. Further, an individual who is less motivated to comply 
with important referents‟ expectations will hold a relatively neutral subjective norm. In a tax 
context, individuals who believe an important referent expects them to comply with their tax 
obligations will conform, provided they are also motivated to do so. 
Empirical evidence provides support that taxpayers who believe their friends and 
acquaintances are noncompliers are more likely to not comply themselves (Grasmick & Scott, 
1982; and Spicer, 1989). Consistent with these findings, taxpayers who believe that important 
referents are compliant (or not compliant) will themselves comply (or not comply). 
Several studies have identified a relationship between the threat of losing respect from 
peers and tax compliance (Grasmick & Scott, 1982; and Grasmick & Bursik, 1990). 
Individuals, who believe that they would lose the respect of their peers or referents if they do 
not comply, and who value the referents‟ respect, are more likely to comply. Although in 
most cases individuals‟ tax compliance decisions are not publicly available, the perceived fear 
of losing their peers‟ respect will, nevertheless, act as a deterrent against noncompliance.  
Based on the above predictions, a taxpayer‟s behavioural intention will be influenced by 
perceived social pressures from relevant referents, and the strength of the taxpayer‟s 
motivation to meet the referents‟ expectations. This prediction is stated formally in the 
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following hypothesis, which proposes to test the relationship between subjective norms and 
behavioural intention: 
H3:  POSITIVE SUBJECTIVE NORMS WILL POSITIVELY INFLUENCE 
BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS. 
4.3.4 Influence of Perceived Behavioural Control 
The TPB posits that an individual‟s behaviour can be predicted by the individual‟s 
appraisal of his or her ability, and the perceived ease (or difficulty) in performing (or 
refraining from or avoiding) the target behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). Control is achieved by 
having the relevant skills, opportunities, resources and the absence of any obstacles in 
performing the desired behaviour (Madden et al., 1992). PBC was operationalised by three 
variables: presence (or absence) of opportunity; visibility of the income (third party 
reporting); and financial distress (cash flow problems). Those with the structural opportunity 
have more control over their income, and therefore will have a higher level of control over 
their tax reporting behaviour (Warneryd & Walerud, 1982; Robben et al., 1990; and Slemrod, 
2007). Income subject to third party reporting or income visibility can exert a significant 
influence on compliance (Kagan, 1989; and Carnes & Englebrecht, 1995). A highly visible 
income stream would impede or represent an obstacle to any noncompliant intentions. 
Warneryd and Walerud (1982) suggest that financially distressed individuals are more likely 
to engage in tax evasion than those experiencing less or no economic strain. The lack of funds 
to pay taxes would inhibit or present an obstacle to any compliance intentions taxpayers may 
have. Studies have also demonstrated that financial constraints have a direct and strong 
influence on the compliance behaviour of self-employed taxpayers (Loo et al., 2008).  
The survey instrument measures the degree of control a person perceives (s)he holds for 
underreporting income. A lower degree of perceived control due to lack of opportunity, 
income visibility and income subject to third party reporting may impede a person from 
undertaking noncompliant behaviour. Therefore, the greater the person‟s beliefs about the 
presence of factors that may impede noncompliant behaviour, the greater will be the 
likelihood of them complying with the tax laws. This prediction is stated formally in the two 
following hypotheses, which test the relationships between PBC and behavioural intentions, 
and between PBC and behaviour: 
H4a:  LOWER DEGREES OF PERCEIVED BEHAVIOURAL CONTROL OVER 
NONCOMPLIANCE WILL POSITIVELY INFLUENCE BEHAVIOURAL 
INTENTIONS.   
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H4b: LOWER DEGREES OF PERCEIVED BEHAVIOURAL CONTROL OVER 
NONCOMPLIANCE WILL POSITIVELY INFLUENCE TAX COMPLIANCE 
BEHAVIOUR.  
4.3.5 Influence of Societal Norms 
The literature provides evidence that individuals will comply with their tax obligations as 
long as they believe that compliance is prevalent among the general population. Cialdini and 
Trost (1998), who referred to societal norms as descriptive norms, define this as values or 
principles developed from observing how others behave in certain situations. In the current 
study, societal norms refer to the perception of the tax compliance behaviour of society at 
large; in particular, the perception of whether tax compliance (or noncompliance) is prevalent 
in society.  
The influence of societal norms is considered to be an important determinant of the tax 
compliance behaviour of individuals. If a taxpayer believes that other taxpayers are cheating 
with their taxes, or even accepting noncompliant behaviour from others, then the taxpayer 
will also be tempted to cheat with his or her taxes (Bergman, 2002; Sandmo, 2005; and Alm, 
2012). Alm (2012) contends that the more prevalent noncompliance is perceived to be, the 
more socially acceptable noncompliance would become, leading to lower subjective 
probability of detection.  
Based on prior studies, the proposition is that taxpayers will comply with their tax 
obligations as long as they believe that compliance is the society norm. This prediction is 
reflected in the following hypothesis, which proposes to test the relationship between 
individual taxpayer‟s perception of the tax compliance behaviour of the general population of 
taxpayers, and the individual‟s own compliance behaviour:   
H5: PERCEPTIONS OF THE PREVALENCE OF TAX COMPLIANCE BY THE 
GENERAL POPULATION (POSITIVE SOCIETAL NORMS) WILL POSITIVELY 
INFLUENCE BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS.  
4.3.6 Influence of Perceptions of the Tax System 
Evidence from the tax compliance literature suggests that individuals‟ attitudes and 
perceptions of the tax system are related to compliance behaviour. Perceived inequalities in 
the tax system are associated with noncompliant behaviour (Cowell, 1990). Sheffrin and 
Triest‟s (1992) review of attitudinal literature provides evidence that individuals‟ attitudes 
and perceptions of the tax system are related to tax compliance. Studies have even 
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demonstrated that attitudes towards the tax system are more important than other economic 
variables in explaining noncompliant behaviour (Kirchler, 1999).  
The predicted effects of a favourable or positive perception of the tax system positively 
increase a person‟s tax compliance behaviour. Conversely, they are less likely to comply fully 
if they view the tax system unfavourably. This leads to the proposition that a favourable view 
of the tax system is a positive predictor of intentions to comply and tax compliance 
behaviour. The prediction is stated formally in the following two hypotheses, which test the 
relationships between perceptions toward the tax system and behavioural intentions, and 
between perceptions toward the tax system and behaviour: 
H6a:  FAVOURABLE VIEWS OF THE TAX SYSTEM WILL HAVE A POSITIVE 
INFLUENCE ON BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS.   
H6b: FAVOURABLE VIEWS OF THE TAX SYSTEM WILL HAVE A POSITIVE 
INFLUENCE ON TAX COMPLIANCE BEHAVIOUR.  
4.3.7 Influence of Perceptions of the Tax Authority 
The literature on PJT‟s PMR (discussed earlier in this chapter) theorises that favourable 
perceptions of the tax authority will increase the authority‟s legitimacy (Gilligan & 
Richardson, 2005; and Tyler, 2010). The legitimacy of the tax authority, in turn, will result in 
taxpayers feeling obliged to obey the tax laws administered by the legitimate tax authority. 
Based on literature from PJT, the above construct was developed to measure the perceived 
fairness of the tax authority in its administration and enforcement of the tax laws.   
The PMR suggests that taxpayers who have a positive view of the tax authority will not 
question its legitimacy, and thus they will be more likely to comply with the tax authority‟s 
rules. A more positive attitude towards the tax authority will increase the taxpayer‟s 
intentions to comply with the tax rules. Conversely, a negative view will lead to less 
motivation to comply, resulting in lowering the taxpayer‟s intentions to comply, and lowering 
the level of compliance. The proposed hypothesis attempts to test the relationship between 
favourable (or unfavourable) perceptions towards the tax authority and behavioural intentions, 
and between behaviour.  The predictions are formally stated in the following two hypotheses:  
H7a: POSITIVE VIEWS OF THE TAX AUTHORITY WILL POSITIVELY 
INFLUENCE BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS.  
H7b:  POSITIVE VIEWS OF THE TAX AUTHORITY WILL POSITIVELY 
INFLUENCE TAX COMPLIANCE BEHAVIOUR.  
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4.3.8 Influence of Motivational Postures (Social Distance) 
The theoretical framework presented in the previous section suggests that when taxpayers 
face regulations imposed by the tax authorities, they respond in ways that meet their own 
interests and needs (Braithwaite, 2003a). Taxpayers respond by adopting one of the 
motivational postures which corresponds to the distance taxpayers have placed between 
themselves and the authority. A deference-oriented motivational posture reflects the least 
social distance between the taxpayer and the tax authority, whereas, a defiance-oriented 
motivational posture places the most social distance between the taxpayer and the tax 
authority. Consistent with the theoretical framework, it is predicted that the least social 
distance a taxpayer places between himself or herself and the tax authority (the deference 
postures) will be reflected in more positive tax compliance behaviour. The predicted influence 
of taxpayer‟s motivational posture on tax compliance behaviour is formally stated in the 
following hypothesis:  
H8: DEFERENCE POSTURES (OR LEAST SOCIAL DISTANCE ADOPTED) WILL 
POSITIVELY REFLECT A MORE POSITIVE TAX COMPLIANCE 
BEHAVIOUR. 
4.3.9 Influence of Justice Rules of the Compliance and Penalties Regime 
The predictions from the theoretical framework presented in the previous section suggest 
that taxpayers‟ perceived procedural fairness of the application of the CPR by the tax 
authority may influence taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour, and attitudes towards compliance 
(Thibaut & Walker, 1975; and Leventhal, 1980). Generally, equity considerations (based on 
procedural justice rules) have received much attention in the tax compliance literature. 
Experimental and survey findings indicate that higher equity leads to higher compliance 
behaviour, while lower perceived equity leads to lower tax compliance (Torgler, 2007).  
Based on this argument, the prediction is that taxpayers who perceive the enforcement 
procedures of the CPR to be procedurally fair are likely to be more compliant, and this 
perception is also likely to positively influence attitudes. The predictions are summarised in 
the following two hypotheses, which test the relationships between perceived procedural 
fairness of the CPR with tax compliance behaviour, and attitudes, respectively. These 
predictions are formally stated in the hypotheses below: 
H9a:  FAVOURABLE JUSTICE PERCEPTIONS OF THE COMPLIANCE AND 
PENALTIES REGIME WILL POSITIVELY INFLUENCE TAX COMPLIANCE 
BEHAVIOUR.  
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H9b:  FAVOURABLE JUSTICE PERCEPTIONS OF THE COMPLIANCE AND 
PENALTIES REGIME WILL POSITIVELY INFLUENCE ATTITUDES 
TOWARDS TAX COMPLIANCE. 
4.3.10 Effectiveness of the Compliance and Penalties Regime 
Deterrence Theory posits that the perceived probability (or threat) of penalties will deter 
noncompliance or encourage compliance (Alm et al., 1990; and Maciejovsky et al., 2001). It 
therefore follows that the perceived effectiveness of the CPR will also deter noncompliant 
behaviour. While a large body of literature has examined the effect of penalties, very few, if 
any, studies have examined the influence of the perceived effectiveness of a penalties regime 
on attitudes and tax compliance behaviour, respectively. The effectiveness of the CPR is 
operationalised by three measures which appraise respondents‟ perceptions of the general 
effectiveness of the regime in deterring noncompliance. These include: the perceived 
effectiveness of the CPR; the fear of being penalised under the CPR; and to avoid penalties.  
The prediction proposed in this study is that taxpayers‟ decisions to comply are influenced 
by the perceived effectiveness of the CPR regime in deterring noncompliant behaviour. This 
prediction is reflected in the following two hypotheses, which propose to test the relationships 
between the perceived effectiveness of the CPR, and attitudes (based on legal and non-legal 
attitudes), and on behaviour, respectively. The predicted effects of perceived effectiveness of 
the CPR on taxpayers‟ attitudes towards compliance behaviour, and behaviour, are stated in 
the following two hypotheses:  
H10a:  PERCEIVED EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COMPLIANCE AND PENALTIES 
REGIME WILL POSITIVELY INFLUENCE TAX COMPLIANCE BEHAVIOUR. 
 H10b:  PERCEIVED EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COMPLIANCE AND PENALTIES 
REGIME WILL POSITIVELY INFLUENCE ATTITUDES TOWARDS TAX 
COMPLIANCE.  
In summary, it is proposed that the TPB and other behavioural determinants incorporated 
into the TPB based research model will be able to predict tax compliance behaviour. 
4.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the theoretical framework and the development of the research 
hypotheses to be tested. The discussions presented concern the TPB, the theoretical 
characteristics of the components of the TPB, and the proposed effects of these components 
on behavioural intentions and behaviour.  
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This study focuses on compliance (noncompliance) with the tax rules, and examines the 
influence the TPB constructs have in predicting compliance behaviour. Further, this study 
will also attempt to examine the contribution of a number of other elements outside the TPB 
in predicting tax compliance behaviour. A number of hypotheses testing the influence of the 
TPB elements and other compliance determinants on compliance behaviour were proposed in 
this chapter.  
In terms of the basic TPB based research model, six hypotheses were developed to test the 
effects of the elements of the TPB: attitudes based on informal sanctions (H2a), attitudes based 
on formal sanctions (H2b), subjective norms (H3), and perceived behavioural control on 
intentions to comply (H4a) and on behaviour (H4b). A further hypothesis was developed to test 
the effect of intention on behaviour (H1). Informal sanctions (or tax morale) are gaining 
prominence amongst researchers, due mainly to recent evidence which suggests that tax 
morale is more influential on compliance behaviour than legal sanctions.  
An additional six hypotheses were developed to test the effects of additional constructs 
used to extend the TPB based research model. These hypotheses were developed to test the 
effects of the following constructs: societal norms (H5); perceptions of the tax system (H6a, 
and H6b); perceptions of the tax authority (H7a, and H7b); and social distance or motivational 
postures (H8), on intentions and/or compliance behaviour.   
Four further hypotheses were developed to test the procedural justice perceptions and 
perceived effectiveness of the CPR on attitudes (based on formal and informal sanctions), and 
also on tax compliance behaviour. Hypotheses H9a and H9b were established to evaluate the 
influence of the procedural justice perceptions of the CPR on behaviour and attitudes, 
whereas Hypotheses H10a and H10b were developed to measure the influence of the perceived 
effectiveness of the CPR on behaviour and attitudes. The next chapter presents the research 
methodology employed to test the hypotheses outlined in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the methodology applied to test the hypotheses developed in the 
previous chapter. The first part of this chapter discusses the research design and the approach 
taken in developing the survey instrument and in collecting the survey data. Section 5.2 
begins by stating the objectives of the current research. This is followed with section 5.3 
setting out the research design which includes the development of the survey instrument. 
Section 5.4 details the model constructs and measures used in the current study.  
The second part of this chapter is devoted to explaining the analytical approach used for 
the data analysis. Section 5.5 describes the process adopted for the data preparation and 
various preliminary analysis carried out on the survey data. This section also provides a 
description of the Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) methodology and the approach used 
in evaluating the measurement and structural models. The last section, section 5.6 presents a 
summary of this chapter.  
5.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The key objective of this research is to examine the role beliefs and attitudes have on tax 
compliance behaviour identified in the literature, within the Theory of Planned Behaviour 
(TPB) framework. The research model was extended to incorporate other variables identified 
in the literature as having some influence on tax compliance behaviour. The secondary 
objective is to test the applicability of a research model based on the TPB, and provide 
justification for using a new analytical tool (PLS-Graph) which has rarely been used in tax 
compliance research. A detailed description of the research objective is presented in 
Chapter 1.  
5.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
5.3.1 Data Collection 
The reliability of the results from any research depends on the methodology adopted to 
collect the data. Sandford (1995) emphasised the basic requirements of an appropriate 
methodology as one which has a good representative sample, relevant questions, and 
sufficient response rate. However, measuring tax compliance behaviour has been fraught with 
problems due to the unobservable and, in most cases, unverifiable nature of the behaviour 
112 
 
under study. This is compounded by the reluctance of some tax authorities to provide 
compliance data for research. Therefore, the principal data collection method adopted for this 
research is the survey method, despite the various concerns raised which include: the validity 
of self-reports, nonresponse bias, small sample size, missing data and the influence of 
premiums.
73
 
Survey research remains one of the main sources of data collection in the social sciences 
(Ziegler, 2006). In the field of tax compliance research, surveys are commonly used as the 
main method of data collection, given their ability to elicit responses on unobservable 
measures used to study compliance behaviour. This method is considered to be the most 
economical and feasible method (in comparison to other methods) to elicit the views of a 
large number of participants on a nationwide basis (Sandford, 1995). There are a number of 
survey methods available for collecting data; some of the more common approaches are face-
to-face questionnaire and surveys by telephone, mail (paper), email (electronic) and the 
World Wide Web/Internet.  
(a) Mail Surveys 
Mail surveys are one of the most popular tools in the study of social behaviour (Brehm, 
1993; and Ziegler, 2006). It is considered to be an important research tool capable of 
capturing a wide range of explanatory variables known only to the subjects, including: values 
and attitudes; expectations of risk of compliance/noncompliance; and other psychological 
factors that may affect compliance behaviour (Collins et al., 1992). Surveys, however, cannot 
measure behaviour but can only measure people‟s perceptions of the behaviour (Sherblom et 
al., 1993). Surveys are also comparatively cheaper to undertake than other data collection 
methods while providing a wider coverage of the population. In addition, surveys can 
guarantee complete anonymity to respondents, whereas interviews or case studies may not 
provide the same level of anonymity to respondents, rendering them less effective in this 
instance.
74
 
Recent tax compliance studies have moved away from the traditional models of tax 
compliance, largely based on Allingham and Sandmo‟s (1972) Economic Deterrence Model 
of tax compliance, which is easily tested using experimental data (for example, audit rates and 
tax rates), to more complex models using noneconomic variables that cannot be easily 
observed or measured. This has led to an increase in the use of self-reports capable of 
measuring unobserved variables. Armitage and Conner‟s (2001) meta-analyses provide 
                                                     
73 Most of these concerns associated with the survey method are addressed in section 5.5 of this chapter.   
74 The questionnaire developed for this study contains personal and sensitive questions. 
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evidence that the prediction of self-reported behaviour in TPB is superior to observed 
behaviour. This clearly suggests that the survey method, which is based on self-reports and 
capable of measuring noneconomic variables, has its place in tax compliance research 
(Andreoni et al., 1998). The nature of this study, which involves examining sensitive 
behavioural variables that cannot be observed, renders the experimental approach, interviews 
and case studies unsuitable. In addition, given the unavailability of archival and actual data 
from the Inland Revenue Department (IRD), the survey method is considered the best 
alternative for collecting the data required for this research. Further, the survey methodology 
enables researchers to transfer and apply the knowledge gained from a representative sample 
to a larger target population (Creswell, 2003). The present study therefore utilised a mail-
based survey for the taxpayer population.  
(b) Web-Based Surveys 
The increasing popularity of web-based surveys is evident by the number of researchers 
using this survey technique in a variety of research areas (Shi & Fan, 2008). The advantages 
of using web-based surveys have been well documented (for example, Dillman, 2000; and 
Cobanoglu et al., 2001). For a specific population that regularly use the internet, the web has 
been found to be a useful means of conducting research (Couper et al., 2001; and Sills & 
Song, 2002). Possible advantages of using the Internet include cost savings related to 
eliminating the printing and mailing of survey instruments (Cobanoglu et al., 2001), as well as 
time and cost savings in having the responses in an electronic form ready for analysis.   
Past studies measuring response rates between mail and web-based surveys have produced 
mixed results (Greenlaw & Brown-Welty, 2009). In contrast, recent studies have shown an 
increase in web-based response rates, as compared to the response rates from mail surveys 
(McCabe, 2004; Kiernan et al., 2005; Michaelidou & Dibb, 2006; and Greenlaw & Brown-
Welty, 2009), however, there is still room for improvement. This may be attributed to the fact 
that less time and attention have been devoted in the past to developing and testing motivating 
tools to increase web-based surveys‟ responses; compared to the well-developed Dillman‟s 
(2000) „tailored design method‟ (Kaplowitz et al., 2004). Michaelidou & Dibb (2006) provide 
some useful suggestions for designing and improving online surveys which includes: ensuring 
complete anonymity and privacy, targeting the appropriate population, and providing 
incentives to encourage response rates. Couper (2000) cautions that the implementation 
approaches that were beneficial for mail surveys may not translate directly to response rate 
benefits for web-based surveys. Successful administration of web-based surveys could also be 
affected if respondents treat legitimate survey contacts as spam mail/email (Porter & 
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Whitcomb, 2007). Findings of studies comparing the response rates of web-based surveys 
with mail surveys also reveal a significant age difference in respondents of mail and web-
based surveys. This suggests that web-based surveys could be used successfully when 
targeting younger subjects or populations with full access to the Internet.    
The current study targets two other populations: members of the New Zealand Institute of 
Chartered Accountants (NZICA), and the New Zealand Law Society (NZLS). The majority of 
NZICA and NZLS members have full access to the Internet. Therefore, the web-based survey 
with its associated low cost was considered a suitable data collection method for these two 
selected groups. This study therefore utilised the Internet to distribute the self-administered 
electronic survey instrument to these two target groups.   
5.3.2 Questionnaire Development 
(a) Mail Survey 
The questionnaire, as presented in Appendix 3, was divided into five sections. Section A 
contained 28 questions based on the TPB. Section B contained a list of civil offences and 
instructions for rating and ranking these offences in the order of perceived severity. In Section 
C, questions were set out under the following sub-headings: The Tax System, The Penalty 
System, The Tax Authority, Perception of Other Taxpayers and General Views. The second 
part of Section C applied only to respondents previously subjected to the penalties regime, 
and contained questions to elicit their views on the processes and experiences that they went 
through. The final section contained questions measuring demographic variables. 
To increase the response rate, the widely accepted elements of the „tailored design 
method‟ for mail surveys developed by Dillman (1978; 2000) were adopted in the design and 
distribution of the survey instrument. Care was taken in the design and layout of the 
questionnaire to minimise the risk of respondents missing questions. Consistent with Dillman 
(1978; 2000), most questions measuring the latent variables integrated into the research model 
were randomly distributed throughout the survey instrument, in an attempt to minimise any 
potential method bias that may be introduced into the dataset (Straub et al., 2004). The 
questions were evenly distributed and well-spaced and minimal effort was required to 
complete the questionnaire.
75
 Clear instructions were also provided at the beginning of each 
section in the questionnaire. Respondents were also given the option of adopting a neutral 
position if they did not wish to respond with a positive or negative answer. In addition, 
                                                     
75 Respondents are only required to tick or circle their selected answer to each question. 
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respondents were given the option of not answering several sensitive questions.
76
 Consistent 
with Dillman (2000), care was also taken to ensure that the first question did not appear to be 
threatening or intimidating to respondents. Finally, the questionnaire was printed in a booklet 
form, with questions printed on both sides of the eight page booklet, to reduce its size and to 
enhance its ease of handling.   
A one page covering letter (set out in Appendix 4) was included, explaining the nature of 
the survey and the importance of respondents‟ feedback. For a professional look, and to 
provide some credibility to the survey, the covering letter was printed on the University of 
Canterbury‟s letterhead. The contact details of the senior academic supervisor and the author 
were also provided. Respondents were further advised that participation in the survey was 
voluntary. The letter also assured respondents complete anonymity of their responses. 
(b) Web-Based Survey 
The questions in the web-based survey were identical to the mail survey instrument except 
for the addition of two extra questions based on promoter penalties.
77
 Equal consideration 
was given to the development of the web-based survey, which was developed with the 
assistance of the Information Technology Department at the University of Canterbury.
78
 In 
the main body of the questionnaire, specific instructions were inserted on how to take each 
necessary computer action to complete the questionnaire. Once the survey was completed 
respondents were able to submit the survey by clicking on the “submit” button. This would 
trigger a message thanking respondents for their participation. Respondents were also advised 
to email the researcher separately if they wished to request a summary of findings.  
5.3.3 Population and Sample Selection 
When undertaking any survey it is important to ensure that the sample population, sample 
frame, sample and sample size are correctly identified (Dillman, 2000). The three survey 
populations targeted for this study are New Zealand taxpayers, tax agents and tax lawyers.   
(a) New Zealand Taxpayers 
The main study involves examining the tax compliance behaviour of New Zealand 
taxpayers; therefore the survey population consists of all New Zealand tax residents. The 
                                                     
76 These questions relate to respondents‟ past noncompliant behaviour. 
77 The author felt that the two additional questions were more relevant to tax agents than the general taxpayers and 
was added for future use (that is, for the purposes of future publication).  
78 The survey was linked to http://survey.it.canterbury.ac.nz/phpsurveyor/index.php?sid=81. 
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sample frame in this case is all individuals listed in the General Electoral Roll (a proxy for 
taxpayers),
79
 and the sample population consists of the 1,000 individuals randomly selected 
from the General Electoral Roll.  
(b) Tax Agents and Tax Lawyers 
In terms of the other two groups (tax agents and tax lawyers), the sample frame consisted 
of all members listed in their respective databases, while the sample population consisted of 
the 1,000 members randomly selected to participate in this study. The survey population at 
the time of distribution of the survey instruments was: 29,435 members of NZICA, and 266 
members of NZLS whose work comprised more than 50 percent tax work. These two sub-
groups selected were considered to have an adequate knowledge of tax matters (compared to 
the general population) and as a group considered to have a vested interest in the tax system. 
Further, these two sub-groups were easily available to participate, through their respective 
professional bodies. 
5.4 MODEL CONSTRUCTS AND MEASURES 
The proposed research model is derived from an incremental study, in that the well-
developed TPB is used as the underlying framework, with new measures, constructs and 
structural paths added to the model. Kirchler (2007) claims that past models used in tax 
compliance tend to utilise highly stylised analysis that fails to incorporate many facets of 
taxpayers‟ realities. The present model, therefore, incorporates a wider number of variables 
associated with tax compliance behaviour. 
Although the TPB model was vigorously tested, most of the measures used for the current 
survey were newly developed for this study. These new measures are based on the theoretical 
and empirical literature in tax compliance, with some measures based on taxpayers‟ opinions 
and views. Accordingly, a number of these newly formed measures used in this study are not 
incorporated into the existing literature.
80
 
5.4.1 Reflective and Formative Variables 
An underlying assumption for SEM analysis is that all indicators used to measure a latent 
variable or construct should be reflective in nature (Chin, 1998a). However, in PLS, the 
constructs can either be modelled with reflective or formative indicators, or even with a 
                                                     
79 Proxy taxpayers were used because the IRD was reluctant to assist with the survey. 
80 The Community Hopes, Fears and Action Survey (Braithwaite, 2001) also provided some general ideas for the 
construction of the survey instrument.  
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combination of both. The decision as to whether the indicators should be modelled as 
reflective or formative should be based on theoretical consideration (Gotz et al., 2010).  Jarvis 
et al. (2003) provide four decision rules for determining whether a construct is reflective or 
formative, and suggest that these should be considered prior to data collection. 
The first consideration is to determine the theoretical direction of causality between each 
construct and its measures. If the direction is from the constructs to the indicators, the 
construct is reflective (see Figure 5.1a). Conversely, if the direction is from the indicators to 
the construct, the construct is formative (see Figure 5.1b). The second involves examining the 
interchangeability of the measures.  If the measures are interchangeable and have a common 
theme, they are considered to be reflective. Such measures should be uni-dimensional and 
reflect the common theme. In contrast, formative measures may not be interchangeable, and 
will often employ different themes. In addition, if one of the measures is removed, the 
meaning of the construct would be affected given that the construct is defined by these 
measures. 
The third decision rule is to consider whether the measures covary with one another. 
Reflective measures are required to covary with one another and therefore internal 
consistency or reliability is important. This is to ensure that all items are measuring the same 
phenomenon or tap into the same concept. Furthermore, if any of the values for one of the 
measures changes, then all of the other values should move in the same direction. In terms of 
formative constructs, the measures need not covary nor should they have any strong 
correlations with one another. Although multicollinearity is required for reflective measures, 
excessive multicollinearity should be avoided for formative measures. The last consideration 
is to determine whether the measures of the constructs have the same antecedents and 
consequences. Reflective measures are interchangeable, and therefore have the same 
antecedents and consequences, because the measures are manifestations of the constructs. In 
contrast, formative constructs are composites that are made up of measures that may be very 
different and, as such, it may not be necessary for the measures to have the same antecedents 
and consequences.  
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Figure 5.1a.  
Construct with Reflective Indicators 
Figure 5.1b.  
Construct with Formative Indicators 
 
(Source: Chin, 2009) 
The four indicators depicted in Figure 5.1a are a reflection of the construct and a change in 
the construct affects the underlying indicators. In contrast, the formative construct in Figure 
5.1b is a composite of the four indicators depicted in that figure, and any changes in the 
measures cause change in the construct (Jarvis et al., 2003; and Petter et al., 2007). The above 
decision rules were applied during the development of the questionnaire to ensure that all 
measures developed are reflective.  
5.4.2 Measurement Scales 
The questionnaire comprised 119 items measuring 12 constructs. Most TPB variables used 
in the research model were measured on a 7-point Likert type optimal scale (Ajzen, 1991; 
2002), in which belief strength and outcome evaluations were both scored in a unipolar mode 
from 1 to 7,
81
 with higher numbers representing lower subjective probabilities and more 
unfavourable evaluations. Most of the other items were measured on a (positive-to-negative) 
7-point Likert scale ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”, with “neither agree 
nor disagree” as a mid-point. Consistent with the TPB, all questions on behaviours and 
attitudes included the four specification elements considered important: the specific action(s) 
involved, the target at which the behaviour is directed, the specific context involved, and the 
unit of time involved (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). The questionnaire has attempted to include 
all four elements in each question in order to increase the accuracy of responses. 
For measures of past behaviour, respondents were asked to indicate on a scale, ranging 
from 1 to 7, the number of times they have suppressed income; a “1” representing none and a 
“7” representing a frequency of more than 5 times. For measures of the amount of income 
                                                     
81 The TPB does not prescribe to any one form of scaling, resulting in the use of either the unipolar scales (from 1 
to 7), or scales scored in a bipolar mode (from -3 to +3).  
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reported, respondents were asked to select on a scale ranging from 1 to 7 the percentage of 
income they reported in their last tax return; a “1” representing 100 percent and a “7” 
representing 0 percent. The response scale for the hypothetical scenario ranged from 1 to 7, 
with a “1” indicating that respondents would be extremely likely to report the cash income, 
and a “7” indicating that they would be extremely unlikely to do so.      
5.4.3 Construct Development 
The proposed model for this study consists of 12 constructs. These are: Behaviour 
(BEHV); Behavioural Intent (BI); Attitude Towards the Behaviour, based on non-legal 
sanctions (ATT1); Attitude Towards the Behaviour, based on legal sanctions (ATT2); 
Subjective Norm (SNORM); Perceived Behavioural Control (PBC); the Tax System (TXSY); 
Justice Elements of the CPR (CnP); Effectiveness of the CPR (CnPeff); the Tax Authority 
(TXAU); Perceptions of Other Taxpayers or Societal Norm (OTHERS); and General Views or 
Social Distance (DST). Appendix 2 defines each construct and provides a list of all the 
indicators used for each construct. In addition, the empirical and theoretical studies 
underpinning these measures are discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, respectively. 
The dependent constructs include measures based on a hypothetical tax scenario and self-
reported behaviour. Self-report measures are considered biased by self-presentation concerns 
(Elffers, 1991);
82
 however, other researchers have equally supported the use of self-reports 
especially when measuring beliefs and attitudes.   
(a) The Research Model (based on the Theory of Planned Behaviour) 
(i) Behaviour 
Behaviour refers to respondents‟ self-reported past tax compliance behaviour. This 
dependent construct was assessed with two items: the frequency or number of times 
respondents did not fully disclose all their income during the past eight years; and by the 
amount of income not reported.
83
 Thus the two items comprise both the number of times and 
the amount of income suppressed. This measure of self-reported past behaviour was used as a 
proxy for measuring behaviour in the research model since past behaviour is considered to 
reflect future behaviour (Titte, 1980; and Burnkrant and Page Jr., 1988). Furthermore, 
attitudes and beliefs which influence behaviour tend to remain quite stable over time (Ajzen, 
                                                     
82 This study provides a comprehensive discussion on prior studies (Hessing et al., 1988; and Elffers et al., 1987) 
which examined the validity of survey responses.   
83 When the survey instrument was distributed the CPR was in operation for the last eight years, hence the use of 
an eight year period to capture tax compliance behaviour post CPR. 
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2010). Findings from New Zealand studies spanning over fourteen years, which examined 
individuals‟ attitudes towards tax noncompliance (as measured by their perceptions of the 
seriousness of tax offences), suggest that individuals‟ attitudes and beliefs have remained 
stable over time (Oxley, 1993; McIntosh & Veal, 2001; Birch et al., 2001; and Gupta, 2006; 
2007).   
(ii) Behavioural Intent 
Behavioural intent refers to respondents‟ intention to comply (or not comply) with their 
tax obligations. This dependent construct was measured by two items. One item measured the 
response to a hypothetical question based on a tax scenario relating to the likelihood of 
respondents suppressing income. The second item measured respondents‟ willingness to pay 
the correct amount of tax. Collectively, these two questions measure respondents‟ behavioural 
intention to comply (or not to comply) with the tax laws.   
 (iii) Attitude Towards the Behaviour 
A person‟s attitude towards performing a given behaviour is related to that person‟s beliefs 
that performing the behaviour will lead to certain consequences, and includes the person‟s 
evaluation of those consequences. This attitude is viewed as one key determinant of the 
person‟s intention to perform the behaviour in question (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Attitude 
towards tax compliance behaviour therefore captures respondents‟ attitude towards complying 
(or not complying) with their tax obligations and their evaluations of these outcomes. Three 
questions were developed to measure the beliefs about the behaviour based on guilt feelings, 
civic duty and moral obligations,
84
 and a further three questions to measure respondents‟ 
evaluations of these outcomes. Consistent with Ajzen and Fishbein (1980), the three 
composite measures of attitude were obtained using four evaluative semantic differential 
scales (for example, beneficial/harmful; good/bad; agree/disagree; important/unimportant). 
Thus the six items transformed into three composite indicators measure attitudes based on the 
non-legal deterrent effects of noncompliance with respondents‟ tax obligations.  
A further set of questions were developed to measure beliefs and outcomes in relation to 
legal sanctions. Three questions were developed to measure beliefs, and another three to 
measure evaluations of these outcomes, based on the certainty of detection, certainty of 
punishment and severity of punishment. These six items were transformed into three 
                                                     
84 Some researchers refer to these variables collectively as „tax morale” (Kirchler, 2007; Torgler, 2007; and 
Kornhauser, 2007). 
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composite indicators used for measuring attitudes, based on the legal deterrent effects of 
noncompliance.  
(iv) Perceived Behavioural Control 
In the TPB Model, PBC refers to the degree of control individuals perceive they have in 
engaging in a particular behaviour. More specifically, control beliefs, the fundamental 
determinants of perceived behavioural control, refer to individuals‟ beliefs regarding the 
presence or absence of resources and opportunities, as well as the obstacles and impediments, 
to perform the specific behaviour in question. PBC measures used in the research model refer 
to the ease or difficulty of complying (or not complying) with respondents‟ tax obligations. 
For the current research model PBC was assessed with six questions: three questions on 
perceived control factors, and three questions on the control belief power or frequency of the 
presence of these factors. These indicators measured the impact of:  
(1) third party reporting, and the frequency of income received subject to third party 
reporting;  
(2) cash flow issues or financial distress, and the frequency of financial distress 
experienced; and  
(3) opportunity present for underreporting income, plus the frequency of such opportunity, 
on tax paying decisions.  
Consistent with Ajzen (1991), each composite measure is made up of factors that assist or 
hinder compliance (or encourage noncompliance), and the frequency of these factors. These 
six items formed the three PBC composite indicators. 
(v) Subjective Norm 
The normative component of the TPB deals with the influence of the social environment 
on intentions and behaviours. It refers to an individual‟s perception that important referents85 
would approve (or disapprove) certain behaviour, and the individual‟s motivation to conform 
to the expectation of important referents in order to achieve (or avoid) particular outcomes 
(Ajzen, 1991). A meta-analysis review provides evidence that subjective norms were the TPB 
component most weakly related to intention (Armitage & Conner, 2001). Therefore, the 
                                                     
85 Based on the discussion provided in paragraph 3.3.4 the questions were based on the expectations and behaviour 
of respondents‟ most important referent(s). 
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traditional measures of the TPB model were replaced with six questions making up three 
newly created composite indicators measuring:  
(1) respondents‟ perceptions of whether important referents would want them to comply, 
plus respondents‟ motivation to conform to the referents‟ expectations;  
(2) whether important referents would themselves comply, plus respondents‟ motivation to 
want to behave in a similar manner to their important referents; and  
(3) whether respondents believe that they will lose the respect of important referents if 
they do not comply, and respondents‟ motivation to maintain this respect.  
Thus six items were developed: three to measure normative beliefs, and three for 
measuring motivation to comply. These are transformed into three composite indicators for 
the PBC construct.  
In their respective aggregates, behavioural beliefs produce a positive or negative attitude 
towards the behaviour; normative beliefs result in perceived social pressure or subjective 
norm; and control beliefs give rise to perceived behavioural control. In combination, attitude 
towards the behaviour, subjective norm and perception of behavioural control, lead to the 
formation of a behavioural intention. Intentions in turn are considered to be the immediate 
antecedent of behaviour (Ajzen, 2002).  
(b) Extension to the Research Model 
Ajzen (1991) contends that a TPB behavioural model can be extended to include 
additional predictor constructs, if the additional constructs improve the predictive qualities of 
the model.
86
 The initial research models which comprised elements of the TPB were therefore 
extended in an attempt to improve the predictive qualities of the research models. The 
following paragraphs present the additional constructs incorporated into the current research 
models, which capture additional determinants of tax compliance behaviour that could 
potentially influence behavioural intentions and behaviour.  
(i) The Penalty System 
Unfair penalties rules and unfair administration of the penalties rules will lead to 
procedural injustice. The construct for the penalty system refers to the procedural 
justice/injustice aspects of the Compliance and Penalties Regime (CPR). Procedural Justice 
                                                     
86 To date, three studies on tax compliance research have applied an extended TPB Model (Bobek & Hatfield, 
2003; Trivedi et al., 2005; and Saad, 2009; 2011).   
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rules were adapted in this study to examine respondents‟ perceptions of the application of the 
CPR by the tax authority, and its effect on attitude towards tax compliance. Eleven indicators 
capturing the justice elements of Leventhal‟s (1980) Procedural Justice Theory (PJT), which 
also include a number of indicators based on taxpayers‟ opinions, were developed to measure 
this construct (CnP). Another four indicators capturing the perceived effectiveness of the CPR 
(CnPeff) were also developed for the research models and a further five indicators to measure 
the perceived fairness of the CPR (CnPfrn).
87
   
(ii) The Tax Authority 
Taxpayers‟ favourable or unfavourable evaluation of the tax authority will influence their 
compliance behaviour (Torgler, 2007). Therefore, how the tax authority is viewed by 
taxpayers will have an influence on their tax compliance behaviour. This construct (TXAU) 
captures respondents‟ evaluation of the tax authority and is measured with eight indicators.  
Most of these indicators, broadly based on the Process Model of Regulation, were newly 
developed for this study. 
(iii) Societal Norms (Others’ Tax Compliance Behaviour) 
Perceived prevalence and acceptance (or non-acceptance) of tax noncompliance among the 
general population (societal norms) will influence an individual‟s tax compliance behaviour 
(Welch et al., 2005; and Kornhauser, 2007). This construct (OTHERS) refers to respondents‟ 
perception about the compliance behaviour of the general population of taxpayers and is 
measured by ten indicators. The measures were adapted from Braithwaite (2001). 
(iv) General Views (Motivational Postures or Social Distance) 
Motivational postures depict the quality of the relationship between the tax authority and 
the taxpayers. Braithwaite (2003a; 2003b) identified four key motivational postures that 
taxpayers adopt in their relationship with the tax authority, and which describe the way 
taxpayers control the amount of social distance they place between themselves and the tax 
authority. This construct (DST) refers to the social distance between the tax authority and 
taxpayers, and is measured by twelve indicators measuring the four postures. All measures 
used were adapted from the instrument developed by Braithwaite (2003a).  
                                                     
87 The fairness construct was eliminated during the item trimming process because most of the measures displayed 
low loadings (refer to paragraph 7.2.1 of Chapter 7).  
124 
 
(v)  The Tax System 
Whether the tax system is perceived to be fair or unfair has an influence on tax compliance 
behaviour. Cowell (1990) provides evidence which indicates that attitudes and perceptions of 
the tax system influence compliance behaviour. This construct (TXSY), measures respondents‟ 
views of the tax system and is measured by four indicators.   
(c) Additional Analysis 
A number of additional questions were included in the survey instrument, in order to 
undertake additional analysis. These items will not be included in the structural model but 
will be used for descriptive analysis. The additional analysis is necessary in order to gain a 
better understanding of the determinants that may influence tax compliance behaviour. 
(i) Tax Noncompliers’ Views 
A number of questions were targeted at respondents previously subjected to the penalties 
regime. These measures or indicators were newly developed for this study, and attempt to 
measure respondents‟ experiences with the process prescribed by the CPR.  
(ii) Perceptions of Tax Offences 
To determine how respondents view tax noncompliance, as compared to other similar 
offences, is an important aspect of understanding taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour. The 
questionnaire used for this study was adapted from a previous New Zealand research by 
Gupta (2006), which replicated a United States study by Karlinsky et al. (2004). These studies 
examined taxpayers‟ perceptions of the severity or seriousness of tax evasion, relative to other 
crimes, including violent crimes. This study, on the other hand, will examine the perceived 
severity of tax noncompliance compared to other similar civil offences. Two questions were 
included to measure respondents‟ perception of the severity of noncompliance, relative to 
other similar civil offences. The first question required respondents to evaluate (or rate) the 
seriousness of each of the seven listed offences. Respondents were required to respond, on a 
5-point Likert scale, ranging from not serious at 1 to extremely serious at 5. The second 
question attempts to capture respondents‟ perceived seriousness of tax noncompliance, 
relative to the perceived seriousness of the other six listed civil offences. Respondents were 
asked to rank the six offences from the most serious to the least serious. A further analysis 
will examine the relationship between perceptions of tax offences and tax compliance 
behaviour. 
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(iii) Demographic Variables 
Demographic variables developed for this study include: age, gender, annual income, 
length of employment, main source of income, industry, educational level, professional 
memberships, type of tasks performed and the source of tax information. The TPB maintains 
that demographic characteristics have no direct effect on an individual‟s intentions or 
behaviour. External variables, such as demographic variables, are therefore considered often 
to be inaccurate predictors of specific behaviours, because of the lack of correspondence 
between overly general predictors and situationally specific behavioural measures (Ajzen & 
Fishbein, 1980).
88
 The current study will therefore only use the demographic data collected to 
test the representativeness of the observed sample against the survey population. The data will 
also be used to examine the profiles of respondents in each sample group.     
5.4.4 Questionnaire Development and Methodological Considerations 
(a) Pre-Testing the Survey Instrument 
In order to minimise concerns of response error bias, as it relates to problems in instrument 
design, a two-step process was adopted. First, the completed questionnaire was pre-tested by 
experts in the field of tax compliance research,
89
 following a process recommended by 
Dillman (2000). All comments and errors identified were addressed and corrected.   
The revised questionnaire was forwarded to 18 accounting and 21 engineering 
postgraduate students,
90
 all from the University of Canterbury. The postgraduate students 
were asked to assess the ambiguity, readability, comprehensibility, the ease of completing the 
questionnaire, and to measure the time taken to complete the task. The exercise provided 
useful feedback, including suggestions for improving the questionnaire. The comments and 
suggestions received were incorporated into the modified questionnaire. The questionnaire 
was then re-submitted to the two academic experts for a final review. Once this was 
completed, the questionnaire for the mail survey was prepared for distribution.  
In terms of the web-based questionnaire, these were forwarded to a number of volunteer 
testers from around New Zealand.
91
 Problems encountered in the testing process were 
forwarded to the IT consultant who attempted to address these problems as they were 
                                                     
88 Demographic variables have, nonetheless, been effectively used as mediating variables in prior studies (Hite, 
1997; McKerchar, 2003a; and Devos, 2008). 
89 Experts included the senior supervisor, co-supervisor and selected members of the IRD. 
90 It was assumed that engineering students would have minimal knowledge of accounting and tax terms. 
91 Students, friends and IRD colleagues from various parts of New Zealand tested the questionnaire on their 
personal computers. 
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identified. Once these were resolved, the questionnaire was linked to the web-page set up for 
this study. 
(b) Self-Reports 
Self-reports are commonly used in data collection, and are widely used to measure 
individuals‟ subjective evaluations of their attitudes, beliefs, feelings, experiences and 
behaviours. Self-reports are an effective way to obtain information that cannot be observed or 
obtained objectively.  
Hite (1988) argues that most survey results based on self-reports suffer from biases due to 
a number of factors. These may include respondents misunderstanding the questions, not 
remembering the information requested, not having any cognisance of the issue, concealing 
information or even deliberately giving misleading or untruthful answers (Hite, 1988; 
Neuman, 2006; and Fowler, 2009). 
A number of studies have provided support for the accuracy of self-reports (Clark & Tifft, 
1966; Tittle & Hill, 1967; Cahalan, 1968; Clausen, 1968; and Sheffrin & Triest, 1992); other 
evidence suggest self-reports to be imperfect representations of actual behaviours (Goddard et 
al., 1961; Cannell & Fowler, 1967; Manfredo & Shelby, 1987; and Elffers et al., 1992). The 
findings to date are still inconclusive.  
Despite this, a literature review undertaken by Tittle (1980) indicated that self-reports are 
generally 80 to 90 percent accurate. A later study by Elffers et al. (1987) compared self-
reports of evaders and non-evaders with government data; however, no significant correlation 
was found between the self-reported and government data. Elffers et al. (1987) found that 
some compliers admitted to noncompliant behaviour, whereas some noncompliers deny 
underreporting their income. The authors attribute this outcome to the fact that government 
statistics tend to underrepresent offences, however, the authors were also unable to explain 
why tax evaders would deny their past noncompliant behaviour. Perhaps this outcome could 
be attributed to the fact that the interviews were conducted personally. Surveys conducted in 
person or over the telephone are more likely to receive less truthful responses compared to 
self-administered mail or web-based surveys (Neuman, 2006). This may suggest the existence 
of self-presentation bias in Elffers et al.‟s (1987) study. Another view attributes this to the 
differences of opinion between auditors and taxpayers, explaining that in the Tax Compliance 
Measurement Program (TCMP) audits, a significant proportion of taxpayers made mistakes 
that overstate their taxable income (Kinsey, 1988). Conversely, auditors may also not detect 
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unreported income, which would also result in a discrepancy between auditor views and self-
reports (Sheffrin & Triest, 1992).    
A key concern with tax compliance research is that, due to rights of privacy, the accuracy 
of most taxpayer survey data cannot be directly established. Therefore, despite the 
shortcomings associated with self-reports, this method of data collection is the best alternative 
for collecting sensitive and personal data, such as individual‟s tax compliance data.  
(c) Method Bias 
Method bias, also known as “methods halo” or “methods effects” may occur when data is 
collected via only one method (Campbell & Fiske, 1959) or via the same method but only at 
one point in time (Marsh & Hocevar, 1988). Arguably, the problem may occur when items 
measuring a particular constructs are placed together, which could influence respondents to 
give a similar response to these items (Straub et al., 2004). Issues could also arise when the 
wording of a survey question influences respondents to give a particular response. 
Straub et al. (2004) are critical of instruments which lack random ordering, arguing that 
the extremely high Cronbach alphas, in the upper .90 range found throughout the TAM 
research stream may be attributed to the non-random ordering of items in the survey 
instrument.
92
 Further, Straub et al. (2004) suggest that Cronbachs of greater than .95 in some 
studies are highly suspicious for this reason.  
The current study involved collecting data via the self-administered survey only, and the 
survey data was collected at one point in time, and therefore may be susceptible to method 
bias. Hence, steps were taken during the development of the questionnaire to ensure that any 
potential effects from method bias are minimised. Dillman‟s (1978; 2000) tailored design 
method was adopted in the development of the questionnaire. This approach included 
randomly ordering non-TPB questions, and reviewing each question to ensure they are not 
likely to influence any of the other responses.
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(d) Ethical Issues 
The key concerns with behavioural surveys, which are likely to contain personal and 
sensitive questions, relate to anonymity of respondents, the safeguard of the data gathered and 
the unlawful use of the data. All University of Canterbury research students dealing with 
                                                     
92 TAM refers to the areas of study involving the Technology Acceptance Model.    
93 It was necessary to place some TPB questions together, especially those multiple questions measuring a 
composite variable (Ajzen, 2002).  
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human subjects are required to obtain prior approval from the Human Ethics Committee 
before proceeding with the research (refer to Appendix 1 for letter of approval). This is to 
ensure that researchers will conduct their research with appropriate regard to ethical 
principles. An application was lodged with the Human Ethics Committee outlining the 
objectives of the research, the steps taken to ensure the anonymity of respondents, and the 
proposed use and storage of the data. The covering letter to respondents informed respondents 
that ethical clearance was given by the Human Ethics Committee to undertake the research 
(refer to Appendix 4). 
(e) Survey Distribution 
(i) Mail Survey 
The survey package contained a copy of the survey instrument, a covering letter 
explaining the nature of the research and soliciting their participation, a form requesting a 
summary of findings and two prepaid self-addressed envelopes.
94
 In addition, a small token of 
appreciation in the form of a tea-bag,
95
 was included with a note thanking the recipient for 
their participation. These were mailed out to the 1,000 subjects randomly selected from the 
New Zealand Electoral Roll. A wide body of literature suggests multiple follow-ups in order 
to increase the response rate of mail surveys (Dillman, 1978; Schaefer & Dillman, 1998; and 
Dillman, 2000). However, this would considerably increase the cost of the study and the 
author decided instead on only one complete follow-up.
96
 
(ii) Web-Based Survey 
The link to the web-based survey, together with an electronic copy of the cover letter, was 
forwarded by the Information Technology Department of the University of Canterbury from 
the University‟s website. Prior notice was given to NZICA and NZLS of the survey. On 
receiving the link and copy of the letter, NZICA emailed the link and letter to 1,000 of its 
members who were randomly selected from the NZICA membership database that contains 
email addresses. The letter reassured all respondents‟ complete anonymity and explained that 
their responses could not be linked to them individually or to their organisation.    
                                                     
94 To assure respondents of anonymity, one envelope was for mailing back the completed questionnaire, while the 
other was for posting the request form for a copy of the summary of findings.  
95 Studies have documented that the inclusion of a premium (token) improves response rates, although some critics 
have argued that it may also induce a response bias. Whitmore (1996) found that small non-monetary tokens do 
not lead to any premium inclusion bias or any systematic bias. 
96 Steps taken to safeguard the anonymity of respondents meant that non-respondents could not be identified. The 
follow-up to taxpayers therefore included everyone on the list.  
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A similar process was adopted for NZLS. However, NZLS‟s membership database 
revealed that only 266 of its members spend more than 50 percent of their time on tax work. 
The electronic letter and the link to the survey were forwarded to those members previously 
identified. No follow-up reminders were issued to selected members, as a result of both 
organisations‟ policy on unsolicited emails. The NZLS, however, inserted a reminder in their 
membership newsletter, which did not result in any additional responses.  
5.5 ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGY 
This section presents the methodology employed to analyse the data obtained from the 
surveys. The first part includes a description of the approach taken to screen and prepare the 
data, in order to ensure the quality of the data collected. The second part provides an 
introduction and a discussion on the Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) methodology used, 
in particular the Partial Least Squares (PLS-Graph) approach, which was used to test the 
validity and reliability of the data and the hypotheses established in the previous chapter.   
5.5.1 Data Preparation and Preliminary Analysis 
(a) Data Screening 
One of the most salient issues to consider before using the data collected from a survey is 
to ensure that the data accurately reflects the responses made, that the data has been correctly 
coded and entered, patterns in missing data points are ascertained, unusual or extreme 
responses are identified, and ensuring the data meets statistical assumptions that underlie the 
methods used to analyse the data (Meyers et al., 2006). 
The data from the web-based surveys (NZICA and NZLS) was received electronically 
from respondents by the Information Technology Department of the University of 
Canterbury, and transferred into a spreadsheet and forwarded to the author. As such, it was 
envisaged that the data would be free of coding errors. Data from the mail survey was entered 
into a spreadsheet and each entry was manually checked against the survey instrument in an 
attempt to minimise any coding errors made during the transfer.   
  The data-sets were also examined to determine whether there were any non-random 
patterns in the missing data points, such as a concentration of missing data points in a specific 
set of questions. Any non-randomness patterns in the missing data points require a closer 
inspection (Hair et al., 2006). A visual check revealed that the missing data points were 
randomly distributed. A more robust analysis, Little‟s Missing Completely At Random 
(MCAR) test, which is available in Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), was 
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also applied to the data-sets. This test determines whether the missing data points are missing 
completely at random, or whether there are any non-random patterns in the missing data 
points.  The MCAR test will therefore ensure that the observed values of Y are a truly random 
sample of all Y values, with no underlying process that lends bias to the observed data (Little 
& Rubin, 1987; Allison, 2001; Little & Rubin, 2002; and Hair et al., 2006).  
 Next the percentage of variables with missing data points for each case was tabulated, 
followed by the tabulation of the number of cases with missing data points for each variable 
(Hair et al., 2006). This process will not only identify the extent of missing data points, but 
any exceptionally high levels of missing data points that occur for individual cases or 
observations. Cases with more than 10 percent of missing data points, or variables with more 
than 10 percent of missing data points were eliminated (Hair et al., 2006). However, missing 
data points from optional questions were not considered to be missing. In addition, a few 
respondents had (via separate email) indicated that they may have unintentionally skipped a 
page, and in such instances these cases are included in the study.
97
 A final review undertaken 
on the missing data points indicated that the remaining missing data points were not 
significant or were below the threshold to warrant any further additional diagnosis (Hair et al., 
2006).  
(b) Response Bias Analysis 
(i) Nonresponse Bias (Levene’s t-Test) 
In order to make valid statistical generalisation, it is necessary to consider whether 
„nonresponse‟ bias is present in the survey data (Brehm, 1993; Dillman, 2000; and Ziegler, 
2006). Nonresponse bias is associated with systematic differences in some key areas between 
respondents and non-respondents. Testing for nonresponse bias establishes whether, if non-
respondents had responded, the outcomes of the survey would have been significantly 
different. While there are a variety of methods to test for nonresponse bias, the two most 
common approaches are to test the difference in outcome between early and late responses, 
and to compare the characteristics of the sample to the population (Leong, 1980; and Sheik & 
Marringly, 1981). Other researchers have suggested contacting a sample of non-respondents 
and comparing the results from the non-respondents (Johnson, 1959; Miller & Smith, 1983; 
and Collier & Bienstock, 2007).  
                                                     
97 Unfortunately, the web-based survey did not have any features preventing respondents who did not complete all 
questions from moving onto the next page. Although some electronic packages (for example, the Survey Monkey 
and Qualtrics) offer a feature that guarantees complete survey responses in all compulsory fields, this was not 
adopted for a number of reasons.  
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Arguably, the last approach appears more empirically sound than the first two approaches; 
however, this option is not always feasible (Collier & Bienstock, 2007). Due to the nature of 
the current survey, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to attempt to contact 
non-respondents. A recent study which analysed 535 articles over a five year period claims 
that the second most empirically sound method for assessing nonresponse was to extrapolate 
early and late respondents on both the variables of the study as well as demographic variables 
(Collier & Bienstock, 2007). In the current study, the extrapolation of early and late 
respondents (used as proxy non-respondents), on both study variables and also on 
demographic variables, will provide some assurance that respondents and non-respondents in 
the sample selected for this study do not differ in sample characteristics, or in their opinions 
and their attitudes that are the specific inquiry of this study. Consistent with Armstrong and 
Overton (1977) the current study compared the first 25 percent to the last 25 percent of the 
sample, with the last 25 percent of respondents representing non-respondents. 
The independent t-test, which is available in SPSS, was employed to test whether the 
means of the two independent groups (early and late respondents) are similar or whether they 
differ (Gaur & Gaur, 2006; and Pallant, 2011). The null hypothesis for the t-test is that there 
is no difference in the responses of the early respondents and late respondents (Hinton et al., 
2004). The significance (or non-significance) of the test statistics (F) will determine which 
values to use.
98
 If the t-test result (of the selected value) shows t statistic of p = < 0.05, then 
the null hypothesis should be rejected. However, if the p-value is greater than 0.05, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected, indicating that the responses of the two groups are similar.  
(ii) Representativeness of Observed Samples 
Samples are measured in order to make generalisations about the target population 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). In order for the results to have generalisability, it is important 
that the sample reflects the true population. Due to the nature of surveys, it is extremely 
difficult to generate a sample that is representative of the population. In this study, a selected 
number of the demographic and economic characteristics of the sample were compared to 
data available for the true population, in order to determine whether the sample reflects the 
population distribution. The selected attributes are: gender, age, income level, income source, 
and educational attainment. 
                                                     
98 A significant F-test statistic indicates that the equal variance not assumed value should be used. Conversely, if 
the F-test statistic is not significant, the equal variance assumed value should be used.   
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Selected attributes of the Taxpayer sample were compared to that of the New Zealand 
population obtained from Statistics New Zealand‟s website.
99
 The Tax Agent sample‟s 
attributes were compared to information available from the NZICA‟s 2006 Annual Report 
while information on remuneration was sourced from published results from the remuneration 
survey undertaken in the 2007 year.
100
 The Tax Lawyer or NZLS sample was removed from 
this study due to the low number of responses (37 responses) received and no further analysis 
was undertaken for this sample group. 
(c) Estimation Technique for Missing Data 
Most statistical packages, including PLS, require complete data sets and as such datasets 
with missing data must be remedied before they can be used. Arguably, the traditional 
approaches may cause problems and Hair et al. (2006) suggest a model-based approach where 
missing data is imputed based on all available data for a given respondent. One such method 
highly recommended is the Expectation Maximisation (EM) approach available in SPSS, 
which estimates the values of each mean and covariance as if there is no missing data. The 
EM method uses a maximum likelihood approach for estimating missing values (Little & 
Rubin, 2002). The EM algorithm is a two-step iterative process, with the first step using 
regression analysis to estimate the missing values.  The next step involves applying maximum 
likelihood procedures to make estimates of parameters (for example, correlations) using the 
missing data replacements (Meyers et al., 2006).      
Advantages of the EM method include fewer problems with convergence and less bias 
under conditions of random missing data. The only known disadvantage noted is that the 
effective sample size is uncertain for EM. Arguably, when the sample size exceeds 250 and 
the total amount of missing data is below 10 percent, it is acceptable to use the pair-wise 
approach. However, when the sample size is small and when the amount of missing data is 
large, then the model-based EM or ML becomes superior (Hair et al., 2006). In the present 
study, due to the smaller sample size, the EM imputation approach was used to address the 
remaining missing data. 
(d) Descriptive Statistics 
In addition to inferential statistical techniques, descriptive statistics are also an important 
feature in most empirical studies, as they provide a simple summary of the survey data and 
                                                     
99 Data downloaded from www.stats.govt.nz/census/Census2006HomePage.aspx. 
100 NZICA‟s 2006 Annual Report was retrieved from: http://www.nzica.com.The results of the remuneration 
survey conducted for the 2007 year was obtained from NZICA‟s website at http://www.institutesurvey.co.nz/2008/ 
2007results.asp. 
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they also form the basis of quantitative analysis of data. Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) argue 
that describing and making inferences about a data set are equally important for empirical 
research. Therefore, prior to undertaking any further analysis, demographic data collected 
from the survey will be used to develop a profile of the sample population; and the descriptive 
statistics computed for selected indicators and constructs in the research model will provide a 
preliminary view of the raw data and explain the underlying information. This involves 
computing the means, standard deviation and frequency for each selected variable.  
5.5.2 Introduction to Structural Equation Modelling 
The hypotheses established for this study were tested using the Structural Equation 
Modelling (SEM) methodology, and in particular, the Partial Least Squares (PLS) approach. 
SEM is a relatively new approach for assessing multivariate models with empirical data and 
was developed by Joreskog in the 1970s (Chin, 1998b). One reason for the increased use of 
SEM among researchers is the ability to simultaneously examine theory and measures (Chin 
& Newsted, 1999). 
SEM, a second generation multivariate analysis tool (Bagozzi & Fornell, 1982), 
incorporates an economic perspective focused on prediction and a psychometric approach that 
models concepts as latent variables that are indirectly inferred from multiple observed 
measures (Barroso et al., 2010).
101
 This approach allows researchers (Fornell, 1982; Chin, 
1998a; and Haenlein & Kaplan, 2004) to:  
(1)  explicitly model measurement error for observed variables;  
(2)  incorporate abstract and unobservable constructs (latent variables) measured by 
 indicators;  
(3)  simultaneously model relationships among multiple predictor and criterion variables; 
 and  
(4)  combine and test a priori knowledge and hypotheses with empirical data.   
There are two stages to the SEM analysis: the measurement model, and a structural model 
assessment (Hair et al., 2006; and Barroso et al., 2010).
102
 The measurement model linking 
observed variables to their associated constructs is assessed by examining whether the 
theoretical constructs are correctly measured by the manifest variables (indicators), with 
                                                     
101 Latent variables are also commonly referred to as constructs, unobserved variables or factors and measures are 
also commonly referred to as indicators, manifest variables or items. 
102 An illustration of the relationship between the measurement model and the structural model is presented in 
Figure 5.2. 
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reference to reliability and validity attributes. In contrast, the structural model linking the 
constructs is assessed according to the meaningfulness and significance of the hypothesised 
relationships between the constructs (Barroso et al., 2010). The following Figure 5.2 
demonstrates these concepts. The latent variable    
   can be described as an unobserved 
variable implied by the covariance among the measured block of indicators x11, x21 and x31. 
Likewise, latent variables     
  and    
  are measured by their associated observed measures,
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and together the three latent variables and their associated indicators represent three 
measurement models. The structural model represented in the middle square prescribes the 
relations among the latent variables (   
       
           
      In other words, each latent variable 
(or circle) represents a construct, and each indicator (small boxes) represents a measure (or 
manifest variable measuring its associated construct), while the arrows between the latent 
variables (between the circles) represent the path coefficients measuring the relationships 
between these constructs. Details of the measurement and structural models are discussed in 
section 5.5.3. 
Figure 5.2: Measurement and Structural Models  
(Reproduced from Chin, 2009) 
 
SEM enables the evaluation of the measurement and structural models in a single 
systematic and comprehensive analysis (Gefen et al., 2000; and Barroso et al., 2010). This 
combined analysis of the measurement and structural model allows measurement errors of the 
observed variables to be analysed as an integral part of the model and factor analysis to be 
combined in one operation with the hypotheses testing (Gefen et al., 2000).  
                                                     
103 The measures (or indicators) for the latent variable    
  are x12 and x22 and for the latent variable    
  include x13, 
x23, x33, x43, and x53).  
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Equally important is SEM‟s ability to express complex variable relationships through 
hierarchical or non-hierarchical, and recursive or non-recursive structural equations to present 
a more complete picture of the entire model (Hanushek & Jackson, 1977; Bullock et al., 1994; 
Gefen et al., 2000; and Barroso et al., 2010). These complex causal networks enabled by SEM 
characterise real world processes better than simple correlation-based models. Therefore, 
SEM is more suited for the mathematical modelling of complex processes to serve both 
theory (Bollen, 1989) and practice (Dubin, 1976; Gefen et al., 2000; and Barroso et al., 2010).   
 The two common but distinct statistical techniques of SEM are the covariance-based SEM 
(Joreskog, 1973; Bollen, 1989; and Rigdon, 1998) and PLS which is a component or 
variance-based method (Wold, 1980a; 1982; 1985). These two techniques differ in the 
objectives of their analyses, the statistical assumption on which they are based, and the nature 
of the fit statistics each produce (Barroso et al., 2010). This is further discussed in the section 
that follows.  
(a) Covariance-Based Structural Equation Modelling and Partial Least 
Squares Techniques 
Advances in causal modelling which enable researchers to simultaneously study theory 
and measures have increased significantly. However, despite the increased use of SEM, most 
readers and reviewers of research articles are still more familiar with the Covariance-Based 
Structural Equation Model (CBSEM) methods than the PLS approach (Barrosa et al., 2010; 
Gotz et al., 2010; and Chin, 2010). The increasing interest in SEM analysis, especially among 
social science researchers, creates the need for making comparisons between various SEM 
techniques (Chin, 2010). Chin (2010) further contends that researchers using PLS path 
analyses are obliged to provide some initial discussion as to the rationale for applying the PLS 
method. This section will therefore include a comparison of the attributes, underlying 
assumptions and limitations of the CBSEM and PLS methods, and a discussion on the 
rationale for employing the PLS approach (as opposed to the CBSEM method).  
The CBSEM and PLS approaches to data analyses are quite distinct in that each of these 
methods differ in terms of their objectives, statistical assumptions and the nature of the fit 
statistics they produce (Gefen et al., 2000; Barroso et al., 2010; and Turkyilmaz et al., 2010).   
(i) Objective/Approach 
The objectives of CBSEM and PLS are quite distinct. Whereas CBSEM aims to estimate 
the parameters of the model (for example, the loadings and path values) in order to minimise 
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the difference between the sample covariance and those predicted by the theoretical model 
(Barroso et al., 2010), PLS on the other hand focuses on the prediction of the dependent 
variables (both latent and manifest) by maximising the explained variance (R
2
) of the 
dependent variables. 
Therefore, while the parameter estimation process of CBSEM tries to reproduce the 
covariance matrix of the observed measures‟ overall goodness of fit (Chin and Newsted, 
1999) to see how well the hypothesised model fits the data (Barclay et al., 1995), the 
parameter estimates for PLS are obtained based on the ability to minimise the residual 
variances for dependent variables. PLS is therefore more suited than CBSEM for predictive 
applications and theory building (exploratory analysis), although PLS can also be used for 
theory confirmation (confirmatory analysis) (Barroso et al., 2010). 
(ii) Assumptions 
Whereas a CBSEM approach rests on the assumptions of a specific multivariate 
distribution and independence of observations, the PLS approach does not make these hard 
assumptions. Instead, PLS uses very general, soft distributional assumptions, which often lead 
to this approach being termed „soft modelling‟ (Wold, 1980b; and Chin, 2010). Although the 
mathematical and statistical procedures are rigorous and robust (Wold, 1980a), the 
mathematical model is „soft‟ in the sense that it makes no measurement, distributional or 
sample size assumptions (Barroso et al., 2010). CBSEM is only efficient and unbiased when 
the assumption of multivariate normality is met (Gotz et al., 2010).   
(iii) Parameter Estimates 
As a full information approach, model misspecification can have a significant impact on 
the estimates obtained throughout the CBSEM model (Chin, 2010).
104
 In contrast, the limited 
estimation procedure of PLS (whereby estimates are limited to the immediate blocks a 
particular construct is structurally connected to), means that misspecification in one part of a 
model will have less influence on the parameter estimates in other parts of the model.   
(iv) Latent Variable Scores 
In contrast to CBSEM, PLS avoids problems associated with inadmissible solutions and 
factor indeterminacy (Fornell & Bookstein, 1982; and Chin & Newsted, 1999). This is 
                                                     
104 For example, adding an item that does not belong to a particular construct can impact estimates obtained 
throughout the model.  
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because the constructs in CBSEM are modelled as indeterminate while in PLS the constructs 
are modelled as determinate.
105
 
(v) Epistemic Relationship between a Latent Variable and its Measures 
In terms of epistemic relationships, CBSEM was designed to operate with reflective 
indicators (Fornell, 1982), and any attempts to include formative indicators in the model 
could lead to identification problems, implied covariance of zero among indicators, and/or the 
existence of equivalent models (MacCullum & Browne, 1993).
106
 In contrast, PLS allows 
working with both formative and reflective indicators (Fornell & Bookstein, 1982). 
(vi) Model Complexity 
PLS models have the capacity to handle very complex models, with a high number of 
constructs, indicators and relationships. In contrast, CBSEM runs into difficulties handling 
larger models with 50 or more items (Barclay et al., 1995; Chin & Newsted, 1999; and Chin, 
2010).  
(vii) Implication 
CBSEM is considered to provide optimal estimates of the model parameters, and is ideal 
for model confirmation and estimation of the “true” underlying population parameters. The 
PLS approach on the other hand is arguably more suitable for prediction accuracy (Chin & 
Newsted, 1999). 
(viii) Sample Size 
The sample size requirement for CBSEM ranges from between 200 to 800. In comparison, 
PLS‟s sample size requirement for complex models is smaller, ranging from 30 to 100 cases 
(Chin & Newsted, 1999). In addition, the sample size for PLS can be small relative to the 
complexity of the model (Chin, 2010). 
In terms of the directional relationship among constructs, CBSEM allows for both 
recursive (unidirectional) and nonrecursive (bidirectional) relationships. In contrast, PLS 
currently only works with recursive relationships (Barroso et al., 2010).  
                                                     
105 A determinate construct is a composite of its indicators. An indeterminate construct is a composite of its 
indicators plus an error term (Fornell, 1982, p.5).   
106 An epistemic relationship describes the link between theory and data (Barroso et al., 2010, p. 431). 
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Despite the differences identified above, Wold (1985) suggested that both CBSEM and 
PLS should be considered as complementary rather than competitive methods, both having 
rigorous rationale of their own. A summary of the key differences discussed above is 
presented in Table 5.1.   
Table 5.1: Comparison between PLS and CBSEM Methodology 
(Reproduced from Chin and Newsted, 1999, p.314) 
Criterion PLS CBSEM 
Objective Prediction oriented Parameter oriented 
Approach  Variance based Covariance based 
Assumptions Prediction specification 
(nonparametric) 
Typically multivariate normal 
distribution and independent 
observations (parametric) 
Parameter estimates Consistent as indicators and 
sample size increase (for 
example, consistency at 
large) 
Consistent 
Latent variables scores Explicitly estimated Indeterminate 
Epistemic relationship 
between a latent variable 
and its measures 
Can be modelled in either 
formative or reflective mode 
Typically only with reflective 
indicators 
Implications Optimal for prediction 
accuracy 
Optimal for parameter accuracy 
Model complexity Large complexity (e.g., 100 
constructs and 1000 
indicators) 
Small to modest complexity 
(e.g., less than 100 indicators) 
Sample size requirements Power analysis based on the 
portion of the model with the 
largest number of predictors 
- minimal recommendations 
range from 30 to 100 cases 
Ideally based on power analysis 
of specific model – minimal 
recommendations range from 
200 to 800 
(b) Reasons for Using PLS-Graph 
The discussion in the previous section clearly demonstrates the advantages of employing 
the PLS approach for this study. The main objective of this study is to predict tax compliance 
behaviour using the PLS approach, which is prediction oriented, and offers better prediction 
capability. As an incremental study which builds on prior theory by developing new measures 
and structural paths, the PLS approach with its limited estimation procedure (whereby 
estimates are limited to the immediate blocks a particular construct is structurally connected 
to), offers better protection against model misspecification. Any misspecification in one part 
of the model would have less influence on the parameter estimates in other parts of the model. 
Equally important is the fact that the sample size from the survey is relatively small (under 
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200 cases), which is not considered suitable for the CBSEM method, which requires over 200 
cases. PLS, with its minimal recommendation range of 30 to 100 cases, and its soft 
distributional assumptions, is considered suitable for this study. Another reason for selecting 
PLS is the ease of model specification and reduction in complexity regarding model 
identification. The PLS-Graph Version 3 used for this study is a relatively easy tool to use. 
Finally, the PLS approach has rarely been applied in tax compliance behaviour, and one of the 
objectives of this study is to use PLS to test the tax compliance model and in the process 
prove that PLS can be successfully used in tax compliance studies. The next section sets out 
the process adopted in evaluating the PLS model.   
5.5.3 Model Evaluation 
The two steps in evaluating the PLS model involve assessing the measurement model (also 
referred to as the outer model), which relates the indicators to their associated latent variables, 
and the structural model (also referred to as the inner model), which relates endogenous latent 
variables to other latent variables (Hair et al., 2006). In assessing a PLS model, the traditional 
parametric-based techniques for testing significance would be inappropriate on the basis that 
PLS makes no distributional assumption, other than predictor specification (Chin, 1998b). 
Therefore, tests consistent with the distribution-free predictive approach of PLS should be 
adopted (Wold, 1980a; 1982). Consequently, the PLS model was evaluated using prediction-
oriented measures that are nonparametric, including various techniques suggested by Chin 
(1998b).   
(a) Evaluating the Measurement Model 
The aim of assessing the measurement model is to test the reliability and validity of the 
model, which is accomplished by examining two elements of factorial validity: convergent 
and discriminate validity (Churchill, 1979; and Gerbing & Anderson, 1988).  Validity tests 
are performed to ensure that the measures perform adequately, by illustrating how well the 
measurement items relate to the constructs (Gefen & Straub, 2005).  When factorial validity is 
satisfied, it means each measurement item correlates strongly with the one construct it is 
related to, while correlating weakly or not significantly with all other constructs. The 
literature provides several criteria for validating reflective constructs (Chin, 1998b; Gefen & 
Straub, 2005; Barroso et al., 2010; and Gotz et al., 2010) which includes: indicator reliability, 
construct reliability, convergent validity and discriminant validity. All these measures are 
generated by the bootstrapping procedures of PLS-Graph Version 3. 
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(i) Indicator Reliability 
The reliability of individual indicators or measures is evaluated by examining the loadings, 
or correlations, of the indicators with their respective latent variables (Hulland, 1999; and 
Barroso et al., 2010). A commonly accepted threshold is to accept items with loadings of 
0.707 or more, which implies that there is more shared variance between the constructs and its 
measures, than error variance (Chin, 1998a; Hulland, 1999; Barroso et al., 2010; and Gotz et 
al., 2010). Arguably, it is equally common to have several items in an estimated model 
displaying loadings of below 0.707, particularly when new items for newly developed scales 
are employed (Hulland, 1999; and Chin, 2010).  
Chin (1998b), however, cautions against eliminating measures with low loadings in cases 
where the measures are important to the construct. Chin (2010) advises that the only time to 
remove measures with low loadings is if these measures are influenced by additional factors, 
such as a method effect or some other concept. Unlike covariance-based SEM, where 
including additional poor indicators will lead to a worse fit; in PLS the inclusion of poor 
indicators will help to extract what useful information is available in the indicator to create a 
better construct score (Barroso et al., 2010). Given that PLS works with determinate 
constructs, poor indicators are factored in by lower weights (Barroso et al., 2010). Therefore, 
keeping items with low loadings may still increase predictiveness since the PLS algorithm 
will still weigh it to the extent it helps minimise residual variance, as long as other more 
reliable indicators exist (Chin, 2010).   
(ii) Construct Reliability 
The construct reliability assessment allows the evaluation of the degree to which a 
variable, or a set of variables, is consistent in what it intends to measure (Straub et al., 2004). 
Construct reliability is established by examining the composite reliability which is a measure 
of internal consistency developed by Werts et al. (1974),  and applicable to latent variables 
with reflective indicators (Chin, 1998b). Therefore, the internal consistency for a given block 
of reflective measures can be evaluated by calculating the composite reliability (Werts et al., 
1974), which can be generated through the bootstrapping resampling procedure. Composite 
reliability is defined as follows:    
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where    , F and     are the factor loading, factor variance, and unique/error variance 
respectively. If F is set at 1, then     is the 1-square of   .
 
Although this measure is similar to Cronbach‟s alpha, it does not assume that all indicators 
are equally weighted (Chin, 1998b). Values larger than 0.6 are considered to be acceptable 
(Bagozzi & Yi, 1988).    
(iii) Convergent Validity 
The Average Variance Extracted (AVE) is commonly used to measure convergent validity 
for reflective measures (Fornell & Larcker, 1981; and Gotz et al., 2010). The AVE attempts to 
measure the amount of variance that a latent variable captures from its indicators, relative to 
the amount due to measurement error (Chin, 1998b). Arguably, this ratio is more conservative 
than composite reliability and is only applicable to constructs with reflective indicators. AVE 
is calculated as follows: 
     
(    
  )      
    
               
 
where   , F and     are the factor loading, factor variance, and unique/error variance 
respectively. If F is set at 1, then     is the 1-square of   .
 
AVE values should be greater than 0.50, demonstrating that 50 percent or more of the 
indicator variance should be accounted for (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988; Chin, 1998b; Chin & 
Dibbern, 2010; and Barroso et al., 2010).  
(iv) Discriminant Validity (Cross Loadings and Squared Average Variance Extracted) 
Discriminant validity demonstrates the extent to which a given construct differs from other 
constructs (Barroso et al., 2010). Discriminant validity is established when each measurement 
item correlates weakly with all other constructs except for the one to which it is theoretically 
associated (Gefen & Straub, 2005). Discriminant validity is assessed in two ways: the first is 
by examining how each item relates to the latent constructs (cross loadings), and the second is 
by comparing the square root of the AVE values with the correlations among constructs. 
Cross loadings measures are derived by correlating the component scores of each latent 
variable with both their respective block of indicators and all other items included in the 
model (Chin, 1998b). Correlation of the latent variable scores with the measurement items 
have to show an appropriate pattern of loadings, one where the measurement items load 
highly on their theoretically assigned construct and not highly on other factors (Gefen & 
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Straub, 2005). Currently there is no widely accepted threshold to establish discriminant 
validity; however, it is commonly accepted that all loadings of the measurement items on 
their assigned latent variables should be larger than any other loadings (Gefen & Straub, 
2005). Chin (1998b) further notes that any indicator that loads higher with other latent 
variables than the one it is intended to measure should be considered for elimination. 
Square Root of Average Variance Extracted is another approach for establishing 
discriminant validity (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). In theory, the AVE test claims that the 
correlation of the latent variable with its measurement items should be larger than its 
correlation with the other latent variables (Gefen & Straub, 2005), and should be at least 0.50 
(Fornell & Larcker, 1981).   
(b) Evaluating the Structural Model 
The main aim of evaluating the structural model is to test for the model‟s predictive power 
and the stability of the estimates. Given the unsuitability of traditional parametric-based 
techniques for evaluating PLS models, non-parametric prediction-oriented measures are 
needed. This includes applying the R
2
 measures to predict the power of the endogenous 
constructs and examining the effect size    to assess whether a predictor variable has a 
significant influence on the dependent variable. In addition, the global goodness of fit index 
was used to evaluate the overall fit of the model.  
(i) R-square (R
2
) 
The R
2
 values for each dependent (endogenous) construct in the PLS model represent the 
amount of variance in the endogenous construct that is explained by the model. The R
2 
values 
generated by PLS are equivalent to the R
2 
values derived from traditional regression analysis. 
R
2 
is a normalised term that can assume values between 0 and 1. Arguably, there are no 
guidelines to determine the acceptable threshold value of R
2
. To determine whether this 
determination coefficient is deemed acceptable or not depends on the individual study. 
However, the larger R
2
 is, the larger the percentage of variance explained.  
The effect size,   , is used to assess whether a predictor variable has a significant 
influence on the dependent variable. The    value represents the change in R2 in the 
dependent variable when a predictor latent variable is used or omitted in the structural 
equation. The effect size    is calculated as follows: 
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where R
2
 included indicates the R
2 
of the dependent variable when the independent 
variable is included, and R
2
 excluded indicates the R
2
 of the dependent variable when the 
independent variable is excluded. 
A higher    value indicates greater influence of the predictor variable on the dependent 
variable. An effect size of 0.02, 0.15 and 0.35 indicates a small, medium or large influence on 
the predictor variable, respectively (Cohen, 1988). A small   , however, does not necessarily 
imply an unimportant effect (Wilson, 2010). In the present study, a number of sub models 
were created, each with one path missing in order to test for their effect size.     
(ii) Path-Coefficients 
The PLS structural model‟s path coefficient values are interpreted in a similar manner to 
standardised regression coefficients (Fornell & Cha, 1994; and Gefen et al., 2000). Path 
coefficients indicate the strength of the relationships between the dependent and independent 
variables. The stability of the path estimates can be assessed through the PLS resampling 
techniques.  
(c) Resampling Techniques 
(i) Q-Square Predictive Relevance (Blindfolding) 
The predictive sample reuse technique, as developed by Stone (1974) and Geisser (1975), 
can also be applied to test the model‟s predictive validity (Chin, 1998b; 2010). The technique 
represents a combination of cross-validation and function fitting with the perspective that the 
prediction of observables or potential observables is of much greater relevance than the 
estimation of what are often artificial construct-parameters (Geisser, 1975). In PLS, the 
blindfolding procedure is used to carry out this test, which omits a part of the data for a 
particular block of indicators during parameter estimations and then attempts to estimate the 
omitted part using the estimated parameters. This procedure is repeated until every data point 
has been omitted and estimated. The predictive measure for the block becomes:  
        
∑    
∑    
 
where d is the distance point; E is the sum of squares of prediction error; and O is the  sum 
of squares errors using the mean for prediction. Q
2
 represents a measure of how well-
observed values are reconstructed by the model and its parameters. If Q
2 
measures more 
than 0, the model is considered to have predictive relevance, whereas a Q
2  
measure of less 
than 0 represents a lack of predictive relevance (Chin, 1998b; 2010).   
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The blindfolding procedure generates two different forms of Q
2
: the cross-validated 
communality Q
2 
and the cross-validated redundancy Q
2
 (Fornell & Cha, 1994; and Chin, 
1998b; 2010). The cross-validated redundancy measures the ability of the model to predict the 
endogenous manifest variables using the latent variables that predict the block in question, 
and serves as a sign of the quality of the structural model (Tenenhaus et al., 2005). The cross-
validated communality measures the ability of the path model to predict the manifest 
variables or data points from their own latent variable score, and serves as an indicator of the 
quality of the measurement model. Chin (1998b) suggests using the cross-validation 
redundancy measure to evaluate the predictive relevance of the theoretical/structural model. 
An omission distance for blindfolding of between 5 and 10 is considered to be sufficient. 
(Wold, 1982; and Chin, 1998b; 2010).  
(ii) Jackknifing 
The jackknife is an inferential technique that assesses the variability of a statistic by 
examining the variability of the sample data rather than using parametric assumptions (Chin, 
1998b). This technique provides both estimates and compensates for bias in statistical 
estimates by developing robust confidence intervals.  The procedure deletes n cases where n 
is typically 1. Parameter estimates are then calculated for each instance and the variations in 
the estimates are analysed. The jackknife, however, is viewed as less efficient than the 
bootstrap because it can be considered as an approximation to the bootstrap (Efron & 
Tibshirani, 1993; and Chin 1998b).   
(iii) Bootstrapping 
The bootstrap is a nonparametric technique for estimating the accuracy of the PLS 
estimates and is preferable to the less efficient jackknife approach (Chin, 1998b). This 
technique creates n sample sets in order to obtain n estimates for each parameter in the model. 
Each sample is obtained by sampling with replacements from the original data set until the 
number of cases is identical to the original sample set. A number of approaches for estimating 
confidence intervals have been developed, but the two procedures available in PLS-Graph are 
the jackknife and bootstrapping methods. Considering that the jackknife is judged to be less 
efficient than the bootstrap, and because it is also considered as an approximation to the 
bootstrap (Efron & Tibshirani, 1993), the current study will adopt the bootstrapping 
resampling technique.     
Efron (1987) noted that applying 100 bootstrap iterations would suffice for the estimation 
of standard errors, but supported the use of 1,000 iterations, for deriving good estimates for 
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the bootstrap confidence intervals. Efron & Tibshirani (1986) explain that confidence 
intervals are essentially a more ambitious measure of statistical accuracy than standard errors, 
and therefore require more computational effort.
107
 Most recent studies on bootstrapping 
techniques tend to suggest the use of 1,000 resamples (Chernick, 2008). This study will 
therefore use 1,000 resamples for the bootstrapping procedure, in an attempt to improve the 
accuracy of the models‟ estimation of the confidence intervals and estimates of standard 
errors.       
(d) Overall Model Validation 
(i) Goodness of Fit Index 
PLS does not optimise any global scalar function and, therefore, an index to evaluate the 
overall quality of the model is not available (Duarte & Raposo, 2010). To overcome this 
shortcoming, a global criterion of goodness of fit (GoF) was proposed by Tenenhaus et al. 
(2004) for validating the PLS model globally. The GoF index takes into account the model‟s 
performance in both the measurement and the structural model, thus providing a single 
measure for the overall prediction performance of the model (Esposito Vinzi et al., 2010). The 
fit of the model is determined by taking the square root of the product of the geometric mean 
of the average communality and the average R
2
:  
 
where the  average communality is computed as weight average of the different 
communalities with the number of manifest variables or indicators of every construct as 
weights. The average R
2
 is the average R
2
 of the endogenous constructs. 
The first part of the formula measures the quality of the outer model and the second part 
measures the quality of the inner model. The computation for the average communality 
should only be used for constructs with multiple indicators (Tenenhaus et al., 2005). Single 
indicator constructs should not be used for the computation of the average communality, 
because they lead to communalities equal to 1 (Tenenhaus et al., 2005). Further, the GoF is 
considered to be more appropriate for reflective models (Esposito Vinzi et al., 2010).  
The computed GoF index ranges from between 0 and 1; however, there is no inference-
based threshold to judge the statistical significance of their values (Esposito Vinzi et al., 
                                                     
107 Advances in modern technology mean that researchers are not limited by computational speed when 
determining the number of iterations in a bootstrapping procedure. 
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2010). Further, there are no clear guidelines as to the threshold for the values; however, recent 
studies seem to suggest that a GoF index of approximately 0.3 is acceptable (Duarte & 
Raposo, 2010; and Tenenhaus et al., 2005).
108
 Further, Chin (2009) also considered a GoF of 
0.3 to be adequate. 
The research model comprises constructs all having multiple reflective indicators, which is 
suitable for calculating the GoF statistic. The GoF index was therefore computed to measure 
the fit of the combined measurement and structural model. This is more efficient than 
applying the two separate Q
2
 tests (communalities and redundancy tests) prescribed for the 
Stone-Geisser test, which requires two separate measures (Stone, 1974; and Geisser, 1975). 
5.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter introduced the research methodology and research design adopted for this 
study. The key objectives were to examine the influence of beliefs and attitudes towards 
paying tax, and to test the applicability of the TPB model and provide justification for the use 
of SEM with PLS in tax compliance research.  
The development of the questionnaire relating to the TPB model was guided by the 
guidelines established by Ajzen (1991), and the remaining questions were based on prior 
literature. The design of the survey instrument was influenced by Dillman‟s (1978; 2000) 
„tailored design method‟. Both the mail and web-based surveys were self-administered to 
randomly selected taxpayers, tax agents and tax lawyers.   
This chapter also presented a description of the analytical methodology, which included 
details of the approaches used to address missing data, nonresponse bias, sample 
representativeness, and the descriptive analysis proposed for the selected demographic and 
study variables.  
Next, the SEM with PLS approach was introduced, followed by a discussion of the key 
differences between the PLS and the CBSEM methods. Reasons were also provided to justify 
the use of PLS (as opposed to CBSEM) for analysing the survey data. The validation process 
of the measurement models, which included a number of reliability and validity tests, was 
discussed. The process involved testing for indicator reliability, construct reliability, 
convergent validity and discriminant validity. The methods applied to evaluate the structural 
models were also discussed, which included: estimating the path coefficients, and the 
                                                     
108 Duarte and Raposo (2010) obtained a GoF index measuring 0.3814, whereas Tenenhaus et al. (2005) obtained a 
GoF index of 0.4645. 
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variance explained or R
2
 for each endogenous construct in the model. These two measures 
were used to evaluate the predictiveness of the survey models. The bootstrapping method 
with 1,000 iterations (resamples) was used for the resampling technique.   
Finally, the computation of a GoF index was discussed, which is a nonparametric test to 
evaluate the overall performance of the research model developed to test the hypotheses 
established in Chapter 4. The next chapter presents the results from the preliminary analysis.  
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CHAPTER 6 
PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the results of the relevant preliminary analysis described in Chapter 
5, while the next chapter (Chapter 7) presents the results from assessing the measurement and 
structural models. The first section, section 6.2, presents the results of the survey and includes 
the response rates for the three selected sample groups. Section 6.3 describes the data 
screening process used in this study. This is followed by section 6.4 which presents the results 
of the nonresponse bias and sample representativeness tests carried out on the survey data. 
Section 6.5 presents a description of the profiles of the observed samples. The results of some 
preliminary data analysis carried out on the survey data are presented in section 6.6, while 
section 6.7 presents the descriptive statistics of selected study variables. Section 6.8 presents 
the results of respondents‟ perceptions of the comparative seriousness of tax noncompliance 
and its effect on compliance behaviour. Section 6.9 provides a summary of the views from 
respondents who were subjected to the penalties regime. Finally, section 6.10 concludes this 
chapter with a summary of the results.  
6.2 ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESPONSES 
6.2.1 Response Rate 
The level of response rate is always of interest in any survey research, which depends on 
the generalisability of the results of the survey. The survey response for each group is 
summarised in Table 6.1.   
Table 6.1: Response Rates for Observed Samples 
Number of Mail-
outs and Returns 
Taxpayers Tax Agents Tax Lawyers 
Numbers Percentage Numbers Percentage Numbers Percentage 
First Mail-out 1000 100 1000 100 266 100 
Not-delivered  62 6.2 18 1.6 21 7.89 
Second mail-out 938 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Not-delivered 20 2.13 n/a n/a 184* n/a 
Total delivered 918 97.87 982 100 61 100 
Total received 194 21.13 183 18.6 37 60.65 
Response Rate (%) 21 19 61 
*Note: Out of the 266 members of the New Zealand Law Society whose work comprises more than 50 percent 
tax work, 184 members work for the Inland Revenue Department.  
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The response rate for the Taxpayer sample was calculated as the percentage of all those 
respondents in the initial sampling frame who received the survey instrument, were able and 
willing to participate, and who completed and returned the survey in the pre-paid envelope. A 
total of 1,000 survey packages were mailed out in early August 2006, with the sample 
randomly selected from the 2006 Electoral Roll. A total of 82 survey packages were returned; 
62 from the first mail-out and 20 from the second mail-out. This worked out to a 21 percent 
response rate for the Taxpayer sample.  
A total of 1,000 emails with an attached link to the web-based survey were distributed in 
early December 2007 by the New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants (NZICA) to 
randomly selected members. A similar approach, as the one adopted for the Taxpayer sample, 
was employed in calculating the response rate for the Tax Agent sample. A total of 18 
instruments were not delivered, due to the following reasons: the email address was not 
current, a prolonged absence from the office, the person was on long-term leave, or not 
currently practicing and now retired. Due to NZICA‟s policy on unsolicited emails, only one 
mail-out was allowed. Table 6.1 shows that a response rate of 19 percent was achieved for the 
Tax Agent sample.  
In terms of the Tax Lawyer sample, the link to the survey website was forwarded by the 
New Zealand Law Society (NZLS) to 266 members whose work comprises more than 50 
percent tax work. This was the total population of members of the NZLS whose work 
comprises more than 50 percent tax work. As a result of NZLS‟s policy on unsolicited emails, 
only one mail-out of the questionnaire was allowed. Further, out of the total population of 266 
members identified for the survey, 184 worked for the IRD. The response rate for this sample 
was therefore calculated as a percentage of the total number of NZLS members who received 
the survey instrument, minus the estimated number of members who worked for the IRD and 
who were unable to participate.
109
 In addition, a total of 21 instruments were not delivered. 
This resulted in a response rate of 61 percent for the Tax Lawyer sample. 
Whilst the response rates for the Taxpayer and Tax Agent samples may seem low, this 
outcome was expected, given the sensitive nature of the questions, and the length of the 
questionnaire (Neuman, 2006). Based on the length of the questionnaire (an eight page 
booklet), some respondents may have started but not completed the questionnaire (Galesic & 
Bosnjak, 2009). Others may not have been comfortable or willing to answer sensitive 
questions about themselves, or may not have the knowledge or interest in issues relating to 
                                                     
109 IRD staff members are subject to an internal code of conduct which prohibits them from commenting on any 
aspects of the tax legislation and case law.  
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tax.
110
 In terms of the web-based survey, the Director of Taxation for NZICA (Craig 
McAlister) confirmed that the normal rate of response for similar studies conducted on 
NZICA members have in the past ranged from 17 percent to 19 percent.
111
 In two similar 
reviews comparing the response rates of postal with electronic mail surveys, electronic 
surveys displayed lower response rates than postal surveys (Schaefer & Dillman, 1998; and 
Mavis & Brocato, 1998).
112
 McKerchar (2010) also found response rates for web-based 
surveys to be generally lower than for mail-based surveys. 
Further, other studies of tax compliance behaviour have yielded even lower response rates.  
For example, a recent Australian study by Tran-Nam and Karlinsky (2008) reported an 
overall response rate of only 8.6 percent. The survey was conducted in early 2008 and 
involved distribution of the questionnaire by email. In addition, a much lower response rate of 
5.5 percent was recorded in a survey conducted by Copeland and Harmelink (1995). Sivo et 
al. (2006) reviewed a large number of Information Systems research based on surveys and 
published in a number of journals. The review found response rates as low as 3 percent 
reported in the European Journal of Information Systems, while other low response rates 
reported include 5.7 percent in MIS Quarterly, and 16 percent in the Journal of Management 
Information Systems. In contrast, Michaelidou and Dibb (2006) achieved a 93 percent 
response rate for their email survey for a consumer study, by addressing issues that may 
inhibit responses.
113
 
Currently, there are no agreed-upon standards for minimum acceptable rates for surveys 
(Fowler, 2009, p.45); nonetheless, McKerchar (2005) suggested that bias associated with 
nonresponse must be considered. Therefore, although the number of responses for the 
Taxpayer and Tax Agent samples is more than adequate for the selected analytical approach 
adopted for this study, a number of tests were applied to the survey data to test for 
nonresponse bias. The Tax Lawyer sample was removed at this stage due to the small sample 
size which did not meet the requirements for the application of PLS-Graph. 
                                                     
110 Two blank questionnaires were returned noting that they lacked the necessary knowledge to respond. 
111 Personal communication with regards to general response rates of past surveys conducted on NZICA members 
(January 2008).  
112 In one extreme case reviewed by Schaefer and Dillman (1998) the mail survey produced a response rate of 75.5 
percent while the response rate for the email survey was only 28.1 percent. 
113 However, unlike a consumer study, a tax compliance study involves the respondents providing private and 
sensitive (and sometimes incriminating) information about their tax compliance behaviour, and therefore some of 
the suggested guidelines may not generally apply.  
152 
 
6.3 DATA SCREENING 
6.3.1 Missing Data 
In order to ensure that the data in the data matrix accurately reflects the respondents‟ 
views, it was necessary to screen all data before proceeding with the analysis. As set out in 
Chapter 5, the screening of data included checking for coding errors, patterns in the missing 
data, unusual or extreme responses and ensuring that the data satisfied the required statistical 
assumptions (Meyers et al., 2006). 
 A superficial analysis of the data revealed that it was of a reasonably high quality. The 
responses of each sample population were first examined for completeness and consistencies 
in the individual responses. The consistency checks were completed by comparing and cross-
checking the responses to similar questions. This examination revealed that very few items 
were overlooked or disregarded and consistencies in responses were apparent. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the data-sets were also examined to identify 
variables with more than 10 percent missing data. The analysis of the Taxpayer data-set, to 
identify cases with more than 10 percent missing data, resulted in the deletion of a number of 
cases from the data-set. In terms of the Tax Agent sample, a more generous threshold was 
adopted on the basis that significant amounts of missing data can be attributed to the design of 
the web-based survey. During the testing phase some testers experienced issues in fully 
completing all the questions. This issue, however, was apparent in only a few responses 
received. As such, for the Tax Agent sample, a threshold of 20 percent was set, which meant 
that cases with more than 20 percent missing data were eliminated from the data-set.
114
 Hair 
et al. (2006) maintain that a higher level of missing data (20 percent to 30 percent) can be 
remedied by applying one of the missing data imputation methods available.
115
   
Consistent with Cohen and Cohen (1983) and Hair et al. (2006), cases with missing values 
for the dependent variables were also deleted from the data-set. Further, Structural Equation 
Modelling (SEM) commonly involves multiple dependent constructs, each measured with 
multiple indicators. Therefore, cases with missing values for all indicators of one or more 
constructs in the model were also considered for deletion. The only exception to this relates to 
two cases with one missing dependent variable each.
116
 Schafer and Graham (2002) opined 
                                                     
114 However, most cases retained have less than 10 percent missing data. 
115 As discussed previously the Tax Lawyer sample was removed because the sample size was too small and did 
not meet the required threshold of at least 130 cases for using PLS-Graph. 
116 Two respondents noted that they did not respond to one particular question (which is a measure of a dependent 
construct) because they found the particular question to be too personal. They, however, noted that they have 
completed the rest of the questionnaire.  
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that missing values on independent variables and missing values on dependent variables do 
not fundamentally differ, and any distinction between independent and dependent variables 
should be left to post imputation analyses. Further, the measure in question was part of a 
construct which has more than one measure. The outcome from the data screening exercise is 
presented in Table 6.2: 
Table 6.2: Final Number of Useable Cases 
Cases Taxpayer Sample Tax Agent Sample 
Total cases received 194 183 
Total cases deleted 14 19 
Total useable cases 180 164 
In summary, a total of 14 cases were deleted from the Taxpayer sample and 19 cases from 
the Tax Agent sample. This included cases where the dependent variables were missing 
(except for the two missing dependent variables noted previously). The above process 
reduced the Taxpayer data-set to 180 cases and the Tax Agent data-set to 164 cases. These 
reduced data-sets were used in all further analysis undertaken for this study.  
Fowler (2009) maintains that a sample size does not have to be large for establishing the 
credibility of findings. Fowler (2009) argues that accuracy increases for sample sizes of 150 
to 200 respondents, but after that point, the gain in accuracy is much more moderate.  Fowler 
(2009, p. 44) further adds that “a sample size of 150 people will describe a population of 
either 15,000 or 15 million with virtually the same degree of accuracy, assuming that all other 
aspects of the sample design and sampling procedures are the same.” This suggests that the 
final population of 180 cases for the Taxpayer sample is adequate to describe New Zealand‟s 
population of 4 million, and the 164 cases for the Tax Agent group is more than adequate to 
describe NZICA‟s population of 29,435 members,117 and provide a reasonable level of 
accuracy in terms of the results of this study. 
6.3.2 Data Analysis 
The reduced data-sets were then subject to a number of statistical tests to assess the 
potential impact of outliers and to determine the normality of the distribution responses. 
Whilst the selected statistical approach, SEM with Partial Least Squares (PLS), does not 
require data to display certain assumptions underlying most multivariate techniques, it is 
                                                     
117 In 2007 when the survey was distributed, NZICA had 29,435 members, however, the current membership 
stands at 32,733 (2011 Annual Report NZICA). 
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necessary if the data is to be used in parametric statistical techniques. Both data-sets were 
therefore assessed for normality and for outliers. 
Normality tests on the two data-sets were performed by evaluating the skewness and 
kurtosis. The tests revealed that although the majority of variables fell within the acceptable 
range of + 2 values of skewness and kurtosis (Pallant, 2011), some also fell outside that 
acceptable range. However, in a large sample such as the current data-sets used, the impact of 
skewness and kurtosis is minimal, suggesting a deviation from normality may not make a 
substantive difference in further analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). The detrimental effects 
of non-normality only take effect for small samples of 50 or fewer observations (Hair et al., 
2006). It is also accepted that in survey research, particularly in the social sciences, data 
collected in most instances will not be normally distributed (Hair et al., 2006). Further, most 
of the new data analysis techniques are reasonably „robust‟ or tolerant of violations of this 
assumption (for example PLS-Graph). 
An extreme value analysis, available in SPSS, is able to determine how much of a problem 
any extreme values are likely to cause (Pallant, 2011). The 5 percent Trimmed Means statistic 
will be able to assess whether any extreme values are distorting the results. The procedure 
involved the removal of the top and bottom 5 percent of the cases, after which a new mean 
value is recalculated. The original mean value is then compared with this new trimmed mean. 
If the trimmed mean and original mean values are very different, these data points need to be 
investigated further to determine how much of a problem these outliers may be causing 
(Pallant, 2011). The results from this analysis revealed that for the majority of the variables, 
the two mean values did not differ too much,
118
 indicating no serious problems with outliers.  
6.4 RESPONSE BIAS ANALYSIS 
6.4.1 Nonresponse Bias 
The importance of testing for nonresponse bias in survey research was discussed in 
Chapter 5. A common approach frequently applied to determine whether nonresponse bias 
exists in survey data is to examine and compare the responses of early respondents with that 
of late respondents. The responses of late respondents are used as proxies for non-respondents 
(Armstrong & Overton, 1977; and Leong, 1980). If there are no significant differences in the 
responses between these two groups, it can be assumed that nonresponse bias is not a 
problem. 
                                                     
118 Currently, no published threshold is available to indicate the level of acceptance.  
155 
 
In this study, 194 responses were received from the Taxpayer sample group and 183 
responses from the Tax Agent sample group.  Consistent with Armstrong and Overton (1977), 
the first 25 percent of responses were selected to represent early respondents while the last 25 
percent of responses received were used to represent late respondents (and proxy non-
respondents). Therefore, the first and last 48 cases from the Taxpayer sample and the first and 
last 46 cases from the Tax Agent sample were used to test for nonresponse bias, on each 
variable used in this study. The independent samples t-test was employed to compare the 
means score for the two groups of respondents (Gaur & Gaur, 2006; and Pallant, 2011), in 
order to determine whether the two groups are similar.   
The SPSS output provides the results of two sets of analysis: the first set assumes equal 
variances in the two groups, with the second set assuming unequal variances. The Levene’s 
Test for Equality of Variances indicates which values to use in order to analyse the equality of 
the means (Hinton et al., 2004; and Gaur & Gaur 2006). One of the assumptions for using this 
test is that both samples have equal variances. Therefore, if the test statistic F is not 
significant, that is, p > 0.05, the two variances are considered to be not significantly different, 
and the equal variance assumption can be accepted. In this case, the first set of analysis is 
used and the null hypothesis is true, and has to be accepted.
119
 Conversely, if the test statistic 
F is significant, that is, p < 0.05, Levene‟s test concludes that the two variances differ 
significantly, and the values in the second set of analysis (statistic associated with equal 
variances not assumed) should be used (Hinton et al., 2004; and Gaur & Gaur, 2006).  
Adopting the above recommended procedure, the results generated for the Taxpayer 
sample show that out of the 119 variables tested, 114 variables (or 96 percent) reported 
insignificant test scores at the predetermined value of p > 0.05. Only five variables (or 4 
percent) displayed observed levels of significance below the pre-established alpha of  
p < 0.05. This outcome indicates that both early and late responses have variances that are not 
significantly different. Similarly, the results for the Tax Agent sample show that out of 119 
variables tested, all except seven variables displayed observed levels of significance over the 
pre-established alpha of p > 0.05. This indicates that a large majority of the variables tested 
reported insignificant outcomes, clearly suggesting that both early and late responses from the 
Tax Agent sample also have variances that are not significantly different. 
Lewis and Ford (1987, p.95) note that where the observed statistics are more than the pre-
established significance level of 0.05, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The results 
reveal that a large majority of the observed values are over the predetermined threshold of 
                                                     
119 The null hypothesis is that the two groups (early and late respondents) have equal variances. 
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p > 0.05 significance level, which means that the null hypothesis that states that the early and 
late respondents have equal variance cannot be rejected. A few differences do not suggest that 
one group is different from the other (Hirst & Goeltz, 1984). The extrapolation of early and 
late respondents on both the study and demographic variables offers some assurance that 
respondents and non-respondents do not differ on sample characteristics or in their beliefs and 
attitudes that are of interest to this study. The next section presents details of the additional 
test applied to assess the representativeness of the observed samples.  
6.4.2 Representativeness of Observed Samples 
The representativeness of the observed samples can be established by determining whether 
each of the survey samples adequately represent their corresponding population distribution. 
This involves comparing five attributes from the observed or survey samples with attributes 
from the total population. The attributes selected were gender, age, income level, income 
source, and educational attainment.
120
 
Selected attributes of the Taxpayer sample were compared to that of the New Zealand 
population obtained from Statistics New Zealand‟s website.121 The Tax Agent sample‟s 
attributes were compared to information available from NZICA‟s 2006 Annual Report122 
while information on remuneration was sourced from published results from the remuneration 
survey undertaken in the 2007 year.
123
 The results are presented in Table 6.3 for the Taxpayer 
sample and Table 6.4 for the Tax Agent sample. 
(a) Gender (Taxpayer) 
The gender split for the Taxpayer sample is 50 percent males and 50 percent females. This 
roughly mirrors the breakdown of the population distribution of New Zealand, which is 
reported by Statistics New Zealand to have a gender split of 49 percent males and 51 percent 
females.  
(b) Age (Taxpayer) 
The percentage of respondents in the 25 to 44 years age bracket, and the over 65 years age 
bracket, are similar for both populations. The 45 to 65 years age bracket appears larger for the 
                                                     
120 These demographic variables were selected because statistics for these attributes were more readily available 
for the New Zealand population. 
121 Data downloaded from http://www.stats.govt.nz/census/Census2006HomePage.aspx. 
122 Available from www.nzica.com.  
123 The results of the remuneration survey conducted for the 2007 year was retrieved from NZICA‟s website at 
http://www.institutesurvey.co.nz/2008/2007results.asp. 
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observed population than for the total New Zealand population. The under 25 years age group 
seems to be underrepresented in the observed population. The results also indicate that a large 
proportion from the sample population and total population appear to be clustered around the 
25 to 64 age bracket. 
(c) Income Level (Taxpayer) 
The range of income brackets established for the survey does not mirror the income 
brackets reported for the total New Zealand population, except for the $40,000 and over 
income bracket. Therefore, it was not possible to make any comparative analysis between the 
observed sample and the population distribution with regards to income level. Nevertheless, it 
is clear that high income earners are overrepresented in the observed population, and low 
income earners underrepresented.  
(d) Income Source (Taxpayer) 
Respondents who derive their income from salary and wages, investments
124
 and from 
other sources appear to be adequately representative of the total population. In contrast, self-
employed respondents are significantly overrepresented, making up 29 percent, compared to 
12 percent in the total population. The student population is also not represented in the survey 
sample; however, the student percentage reported in the total population is extremely low (1 
percent). Those receiving welfare, pensions or similar payments are also underrepresented in 
the sample population.   
(e) Educational Level (Taxpayer) 
Respondents with Year 11 or under qualifications, or who have trade or vocational 
qualifications, or other qualifications, appear to adequately reflect the total population. 
Respondents with Year 12 or Year 13 qualifications seem to be underrepresented in the 
observed population. In contrast, university graduates appear to be overrepresented, and also 
make up the largest group in the survey. This is not a surprise given that this group may have 
more confidence to respond to the type of tax questions in the survey instrument.   
 
 
 
                                                     
124 Investment income refers to interests, dividends, rents, royalties and other similar income. 
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Table 6.3: Representativeness Analysis (Taxpayer) 
Summary Characteristics of Socio-Demographic Variables (Taxpayer) 
Observed Population Total Population 
Variables 
Survey 
Numbers 
Percentage 
% 
Variables 
Census 
Numbers 
Percentage 
% 
Gender  
1. Male 89 50 Male 1,965,621 49 
2. Female 89 50 Female 2,062,326 51 
Total 178 100 Total 4,027,947 100 
Age 
1. Under 25 years 5 3 Under 25 years 385,074 13 
2. 25 to 44 years 64 36 25 to 44 years 1,134,252 38 
3. 45 to 64 years 82 45 45 to 64 years 959,334 32 
4. 65 years and over 28 16 65 years and over 495,612 17 
Total 179 100 Total
a
 2,974,272 100 
Income  
1. Under $20,000 28 16 Under $20,000 1,081,302 38 
2. $20,000 to $39,999 38 21 $20,000 to $39,999 839,031 30 
3. $40,000 to $59,999 44 25 $40,000 and over
b
 774,106 27 
4. $60,000 and over 66 37 n/a n/a n/a 
5. None 1 1 None 145,050 5 
Total 177 100 Total 2,839,485 100 
Income Source  
1. Salary/Wages 82 46 Salary/Wages 1,775,340 41 
2. Interest/Dividends 18 10 Investment income
c
 714,729 17 
3. Rents/Royalties 9 5 n/a n/a n/a 
4. Self-employed 52 29 Self-employed 492,024 12 
5. Student 0 0 Student 64,284 1 
6. All welfare/pensions 6 3 All welfare/pensions 950,478 22 
7. Others 3 2 Others 287,202 7 
9. Multiple Sources 8 5 - - - 
Total 178 100 Total 4,284,057 100 
 Education  
1. Year 11 and under 32 18 Year 11 and under 389,259 22 
2. Year 12 or 13 18 10 Year 12 or 13 440,460 25 
3. Trade/Vocational 52 29 Trade/Vocational 507,891 28 
4. University  56 32 University 292,086 16 
5. Others 20 11 Others and Overseas 166,170 9 
Total 178 100 Total
d
 1,795,866 100 
Legend: 
aTotal figure excludes those aged between 0 and 18 years (i.e. those excluded from the Electoral Roll).  
bCensus data does not provide any further breakdown of income levels.  
cCensus data summed the total of income such as: interest, dividends, rents and royalties.   
dTotal does not include the 1,944,625 people who do not possess any qualifications and the large number of 
responses that were unusable.  
Note: 
1. Also note that missing data for demographic valuables were not included in the above calculation, which 
explains the different total figures above. 
2. All figures have been rounded to the nearest whole number where applicable. 
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The next section and Table 6.4 provide the comparative results for the Tax Agent survey 
sample. The 2007 Annual Report published indicates a total membership of 29,435 
members.
125
 
Table 6.4: Representativeness Analysis (Tax Agent) 
Summary Characteristics of Socio-Demographic Variables (Tax Agent) 
Observed Population NZICA Population 
Variables 
Survey 
Numbers 
Percentage 
% 
Variables 
NZICA 
Numbers 
Percentage 
% 
Gender  
1. Male 100 61 Male 18,534 63 
2. Female 63 39 Female 10,901 37 
Total 163 100 Total 29,435 100 
Age 
1. Under 25 years 5 3 Under 30 years 3,402 12 
2. 25 to 44 years 84 51 30 to 39 years 8,447 29 
3. 45 to 64 years 68 42 40 to 49 years 8,393 29 
4. 65 years and over 7 4 50 to 59 years 4,764 16 
- - - 60 years and over 4,083 14 
Total 164 100 Total 29,089
a
 100 
Income  
1. Under $20,000 2 1  
Average salary for NZICA members was 
$144,347.00 (the figure may include other 
remuneration).
b
 
2. $20,000 to $39,999 5 3 
3. $40,000 to $59,999 26 17 
4. $60,000 and over 125 79 
Total 158 100  
Income Source  
1. Salary/Wages 122 75  
 
 
The majority of NZICA members are salary and 
wage earners. 
2. Interest/Dividends 4 2 
3. Rents/Royalties 1 0.7 
4. Self-employed 34 21 
5. Student 0 0 
6. All welfare/pensions 1 0.7 
9. Others 1 0.6 
Total 163 100 
 Education  
1. Year 11 and under 0 0  
2. Years 12 or 13 1 1 The majority of NZICA members would hold a 
university degree. 3.Trade/Vocational 9 5 
4. University  140 86 
5.Others 13 8 
Total 163 100  
Legend: 
aFigure excludes 346 missing data. 
bSalary band not available. Average annual salary of members obtained from Remuneration Survey.  
Note: 
1. Also note that missing data for demographic valuables were not included in the above calculation, which 
explains the different total figures above.  
2. All figures have been rounded to the nearest whole number where applicable 
                                                     
125 Refer to page 29 of the 2007 NZICA Annual Report.   
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(f) Gender (Tax Agent) 
The gender split for the observed sample of 61:39, males to females, is almost identical to 
the gender split of 63:37, males to females, reported for the total NZICA population.  
(g) Age (Tax Agent) 
The age brackets established for the survey differ significantly from the age brackets 
reported for the NZICA population.  As such, it was not possible to make any meaningful 
comparisons between the two populations. However, it appears that the largest group of 
respondents are concentrated in the middle age bracket.    
(h) Income Level (Tax Agent) 
The breakdown for the various levels of income for the NZICA population is not available. 
However, the figures for the average income earned per year can be found in the Hudson 
Remuneration Survey published yearly.
126
 The published results indicate an average income 
of $144,347 per year for members for the 2007 year.
127
  A significant number of respondents 
(over 79 percent) earn more than $60,000 per annum, which compares favourably with the 
2007 Remuneration Survey statistics published.
128
 Data for the remaining income categories 
were not published in the survey report and therefore not available for any comparative 
analysis between the two populations.  
(i) Income Source (Tax Agent) 
Statistics for the source of income for the total NZICA population are not available. 
Therefore, a comparison cannot be made for each category of income source. However, the 
2007 Remuneration Survey indicates that a majority of members derive their income from 
salary and wages (either in accounting firms or in various corporate organisations or 
industries). The sample population comprises a significant number of respondents earning 
income through salary and wages, which is consistent with the statistics for the total NZICA 
population. Therefore, it can be assumed that the majority of respondents in both populations 
are salary and wage earners.  
                                                     
126 Hudson Remuneration Survey retrieved from http://www.institutesurvey.co.nz/2008/2007results.asp.  
127 Average income for the 2007 year, which is the year the survey was distributed. 
128 2007 Hudson Remuneration Survey retrieved from http://www.institutesurvey.co.nz/2008/2007results.asp. 
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(j) Educational Level (Tax Agent) 
Statistics on educational attainment are also not available for each individual educational 
level. However, it is commonly accepted that most NZICA members are tertiary qualified 
(except those wishing to apply for Accounting Technician status).
129
 As such, in the absence 
of any statistical data, it can be inferred that the majority of NZICA members are university 
graduates. The survey data reveals that a large majority of respondents (86 percent) are 
university graduates, suggesting adequate representation to the total NZICA population.   
In general, the sample observed in the Taxpayer survey appears to be adequately 
representative of the total population. There is sufficient agreement between the observed 
sample and the population distribution in most of the selected attributes, notwithstanding the 
high percentage of self-employed, high earners and university graduates among the 
respondents (compared to the population distribution). Nonetheless, this outcome is expected, 
since respondents in this category would have a better working knowledge of taxation, and 
therefore have the expertise to participate in the survey.
130
 Further, the self-employed have to 
make regular tax paying decisions,
131
 which highlights the importance of including this group 
in the current study. Similarly, the Tax Agent survey generated a sample that is an 
approximate representation of its corresponding population, with a few minor and 
inconsequential exceptions, some resulting from the unavailability of the necessary statistics. 
The next section reports on the respondents‟ profiles. 
6.5 SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS (RESPONDENTS’ PROFILES) 
This section describes the survey respondents‟ profiles. The various demographic 
characteristics of the respondents by Age, Gender, Income Level, Income Source, and 
Educational Level, are summarised previously in Table 6.3 and 6.4. 
6.5.1 Age 
Across both samples, the largest concentration of respondents participating in the survey is 
clustered around the 25 to 44 and 45 to 64 age groups. Collectively, these two groups 
represent 81 percent of respondents in the Taxpayer sample and 93 percent of respondents in 
the Tax Agent sample. Both samples are underrepresented by respondents belonging to the 
                                                     
129 It should be noted that older members may not be tertiary educated. 
130 A few blank questionnaires were returned in the pre-paid envelope, noting that they did not have the knowledge 
to complete the questionnaire. This suggests that some tax knowledge is required to be able to confidently 
complete the questionnaire.    
131 Most income types listed in the questionnaire are subject to a form of withholding tax, except income earned by 
those who are self-employ.  
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under 25 years and over 65 years age brackets. Nonetheless, the age of respondents cover all 
the range of categories established for the survey.  
6.5.2 Gender 
Gender is equally represented in the Taxpayer sample, comprising of a 50:50 split, of 
males and females, indicating that an equal number of males and females participated in the 
survey. In contrast, the Tax Agent sample has a higher percentage of males (61 percent) 
compared to females (39 percent). However, as discussed previously, this is consistent with 
the data obtained from NZICA and is representative of the total NZICA population.  
6.5.3 Income Level 
The largest group of respondents (37 percent) from the Taxpayer sample are in the higher 
income bracket (that is, over $60,000), while the mid-income brackets ($20,000 to $39,000 
and $40,000 to $59,000) are also well represented in the sample. A reasonable number of 
respondents earn under $20,000.  The results indicate the Taxpayer sample covers all income 
brackets created for the survey.  
Respondents from the highest income bracket ($60,000 and over) are significantly 
overrepresented in the Tax Agent sample, with comparatively marginal representation in the 
lower income brackets.
132
 This is representative of the level of income earned by members of 
this profession. Notwithstanding this situation, all categories of identified income brackets are 
covered by participants of the survey.  
6.5.4 Income Source 
A large percentage of respondents from the Taxpayer sample are salary and wage earners 
(46 percent), followed by those who are self-employed (29 percent). Similarly, the Tax Agent 
sample is dominated by salary and wage earners (75 percent), followed by the self-employed 
(21 percent). Full-time students are not represented in either sample, while the remaining 
sources are also less represented, especially in respect to the Tax Agent sample. However, all 
categories, (except full time students) are covered by both observed samples (albeit at a 
minimal level in some cases). 
                                                     
132
 The median annual personal income from all sources for people aged 15 years and over was $24,400 
in 2006 (Statistics New Zealand, 2006). 
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6.5.5 Educational Level 
Most respondents from the Taxpayer sample (at least 60 percent) have completed a 
university degree, or trade or vocational training. The third largest group is made up of those 
with Year 11 or under qualifications. The remainder have either completed Year 12 or 13 or 
have some other qualifications. The majority of respondents appear to have attained higher 
qualifications, which may suggest that they would have sufficient knowledge on tax matters 
to be able to complete the questionnaire. Further, the respondents covered all listed 
categories.  
As expected, a large percentage of respondents from the Tax Agent sample have 
completed a university degree (86 percent), compared to 5 percent who completed trade or 
vocational training. Only one respondent had a Year 12 or 13 qualifications, and none had 
qualifications at Year 11 or under.  The level of tertiary educated respondents in this group 
suggests that most would have sufficient knowledge to be able to understand and respond 
correctly to the questions on tax and tax issues.  While the majority hold higher qualifications, 
the respondents covered all categories except for the „Year 11 and under‟ category. 
In summary, a number of tests were performed on the two data-sets to determine the 
adequacy of the data for further analysis. The results suggest that the two observed samples 
are adequately representative of all categories established for the survey, in respect to the 
selected attributes. In particular, the results suggest that no serious problems are apparent in 
each data-set that may compromise the results of this study. The next section presents the 
results of some preliminary analysis, including descriptive statistics.  
6.6 PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
The previous chapter (Chapter 5) provided a detailed discussion of the preliminary data 
analysis that was undertaken for this study, which includes missing value analysis and 
descriptive analysis. The missing value analysis was undertaken to ensure the data-sets 
conform to the missing completely at random criteria, in order to justify the application of the 
EM technique to address missing data, whereas the descriptive analysis provides basic 
statistical qualities or properties of the data used in this study.  The results of the analysis are 
presented and discussed in the sections that follow.  
6.6.1 Missing Value Analysis 
The data-sets used for the missing value analysis have already been screened. As a result, 
cases and variables with more than 10 percent missing values for the Taxpayer sample and 25 
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percent for the Tax Agent sample were eliminated.
133
 This process reduced the Taxpayer 
sample from 191 cases to 180 cases, and the Tax Agent sample from 183 to 164 cases. The 
process also involved deleting cases with missing dependent variables, except in two 
instances where the respondents notified that these were intentionally left blank.  
The reduced data-set for the Taxpayer research model comprises 180 cases, and 110 
indicators, resulting in a total of 19,800 data points, with 149 missing values. The percentage 
of missing values is extremely low at 0.7 percent. Similarly, the reduced data-set of the Tax 
Agent model contains 18,040 data points (164 cases and 110 indicators), with 177 data points, 
or 0.9 percent missing values. The percentages of missing data points for both models appear 
to be hugely insignificant, and the percentages are also significantly lower than the 
percentages accepted in prior studies.
134
 
Although the missing values are low, it is equally important to ensure that these remaining 
missing values are distributed randomly throughout the observations and no distinct patterns 
are identifiable in the data-sets. Data missing completely at random (MCAR) indicates a 
higher level of randomness, suggesting that “the cases with missing data are indistinguishable 
from cases with complete data” (Hair et al., 2006, p.57). Missing data that are not MCAR 
may cause problems in the generalisability of the results (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
Observations are considered to be MCAR if none of the variables in the data-set contain 
missing values related to the values of the variable under scrutiny (Meyers et al., 2006). A 
Missing Value Analysis was undertaken in SPSS, which produced the estimation statistics for 
Little‟s MCAR test. The null hypothesis for Little‟s MCAR test is that the data points are 
missing completely at random (MCAR). A non-significant value of p = > 0.05 indicates that 
the data are MCAR. The EM estimates table for the Taxpayer sample reports a non-
significant value of 0.399 while the EM estimates table for the Tax Agent sample shows a 
non-significant value of 0.558, both clearly exceeding the p = > 0.05 threshold.
135
 The null 
hypothesis (which states that the data point are missing completely at random) therefore 
cannot be rejected, and indicates that the missing data points are probably missing completely 
at random, with no evidence present of any systematic pattern of missing data. This outcome 
suggests that any estimation method applied should produce unbiased results (Hair et al., 
2006). 
                                                     
133 Although the threshold for the Tax Agent sample was set at 25 percent, most missing values for cases and 
variables were under 10 percent.  
134 Missing values as recorded in the following studies: 2.6 percent (Yue, 2004), 2 percent (Vatanasakdakul, 2007), 
and 7 percent (Venik, 1999).  
135 Little‟s Chi-square statistics for testing whether values are MCAR is available as a footnote to any EM estimate 
table generated by SPSS. 
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6.6.2 Estimation Technique 
The choice of missing data imputation was next considered. Tabachnick & Fidell (2007, 
p. 71) noted that the Expectation Maximisation (EM) methods generally offer the simplest 
and most reasonable approach to imputation of missing data, as long as the preliminary 
analysis provides evidence that scores are missing randomly. The missing value analysis 
confirmed that the missing data points are missing completely at random. Further, a recent 
study by Kristensen and Eskildsen (2010) compared four different methods of handling 
missing values in a PLS model, which included the EM substitution, pair-wise deletion, 
means substitution and regression-based substitution. All of these approaches are available in 
the SPSS Missing Values module.
136
 The results provided evidence that the regression 
technique and the EM algorithm in general outperformed the other techniques examined. The 
study also noted that, for small fractions of missing values, the two techniques are not 
significantly different. However, when the fraction of missing values is increasing, the EM 
algorithm is superior to the regression technique.  
After careful consideration, the EM algorithm was selected, on the basis that the EM 
algorithm was considered to be superior to the other available methods. This ensures the data-
sets are complete for both samples, and is adequate for further analysis. The next section 
presents the results from the descriptive analysis, in respect to selected study variables. 
6.7 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR STUDY VARIABLES 
The means, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum scores were computed for 
each of the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) constructs and its corresponding measures. 
The composite scores for the means of each construct were derived by adding up all the 
expectancy and value items‟ scores and then averaging the summed score. Likewise, the 
composite score for the means of each measure was derived by adding up the expectancy and 
value item scores of each individual measure. The average score for each construct, and each 
measure, was then described in terms of means and standard deviation, and presented in 
Tables 6.5 to 6.7. Lower scores indicate increased importance of an item towards intentions to 
comply, whereas higher scores indicate the importance of an item towards intentions not to 
comply. All measures also reported acceptable variances (Hair et al., 2006). The means of the 
remaining study variables are presented in Appendix 17 (Taxpayer) and Appendix 18 (Tax 
Agent). 
                                                     
136 The SPSS Missing Values Analysis is considered to be adequate for estimating replacement values (Meyers et 
al., 2006). 
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6.7.1 Measures of Attitudes 
Two different attitude constructs were included in the research model: attitudes based on 
legal and non-legal sanctions. Each attitude construct is measured by three composite indexes 
of behavioural belief strengths and outcome evaluation. Individual indicators of non-legal 
attitude include a sense of civic duty, moral obligation and feelings of guilt, all associated 
with the performance or non-performance of the behaviour of interest. Table 6.5 presents 
descriptive statistics for the attitudes towards the behaviour construct. 
Table 6.5: Descriptive Statistics for the Attitude Constructs and its Measures 
Attitude 
Indicators 
 
N 
Taxpayer Tax Agent 
Min Max Mean Std Dev Min Max Mean Std Dev 
Non-Legal Attitude 
ATTI 6 1.00 5.80 2.76 1.01 1.00 4.67 2.53 0.67 
Civic 2 1.00 5.50 2.59 1.02 1.00 5.00 2.59 0.83 
Moral  2 1.00 7.00 2.11 1.36 1.00 5.00 1.59 0.86 
Guilt 2 1.00 7.00 3.58 1.44 0.91 7.00 3.39 1.22 
Legal Attitude 
ATT2 6 1.00 6.67 3.31 1.29 1.00 6.00 3.68 1.17 
Certainty of 
Detection  
2 1.00 7.00 3.71 1.82 1.00 7.00 4.26 1.70 
Certainty of 
Punishment  
2 1.00 7.00 3.36 1.46 1.00 7.00 3.86 1.46 
Severity of 
Punishment  
2 1.00 7.00 2.85 1.46 1.00 7.00 2.91 1.21 
Overall, the Tax Agent sample (means score of 2.53) appears to be influenced more by 
non-legal sanctions than the Taxpayer sample (means scores of 2.76) in their tax compliance 
decisions. The more important measure influencing intentions to comply, for both samples, is 
the sense of moral obligation towards paying tax. This is followed by the sense of civic duty 
and feelings of guilt associated with tax compliance (noncompliance) behaviour. The results 
suggest that moral obligations towards paying tax are one of the key elements influencing 
attitudes.  
With regard to attitude based on legal sanctions, the Taxpayer sample (means score of 
3.31) appears to be influenced more by the effects of legal sanctions than the Tax Agent 
sample (means score of 3.68). The results further indicate that respondents in both samples 
were mostly influenced by the severity of punishment in their intentions to comply, followed 
by the certainty of punishment (probability of punishment), and lastly, by the certainty of 
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detection (or probability of detection). The key element influencing attitudes based on legal 
sanctions for both groups seem to be the perceived severity of punishment.  
6.7.2 Measures of Subjective Norms 
Subjective norms consist of three composite measures, representing three aspects of 
subjective norm. Each of these composite measures assesses the normative beliefs and the 
motivation to comply. These measures include: referents‟ expectations of them, referents‟ 
own tax paying behaviour, and perceived loss of respect from the referent if they do not 
comply with their tax obligations. Descriptive statistics for subjective norm are displayed in 
Table 6.6. 
Table 6.6: Descriptive Statistics for Subjective Norms and its Measures 
SNORM 
Indicators 
 
N 
Taxpayer Tax Agent 
Min Max Mean Std Dev Min Max Mean Std Dev 
Subjective Norms 
SNORM 6 1.00 6.33 2.84 1.39 1.00 6.00 2.59 1.18 
Snorm 1 
(referents‟ 
expectation) 
2 1.00 7.00 2.65 1.69 1.00 7.00 2.27 1.35 
Snorm 2 
(referents‟ 
behaviour)  
2 1.00 7.00 2.73 1.53 1.00 6.50 2.82 1.46 
Snorm 3 
(referents‟  
respect) 
2 1.00 7.00 3.15 1.78 0.20 7.00 2.68 1.53 
Table 6.6 displays a lower means score (2.59) for the Tax Agent sample compared to the 
Taxpayer sample‟s score (2.84), indicating that subjective norms have more influence on Tax 
Agents‟ intentions to comply than on Taxpayers‟ intentions. In terms of the individual 
measures of subjective norms, referents‟ expectations of individuals‟ compliance behaviour 
was comparatively more influential on intentions than the other measures for the Taxpayers. 
This is followed by referents‟ own compliance behaviour, and the threat of losing referents‟ 
respect if they do not conform to referents‟ expectations. In contrast, the influential measures 
in the order of importance for the Tax Agents are: important referents‟ expectations, the threat 
of losing referents‟ respect, and important referents‟ own tax compliance behaviour.  
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6.7.3 Measures of Perceived Behavioural Control 
Perceived behavioural control (PBC) comprises three items measuring control beliefs and 
another three measuring perceived control. Each measure is a composite score of control 
beliefs and the frequency of occurrence of these control beliefs. The three measures of PBC 
refer to the presence of opportunities, income subject to third party reporting and financial 
distress experienced during the compliance decision-making process. In summary, the lack of 
opportunities, income subject to third party reporting and financial distress could inhibit 
individuals from their intentions to not comply (and comply instead) with their tax 
obligations. Descriptive statistics for PBC are presented in Table 6.7. 
Table 6.7: Descriptive Statistics for Perceived Behavioural Control and its Measures 
PBC Indicators 
 
N 
Taxpayer Tax Agent 
Min Max Mean Std Dev Min Max Mean Std Dev 
Perceived Behavioural Control (PBC)  
PBC 6 1.00 6.00 2.51 1.25 1.00 7.00 2.74 1.26 
PBC1 
(opportunity)  
2 1.00 7.00 2.56 1.47 1.00 7.00 2.83 1.44 
PBC2 (third 
party reporting)  
2 1.00 5.33 2.33 1.27 1.00 7.00 2.89 1.51 
PBC3 (financial 
distress) 
2 1.00 7.00 2.64 1.34 0.99 7.00 2.49 1.14 
In summary, the Taxpayer sample scored a lower means score (2.51) compared to the Tax 
Agent sample‟s slightly higher score (2.74), indicating PBC‟s comparatively stronger 
influence on Taxpayers‟ compliance decisions. For the individual measures of PBC, the 
presence or absence of income subject to third party reporting appears to be the more 
important measure influencing Taxpayers‟ intentions to comply (or not comply). This is 
followed by the presence or absence of opportunities and financial distress. In contrast, the 
results highlighted the increased importance of the absence or presence of financial distress in 
Tax Agents‟ compliance decisions. The presence or absence of opportunity and income 
subject to third party reporting were rated as the second and third important measures 
influencing intentions to comply, respectively.  
6.8 PERCEPTIONS OF TAX OFFENCES 
A further analysis was undertaken to examine the perception of the seriousness of tax 
noncompliance compared to six other civil offences, which include: bicycle theft, welfare 
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fraud, bank fraud, driving offence, speeding offence, and drug offence.
137
 Two measures were 
used to capture respondents‟ perceptions of the comparative seriousness of committing a tax 
offence. The first measure (rating) captures respondents‟ perceptions of the seriousness of 
each individual offence listed in the survey instrument, independent of the other listed 
offences. The second measure (ranking) requires respondents‟ to rank each offence in the 
order of perceived seriousness. The paired samples t-test (refer to Appendices 5 and 6) was 
applied to measure and compare the responses and to test for statistical significance (Gaur & 
Gaur, 2006; and Pallant, 2011). The survey procedure carried out was explained in Chapter 5. 
6.8.1 Rating the Seriousness of Tax Offences 
The results of the paired t-test, examining respondents‟ rating (or evaluation) of each listed 
offence are reported in Table 6.8. The mean score for each of the offences for both groups and 
the results of the significance test are included in the table. A lower mean score indicates that 
the offence is viewed as a less serious offence, whereas a higher score indicates that the 
particular offence is viewed as a more serious offence. All the means scores are significant at 
the p = < 0.0001 level with the exception of the marginal score for the drug offence (Taxpayer 
sample).  
Table 6.8: Comparison of the Severity of Tax Offence to Other Civil Offences 
Description of 
Offence 
Taxpayer Tax Agent 
Tax 
Offence 
Other 
Offences 
Significance Test 
Tax 
Offence 
Other 
Offences 
Significance Test 
Mean Mean t-test p-value Mean Mean t-test p-value 
Bicycle theft 3.10 3.61 5.98 0.000 2.13 3.54 15.73 0.000 
Welfare fraud 3.10 4.04 11.39 0.000 2.13 2.89 6.75 0.000 
Bank fraud 3.10 3.87 10.06 0.000 2.13 3.41 12.24 0.000 
Driving  offence 3.10 3.43 3.44 0.000 2.13 4.00 17.73 0.000 
Speeding offence 3.10 2.03 -11.76 0.000 2.13 3.61 14.31 0.000 
Drug offence 3.10 2.88 -1.87 0.063 2.13 4.06 19.59 0.000 
Legend: 
Bicycle theft (SVA1) – Bicycle theft worth $1,000 
Welfare fraud (SVA2) - Welfare fraud worth $1,000 
Tax offence (SVA3)  – No reporting tax of $1,000 
Bank fraud (SVA4) - Defrauding a bank of  $1,000 
Driving offence (SVA5) - Driving while slightly over the alcohol limit 
Speeding offence (SVA6) - Speeding 10kph over the speed limit 
Drug offence (SVA7) - Smoking marijuana or cannabis 
                                                     
137 The non-violent offences selected for this study were adapted from two relatively recent New Zealand studies 
(Gupta, 2006; 2007). 
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The results suggest that respondents from the Taxpayer sample perceive committing a tax 
offence as being less serious than committing a number of other non-tax civil offences, such 
as: welfare fraud, bank fraud, stealing a bicycle, and committing a driving offence. These four 
offences reported higher means scores than the means score attributed to the tax offence. On 
the other hand, respondents viewed committing a tax offence as more serious than committing 
a speeding or drug offence, with these two offences scoring lower means than the tax offence. 
In contrast, respondents from the Tax Agent sample viewed committing a tax offence as the 
least serious of all the listed offences, with the tax offence scoring a lowest means score of 
2.13. The results are consistent with a similar relatively recent New Zealand study, which 
generally found that tax offences are viewed as somewhat less serious than other similar civil 
offences (Gupta, 2006).  
Comparing the mean scores of both sample groups for the tax offence, reveals that, the 
Taxpayer sample (with a means score of 3.10) considers committing a tax offence as more 
serious than the Tax Agent sample (with a lower means score of 2.13). This may suggest that, 
compared to taxpayers, tax agents view tax noncompliance as less serious relative to other 
similar civil offences.  
6.8.2 Ranking the Seriousness of Tax Offences 
Respondents were also asked to rank the seriousness of the seven offences listed in the 
questionnaire, in the order of seriousness (from the most serious to the least serious).  Table 
6.9 presents the rankings awarded to each of the listed offences. For the purposes of this 
analysis, the scores are reversed, with the lowest scores corresponding to the least serious 
offence and the highest scores corresponding to the most serious offence.  
Table 6.9: Ranking of Offences Surveyed 
Description of Offence 
Taxpayer Tax Agent 
Mean Ranking Mean Ranking 
Welfare fraud 5.34 1 2.11 7 
Bank fraud 4.75 2 3.75 5 
Bicycle theft 4.55 3 2.90 6 
Driving offence 4.19 4 4.51 4 
Tax fraud 3.61 5 4.76 3 
Drug offence 3.20 6 5.04 1 
Speeding offence 2.17 7 4.85 2 
171 
 
Of the seven listed offences, the Taxpayer sample rated welfare fraud as the most serious 
offence. This was followed by offences involving: bank fraud, bicycle theft, and driving 
offence (which were ranked as the second, third and fourth most serious offences in that 
order). The tax offence was ranked as the fifth most serious offence, with only the drug and 
speeding offences being rated as comparatively less serious. In contrast, the Tax Agent 
sample ranked the drug offence as the most serious offence, followed by the speeding 
offence. Tax fraud was ranked as the third most serious offence. The remaining offences 
(driving offence, bank fraud, bicycle theft, and welfare fraud) were ranked behind the tax 
offence, suggesting that these offences were considered less serious than committing a tax 
offence.  
The above results in Table 6.9 provide useful insights as to how each group views tax 
offending in relation to other similar non-tax offences. As expected, the perception of the 
severity (or seriousness) of tax noncompliance differed between the Taxpayer group and the 
Tax Agent group. The Taxpayer group viewed all the listed offences, with the exception of 
the speeding and drug offences, as more serious than committing a tax offence. In contrast, 
the Tax Agent group considered only two offences (that are, drug and speeding offences) to 
be more serious than a tax offence. The remaining offences are considered to be 
comparatively less serious that a tax offence.  
Whilst the Taxpayer sample‟s rating and ranking (refer to Tables 6.8 and 6.9 under the 
„Taxpayer‟ column) of the offences appear to be similar (as expected), the rankings (refer to 
Table 6.9) given by the Tax Agent sample differed quite significantly from their ratings (refer 
to Table 6.8). Whilst the Tax Agent sample rated the tax offence as the least serious crime (in 
the rating exercise), it was nonetheless ranked as the third most serious offence (in the 
ranking exercise). This raises some issues in terms of how taxpayers‟ perceptions were 
measured in the past. The results seem to suggest that the method used to measure the 
perceived seriousness of tax noncompliance may potentially influence the outcome. Further 
tests are therefore required before the results can be generalised with confidence.   
In summary, the results indicate that tax offences are generally not considered to be as 
serious as some other similar offences, and this perception may influence individuals‟ tax 
compliance beliefs and attitudes towards tax compliance behaviour. The next section 
examines the relationship between individuals‟ perceptions of the seriousness of tax 
noncompliance and their tax compliance behaviour.  
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6.8.3 Perceptions of Tax Offences and Tax Compliance Behaviour 
An additional analysis was carried out to determine whether the perceived severity (or 
seriousness) of committing a tax offence, has any influence on respondents‟ tax compliance 
behaviour. The results from the previous section indicate that tax offences are generally not 
considered to be as serious as some of the listed offences. Arguably, the perceived seriousness 
of tax offences may influence a person‟s compliance behaviour. That is, if people perceive 
committing a tax offence as generally not serious, then they are less likely to comply. 
Conversely, if people perceive committing a tax offence as serious, they are more likely to 
comply with their tax obligations.  
The bar charts displayed in Figure 6.1 below show the influence of perceived seriousness 
of tax offences on tax compliance behaviour for the two sample groups. The vertical axis 
measures tax compliance behaviour, with a scale ranging from 1 (compliant) to 5 (not 
compliant), while the horizontal axis measures perceived severity of committing a tax offence 
(SVA3), using  a similar scale ranging from 1 (not serious) to 5 (serious). 
The results from both the Taxpayer and Tax Agent samples display a downward slope. 
This indicates that those who rate tax offences as not serious (score of 1) displayed 
comparatively higher non-compliant behaviour. In contrast, those who rated committing a tax 
offence as extremely serious (score of 5) appear to display more compliant behaviour.  The 
above results suggest that taxpayers who consider tax noncompliance as a serious offence will 
be more compliant than those who consider tax noncompliance as less serious.  
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Figure 6.1: Influence of Perceived Severity on Compliance Behaviour  
Severity (SVA3) on Behaviour (Behave) - Taxpayer Sample 
 
 
Severity (SVA3) on Behaviour (Behave) - Tax Agent Sample 
 
 
In summary, whilst Tax Agents may view the seriousness of tax noncompliance as only 
somewhat serious, this view has a marginal effect on their compliance behaviour. In contrast, 
the Taxpayers‟ perceptions of tax noncompliance appear to have a comparatively more 
pronounced effect on their tax compliance behaviour. Nonetheless, the results suggest that 
taxpayers‟ perception of the seriousness of committing a tax offence could influence their tax 
compliance behaviour. The next section presents the views of respondents who as taxpayers 
were subjected to penalties under the Compliance and Penalties Regime (CPR).  
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6.9 TAX NONCOMPLIERS’ VIEWS 
A further analysis was undertaken on respondents who have indicated being penalised 
under the current penalties regime (CPR). Their views on their experiences in dealing with the 
penalties regime are summarized in Table 6.10.   
A total of 13 respondents (or 7 percent) from the Taxpayer sample and four respondents 
(or 2 percent) from the Tax Agent sample indicated having been penalised under the CPR. 
Despite the low numbers, the samples can still be reasonably considered to be representative 
of the population of taxpayers who were penalised under the regime. In 2006, the number of 
taxpayers in New Zealand was reported at 2.69 million,
138
 whereas only 2,516 taxpayers were 
penalised for noncompliance,
139
 suggesting that less than 1 percent of the New Zealand 
taxpaying population was penalised under the CPR.
140
 Based on the percentages, both 
samples can be considered to adequately reflect the total population of taxpayers who have 
been penalised. The mean scores and standard deviations for the responses are presented in 
Table 6.10. The standard deviations are all inside the accepted threshold of +3 (Hair et al., 
2006).  
Generally, both samples seem to agree on the majority of issues, with regard to their 
experiences and views of being penalised. Both samples seem to agree that the penalties 
imposed were harsh, unfair and excessive in their case.
141
 There was further agreement that 
the imposition of the penalties was not justified, and the economic and emotional costs were 
significant to the individuals.
142
 Both parties were also unhappy with the process available for 
disputing the level of penalties imposed, and believed that the tax authority did not consider 
their views in determining the outcome of the dispute.
143
 The results are consistent with a 
recent Australian study which found that the Australian taxpayers also believe that the 
penalties imposed were quite severe (Devos, 2009). The results further suggest that the 
perceived severity of the penalties imposed could influence taxpayers‟ future compliance 
behaviour (Devos, 2009).  
 
                                                     
138 The reported taxpaying population in 2006 was 3,160,371, but after eliminating those who earned no income 
that year and those who did not state their income in the census form, the final figure was 2,694,432.  
139 Inland Revenue Annual Report, 2006. 
140 Using the average figures for the last eight years also yielded the same results, that is, less than 1 percent of the 
population was penalised under CPR.  
141 Statements 3, 8 and 10. 
142 Statements 1, 7 and 11. 
143 Statements 2 and 9. 
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Table 6.10: Means and Standard Deviation for Noncompliers 
Views of Penalties Imposed 
(summarised) 
Taxpayer 
(n=13) 
Tax Agent 
(n=4) 
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
1. The penalties imposed were justified.  5.53 1.50 5.00 2.44 
2. My views were considered by IRD in determining the 
outcome. 
4.61 1.70 5.00 2.44 
3. Penalties imposed were harsh considering no one 
suffered as a result of the noncompliance.  
2.61 2.06 3.75 2.21 
4. My tax position was clearly explained to me during 
the process. 
3.61 1.80 3.75 2.06 
5. Penalties imposed have deterred me from future 
noncompliance.  
3.38 1.93 2.50 1.29 
6. The process required was simple and easy to follow. 4.61 2.02 3.75 2.36 
7.  The economic cost (time and money) of the process 
was significant. 
2.84 1.86 3.00 1.82 
8.  The level of penalties imposed was relatively 
excessive. 
2.38 2.02 2.75 1.70 
9. Happy with the disputes process and level of 
penalties imposed.  
4.46 1.61 5.25 2.06 
10. Paying the tax shortfall, interest plus penalties was 
harsh and unfair.  
2.76 2.08 2.75 2.06 
11. Emotional cost of going through the process was 
significant. 
2.69 1.75 3.50 1.73 
Note: Lower scores indicate agreement with the statements, whereas higher scores indicate 
disagreement with the statements.  
On the other hand, respondents from both samples agree that their tax positions were well 
explained to them, and most importantly both parties agree that being penalised had deterred 
them from further noncompliance.
144
 This is consistent with the outcome from a number of 
studies which demonstrated that penalties deter noncompliant behaviour (for example, Alm et 
al.,1995; and Fjeldstad & Semboja, 2001). In terms of ease and simplicity of the process, the 
Tax Agent sample found the disputes process simple and easy to follow, whereas the 
Taxpayer respondents disagreed with this statement.
145
   
The preceding sections presented results of the preliminary analysis carried out on the 
survey data, and descriptive statistics for some study variables. The next section provides a 
summary of the results discussed in this chapter. 
                                                     
144 Statements 4 and 5. 
145 Statement 6. 
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6.10 SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the results of some preliminary analysis carried out on the survey 
data, which included analysing the survey response rate, developing respondents‟ profiles, 
and determining the representativeness of the observed sample to the population distribution. 
The response rates of 21 percent, 19 percent and 61 percent for each of the observed samples 
were considered to be acceptable for this research.
146
 The number of useable responses is 
adequate for use in PLS-Graph, which was used to analyse the data, and for testing the 
hypotheses developed for this study.   
 A number of tests were applied, which included testing for nonresponse bias and 
determining the representativeness of the observed samples to their corresponding population 
distribution, which produced satisfactory results. The missing value analysis undertaken 
suggested that the missing data was MCAR and therefore suitable for any estimation 
methods. The EM technique was selected to address the missing data, because the EM 
algorithm was considered superior to other available method. Descriptive statistics were also 
carried out on selected study variables, to identify the effect of each variable on its 
corresponding constructs, or the comparative importance of each of these measures to their 
corresponding construct.   
The results from taxpayers‟ perceptions of tax noncompliance indicate that, generally, 
most respondents consider tax noncompliance to be less serious than a number of other 
similar offences. The results also found perceived seriousness of tax noncompliance to 
influence tax compliance behaviour. Finally, the views and experiences of respondents who 
were subjected to the penalties regime were analysed. The results indicate a general 
dissatisfaction with a number of aspects relating to the penalties process. Nonetheless, there is 
general agreement that being penalised will deter them from future noncompliance. The next 
chapter presents the results from the assessments of the measurement and structural models. 
  
                                                     
146 Although the Tax Lawyer sample achieved a response rate of 61 percent, the sample was removed from further 
analysis because the small sample size did not meet the required threshold for the application of PLS-Graph. 
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CHAPTER 7 
RESULTS FROM MODEL EVALUATION 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the evaluation of the Partial Least Squares (PLS) research models 
which explains tax compliance behaviour. The models developed for this research are based 
on the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB), and examine the relationships of the elements of 
the TPB and other tax compliance variables, with behavioural intentions to perform certain 
behaviour, and its link to the actual behaviour. This chapter is set out in five sections.  
The following section 7.2 presents the results from the evaluation of the measurement 
models (also referred to as the outer models). This is followed by section 7.3, which discusses 
the results from the assessment of the structural models (also referred to as the inner models). 
Section 7.4 links the results from the structural models to the hypotheses developed in 
Chapter 4, and discusses the outcomes for the Taxpayer and Tax Agents Models.  Finally, 
section 7.5 provides a summary of this chapter. 
7.2 MEASUREMENT MODEL RESULTS 
Following the validation guidelines provided by various researchers (Straub et al., 2004; 
Chin, 2010; and Gotz et al., 2010), the measurement models were tested for indicator 
reliability (loadings), construct reliability (composite reliability), convergent validity (average 
variance extracted (AVE) analysis) and discriminant validity (square root of AVE and 
loadings and cross loadings analysis), by applying generally accepted decision rules. The 
results of these validity and reliability tests, which will provide a level of assurance that the 
survey items are measuring the constructs they are designed to measure, are presented in the 
following sections.  
7.2.1 Indicator Reliability (Indicator Loadings) 
Due to the exploratory nature of this study, the majority of measures used in developing 
the research models were newly created, while some measures were adopted from various 
other studies. Therefore, a large number of measures were used, especially for the 
Compliance and Penalties Regime (CnP) construct, with the expectation that many may not 
meet the required test. Further, no pilot test (normally used to refine a survey instrument) was 
undertaken for the current study, which further increased the expectation of a large number of 
measures not meeting the required test, and thus having to be eliminated. 
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Indicator reliability, which was described in Chapter 5, explains the extent to which a 
measure or a set of measures is consistent in respect of what it intends to measure. The 
reliability of one construct is independent of, and calculated separately from, that of other 
constructs (Urbach & Ahlemann, 2010). The PLS bootstrapping technique estimates item 
loadings and measurement errors along with their respective t-values (Gefen et al., 2000). 
All measures were initially included in the research models and the reliability of individual 
indicators or measures were evaluated by examining the loadings of each measure. A 
commonly accepted threshold is to accept items with loadings of 0.707 or higher, which 
implies that there is more shared variance between the constructs and its measures than error 
variance (Chin, 1998a; Hulland, 1999; Barroso et al., 2010; and Gotz et al., 2010). Arguably, 
it is equally common to have several items in an estimated model having loadings measuring 
less than the prescribed 0.707 level; particularly when new items for newly developed scales 
are employed (Hulland, 1999; and Chin, 2010).  
For this study, an item trimming process was undertaken simultaneously for both the 
Taxpayer and Tax Agent Models. Measures with very low loadings were removed one at a 
time, until most measures achieved reasonable loadings and a significant t-value at the 0.05 
level. During this process, the indicators of a construct that was supposed to measure the 
fairness aspect of the penalties regime (comprising five indicators) displayed loadings that 
differed significantly between the two research models (Taxpayer and Tax Agent Models). In 
order to make a comparative analysis of the two models, both models will have to be 
identical. Consequently, this construct and its associated measures were removed because 
they did not meet the standard required.
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In addition to removing the above construct, further measures that did not meet the 
required standards were also eliminated. This is not unusual for studies using newly created 
measures. Albers (2010) reported instances where researchers eliminated 50 percent of 
measures developed for a particular research, due to low reliability.  In this study, out of a 
total of 84 measures used, 23 measures were deleted at this stage (which is approximately 27 
percent). The summarised results are in the following Table 7.1, which reports the loadings, 
and the significance of the t-values of each measure, for both sample groups. The research 
models were further refined by eliminating measures that fail to meet the loadings threshold 
level and the established significance level of 0.05 for its t-values. The refined research 
models are presented in Table 7.2. The outputs generated by the bootstrapping procedure, for 
                                                     
147 To make a comparison of two models, the corresponding constructs should have identical indicators. If an 
indicator is not significant in one model, it should be removed from both models (Professor Wynne Chin, personal 
communication, November 3, 2009).   
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the final trimmed (or refined) Models, are presented in Appendix 7 for the Taxpayer Model 
and in Appendix 8 for the Tax Agent Model. 
Table 7.1: Loadings After the First Trimming Process for the Measurement Models 
Constructs and Items 
Taxpayer Tax Agent 
Loadings t-stat Sig. Level Loadings t-stat Sig. Level 
Behaviour (BEHV) Behaviour (BEHV) 
BEH1 0.944 55.683 0.001 0.888 3.723 0.001 
BEH2 0.948 59.221 0.001 0.853 5.060 0.001 
Behavioural Intention (BI) Behavioural Intention (BI) 
BI 1 0.705 11.539 0.001 0.794 18.560 0.001 
BI 2 0.895 35.850 0.001 0.890 27.430 0.001 
Attitude 1 (Non-Legal) (ATT1) Attitude 1 (Non-Legal) (ATT1) 
MORAL 0.824 30.499 0.001 0.886 40.692 0.001 
CIVIC 0.829 30.316 0.001 0.723 11.454 0.001 
GUILT 0.789 22.247 0.001 0.522 4.538 0.001 
Attitude 2 (Legal) (ATT2) Attitude 2 (Legal) (ATT2) 
COPun 0.513 3.885 0.001 0.599 3.420 0.001 
SOPun 0.883 29.145 0.001 0.752 6.027 0.001 
CODet 0.882 28.592 0.001 0.904 8.1905 0.001 
Subjective Norm (SNORM) Subjective Norm (SNORM) 
SNORM1 0.883 35.379 0.001 0.769 10.276 0.001 
SNORM2 0.801 14.060 0.001 0.777 11.825 0.001 
SNORM3 0.668 8.239 0.001 0.843 18.161 0.001 
Perceived Behavioural Control (PBC) Perceived Behavioural Control (PBC) 
PBC1 0.929 97.402 0.001 0.950 8.374 0.001 
PBC2 0.835 20.461 0.001 0.491  1.970 0.010 
PBC3 0.845 29.619 0.001 0.731 4.230 0.001 
Procedural Justice of CnP Regime (CnP) Procedural Justice of CnP Regime (CnP) 
CnP1  0.656 8.454 0.001 0.735 6.802 0.001 
CnP2  0.703 11.389 0.001 0.769 6.540 0.001 
CnP3  0.826 18.855 0.001 0.753 4.599 0.001 
CnP4  0.859 28.414 0.001 0.799 5.657 0.001 
CnP5  0.709 12.163 0.001 0.590 2.534 0.001 
CnP6  0.642 8.220 0.001 0.659 5.163 0.001 
Prevalence of  Compliance (OTHERS) Prevalence of  Compliance (OTHERS) 
OTH1 0.832 22.743 0.001 0.627 4.350 0.001 
OTH3 0.645 7.223 0.001 0.453  2.610 0.010 
OTH4 0.676 10.419 0.001 0.757 6.020 0.001 
OTH5 0.694 11.561 0.001 0.877 10.270 0.001 
OTH11 Delete Delete Delete Delete Delete Delete 
Effectiveness of the CnP Regime (CnPeff) Effectiveness of the CnP Regime (CnPeff) 
CnPeff1 0.500 1.832 0.050 0.573 2.234 0.010 
CnPeff2 0.927 12.549 0.001 0.850 8.109 0.001 
CnPeff3 0.699 3.708 0.001 0.894 8.142 0.001 
Tax Authority (TXAU) Tax Authority (TXAU) 
TXAU1  0.671 10.813 0.001 0.480 2.768 0.001 
TXAU2  0.857 31.958 0.001 0.674 4.235 0.001 
TXAU3 0.783 13.673 0.001 0.812 6.505 0.001 
TXAU4 0.719 10.095 0.001 0.604 4.402 0.001 
TXAU5 0.858 27.837 0.001 0.689 4.161 0.001 
TXAU6 0.786 15.324 0.001 0.618 4.353 0.001 
Tax System (TXSY) Tax System (TXSY) 
TXSY1 Delete Delete Delete Delete Delete Delete 
TXSY2 0.784 4.041 0.001 -0.653 2.340 0.010 
TXSY3 Delete Delete Delete Delete Delete Delete 
TXSY4 0.548 2.596 0.001 0.870 5.034 0.001 
Social Distance from Tax Authority (DST) Social Distance from Tax Authority (DST) 
DSTa   DST6 0.738 4.272 0.001 0.938 2.790 0.001 
DSTa   DST7 0.911 7.771 0.001 0.723 2.129 0.010 
DSTb   DST12 0.909 13.076 0.001 0.999 3.451 0.001 
DSTb   DST13 0.909 14.445 0.001 0.606 2.179 0.025 
DSTc   DST5 0.852 7.510 0.001 0.823 3.183 0.001 
DSTc   DST8 0.879 9.835 0.001 0.894 5.435 0.001 
DSTd   DST10 0.661 4.498 0.001 0.616 3.369 0.005 
DSTd   DST11 0.895 14.381 0.001 0.931 4.406 0.001 
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Table 7.2: Loadings for the Final Trimmed Measurement Models 
Constructs and Items Taxpayer Tax Agent 
Loadings T-stat Sig. Level Loadings T-stats. Sig. Level 
Behaviour (BEHV) Behaviour (BEHV) 
BEH1 0.944 56.657 0.001 0.888 3.735 0.001 
BEH2 0.948 59.888 0.001 0.853 6.296 0.001 
Behavioural Intention (BI) Behavioural Intention (BI) 
BI 1 0.705 11.924 0.001 0.794 17.542 0.001 
BI 2 0.895 38.381 0.001 0.890 28.491 0.001 
Attitude 1 (Non-Legal) (ATT1) Attitude 1 (Non-Legal) (ATT1) 
MORAL 0.824 33.101 0.001 0.886 40.420 0.001 
CIVIC 0.829 30.453 0.001 0.723 12.071 0.001 
GUILT 0.789 20.288 0.001 0.522 4.876 0.001 
Attitude 2 (Legal) (ATT2) Attitude 2 (Legal) (ATT2) 
COPun 0.513 4.017 0.001 0.599 3.698 0.001 
SOPun 0.883 28.590 0.001 0.752 5.525 0.001 
CODet 0.882 30.490 0.001 0.904 7.871 0.001 
Subjective Norm (SNORM) Subjective Norm (SNORM) 
SNORM1 0.883 35.950 0.001 0.769 10.522 0.001 
SNORM2 0.801 14.735 0.001 0.777 11.905 0.001 
SNORM3 0.668 8.522 0.001 0.843 19.378 0.001 
Perceived Behavioural Control (PBC) Perceived Behavioural Control (PBC) 
PBC1 0.929 95.163 0.001 0.950 6.245 0.001 
PBC2 0.835 22.477 0.001 0.491 1.972 0.010 
PBC3 0.845 29.461 0.001 0.731 4.369 0.001 
Procedural Justice of CnP Regime (CnP) Procedural Justice of CnP Regime (CnP) 
CnP1 0.656 8.206 0.001 0.735 6.107 0.001 
CnP2  0.703 10.652 0.001 0.769 6.406 0.001 
CnP3  0.826 21.504 0.001 0.753 4.362 0.001 
CnP4  0.859 30.886 0.001 0.799 5.412 0.001 
CnP5  0.709  0.001 0.590  0.001 
CnP6 0.642 8.816 0.001 0.659 4.761 0.001 
Societal Norm (OTHERS) Societal Norm (OTHERS) 
OTH1 0.832 21.846 0.001 0.627 4.320 0.001 
OTH3 0.645 7.326 0.001 0.453 2.412 0.010 
OTH4 0.676 10.094 0.001 0.757 6.623 0.001 
OTH5 0.694 12.006 0.001 0.877 14.229 0.001 
Effectiveness of the CnP Regime (CnPeff) Effectiveness of the CnP Regime (CnPeff) 
CnPeff1 0.500 1.830 0.05 0.573 2.449 0.010 
CnPeff2 0.927 12.314 0.001 0.850 10.366 0.001 
CnPeff3 0.699 3.840 0.001 0.894 9.618 0.001 
Tax Authority (TXAU) Tax Authority (TXAU) 
TXAU1  0.671 11.001 0.001 0.480 2.842 0.001 
TXAU2  0.857 32.102 0.001 0.674 3.943 0.001 
TXAU3 0.783 14.664 0.001 0.812 8.012 0.001 
TXAU4 0.719 10.192 0.001 0.604 4.512 0.001 
TXAU5 0.858 29.055 0.001 0.689 3.997 0.001 
TXAU6 0.786 15.741 0.001 0.618 4.265 0.001 
Tax System (TXSY) Tax System (TXSY) 
TXSY2 0.784 3.762 0.001 -0.653 2.295 0.010 
TXSY4 0.548 2.576 0.001 0.870 4.870 0.001 
Social Distance from Tax Authority (DST) Social Distance from Tax Authority (DST) 
DSTa    DST6 0.738 4.510 0.001 0.938 2.643 0.001 
DSTa    DST7 0.911 8.891 0.001 0.723 2.187 0.010 
DSTb    DST12 0.909 15.142 0.001 0.999 3.505 0.001 
DSTb    DST13 0.909 16.394 0.001 0.606 2.167 0.025 
DSTc    DST5 0.852 7.104 0.001 0.823 3.229 0.001 
DSTc    DST8 0.879 12.368 0.001 0.894 5.129 0.001 
DSTd    DST10 0.661 4.767 0.001 0.616 3.370 0.005 
DSTd    DST11 0.895 14.118 0.001 0.931 4.106 0.001 
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The loadings of all indicators in the Final Trimmed Models were examined to assess the 
indicators‟ reliability. A cut-off point of 0.5 was set for the loadings subject to these measures 
achieving significant t-values of at least 0.05.
148
 Most of the measures or indicators‟ loadings 
values were above the threshold of 0.5 set for this study, with all achieving significant t-
values.   
Examining the loadings for each of the 15 constructs for the Taxpayer Model, 33 variables 
out of 48 variables displayed loadings of over 0.70 as prescribed by Chin (1998), and 
achieved significance at the 0.05 level. In terms of the remaining variables (all significant at 
the p = < 0.05 significance level), nine measures displayed loadings of over 0.60, and three 
measures reported loadings of over 0.50. These loadings can be accepted, if there are other 
measures reflecting the same construct (Chin, 1998b). These measures were therefore retained 
in the Taxpayer Model, on the basis that each of the measure‟s associated construct had 
multiple measures, and achieved significance at the p = < 0.05 level. Three measures 
(OTH11, TXSY1 and TXSY3) were deleted due to either an extremely low loading and/or for 
not achieving the required threshold significance level of p = < 0.05. 
In terms of the Tax Agent Model, 29 measures out of 48 met the generally accepted 
loadings threshold of 0.707 (Chin, 1998b). Thirteen measures, all achieving significant t-
values at the p = < 0.05 level, had loadings of either over 0.60 or over 0.50. Consistent with 
the approach adopted for the Taxpayer Model, these measures were retained on the basis that 
each of these measures had achieved the required significance level (value), and also because 
the constructs to which these measures were assigned to had multiple measures (Chin, 
1998b). Another three measures, PBC2, OTH3 and TXAU1, had loadings that were 
marginally below 0.50 and were considered for elimination.  Further examination revealed 
that despite the marginal loadings scores, all three variables had achieved significant t-values 
at the p = < 0.05 level. Two of these three measures were considered critical to the model 
(PBC2 and OTH3).   
Several researchers have argued about the merits of applying stringent standards in the 
early stages of scale development (Chin, 1998b) and when scales are applied across different 
contexts (Barclay et al., 1995). Past studies, in some instances, have retained low loadings of 
0.40 and under (Fornell et al., 1990; and Johansson & Yip, 1994). Chin (1998b) advised 
against eliminating measures with low loadings where the measures are important to the 
construct. In terms of the current study, Professor Wynne Chin
149
 suggested retaining all three 
                                                     
148 Bagozzi and Yi (1988) suggested that a composite reliability greater than 0.6 is desirable and that individual 
item reliability will be lower than the composite. 
149 Professor Wynne Chin, personal communication, November 3, 2009. 
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measures, provided these measures satisfy the discriminate validity test.
150
 Further, in view of 
the fact that the majority of items returned loadings of greater than 0.707, and the average 
variance extracted (AVE) of these three measures returned acceptable scores for each of the 
associated constructs, these measures were considered to be reliable measures of their 
corresponding constructs. These three measures were therefore retained, and were subjected 
to further analysis to justify their continued retention. The final trimmed model is presented in 
Table 7.2. 
To sum up, the majority of the measures for both models exceeded the more stringent cut-
off threshold of 0.707, which implies that more than 50 percent of the variance in the 
observed variable is shared with the construct (Barclay et al., 1995). The remaining measures 
were retained on the basis that the loadings satisfied Chin‟s (1998b) recommendation of 
accepting loadings of 0.6 and 0.5, for measures that are part of a multi-indicator construct; 
and also on the basis that all these measures have significant t-values at the p = < 0.05 level. 
Three measures with loadings marginally below 0.5, from the Tax Agent Model, were 
eliminated in the above process, reducing the measures used in the final model from 48 to 45. 
The same measures were also subsequently removed from the Taxpayer Model. 
Whilst most of the items loadings were within the accepted threshold; measures with lower 
loading, which at this stage have been retained, will be subject to further tests (discriminant 
validity test), which will determine whether these lower scoring measures should still be 
retained or eliminated.
151
 The next step is to assess the internal consistency of each construct, 
which is presented in the next section.  
7.2.2 Construct Reliability (Composite Reliability) 
Construct reliability was discussed in Chapter 5. The construct reliability, which fulfils the 
same task as Cronbach‟s alpha, allows the evaluation of the extent to which a variable or a set 
of variables is consistent with what it intends to measure (Straub et al., 2004).  Construct 
reliability was examined using the composite reliability index which ranges from 0 
(indicating completely unreliable) to 1 (indicating perfectly reliable). All values larger than 
0.6 are considered to be acceptable (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988; Dibbern & Chin, 2005; Gotz et al., 
2010; and Urbach & Ahlemann, 2010). 
The composite reliability values, generated by the bootstrapping procedure of PLS-Graph, 
are presented in Table 7.3 for both the Taxpayer and the Tax Agent Models. The values for 
                                                     
150 Professor Wynne Chin, personal communication, November 3, 2009. 
151 Professor Wynne Chin, personal communication, November 3, 2009. 
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the Taxpayer Model ranged from 0.62 to 0.94, with the majority of the scores in the 0.8 range. 
In terms of the Tax Agent Model, the composite reliability values ranged from 0.74 to 0.86, 
with the majority of scores again being in the 0.8 range.  
The results displayed in Table 7.3 clearly indicate that all composite reliability indices for 
all constructs used in the research model exceeded the acceptable threshold of 0.6.  Construct 
reliability has therefore been established for both the Taxpayer and Tax Agent Models. The 
next step is to assess convergent validity of the measurement models. 
Table 7.3: Composite Reliability (CR) and Average Variance Extracted (AVE) Coefficients 
 
Constructs 
Taxpayer Tax Agent 
Composite 
Reliability 
Average Variance 
Extracted 
Composite 
Reliability 
Average Variance 
Extracted 
BEHV 0.944 0.895 0.862 0.758 
BI 0.785 0.649 0.831 0.712 
ATT1 0.855 0.663 0.762 0.527 
ATT2 0.817 0.610 0.802 0.581 
SNORM 0.830 0.622 0.839 0.635 
PBC 0.904 0.758 0.781 0.559 
OTHERS 0.806 0.512 0.781 0.485 
TXSY 0.620 0.457 0.740 0.592 
TXAU 0.904 0.612 0.814 0.427 
CnP 0.872 0.533 0.862 0.513 
CnPeff 0.763 0.532 0.824 0.616 
DSTa 0.813 0.687 0.822 0.701 
DSTb 0.905 0.826 0.803 0.682 
DSTc 0.857 0.749 0.849 0.738 
DSTd 0.760 0.619 0.760 0.623 
7.2.3 Convergent Validity (Average Variance Extracted or AVE) 
In order to satisfy the convergent validity test, it is necessary to ensure that the measures or 
items share more variance with its measures than with other constructs in the model (Fornell 
& Larcker, 1981). The AVE, which attempts to measure the amount of variance that a latent 
variable captures from its indicators relative to the amount due to measurement error, is 
commonly used to measure convergent validity of reflective measures (Fornell & Larcker, 
1981; Chin, 1998b; and Gotz et al., 2010).  
While a universally accepted threshold for this measure is yet to be determined, an AVE of 
at least 0.50 is considered acceptable (Gefen & Straub, 2005; and Hair et al., 2006). This 
would indicate that 50 percent or more of the indicator variance has been accounted for. 
AVEs are generated automatically by the bootstrap technique by PLS-Graph. The results of 
the AVE analysis are presented in Table 7.3 above.  
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Table 7.3 reports that most of the average variances extracted by the measures range above 
the acceptable level of 0.5 (Fornell & Larcker, 1981), with only three constructs 
demonstrating values that are marginally below the 0.5 threshold. Most of the constructs in 
the Taxpayer Model have AVE values ranging from 0.51 to 0.89, with only one construct 
(TXSY) displaying a value of 0.46, which is only marginally below the acceptable threshold. 
In terms of the Tax Agent Model, most of the constructs in the model have AVE values 
ranging from 0.51 to 0.75, with the exception of two constructs having AVE values 
measuring below the acceptable threshold. These are OTHERS (0.48) and TXAU (0.42) which 
are marginally below the acceptable threshold.  
Professor Wynne Chin supports AVE measures of under 0.5 as long as the composite 
reliability and discriminant validity are established for the particular constructs and its group 
of indicators.
152
 Duarte and Raposo (2010) retained a construct with an AVE value of 0.361 
on the basis that the composite reliability and discriminant validity were both at the 
acceptable level.  Based on this, the three constructs identified previously as having AVE 
scores of marginally under 0.5 (or over 0.4) have been retained in the models, given that the 
composite reliability requirements were met for each of these constructs (but their final 
retention in the models will depend on these constructs also establishing discriminant 
validity).  
Convergent validity has therefore been established for both the Taxpayer and Tax Agent 
Models. The next step is to assess discriminant validity of the measurement models. 
7.2.4 Discriminant Validity 
Following the successful reliability assessment of the measurement models, discriminate 
validity of the measurement models was next assessed. Discriminant validity which can be 
evaluated by comparing the square root of AVEs of the constructs and the correlations among 
the constructs (loadings and cross loadings) was discussed in Chapter 5.   
Discriminant validity, which indicates the extent to which a given construct is different 
from other constructs in the model, is established when each measurement item correlates 
weakly with all other constructs except for the one to which it is theoretically associated 
(Gefen & Straub, 2005). Discriminant validity was assessed in two ways. The first method 
involved comparing the square root of the AVE values, which is the average variance shared 
between a construct and its measures, with the correlations among constructs. The second 
method involved examining the loadings and cross loadings matrix, in order to ensure that no 
                                                     
152 Professor Wynne Chin, personal communication, November 3, 2009.  
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indicators load more highly on other constructs in the model than they do on their 
theoretically assigned construct, and all constructs load higher on their assigned measures 
than on measures from other constructs.  
(a) Square Root of Average Variance Extracted 
As discussed in the previous paragraph, the first approach for establishing discriminate 
validity is an appropriate AVE analysis (Fornell & Larcker, 1981; and Gefen & Straub, 2005). 
AVE scores were generated by the bootstrap procedure of PLS-Graph. The square root of the 
AVE is calculated from this, and inserted in the correlation matrix table also generated by the 
bootstrap technique. The square root of the AVE of each construct should be greater than the 
correlation coefficient of the construct and all other constructs in the model (Fornell & 
Larcker, 1981; and Gefen & Straub, 2005).  Equally important is for the AVE value to 
achieve the acceptable threshold of 0.50 (Fornell & Larcker, 1981; Chin, 1998; and Hair et 
al., 2006).  
Appendix 11 and Appendix 12 present the correlation matrix for the Taxpayer and Tax 
Agent Models, respectively. The second column in each table reports the AVE scores 
generated from the bootstrapping procedure, with the calculated square root of the AVE 
presented in the diagonal figures in bold text.  
The correlation tables were examined in order to compare the square roots of the AVE 
scores of each construct (that is, the diagonal values in bold) to the correlations of this 
construct and all the other constructs (that is, the off-diagonal elements). It has been 
established in a previous section that all the AVE scores for the Taxpayer and the Tax Agent 
Models were either over the accepted threshold of 0.50, or marginally below this threshold, 
and therefore considered still acceptable. The correlation matrices for the Taxpayer and Tax 
Agent Models further report the diagonal elements or values (which are the square root of 
each construct‟s AVE) to be significantly greater than the off-diagonal elements in the 
corresponding rows and columns. A square root of AVE larger than the square of the 
correlations among the constructs (or latent variables) indicates that more variance was shared 
between the construct and its block of indicators, than with another component representing a 
different block of indicators. In other words, the results confirmed that each measure is not 
tapping into different concepts; rather, it provides confirmation that each construct correlates 
more strongly to its own measures than to others. For adequate discriminant validity, the 
measures should be greater than the variance shared between the construct and other 
constructs in the model. The results therefore suggest satisfactory discriminant validity.  
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While some studies establish discriminant validity by only conducting the square root of 
the AVE analysis (Cool et al., 1989; Ruiz et al., 2010; and Streukens et al., 2010), other 
studies added a further test (loadings and cross loadings analysis) to that of the AVE analysis 
(see Barclays et al., 1995; Chin, 1998b; Hulland, 1999; and βow-Thies et al., 2010). For the 
purposes of this research, both tests were applied in an attempt to increase the robustness of 
the discriminant validity test.  
(b) Loadings and Cross Loadings Analysis 
The second test for assessing discriminant validity involved examining the loadings and 
cross loadings of measures. Cross loadings were obtained by correlating each construct‟s 
scores with all the other measures. The constructs‟ scores were obtained from the bootstrap 
technique of PLS-Graph (from Appendices 9 and 10) and copied to SPSS, together with the 
original data for each sample (Gefen & Straub, 2005).  The cross loadings were then obtained 
by correlating each construct‟s scores with all the other measures used in the Taxpayer and 
Tax Agent Models.  
The criterion applied for cross validating items is that the loadings of each measure must 
be larger on its designated construct than on any other constructs; and each of the constructs 
must load highest with its own measures. This is consistent with a large number of studies 
(Barclay et al., 1995; Schwarz & Schwarz 2007; Chin, 1998b; Chin, 2010; and Urbach & 
Ahlemann, 2010).  
The cross loadings were examined by scanning across all measures in each row, in order to 
determine whether each measure related more strongly to its intended construct‟s column than 
to any other construct‟s column. The results (not presented in this study) show that all 
measures loaded higher on their intended construct than with any other construct. The only 
exception to this was the CnP5 measure, which appears to load higher on the DSTc construct 
(0.623) than on its designated CnP construct (0.590). Consistent with Chin (1998b), this 
indicator was eliminated, because it is unclear which construct or constructs CnP 5 is actually 
reflecting (that is, CnP or DSTc).  
To examine the loadings, each column was scanned to determine whether each construct 
loaded highest with its own measures or whether it also loaded highest in measures belonging 
to other constructs. This is to ensure that all constructs share more variance with their own 
measures than with others. It was observed that all constructs loaded highest in the measures 
or indicators assigned to it, for both the Taxpayer and Tax Agent Models. The only exception 
was the measures for the ATT1 construct. The ATT1 construct loaded highest in two out of 
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three of its corresponding measures. A third measure, Guilt, loaded slightly lower (0.522) 
than another measure, BI2 (0.567), assigned to the Behavioural Intent (BI) construct, thereby 
requiring further scrutiny. However, on examining the questions relating to these measures, it 
became quite clear that these two measures are distinct. One refers to feelings of guilt, 
whereas the other measures an action or intention. On that basis, it may be plausible to 
suggest that the marginal cross loadings can be attributed to „noise‟ (Chin, 1998b) and 
therefore retained in the model. This approach is consistent with Swart and Swart (2007) who 
also retained measures that loaded below measures that were not assigned to a particular 
construct. Further, both of these measures are critical to the research model, and the AVE 
analysis indicated no problems with discriminant validity, in respect of these two measures. 
As a result of eliminating the CnP measure, the whole process of testing for discriminate 
validity using the loadings and cross loadings was repeated for both the Taxpayer and Tax 
Agent Models. The results are displayed in Appendices 13 and 14 for the Taxpayer Model 
and the Tax Agent Model, respectively. The tables present the comparison of each indicator 
or measure to its intended construct (that is, loadings) and to all other constructs (that is, cross 
loadings). 
Going across each row, all measures now load higher with their intended constructs; and 
going down each construct column, all measures assigned to a particular construct displays 
higher loadings than measures relating to other constructs.
153
 This outcome suggests that each 
measure loads more highly on the construct it attempts to reflect than on other constructs, and 
that all constructs share more variance with their assigned measures than with measures 
assigned to other constructs (Chin, 2010).  
This satisfies the second discriminant validity test and indicates that discriminant validity 
at the indicator level is adequate. Further, it was noted that the constructs TXSY (Taxpayer), 
and OTHERS (Societal Norms) and TXAU (Tax Agent) that previously reported AVE scores 
that were marginally below the commonly accepted threshold of 0.5 for the convergent 
validity test passed the current test and the decision to retain these has been justified.
154
. 
Collectively, the results presented above provide support for the overall quality of the final 
measures used in this study. The statistics suggest that the component measures are reliable, 
are internally consistent, and have convergent and discriminant validity. The measurement 
models are therefore acceptable for further analysis, and the next section presents the results 
of the evaluation of the structural models.  
                                                     
153 Except for the ATT1 construct which has already been accepted. 
154 Professor Wynne Chin, personal communication, November 3, 2009. 
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7.3 STRUCTURAL MODEL RESULTS 
After validating the measurement models, the structural models were evaluated to provide 
evidence to support the theoretical model developed for this study. Each of the structural 
models illustrates the relationships between constructs or latent variables that were 
hypothesised in the theoretical model or TPB Model and presented in Chapter 4. The main 
objective of the PLS model is prediction and, therefore, the goodness of fit of the current 
theoretical models was established by the strength of each structural path and the combined 
predictiveness (R
2
) or strength of the variance of its exogenous constructs (Chin, 1998b). 
Further, the bootstrapping resampling procedures were applied to examine the stability of 
estimates.  
A bootstrap re-sampling procedure with 1,000 sub-samples, was run in PLS-Graph for 
each sample group, generating scores representing the strength of the variances (R
2
) and the 
path coefficients, together with the t-values used to assess the significance levels of the PLS 
estimates. The full partial least square bootstrapping outputs for both groups are presented in 
Appendix 7 (Taxpayer Model) and Appendix 8 (Tax Agent Model). The full PLS graphic 
outputs, which show all individual measures associated with each construct, are displayed in 
Appendices 15 and 16 for the Taxpayer and Tax Agent Models, respectively. Concise PLS 
graphic outputs, also generated by the bootstrap resampling technique, are presented as 
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 for the Taxpayer and Tax Agent Models, respectively. Finally, a global 
goodness of fit index was also computed manually for each sample, to determine the overall 
adequacy of the Taxpayer and Tax Agent Models (Tenenhaus et al, 2004). 
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Figure 7.1: Summarised PLS Output (Taxpayer Model) 
 
 
Figure 7.2: Summarised PLS Output (Tax Agent Model) 
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7.3.1 Variance Explained (R
2
) 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the predictive power of the PLS structural model is assessed by 
the endogenous constructs‟ R2 scores, which indicates the amount of the constructs‟ variance 
explained (Barclay et al., 1995; and Hair et al., 2006). Therefore, the initial step in the 
evaluation of the structural models involved determining the ability of each model to explain 
the variance in each dependent variable. The dependent or exogenous variables are BEHV 
(behaviour), BI (behavioural intent), ATT1 (attitude based on non-legal sanctions) and ATT2 
(attitude based on legal sanctions). The R
2
 values for each of the endogenous constructs 
generated by the bootstrapping technique, and graphically displayed in Figures 7.1 and 7.2 for 
the Taxpayer and Tax Agent Models, respectively, are summarised in Table 7.4. 
Table 7.4: Variance Explained (R
2
Values) 
Construct 
R
2
 
(Taxpayer Model) 
R
2
 
(Tax Agent Model) 
BEHV (Behaviour) 0.450 0.259 
BI (Behavioural Intent)  0.474 0.451 
ATT1 (Non-Legal Sanctions) 0.136 0.057 
ATT2 (Legal Sanctions)  0.071 0.063 
(a) The R
2
 of Behaviour (BEHV) 
The variance explained or the R
2
 for the BEHV construct for both the Taxpayer and Tax 
Agent Models are displayed in Table 7.4. The R
2
 of 0.450 for the Taxpayer Model and 0.259 
for the Tax Agent Model, both measured greater than the minimum threshold of 0.1.
155
 This 
indicates that the direct effect of the BI, TXAU, TXSY, PBC, CnP, CnPeff and all DST 
constructs, together with the  indirect effect of ATT1, ATT2, SNORM, OTHERS, PBC, TXSY, 
and the TXAU constructs, accounted for 45 percent of the variance of the BEHV construct for 
the Taxpayer Model. Similarly, the direct and indirect effect of these same constructs in 
respect of the Tax Agent Model accounted for 26 percent of the variance of the BEHV 
construct. 
  The R
2
 results of the Taxpayer Model indicate reasonable predictive power, and suggest 
the existence of a combined effect of all the independent constructs (mentioned above) on the 
                                                     
155 A number of researchers argue that the variance explained or R2 for endogenous variables or constructs should 
be greater than 0.1 (Falk & Miller, 1992; Hanlon, 2001; and Santosa et al., 2005). Further, Backhause et al., (2003) 
argue that no generalisable statement can be made about an acceptable threshold of R2, adding that whether this 
determination coefficient is deemed acceptable or not depends on the individual study (quoted in Gotz et al., 
2010). 
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dependent construct BEHV (behaviour) in the structural model. The R
2
 of 0.259 for the Tax 
Agent Model indicates a moderate level of predictiveness.  
(b) The R
2
 of Behavioural Intent (BI) 
The R
2 
for the BI construct, as displayed in Table 7.4, measured 0.474 for the Taxpayer 
Model, and 0.451 for the Tax Agent Model; with both exceeding the acceptable threshold of 
0.1. The direct effect of the ATT1, ATT2, SNORM, OTHERS, PBC, TXSY, and the TXAU 
constructs, together with the indirect effect of the CnP and CnPeff constructs accounted for 47 
percent of the variance of the BI construct for the Taxpayer Model. Similarly, the direct and 
indirect effects of these same constructs relating to the Tax Agent Model, accounted for 45 
percent of the variance of the BI construct for the Tax Agent Model.  
The comparatively high R
2
 values of the BI (behavioural intent) constructs for both the 
Taxpayer and Tax Agent Models indicate strong predictive powers. This indicates the 
existence of a combined effect of all the independent constructs (listed above) on the 
dependent construct BI (behavioural intent) in the Structural Model.  
(c) The R
2
 of Attitudes (ATT1 and ATT2) 
Table 7.4 also displays the R
2
 values of the two attitude constructs (ATT1 and ATT2) for 
both the Taxpayer and Tax Agent Models. Unfortunately, only the R
2
 value in respect of the 
Taxpayer Model, measuring 0.136, adequately satisfied the acceptable threshold of 0.1. This 
suggests that the CnP and CnPeff constructs accounted for 14 per cent of the variance in the 
ATT1 construct. The R
2
 values of ATT2 in respect of the Taxpayer Model, and the R
2
 values 
of both ATT1 and ATT2 in respect of the Tax Agent Model measured well below the 
acceptable threshold, displaying values of 0.071, 0.057, and 0.063, respectively. 
In summary, the Taxpayer Model accounted for substantial variances in BI (R
2
 = 0.47) and 
BEHV (R
2 
= 0.45); modest variances in ATT1 (R
2
 = 0.136); and marginal variances in ATT2 
(R
2
 = 0.07). The Tax Agent Model on the other hand, accounted for substantial variances in 
BI (R
2
 = 0.45); modest variances in BEHV (R
2
 = 0.26), and marginal variances in ATT1 
(R
2 
= 0.06) and ATT2 (R
2
 = 0.06). Overall, the results indicate the predictive capacity of both 
models. The next section presents the results of the effect size for each endogenous construct. 
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7.3.2 Effect Size 
In addition to determining the significance of the constructs in the two models, it is equally 
important to determine whether a predictor variable has a substantive influence on the 
dependent variable. This can be assessed by examining the effect size (f
2
). The application of 
effect size is explained in Chapter 5. The change in the determination coefficient will indicate 
whether an independent latent variable has a substantial influence on the dependent latent 
variable. Table 7.5 reports the effect size in respect of the exogenous constructs in both 
models.  
Table 7.5: Effect Size in the Structural Models 
 
Construct 
Excluded  
Taxpayer Model Tax Agent Model 
R
2
excluded 
 
f
2
 
Degree 
of effect 
(Rating) 
F test R
2
excluded 
 
f
2
 
Degree 
of effect  
(Rating) 
F test 
BEHV  R
2
  = 0.450 BEHV  R
2
  = 0.259 
BI .377 0.073 small **** .199 0.080 small **** 
PBC .368 0.082 small **** .229 0.040 small **** 
TXAU .449 0.001 none n/s .249  0.013 none * 
CnP .444 0.026 small **** .239 0.026 small **** 
CnPeff .450 0.000 none n/s .258 0.001 none n/s 
TXSY .449 0.001 none n/s .256 0.004 none n/s 
DSTa .447 0.003 none n/s .256 0.004 none n/s 
DSTb .448 0.003 none n/s .248 0.014 none * 
DSTc .450 0.000 none n/s .250 0.012 none n/s 
DSTd .429 0.038 small **** .243 0.021 small *** 
BI         R
2
 = 0.474  BI        R
2
  = 0.451  
ATT1 .400 0.140 small **** .226 0.225 medium **** 
ATT2 .471 0.005 none n/s .450 0.001 none n/s 
SNORM .456 0.034 small **** .440 0.020 small *** 
PBC .456 0.034 small **** .449 0.003 none n/s 
OTHERS .463 0.020 small **** .434 0.030 small *** 
TXAU .474 0.000 none n/s .431 0.036 small **** 
TXSY .456 0.034 small **** .450 0.001 none n/s 
ATT1   R
2
 = 0.136  ATT1   R
2
  = 0.057  
CnP .006 0.130 small **** .015 0.042 small **** 
CnPeff .135 0.001 none n/s .032 0.025 small **** 
ATT2    R
2
 = 0.071  ATT2   R
2
  = 0.063  
CnP .026 0.045 small **** 0.059 0.004 none n/s 
CnPeff .063 0.008 none n/s .001 0.069 small **** 
Note: Significance levels of Pseudo F test:  n/s = not significant; * 0.5,  **0.02, ***0.01,  
****0.001   
As discussed in the previous chapter, the effect of each independent construct on the four 
endogenous constructs was obtained by removing each of the independent variables one at a 
time, creating 21 sub-models for each group.  Consistent with Cohen and Cohen (1983), when 
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a set of explanatory variables is added to a multiple regression model, the effect size (f
2
) of 
0.02, 0.15 and 0.35 reflects small, medium and large effects, respectively, at the structural 
level.  In order to determine whether the size of the effect is significant, a pseudo F test for 
testing the significance of the f
2
 statistics with 1 and n-k degrees of freedom was manually 
calculated. The pseudo F test statistic was calculated by multiplying f
2
 by (n-k-l), where n is 
the sample size and k is the number of independent construct (Mathieson et al., 2001, p. 104). 
The significance levels of the calculated test statistics for testing the significance of effect size 
(f
2
) is set out in the last column of Table 7.5. The results displayed indicate that all constructs 
with an effect size displayed have achieved significance at least at the p < 0.05 level.  
(a) Taxpayer Model 
For the Taxpayer Model, the table shows that only four out of ten independent constructs 
had some effect on the dependent construct BEHV. The four independent constructs, BI, PBC, 
CnP and DSTd seem to be the key explanatory factors in terms of incremental variance 
explained in the dependent variable. For the dependent construct BI, five out of seven 
independent constructs showed some effect. This suggests that these five constructs, ATT1, 
SNORM, PBC, OTHERS, and TXSY, are the key explanatory factors for the dependent 
variable BI. In terms of the dependent construct, ATT1 and ATT2, only the CnP construct 
displayed any acceptable effect size on each of the attitude constructs (that is, ATT1 and 
ATT2). Unfortunately, the CnPeff construct did not display any effect size on either of the 
attitude constructs.  
(b) Tax Agent Model 
The above table also confirms that the same four independent constructs exerted some 
effect on the dependent construct BEHV. These independent constructs, BI, PBC, CnP and 
DSTd appear to be the key explanatory factors in terms of incremental variance explained in 
the dependent construct, BEHV.  Further, the table shows that although the impact of adding 
TXAU (f
2
 = 0.013, p = 0.05) and DSTb (f
2 
= 0.014, p = 0.05) were marginally below the 
threshold, both are significant (Mathieson et al., 2001).  The results further indicate four out 
of seven independent constructs as having some effect on the dependent construct BI. These 
include ATT1, SNORM, OTHERS  and TXAU; suggesting these four independent constructs to 
be the key explanatory factors in terms of incremental variance explained in the dependent 
variable, BI. For the ATT1 construct, both the independent constructs appear to have some 
effect on the ATT1 construct. However, in respect of the ATT2 construct, the CnPeff construct 
displayed a small effect, whereas the CnP construct showed no effect on ATT2. 
194 
 
In summary, the results from both the Taxpayer and Tax Agent models confirm that the 
total variation in the dependent construct BEHV (behaviour) was produced equally by the four 
independent constructs: BI (behavioural intent), PBC (perceived behavioural control), CnP 
(justice elements of the penalties regime), and DSTd (social distance). 
The total variation in the other dependent construct BI (behavioural intent), in respect of 
the Taxpayer Model, was created by the effects of five independent constructs: ATT1 (attitude 
based on non-legal sanctions), SNORM (subjective norm), PBC (perceived behavioural 
control), OTHERS (societal norms or prevalence of others‟ compliance behaviour), and TXSY 
(perception of the tax system). In contrast, and in respect of the Tax Agent Model, four 
independent constructs contributed towards the total variance in the dependent construct BI 
(behavioural intent): ATT1 (attitude based on non-legal sanctions), SNORM (subjective 
norm), OTHERS (prevalence of others‟ compliance behaviour), and TXAU (perception of the 
tax authority).    
The next step involved testing the structural models (both the Taxpayer and Tax Agent 
Models) in order to determine whether they are valid representations of tax compliance 
behaviour. This was carried out by assessing the significance of the t-statistics of the proposed 
relationships among constructs that directly or indirectly influence tax compliance intentions 
and ultimately tax compliance behaviour. 
7.3.3 Significance Test of Path Coefficients 
In evaluating the structural models‟ (Taxpayer and Tax Agent) predictiveness, the path 
coefficients between each construct in the structural models were also estimated using the 
bootstrap technique, with 1,000 sub-samples. The path coefficients indicate the size, direction 
and significance of the statistical relationship between two constructs (Hair et al., 2006). The 
files generated by the bootstrap technique, to investigate the path coefficients, are found in 
Appendices 7 and 8, respectively. Graphical representations of the findings from the 
Taxpayer and Tax Agent Models are illustrated in Figures 7.1 (Taxpayer) and 7.2 (Tax 
Agent) respectively, and the detailed results for both Taxpayer and Tax Agent Models are 
found in Appendices 15 and 16.  The results from the assessment of the structural models are 
summarised in Table 7.6, which reports each independent construct‟s effect on its 
corresponding dependent constructs, the path coefficients, the observed t-statistics and their 
corresponding level of significance.   
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Table 7.6: Summarised Results from the Evaluation of the Structural Models 
 
Measures 
Taxpayer Model Tax Agent Model 
Effect Path 
coefficient 
t-
value 
Sig. 
level 
Effect Path 
coefficient 
t-
value 
Sig. 
level 
Effect on BI  R2 = 0.474 R2 = 0.451 
ATT1 + 0.363 4.25 ***** + 0.521 6.79 ***** 
ATT2 + 0.071 0.97 n/s - 0.038 0.48 n/s 
PBC + 0.118 1.41 * + 0.048 0.53 n/s 
SNORM + 0.129 1.69 ** + 0.124 7.73 ***** 
OTHERS + 0.131 2.02 *** + 0.139 2.39 *** 
TXAU - 0.007 0.11 n/s + 0.144 2.03 *** 
TXSY + 0.151 1.87 ** + 0.022 0.34 n/s 
Effect on BEHV R2  = 0.450 R2 = 0.259 
BI + 0.341 3.74 ***** + 0.267 2.66 **** 
PBC + 0.345 4.96 ***** + 0.185 1.11 n/s 
TXAU - 0.046 0.59 n/s + 0.133 1.74 ** 
CnP + 0.112 1.17 n/s + 0.180 1.71 ** 
CnPeff + 0.015 0.22 n/s + 0.035 0.30 n/s 
TXSY + 0.038 0.52 n/s - 0.070 0.70 n/s 
DSTa - 0.071 0.89 n/s - 0.057 0.59 n/s 
DSTb - 0.067 0.74 n/s - 0.130 1.12 n/s 
DSTc - 0.010 0.11 n/s - 0.186 1.61 * 
DSTd + 0.180 2.15 *** + 0.113 1.50 * 
Effect on ATT1 R2 = 0.136 R2 = 0.057 
CnP + 0.376 5.65 ***** + 0.210 2.74 **** 
CnPeff - 0.029 0.32 n/s - 0.162 1.94 ** 
Effect on ATT2  R2  = 0.071 R2 = 0.063 
CnP  + 0.224 3.13 **** - 0.058 0.60 n/s 
CnPeff + 0.095 1.14 n/s - 0.256 2.51 *** 
Note: *p< 0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.025; ****p<0.005;  *****p<0.001 ; n/s = not significant (1-tail test).  
(a) Effect on Behavioural Intent (BI) 
Table 7.6 confirms the statistically significant causal paths for all independent constructs 
(except ATT2 and TXAU) to BI, for the Taxpayer Model. ATT1 demonstrated a moderately 
strong path coefficient of β = +0.363, with a significance level of p < 0.001. The remaining 
path coefficients, PBC (β = +0.118), SNORM, (β = +0.129), OTHERS (β = +0.131), and 
TXSY (β = +0.151) reflected moderate relationships with BI. All of these path coefficients 
were significant at least at the 0.05 significance level; except PBC, which was found to be 
marginally significant at the 0.1 level. A significance level of 0.1 is acceptable in behavioural 
research which is exploratory in nature.
156
 Furthermore, all the significant path coefficients 
                                                     
156 A significance level of 0.1 is acceptable for exploratory behavioural research in the domain of behavioural 
science (Russell & Roberts, 2001). Further, a number of behavioural studies have accepted p-values of 0.10 
including Hasseldine et al. (1994, p.87) and Jones et al. (2002, p.149).   
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displayed the expected positive sign. In contrast, the results indicate inconclusive outcomes 
for ATT2 and TXAU.
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In terms of the Tax Agent Model, all constructs except ATT2, PBC and TXSY displayed 
significant path coefficients. As with the Taxpayer Model, the results for the Tax Agent 
Model indicated ATT1 as having a moderately strong relationship with BI, reporting a path 
coefficient of β = +0.521, and a significance level of p < 0.001. The other constructs which 
displayed moderate influence on BI include: SNORM (β = +0.124), OTHERS (β = +0.139) 
and TXAU (β = +0.144). All these path coefficients are significant at least at the p < 0.025 
level and positively related. The results for ATT2, PBC and TXSY indicated inconclusive 
outcomes.  
(b) Effect on Behaviour (BEHV) 
The results for the Taxpayer Model indicate that only three independent constructs linked 
to BEHV, demonstrated any significant effects on BEHV. Of the three constructs, BI and PBC 
appear to exert the most significant influence on BEHV. BI displayed a positive path 
coefficient of β = +0.341, and a significance level of p < 0.001. Similarly, PBC displayed a 
positive path coefficient of β = +0.345 and a significance level of p < 0.001. The third 
independent construct, DSTd, displayed a moderate effect on BEHV, with a path coefficient of 
β = +0.180 and a significance level of p < 0.025. Further, all three significant path 
coefficients exhibited the expected positive sign. In contrast, the results indicate inconclusive 
outcomes for the remaining constructs. 
The Tax Agent Model revealed five independent constructs to be significant, with BI 
displaying a path coefficient of β = +0.267, and a significance level of p < 0.005). TXAU 
(β = +0.133) and CnP (β = +0.180) both indicated positive significant path coefficients at the 
0.05 significance level. DSTc and DSTd displayed marginal but acceptable significant path 
coefficients. 
The TPB postulates that PBC has a direct and an indirect path to BEHV. Hair et al. (2006, 
p.868) set out the method for calculating the total effect by multiplying the indirect effects 
and summing it up with the direct effect. The total effect of PBC calculated for the Taxpayer 
Model is 0.386 whereas the total effect calculated for the Tax Agent Model is 0.198.  
                                                     
157 This outcome for ATT2 was expected, as it was hypothesised that legal sanctions will not influence behavioural 
intentions to comply, or not comply. 
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(c) Effect on Attitude Based on Non-Legal Sanctions (ATT1) 
The effect of CnP on ATT1 was significant and positive for both Taxpayer (β = +0.376, 
p < 0.001) and Tax Agent Models (β = +0.210, p < 0.005).  In contrast, the effect of CnPeff 
on ATT1 was inconclusive for the Taxpayer Model but was significant and negative for the 
Tax Agent Model (β = -0.162, p < 0.05). 
(d) Effect on Attitude Based On Legal Sanctions (ATT2) 
The effect of the CnP constructs on ATT2, in respect of the Taxpayer Model, was positive 
and significant (β = +0.224, p < 0.005), whereas the link between CnPeff and ATT2 was 
inconclusive.  In contrast, the link between CnP and ATT2 was found to be inconclusive, for 
the Tax Agent Model, but the influence of the CnPeff on ATT2 was found to be negative and 
significant (β = -256, p < 0.025). 
In summary, the results indicate that Behavioural Intentions (BI) and Behaviour (BEHV) 
both displayed relatively good fit to the respective data for both samples. Attitudes based on 
non-legal sanctions also displayed a relatively good fit (albeit a moderate influence) for the 
Taxpayer Model; however, this was not the case for the Tax Agent Model. Further, attitudes 
based on legal sanctions did not show any significance for either of the models.  Overall, the 
results substantiated the expectations that some of the paths in the model may be of little or no 
significance. In particular, the ATT2 construct which refers to attitudes based on legal 
sanctions was expected to be either of little significance or of no significance in influencing 
behavioural intentions.  
One final test before confirming the outcome of the established hypotheses is a global 
goodness of fit index, to measure the overall adequacy of the research models. This is 
presented in the next section.   
7.3.4 Goodness of Fit Index 
A global criterion of goodness of fit (GoF) index as proposed by Tenenhaus (2004), and 
presented and explained in Chapter 5, was applied to measure the quality of the causal model. 
The GoF index takes into account the model‟s performance in both the measurement and the 
structural model, providing a single measure for the overall prediction performance of the 
causal model (Esposito Vinzi et al., 2010). 
The indices for explained variability (R
2
) and communality were obtained from the 
„Deck.lst‟ file, generated by the bootstrapping procedure. Explained variances (R2) are only 
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computed for endogenous constructs, whereas communalities are computed for both 
endogenous and exogenous constructs (Tenenhaus et al., 2005). The average communality is 
computed as a weighted average of the various communalities with the number of indicators 
of each construct as weights. Single indicator constructs were excluded from the computation 
of the average communality because they will automatically result in communalities equal to 
1 (Tenenhaus et al., 2005). In this study, all constructs have a minimum of two indicators, and 
therefore all constructs were included in the computation for the average communality.  
Both models have only four endogenous constructs and therefore the sum of the explained 
variability (R
2
) was divided by four. This gave an average score of 0.283 for the Taxpayer 
Model and 0.207 for the Tax Agent Model. The average communality was computed as 0.632 
for the Taxpayer Model and 0.583 for the Tax Agent Model. The GoF indexes were then 
calculated based on the formula, which was explained in Chapter 5, and reproduced below: 
 
The calculated GoF index for the Taxpayer Model is 0.42 and 0.35 for the Tax Agent 
Model. As discussed in Chapter 5, there are no widely accepted thresholds to judge the 
significance of index. Based on comments from Professor Wynne Chin,
158
 and results from a 
number of recent studies (for example, Tenenhaus et al., 2005; and Duarte & Raposo, 2010), 
an index measuring 0.3 seems adequate. This clearly suggests that the GoF indexes achieved 
for the Taxpayer and Tax Agent Models, of 0.42 and 0.35, respectively, are adequate, and 
provide further support in terms of the acceptable quality of both structural models used in 
this study.  
In summary, the overall fit of the structural models (for Taxpayer and Tax Agent Models) 
was evaluated by the incidence of significant relationships among the constructs on the one 
hand, and by the explained variance of the endogenous latent variables on the other hand. The 
Taxpayer and Tax Agent Models show reasonably good fit, and some of the hypothesised 
paths are significant and in the direction hypothesised. In addition, the adequacy of the overall 
fit of both models was further supported by the acceptable level of the GoF indices.  
7.4 HYPOTHESES TESTING 
The preceding two sections provided evidence of the adequacy of the measurement and 
structural models for both samples, and also the adequacy of the overall fit of these models. 
                                                     
158 Professor Wynne Chin, personal communication, November 3, 2009. 
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The next section links the results to the hypotheses established in Chapter 4, in order to 
determine which of these hypotheses are supported as a result of the analysis.  
Table 7.7 presents the hypotheses established for this study and the statistical outcomes, 
based on results from testing the Taxpayer and Tax Agent Models as presented in Table 7.6. 
Every significant relationship identified in Table 7.6 is characterised by a path coefficient of 
more than 0.1, and can therefore not be neglected (Sellin & Keeves, 1994). For the Taxpayer 
Model, the results in Table 7.7 show that nine out of sixteen hypotheses were supported, one 
was partially supported, and six were not supported, and therefore rejected. In terms of the 
Tax Agent Model, nine out of sixteen hypotheses were supported, two partially supported and 
five were rejected.  
Hypothesis 1, which stated that Behavioural Intent (BI) will have a significant influence on 
a person‟s tax compliance behaviour (or Behaviour (BEHV)) was fully supported for both the 
Taxpayer (β = 0.341, t = 3.74, p < 0. 0001) and Tax Agent (β = 0.269, t = 2.66, p < 0.005) 
Models, with the paths linking BI to BEHV  being positive and significant. The results are 
consistent with the TPB, which posits that Behavioural Intent (BI) is the immediate 
antecedent of Behaviour (BEHV). 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b evaluated the relationships between BI and ATT1, and BI and ATT2. 
In support of hypothesis 2a, ATT1 (attitude based on non-legal sanctions) displayed a 
significant positive effect on BI, for both the Taxpayer (β = 0.363, t = 4.25, p < 0.001) and 
Tax Agent (β = 0.521, t = 6.79, p < 0.001) Models. Further, as predicted, Hypothesis 2b, 
which stated that ATT2 (attitude based on legal sanctions) will not have any significant 
influence on BI, was supported. The path coefficients between BI and ATT2 for both models 
were not significant.  The results provide support that attitude based on the effects of legal 
sanctions (with its associated fiscal punishment for noncompliance) may not be as effective or 
relevant as attitudes based on the effects of non-legal sanctions, in increasing an individual‟s 
(behavioural) intention to perform certain behaviour.  
Hypothesis 3, which stated that SNORM (subjective norms) will have a significant effect 
on BI, was supported for both the Taxpayer (β = 0.229, t = 1.70, p < 0.05) and Tax Agent 
(β = 0.124, t = 7.73, p < 0.001) Models; with each model displaying a significant and positive 
link from SNORM to BI. This outcome suggests that the more a person values his or her 
important referents‟ expectation, and the more motivated he or she is to comply with the 
important referents‟ expectations, the more likely they would be willing to comply with that 
expectation. This expectation will influence an individual‟s behavioural intention towards the 
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behaviour. A person‟s tax compliance intention is positively related to the normative beliefs 
of his or her important referents.  
Hypotheses 4a and 4b addressed the relationship between PBC (Perceived Behavioural 
Control) and BI (Behavioural Intent) and between PBC and BEHV (Behaviour). Hypothesis 
4a, which stated that PBC will have a significant positive influence on BI, was marginally 
supported for the Taxpayer Model (β = 0.118, t = 1.413, p < 0.10) but not supported for the 
Tax Agent Model. Hypothesis 4b, which claimed that PBC will have a significant and 
positive influence on BEHV, was supported in terms of the Taxpayer Model (β = 0.345, 
t = 4.946, p < 0.001), but no support was provided for the Tax Agent Model. The results 
suggest that an individual‟s beliefs about the presence of factors that may facilitate or inhibit 
the performance of the behaviour will influence that individual‟s tax compliance behaviour 
directly or indirectly through behavioural intentions. Unfortunately, the non-significant 
outcome suggest that these factors may have no effect on Tax Agents‟ behavioural intention 
or behaviour.  
In support of Hypothesis 5, OTHERS (perceived prevalence of compliance behaviour by 
others) displayed a positive and significant influence on BI (Behavioural Intent) for both the 
Taxpayer (β = 0.131, t = 2.018, p < 0.025) and Tax Agent (β = 0.139, t = 2.39, p < 0.025) 
Models. The results suggest that an individual‟s perception that others are complying with 
their tax obligations will influence that individual‟s (behavioural) intention to comply with his 
or her own tax obligations.  
Hypotheses 6a and 6b addressed the potential influence of the TXSY (Tax System) on BI 
(Behavioural Intent) and BEHV (Behaviour), respectively. Whilst the results indicated that 
TXSY had a positive and significant influence on BI for the Taxpayer Model (β = 0.151, 
t = 1.1866, p < 0.05), the link between TXSY and BI for the Tax Agent Model was not 
significant. Hypothesis 6a was therefore accepted for the Taxpayer Model and rejected for the 
Tax Agent Model. Failing to support Hypothesis 6b, TXSY did not show any significant effect 
on BEHV, for neither the Taxpayer nor the Tax Agent Model. The results suggest that the 
TXSY construct, which comprised elements of compliance cost, is only relevant to Taxpayer‟s 
(Behavioural) intention and not relevant for the Tax Agent Model.   
Hypotheses 7a and 7b related to the influence exerted by the TXAU (Tax Authority) on BI 
(Behavioural Intent) and on BEHV (Behaviour), respectively. Hypothesis 7a, which stated 
that positive perception of the TXAU will positively influence BI,  did not support the 
Taxpayer Model, but supported the Tax Agent Model (β = 0.144, t = 2.03, p < 0.025). 
Similarly, Hypothesis 7b, which stated that a positive perception of the TXAU will positively 
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influence BEHV, did not support the Taxpayer Model, but provided support for the Tax Agent 
Model (β = 0.133, t = 1.74, p < 0.05). The results indicate that while perceptions of the tax 
authority may influence behavioural intentions, and behaviour for the Tax Agent sample, 
perceptions of the tax authority had no effect on the Taxpayer sample‟s behavioural intention 
or behaviour.     
Hypothesis 8, which stated that DST (degree of „social distance‟ from the tax authority) 
will influence BEHV (Behaviour), was partially supported for both models. DST comprised 
four levels of social distance, ranging from fully noncompliant (DSTa or the disengagement 
posture), to fully compliant (DSTd or the commitment posture). In terms of the Taxpayer 
Model, only respondents who are fully compliant or adopting a commitment posture (DSTd) 
displayed a positive and significant relationship to BEHV (β = 0.180, t = 2.150, p < 0.025), 
thereby providing partial support to Hypothesis 8. In terms of the remaining Taxpayer 
respondents; those less compliant or displaying a resistance posture (DSTc) to fully 
noncompliant or those adopting a disengagement posture (DSTa), all displayed a negative 
effect as expected, but none of the results were significant. Similarly, Hypothesis 8 was 
partially supported for the Tax Agent Model. Individuals who were fully compliant and 
displayed the commitment posture (DSTd), displayed a positive and marginally significant 
influence on BEHV (β = 0.113, t = 1.50, p < 0.10). In contrast, individuals who were 
considered to be not fully compliant and who adopted the capitulation posture (DSTc), 
displayed a negative but marginally significant influence on tax compliance behaviour        
(β = -0.186, t = 1.61, p < 0.10). The remaining two levels of compliance (DSTb and DSTa) 
which relates to the resistance posture and disengagement posture, respectively, displayed 
negative effects as expected; however, the results were not significant. Overall, the results 
were inconclusive, although they suggest that social distance is relevant for individuals who 
are considered fully compliant (commitment). 
Hypotheses 9a and 9b related to the influence of CnP (justice elements of the CPR) on 
BEHV and on ATTI and ATT2. Hypothesis 9a, which stated that CnP will positively influence 
BEHV, was not supported for the Taxpayer Model, but exhibited a significant positive 
relationship for the Tax Agent Model (β = 0.180, t = 1.71, p  < 0.05).  The outcome suggests 
that the justice elements of the CPR, (CnP) have no influence on the behaviour of the 
Taxpayer sample, but have a positive influence on the behaviour of the Tax Agent sample. 
In support of Hypothesis 9b, which stated that the justice perceptions of CnP (justice 
elements) will positively influence attitudes (ATT1 and ATT2), the path coefficients between 
CnP and ATT1 (β  = 0.376, t = 5.65, p < 0.001)  and CnP and ATT2 (β = 0.224, t = 3.13, 
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p < 0.005) were both positive and significant for the Taxpayer Model. In contrast, the path 
coefficient between CnP and ATT1, for the Tax Agent Model, was positive and significant 
(β = 0.210, t = 2.74, p < 0.005), but the link between CnP and ATT2 was not significant, 
resulting in partial support for Hypothesis 9b. The results suggest that the justice elements of 
the CPR are capable of significantly influencing both attitudes (ATT1 and ATT2) of the 
Taxpayer sample. In contrast, for the Tax Agent sample, the justice elements of the penalties 
regime were only significant for ATT1, but no significant effect was found in its relationship 
with ATT2. 
Hypotheses 10a and 10b evaluated the influence of CnPeff (the effectiveness of the CPR) 
on BEHV (Behaviour) and ATT1 and ATT2 (attitudes). Hypothesis 10a stated that CnPeff 
(effectiveness of the CPR) will have a positive influence on BEHV (Behaviour). The path 
coefficient between CnPeff and BEHV was positive but not significant for both models, 
leading to the rejection of Hypothesis 10a.  The results indicate that the perceived 
effectiveness of the CPR have no influence on the behaviour of either the Taxpayer or Tax 
Agent samples.  
Hypothesis 10b stated that CnPeff (effectiveness of the CPR) will positively influence 
ATT1 (attitude based on non-legal sanctions) and ATT2 (attitude based on formal sanctions) 
compliance behaviour. The path coefficients between CnPeff and ATT1 and CnPeff and ATT2 
were both not significant for the Taxpayer Model. Conversely, the path coefficients between 
CnPeff and ATT1 (β = - 0.162, t = 1.94, p < 0.05) and CnPeff and ATT2 (β = - 0.256, t = 2.51, 
p < 0.025) were both negative and significant for the Tax Agent Model. The results suggest 
that the perceived effectiveness of the regime will contribute negatively towards an 
individual‟s attitudes (ATT1 and ATT2) towards compliance behaviour. This outcome, which 
was unexpected, suggests that increased perceived effectiveness of the penalties regime leads 
to negative attitudes towards compliance.    
In summary, all hypotheses (listed in Table 7.7 below), with the exception of 6b, 7a, 7b, 
9a, 10a and 10b, in respect of the Taxpayer Model, were fully or partially supported. In terms 
of the Tax Agent Model, all hypotheses, except hypotheses 4a, 4b, 6a, 6b and 10a, were either 
fully or partially supported. In addition, all hypotheses relating to the TPB elements were 
supported for both models, with the exception of the PBC element on BI and BEHV, in 
respect of the Tax Agent Model. 
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Table 7.7: Summary of Results of Hypotheses Testing  
Hypotheses Research Hypothesis 
Taxpayer Tax Agent 
Results Results 
Hypothesis 1 Positive behavioural intentions to comply will positively 
influence tax compliance behaviour.  
Accepted Accepted 
Hypothesis 2a Positive attitudes based on informal sanctions towards tax 
compliance will have a positive effect on behavioural 
intentions.   
Accepted Accepted 
Hypothesis 2b Positive attitudes based on formal sanctions towards tax 
compliance will not have any effect on behavioural 
intentions.   
Accepted Accepted 
Hypothesis 3 Positive subjective norms will positively influence 
behavioural intentions.      
Accepted Accepted 
Hypothesis 4a Lower degrees of perceived behavioural control over 
noncompliance will positively influence behavioural 
intentions.      
Accepted Rejected 
Hypothesis 4b Lower degrees of perceived behavioural control over 
noncompliance will positively influence tax compliance 
behaviour.    
Accepted Rejected 
Hypothesis 5 
Perceptions of the prevalence of tax compliance by the 
general population (positive societal norms) will 
positively influence behavioural intentions.   
Accepted Accepted 
Hypothesis 6a Favourable views of the tax system will have a positive 
influence on behavioural intentions.   
Accepted Rejected 
Hypothesis 6b Favourable views of the tax system will have a positive 
influence on tax compliance behaviour.  
Rejected Rejected 
Hypothesis 7a  Positive views of the tax authority will positively 
influence behavioural intentions.     
Rejected Accepted 
Hypothesis 7b  Positive views of the tax authority will positively 
influence tax compliance behaviour.  
Rejected Accepted 
Hypothesis 8 Deference postures (or least social distance adopted) will 
positively reflect more positive tax compliance behaviour.   
Partially 
Accepted 
Partially 
Accepted 
Hypothesis 9a Favourable justice perceptions of the Compliance and 
Penalties Regime will positively influence tax compliance 
behaviour.  
Rejected Accepted 
Hypothesis 9b Favourable justice perceptions of the Compliance and 
Penalties Regime will positively influence attitudes 
towards tax compliance. 
Accepted Partially 
Accepted 
Hypothesis 10a Perceived effectiveness of the Compliance and Penalties 
Regime will positively influence tax compliance 
behaviour.  
Rejected Rejected 
Hypothesis 10b Perceived effectiveness of the Compliance and Penalties 
Regime will positively influence attitudes towards tax 
compliance.  
Rejected Accepted 
7.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the results from the assessment of the measurement and structural 
models. The measurement and structural models were evaluated using a bootstrap technique 
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with 1,000 resamples in PLS-Graph. In the first of a two-step procedure, a number of 
reliability and validity tests were conducted, in order to determine the integrity and adequacy 
of the measurement model. Once the integrity and adequacy of the measurement models were 
established, the structural models were assessed. This involved examining the standardised 
path coefficient and its corresponding significance values, including the R
2 
and effect size (f
2
) 
of all endogenous constructs. 
The final step included calculating a global goodness of fit index for validating the PLS 
causal model globally. The combination of the measurement and structural model analysis 
(which included factor analysis and hypothesis testing in the same analysis) resulted in a more 
rigorous evaluation of the theoretical model and offers a better methodological assessment 
tool (Bollen, 1989; Bullock et al., 1994; and Joreskog & Sorbom, 1989).  
The PLS results suggest that the model estimates for both the measurement and structural 
models were adequate for both of the Taxpayer and Tax Agent Models. In terms of the 
measurement models, there was adequate convergent and discriminant validity for all 
constructs included in both the Taxpayer and Tax Agent Models. For the structural models, 
the predictor constructs adequately explained the two outcomes constructs of Behavioural 
Intent (BI) and Behaviour (BEHV). The global goodness of fit index calculated revealed the 
adequacy of the overall fit of the Taxpayer and Tax Agent Models. 
The results were then linked to the hypotheses developed in Chapter 4. Overall, all except 
six out of a total of sixteen hypotheses developed for the current research were accepted in 
respect of the Taxpayer Model, and all except five out of a total of sixteen hypotheses relating 
to the Tax Agent Model were accepted.   
The results are summarized in Chapter 8, which includes the interpretation of the results 
and the implications for tax authorities and policymakers. The next chapter also addresses 
some of the limitations associated with the current study and offers recommendations for 
future extensions.  
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CHAPTER 8 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, IMPLICATIONS, 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This research was undertaken to explore the diverse range of psychological influences, in 
addition to economic factors, affecting tax compliance behaviour. This final chapter contains 
a summary of the results from testing the research models and conclusions based on the 
results.  
The introduction to this chapter is followed by section 8.2, which presents an overview of 
the research, including the research objectives. Section 8.3 summarises the results presented 
in Chapters 6 and 7, followed by a discussion of the findings. Section 8.4 highlights the 
contributions made by this thesis to the current body of literature. Section 8.5 presents and 
discusses the policy implications and challenges of the findings for tax authorities and policy 
makers. Section 8.6 discusses some of the limitations identified in this study. Some potential 
future directions and possible extensions to the current study are recommended in section 8.7. 
Finally, section 8.8 presents some concluding comments. 
8.2 OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH 
The key objective of this study was to examine selected tax compliance variables within 
the framework of the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB), while at the same time testing the 
validity and adequacy of the TPB Model in explaining individual‟s tax compliance behaviour. 
The objectives also include testing the Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) approach, using 
Partial Least Squares (PLS) to predict behavioural intentions and behaviour. The analysis was 
carried out in PLS-Graph, which is an analytical tool capable of handling complex causal 
models, and which simultaneously carries out factor analysis, multiple regressions, and path 
analysis. The data was collected through multiple survey methods: mail survey for the sample 
comprising taxpayers; and web-based survey for the sample comprising tax agents.  
Hypotheses concerning the effects of beliefs and attitudes on intentions to comply, and 
ultimately on behaviour, were proposed and tested. The key elements of the research models 
were grounded in the TPB, Deterrence Theory, and Procedural Justice Theory (PJT). Whilst 
the key elements of this study were based on beliefs and attitudes, economic elements (such 
as legal and formal sanctions) were also included in the research models. The premise is that 
tax compliance behaviour is complex and a multitude of variables, rather than a few, 
influence compliance behaviour. The inclusion of all possible variables in one model is 
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beyond the scope of this study; nevertheless, several key economic and noneconomic 
variables were selected for inclusion in the research models.   
This area of study was chosen to fill the research gap in studies examining selected 
behavioural theories in tax compliance in a New Zealand context. Given that tax 
noncompliance is a continual and growing problem globally, including New Zealand, there is 
a need to better understand taxpayers‟ attitudes and beliefs towards tax compliance (or 
noncompliance) in order to modify undesirable behaviour. Further, the use of new research 
tools, in this case, the use of PLS-Graph to analyse the survey data, is in response to calls for 
researchers to seek and use better research methods (Hessing et al., 1988; Richardson & 
Sawyer, 2001; and McKerchar, 2010).  
The research also involves predicting the compliance behaviour of two key stakeholders of 
the tax system, namely: taxpayers, and tax agents. Prior studies provide evidence that 
taxpayers do not belong to one homogeneous group; rather, taxpayers are made up of 
different sub-groups comprising various distinguishing characteristics (Ritsema et al., 2003). 
This may affect the way each sub-group is influenced by internal and external factors, in 
terms of their tax reporting behaviours. The influence of the variables selected for this study 
was therefore tested on each of the two distinct groups separately.   
8.3 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This section provides a summary and discussion of the findings. The full detailed results 
from the analysis of the survey data are presented in Chapters 6 and 7.
159
 The summarised 
results for the observed population sample for both the taxpayer (Taxpayer Model) and the 
tax agent (Tax Agent Model) groups are presented in Figures 8.1 and 8.2, respectively. The 
circles represent the latent variables or constructs. The arrows in bold lines between the latent 
variables indicate significant relationships between the constructs, whereas the dotted lines 
indicate that the relationships between the latent variables are inconclusive. The R
2 
in the 
circles indicates the variance explained for the two key constructs: intentions, and behaviour. 
Finally, the goodness of fit index (GoF), presented at the top right-hand corner of each table, 
reflects the global goodness of fit for each of the research models (Taxpayer Model and Tax 
Agent Model). Both indices measure above the acceptable threshold, thus indicating adequate 
goodness of fit for both models.  
 
 
                                                     
159 Chapter 6 presents the results of the preliminary analysis, which includes the descriptive statistics, while 
Chapter 7 presents the PLS results for the Taxpayer and Tax Agent Models.    
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Figure 8.1: PLS Results of the Path Analysis for the Taxpayer Model 
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Figure 8.2: PLS Results of the Path Analysis for the Tax Agent Model 
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8.3.1 Attitudes (ATT1 and ATT2) 
Attitudes comprise measures of attitudes based on formal (or legal) sanctions and attitudes 
based on informal (or non-legal) sanctions. The effects of both types of attitudes (attitudes 
based on formal and informal sanctions) were observed; however, no statistically significant 
influence was observed for Attitude 2 (based on formal sanctions), for either the Taxpayer or 
Tax Agent group. In contrast, Attitude 1 (based on informal sanctions) supports a statistically 
significant effect on intentions. This outcome suggests that attitudes based on the effects of 
informal sanctions (which are based on psychological variables, for example tax morale) are 
more effective in influencing intentions to comply (or not comply) with the tax laws, than 
attitudes based on formal sanctions (which are based on economic variables).  
Informal sanctions, based on personal norms (as measured by attitudes), are imposed by 
the individual, and paying tax is motivated by the individual‟s personal sense of moral values, 
feelings of guilt and/or sense of civic duty. Formal sanctions, based on economic deterrent 
tools such as probability of detection, probability of being penalised and perceived severity of 
the penalties, are imposed by the state, and paying tax is motivated by the fear of being caught 
and punished.  
This outcome is consistent with the literature discussed in Chapter 2, which 
overwhelmingly supports the role of informal sanctions, based on tax morale and other 
psychological variables, on tax compliance behaviour.  Bobek and Hatfield (2003) found 
beliefs about guilt to be significant across all three scenarios used in their study.
160
 Hasseldine 
et al. (1994) illustrated that taxpayers who believe evasion is morally unacceptable are more 
likely to fully comply with their tax obligations. Orviska and Hudson (2002) found that 
individuals with a sense of civic duty are more likely to be motivated to comply, or, in the 
context of this study, are more likely to positively influence intention to comply. Kornhauser 
(2007) maintains that variables such as moral values are internalised, and such internalised 
norms are more likely to affect behaviour in large groups, particularly in situations where an 
individual‟s behaviour is not observable by others.161 Tax paying behaviour is an activity that 
is not observable, and therefore social norms are not very effective in such situations because 
of the difficulty in imposing informal sanctions. On the other hand, internal or personal norms 
(imposed by self) would have a strong and positive impact on tax compliance (Kornhauser, 
2007).  
                                                     
160 The study used six elicited beliefs which included: cheating intentions; tax paid beliefs; illegal beliefs; penalty 
beliefs; fairness beliefs; and guilt beliefs. 
161 Kornhauser (2007) refers to moral and ethical values as personal norms, whereas attitudes and beliefs are 
referred to as tax morale. 
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8.3.2 Subjective Norms (SNORM) and Societal Norms (OTHERS) 
Subjective norms (also sometimes referred to as social norms) were observed to exert 
positive and statistically significant effects on intentions, for both samples. The results 
indicate that respondents‟ beliefs of important referents‟ expectations of them are significant 
predictors of intentions. Subjective norms include measures of an individual‟s perception of 
important referents‟ expectations of how they should behave, the threat of loss of respect if 
they do not conform to referents‟ expectations, and the perception of how important referents 
would behave in a similar situation. While personal norms are imposed by self, social norms 
on the other hand are imposed by important referents, that is, by their expectations (or social 
pressure) with regard to performing or (not performing) the target behaviour. The outcome 
suggests that social pressures from important referents (or normative beliefs) are effective in 
influencing intentions to comply (or not comply) with individuals‟ tax obligations. This 
finding is consistent with the results from Bobek and Hatfield (2003) and Trivedi et al. 
(2005). 
Societal norms or positive (or negative) perceptions of others‟ tax reporting behaviour, 
also positively influenced intentions to comply, in respect with both sample groups. Societal 
norms are imposed by society and are based on the norms of the general taxpaying 
population. The results suggest that societal norms are important motivators in an individual‟s 
intention to comply with the tax laws.  
While the effects of informal sanctions by peers and society could influence behaviour, the 
actual noncompliant behaviour is not visible, and therefore not observable. Social sanctions in 
the form of disapproval from referents (or society) would not be forthcoming if the referent 
(or society) is unaware of any noncompliant activities undertaken by the individual. For 
informal sanctions to apply, the target behaviour must be visible, or known to those charged 
with imposing the informal sanctions. However, for the purpose of this research, it is not the 
threat of the actual informal sanctions that inhibits unacceptable behaviour; rather, it is the 
individual‟s perception of the threat of informal sanctions that acts as a deterrent. The 
outcome of a positive and significant relationship between societal norms and intentions 
towards tax compliance is supported by a number of studies (Porcano, 1988; Sandmo, 2005; 
and Traxler, 2010).   
8.3.3 Perceived Behavioural Control (PBC) 
PBC, which was measured by three elements (financial distress, third party reporting and 
opportunity) was observed to have a significant effect on intentions, and also a direct effect 
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on behaviour, but only for the Taxpayer sample. In respect to the Tax Agent sample, the 
relationships between PBC and intentions, and PBC and behaviour, were observed to be 
inconclusive. This suggests that the presence or absence of the identified impediments or 
barriers influence intentions and behaviours of the taxpayers, but, as expected, these 
impediments are not perceived by the tax agents to have any impact on their intentions to 
comply (or not comply), nor on their behaviour. Trivedi et al. (2005) did not find any 
significant relationship between PBC and tax compliance for their student sample. Further, 
the survey conducted by Bobek and Hatfield (2003) found a significant relationship between 
PBC and intentions to comply for only one of the three scenarios used for the study. The other 
two scenarios used in their study failed to show any relationship between PBC and intentions.  
The discrepancy in the current study‟s results between the Taxpayer and Tax Agent 
samples could be attributed to the tax agents‟ comparatively higher levels of knowledge (of 
the tax laws and the tax system), compared to the taxpayers‟ level of  knowledge. As such, tax 
agents may not consider the PBC factors used in this study as facilitating or hindering their 
intended behaviour. This is not to suggest that tax agents will not comply because they have 
control over their behaviour. Rather, the results suggest that PBC has no effect in influencing 
tax agents‟ behavioural intentions or tax compliance behaviour. As such, tax agents‟ 
behavioural intent, and ultimately behaviour, will instead be influenced by attitudes and 
subjective norms. The results also demonstrate that measures of PBC that give rise to tax 
agents‟ perceptions of control differ from that of the taxpayers.  
8.3.4 Tax System (TXSY) 
Tax system was measured by statements which elicit taxpayers‟ views on the fairness of 
the tax system, which also includes the compliance costs imposed by the tax system. The 
remaining tax system measures (after the trimming exercise) relate to the cost of compliance. 
The only significant relationship displayed by the tax system construct is the relationship 
between the tax system and intentions, in respect to the Taxpayer sample. No other 
relationship exists between the tax system and other constructs, for either sample group. The 
only possible explanation to account for this outcome is, perhaps, that compliance costs do 
not feature in the tax agents‟ minds when considering fairness of the tax system. On the other 
hand, compliance costs may be considered to be relevant for taxpayers because, while tax 
agents may be able to complete their own tax returns, taxpayers with complex tax returns are 
more likely to engage a tax agent to complete their returns. This means that taxpayers incur 
compliance costs when complying with their tax obligations.  
212 
 
A number of studies have examined the scope of compliance cost (for example, 
Blumenthal & Slemrod, 1992); however, studies have not sufficiently examined the 
relationship between compliance costs and taxpayer compliance behaviour (Richardson & 
Sawyer, 2001).
162
  
8.3.5 Tax Authority (TXAU) 
The tax authority construct was measured by statements based on how favourably (or 
unfavourably) respondents view the tax authority. The effects of perceptions of the tax 
authority on behavioural intentions and behaviour were found to be inconclusive for the 
Taxpayer sample, but clearly significant for the Tax Agent sample.  One explanation for this 
outcome could be the lack of, or limited, engagement by most taxpayers with the tax 
authority, whereas tax agents are more likely to frequently engage with the tax authority on 
behalf of their clients.  
Since the 1999/2000 income year, individual taxpayers in New Zealand who derive 
income that is fully taxed at source are not required to file tax returns, and as a result do not 
need to engage or interact with the tax authority. Taxpayers who have complex tax returns are 
more likely to engage tax agents to complete and file their tax returns; therefore, their contact 
with the tax authority tends to occur through their tax agents. It is therefore unsurprising that 
tax agents are more likely than taxpayers to frequently engage directly with the tax authority. 
Further, the New Zealand tax authority has been increasingly discouraging taxpayers from 
direct contact with the tax authority; instead, taxpayers are encouraged to self-manage their 
tax affairs online. While this may increase efficiency and reduce costs, the downside is that 
taxpayers could potentially become alienated from the tax authority. Perhaps this may be one 
of the reasons why taxpayers do not appear to have any opinion, whether favourable or 
unfavourable, towards the tax authority, hence the inconclusive results. In contrast, tax agents 
may have regular contact with the tax authority; hence the significant relationship between 
their perceptions of the tax authority and intentions, and also with behaviour directly.  
 The majority of studies reviewed by Jackson and Milliron (1986) and Richardson and 
Sawyer (2001) concern the effect of tax authority contact on tax compliance. There does not 
appear to be any studies examining the effect of people‟s (favourable or unfavourable) 
perception of the tax authority on compliance behaviour. The lack of such studies prevents 
any comparison of the current results with the results of prior studies.   
                                                     
162 Recent studies tend to examine the burden of compliance cost on taxpayers rather than the relationship between 
compliance cost and tax compliance behaviour (for example, Guyton et al., 2003; and Mathieu et al., 2010). 
213 
 
8.3.6 Motivational Postures or Social Distance (DST) 
Motivational postures, or social distance (DST), were measured by the four motivational 
postures developed by Braithwaite (2003a; 2003b). These are commitment and capitulation 
(which are the two deference positions), and resistance and disengagement (which are the two 
defiance positions). Out of the four motivational postures used for this study, only one 
deference posture (commitment), for the Taxpayer sample, and two deference postures 
(commitment and capitulation), for the Tax Agent sample, were significant and positively 
related to tax compliance behaviour. Braithwaite (2003a) maintains that the two deference 
postures are the most frequent motivational postures adopted by taxpayers, whereas the two 
defiance postures were found less frequently. Further, Braithwaite‟s (2003a) survey found 
commitment and capitulation (the deference postures) to be negatively related to evasion and 
tax avoidance (in other words, positively related to compliance), whereas the other defiance 
postures were positively related to evasion and avoidance.  
The somewhat varied outcomes from this study are consistent with the views of a number 
of researchers who argue that the majority of taxpayers are compliant and honest (Long & 
Swingen, 1991; James & Alley, 2002; and Kirchler et al., 2009). Further, in most cases, the 
positions adopted by people are dynamic, as individuals move between the various postures 
(Braithwaite, 2003a). This explains the inconclusive outcomes for three of the postures in 
respect to the Taxpayer sample, and the inconclusive outcomes of two of the postures with 
regard to the Tax Agent sample.   
8.3.7 Compliance and Penalties Regime (CPR) 
Measures of the effectiveness of the CPR (CnPeff) on both attitude constructs (Attitude 1 
and Attitude 2), and on behaviour, were found to be  inconclusive for the Taxpayer sample. In 
contrast, the effect of CnPeff on both attitudes was significant for the Tax Agent sample, 
although the link between CnPeff and behaviour was inconclusive. The results suggest that 
taxpayers‟ attitudes are not influenced by the perceived effectiveness of the CPR, whereas the 
tax agents‟ attitudes (both Attitude 1 and Attitude 2) appear to be clearly influenced by the 
perceived effectiveness of the CPR.  
The justice elements of the CPR (CnP), on the other hand, appeared to significantly 
influence both attitudes (Attitude 1 and Attitude 2), in respect to the Taxpayer sample, 
although it displayed inconclusive results on its effect on taxpayers‟ behaviour. In terms of 
the Tax Agent sample, the CnP element was significant for attitudes based on informal 
sanctions (Attitude 1), but inconclusive in its effect on attitudes based on formal sanctions 
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(Attitude 2). Further, the results examining the link between CnP and behaviour are positive 
and significant for the tax agent sample.   
It is interesting to note that the effectiveness of penalties is not relevant to taxpayers‟ 
attitudes (based on formal or informal sanctions); however, they appear to be relevant in 
influencing tax agents‟ attitudes based on both formal and informal sanctions. Perhaps tax 
agents who work with the CPR legislation may be aware of the effects of the legislation, 
whereas taxpayers may be far removed from the CPR in their daily life and, thus, it may not 
specifically feature in their decision-making process. This argument may explain why the 
effectiveness of the CPR influences both types of attitudes for tax agents, while at the same 
time not featuring in taxpayers‟ attitudes towards compliance. Similarly, the justice elements 
(CnP) also have different effects on taxpayers and tax agents.  
8.3.8 Behaviour 
Behaviour is strongly influenced by intentions (or behavioural intentions). For both sample 
groups, there is a clear, significant and positive relationship between intentions and 
behaviour. The reasonably high R
2 
of both samples (especially in the Taxpayer Model) 
suggests good predictive power. Further, the acceptable level of the GoF index provides 
support to the overall fit of both the Taxpayer and Tax Agent Models. A few studies have 
applied the TPB to examine tax compliance behaviour (Bobek & Hatfield, 2003; Trivedi et 
al., 2005; and Saad, 2009; 2011); however, only one of the studies has applied the full TPB 
Model, which includes the relationship between intentions and behaviour.
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8.3.9 Perceptions of Tax Offences 
Measures of respondents‟ perceptions of the seriousness of tax noncompliance, together 
with other civil offences, were also examined in this study. This additional analysis provides 
information that allows for a better understanding of taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour. 
Respondents were required to rate the seriousness of the offence on a Likert scale, and then to 
rank each offence according to the perceived seriousness of the crime.
164
 
                                                     
163 A full TPB model refers to models which include all the elements of the TPB, that is: attitudes; subjective 
norms; PBC; intentions; and behaviour. Bobek and Hatfield (2003) and Saad (2009) did not include behaviour in 
their TPB models, and therefore did not examine the link between behavioural intentions and behaviour. To the 
best of the author‟s knowledge, Trivedi et al. (2005) appears to be the only other published study on tax 
compliance behaviour to include the effect of intentions on behaviour. 
164 In the rating exercise, each offence was rated individually and based on the perceived seriousness of that 
particular offence. In contrast, the ranking exercise involved respondents ranking each offence based on the 
comparative seriousness of the offence (when compared to the other listed offences).  
215 
 
The results from the rating exercise found that the Taxpayer sample tend to consider 
committing a tax offence as less serious than committing four other similar civil crimes such 
as: bicycle theft; welfare fraud; bank fraud; and a speeding offence; thus rating the tax offence 
as the fifth most serious offence. The Taxpayer sample also ranked the tax offence as the fifth 
most serious offence. In contrast, the Tax Agent sample rated committing a tax offence as the 
least serious of all the listed offences, at seventh position. However, the tax offence fared 
better in the ranking exercise, where it was ranked as the third most serious offence, ahead of 
the drug and speeding offences.  
It is interesting to note that whilst the rating and ranking of the tax offence remained 
consistent for the Taxpayer sample, this was not the case for the Tax Agent sample. Tax 
agents rated the tax offence as the least serious of the listed crimes (when each offence was 
judged on its perceived seriousness), whereas it was ranked as the third most serious crime 
(when each offence was judged based on the relative seriousness of the other offences on the 
list). This suggests further study may be required to determine whether individuals‟ 
perceptions are influenced by the measurement methods adopted.  
Further, it may be useful to note that whilst taxpayers were able to review both questions 
(the rating and ranking) at the same time, tax agents were not able to compare their two 
responses (rating and ranking).
165
 Nevertheless, the overall results are consistent with similar 
studies from New Zealand and overseas, which found that the general public does not 
consider committing a tax offence to be a serious crime (McIntosh & Veal, 2001; Karlinsky et 
al., 2004; and Gupta, 2006; 2007). It is especially worrying that a relatively recent New 
Zealand study (McIntosh & Veal, 2001) found that over half of the respondents (54 percent) 
believe that tax evasion by small businesses have increased over the last five years, with only 
6 percent believing that evasion has decreased.
166
 This is compounded by a further revelation 
that 79 percent of respondents in the study agree that New Zealand is becoming a society in 
which understating income is widely acceptable. This would have important implications for 
the tax authority in terms of penalising tax offenders. If the general public view tax offences 
as not serious, then it will be challenging for the tax authority to convince tax offenders that 
the penalties imposed are not unduly harsh.  
                                                     
165 The electronic survey did not allow respondents to go back to any completed sections of the questionnaire, a 
flaw the author was unable to address. Nevertheless, the intent was to capture the first view of the respondents, not 
their hindsight (or reconsidered) views. 
166 Considering that perceptions towards tax offences have remained fairly stable over fourteen years (from 
Oxley‟s study in 1993 (Oxley, 1993) to Gupta‟s 2007 study (Gupta, 2007), it can be assumed that this view may 
still hold. 
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This study also examined the link between the perceived seriousness of tax noncompliance 
(tax offence) and tax compliance behaviour. The results suggest that respondents who 
consider tax noncompliance to be a serious offence are more likely to comply, and those who 
do not view this as a serious offence are more likely to be less compliant.   
8.3.10 Tax Noncompliers’ Views 
Taxpayers penalised under the CPR responded to a number of questions eliciting their 
views on aspects of the penalties imposed, and their experience with the process and the tax 
authority. The results indicate that on a majority of issues the responses of both groups are 
similar.  It is interesting to note that although culpability would have been established by the 
tax authority during the disputes process, and before penalties are considered and imposed, 
both groups of respondents believe that the penalties imposed were harsh, unfair and 
excessive. Both sample groups were also dissatisfied with the process available in disputing 
the level of penalties imposed, and did not feel that the tax authority had considered their 
views in determining the outcome. In terms of experience, both groups felt that the emotional 
and economic costs were considerable. 
Overall, despite respondents‟ negative views of their experiences, and their reluctance at 
accepting the decisions of the tax authority, the majority of respondents from both groups 
admitted that being penalised has deterred them from future noncompliance. This is consistent 
with the classical deterrence theory of Allingham and Sandmo (1972), which argues for the 
use of penalties to deter noncompliant behaviour. However, contemporary researchers have 
demonstrated the importance of procedural justice of legal authorities in discouraging 
undesirable behaviour and encouraging general compliance. PJT contends that people are 
more likely to agree and cooperate with the authorities if they consider that the decision-
making process and the treatment they received are fair (Tyler, 2010). In the current study, it 
is unclear whether penalties alone contributed towards this group‟s future intentions to 
comply, or a combination of other factors and penalties. Therefore, the tax authority may also 
need to monitor the long term compliance efforts of tax offenders to determine the 
effectiveness of penalties.  
In summary, the TPB is useful in identifying psychological determinants of self-reported 
tax compliance behaviour, and could provide a useful tool to tax authorities for developing 
compliance programs. The key objective of identifying determinants of tax compliance 
behaviour is to more effectively plan interventions that increase the levels of voluntary 
compliance. The results of this study (which are supported by other similar studies on a 
217 
 
variety of behaviours),
167
 suggest that tax compliance programs would be more effective and 
efficient, when components identified as those capable of encouraging positive beliefs on tax 
compliance and the evaluation of those beliefs for the individuals are included in the program 
design. The results of the current research, which are consistent with a number of prior 
studies, also demonstrate that less enforcement and less harsh penalties can be implemented at 
little cost in terms of revenue collected, when other social values are important for 
individuals. Individuals are willing to comply with their tax obligations to avoid the effects of 
tax morale on their conscience (informal sanctions), rather than the threat of being caught and 
punished (by formal sanctions). Changing beliefs about compliance could improve attitudes, 
which in turn influences intention. The results from this study suggest that people who hold 
positive evaluations of compliance are more likely to comply. The results also provide 
support for the application of the full TPB Model to predict behaviour and in explaining the 
effects of sanctions and other variables. 
8.4 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS 
There is a large body of research on taxpayer behaviour and compliance; however, most of 
the results from these studies tend to be mixed or inconclusive. Consequently, there is a need 
to continue with such research until a comprehensive model of tax compliance is developed 
from contributions from the increasing number of tax compliance studies. This study 
therefore attempts to make a small, but useful, contribution to the large body of research 
currently available.   
A large number of researchers agree that tax compliance behaviour is complicated and 
involves complicated decision processes (McKerchar, 2010). Although there is no denying 
that legal or formal sanctions have a role in managing taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour; there 
are other equally important factors that have not been integrated into most economic models 
of tax compliance. The findings of this study, which highlights the influence of beliefs and 
attitudes on compliance behaviour, could potentially contribute towards a more integrated tax 
compliance model.   
The current research is also one of the very few studies to apply the full TPB Model to 
examine the determinants of tax compliance behaviour.
168
 The other known studies did not 
include behaviour, and therefore did not examine the relationship between intentions and 
behaviour (Bobek & Hatfield, 2003; and Saad, 2009; 2011). Trivedi et al. (2005) was the only 
                                                     
167 Refer to the literature review in Chapter 2 for relevant studies. 
168 Full TPB Models comprise all the elements of the TPB (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Some studies tend to omit 
the behaviour construct (which makes it incomplete).  
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other study that examined tax compliance behaviour within a full TPB Model. Trivedi et al.‟s 
(2005) study was undertaken in Canada (a different tax jurisdiction), and the sample 
comprised one group of students. Further, the TPB Model was extended with the inclusion of 
only one additional construct (ethics). In contrast, the current New Zealand study uses two 
distinct groups of taxpayers, and the TPB Model was extended with the inclusion of multiple 
constructs: economic and noneconomic constructs. The current study also applied SEM to 
analyse the survey data.
169
 Further, while this study is not the first, it is one of a few to 
address the role of procedural justice elements in enhancing tax compliance behaviour, 
directly and through its intervention on attitudes towards compliance (or noncompliance). 
Understanding the types of experiences encountered by taxpayers subjected to the CPR (or 
any other penalties regime) for tax noncompliance is equally important for tax authorities. To 
date, no empirical evidence is publicly available on the effects of penalties on detected 
noncompliant behaviour.
170
 This type of information is not publicly available, and therefore 
this is an area that should be targeted for further research. This knowledge will enable tax 
authorities to review how their processes are affecting taxpayers‟ attitudes towards the tax 
authority, and ultimately on subsequent compliance behaviour. The findings are therefore 
relevant, and make a valuable contribution to the literature on penalties, although further 
research is still needed.  
While this is one of a number of studies examining people‟s perceptions of the seriousness 
of tax noncompliance, this is one of the few to measure the perceived seriousness of 
committing a tax offence using two different approaches, and then comparing the outcomes of 
these two approaches. This highlights the need for not only a common definition for tax 
compliance and other commonly used determinants of tax compliance, but also the need for a 
standardised method of measuring behaviours and attitudes. 
This is also one of the few studies that included and examined the effects of three different 
types of norms: personal norms; social norms; and societal norms. To the best of the author‟s 
knowledge, this study is the first to test the effects of three different types of norms identified 
in literature (for example, Kirchler, 2007) in one causal model. The results provide empirical 
evidence of the importance of all three norms in tax compliance behaviour, and make a useful 
contribution to existing literature, especially in TPB literature, which had so far only focused 
                                                     
169 Trivedi et al. (2005) have called for a replication of their study using path analysis (or SEM).  
170 An Australian study found that penalties were generally viewed as being ineffective in influencing tax 
compliance behaviour; however, the study also found that penalties could still be effective on some types of 
taxpayers, that is, taxpayers who operate within the tax laws (Devos, 2009).  
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on social norms (that is, subjective norms). This study proves that personal and societal norms 
are just as important as social norms in predicting compliance behaviour.    
By applying SEM with PLS, this study illustrates how PLS path modelling can be used 
successfully in complex behavioural models with multiple constructs, and also demonstrates 
the method‟s capability in handling small samples and non-random data distribution. This 
study was able to explain the relationship between the various constructs and behavioural 
intentions and behaviour. The PLS path model is also capable of providing information at the 
indicator level to show which individual measures contributed more towards a particular 
construct, and which is not easily available in other forms of analysis (for example, multiple 
regression analysis). The use of this new methodological approach, which has proven to be a 
powerful and reliable tool, is an important contribution to tax compliance literature. The tax 
compliance literature is plagued by low response rates and non-normal data distribution, 
which would otherwise invalidate the use of parametric technique. Further, the current robust 
validation process, together with selecting 1,000 resamples for the bootstrapping technique 
(instead of the recommended 200 to 500 resamples), will enhance the level of confidence in 
the findings, which according to McKerchar (2010), is itself an important contribution. Tax 
compliance behaviour is a complex behavioural issue, and to better understand it requires a 
variety of approaches, methodologies, and data sources. The methodology used, which 
increased the level of confidence in the findings, is itself an important contribution.  
Most previous studies of tax compliance tend to use either taxpayer or tax agent samples. 
This study appears to be one of the very few studies to use both groups of stakeholders of a 
tax system: taxpayers, and tax agents. The results provide some unique insights into the 
similarities and differences of selected determinants of tax compliance behaviour on each of 
the distinct groups. Prior studies have compared the effects of different variables on the 
compliance behaviour of taxpayers and tax agents, but none (to the best of the author‟s 
knowledge) have examined the elements within a TPB framework.
171
 As such the findings of 
this study can make a valuable contribution to the literature of tax agents and taxpayers.   
 This study identified a number of weaknesses which allows researchers to identify areas 
for future research. In addition, there are a number of areas in which the current study can be 
extended in future research. McKerchar (2010) notes that leaving a trail for other researchers 
to undertake further research is itself an important contribution to the body of knowledge.     
                                                     
171 Schisler (1995) compared the effects of equity perceptions, aggressiveness, and degrees of consensus with the 
tax authority.  
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Finally, there is a dearth of empirical compliance literature originating from New Zealand, 
and most New Zealand researchers have to rely on research conducted in other tax 
jurisdictions. This study is one of the relatively few pieces of empirical research undertaken 
on tax compliance behaviour in New Zealand, independent of the IRD, and therefore would 
make a positive contribution towards increasing the current level of knowledge. The results 
will provide a better understanding of the complex nature of tax compliance behaviour of the 
New Zealand taxpayers and tax agents, enabling the New Zealand tax authority to better 
target their interventions.   
As noted by McKerchar (2003b), when searching for a „long-term cure‟, you need to 
understand and address the illness rather than treat the symptoms. That is, first we need to 
understand noncompliance behaviour, and what motivates taxpayers to not comply with their 
tax obligations, before we can address the noncompliance problem. This research therefore 
contributes towards understanding some aspects of tax compliance behaviour, especially of 
New Zealand taxpayers. This is especially important for New Zealand where, as noted, there 
is comparatively little empirical evidence on which to base policy designs. Studies from other 
countries are based on their own legislative environment and their administrative practices 
and culture. As such, it may not be practical to adopt the findings of research from other tax 
jurisdictions without adapting it to the New Zealand tax environment.  
8.5 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Tax authorities are continuously searching for strategies to increase the level of tax 
compliance, which would generate increased revenues. Increasing revenue without burdening 
the taxpayers with increased spending on enforcement activities is critical for most 
economies, especially in times of large fiscal deficits that are currently facing New Zealand 
and most developed countries. Designing tax policies that produce a greater outcome for the 
dollars spent requires understanding the compliance behaviour of taxpayers. This includes 
testing the effectiveness of traditional compliance models grounded in economic theory, and 
based on legal or formal sanctions (such as audits and penalties), and other forms of responses 
(largely based on beliefs, attitudes, and norms) to combat tax noncompliance. The results of 
this study identified several determinants of tax compliance behaviour, which may have 
implications for tax authorities, especially for the New Zealand tax authority, and policy 
makers.   
The traditional approach of raising taxes and increasing enforcement strategies are only 
two of the policy instruments that are frequently used by tax authorities to increase tax 
revenue (Kirchler, 2007). Although enforcement activities can be easily managed and 
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controlled by the tax authorities, this approach to increasing compliance levels can be costly 
and promotes negative attitudes towards tax authorities. Further, a large body of literature 
provides only limited support on the effectiveness of these policy tools in increasing 
compliance. Consistent with these findings, the results from the current study indicate that the 
effects of formal sanctions on behavioural intentions (and ultimately behaviour) were 
inconclusive. Therefore, it is not clear whether increasing audit rates, or penalties (which will 
increase the probability of detection), and the certainty and severity of penalties will increase 
the level of compliance behaviour of New Zealand taxpayers. In fact, Frey (1992) contends 
that tight monitoring and heavy punishment on noncompliant taxpayers can crowd out tax 
morale, ultimately resulting in greater noncompliance. 
In contrast, the results of this study provide support to the large body of emerging 
literature that provides evidence that informal sanctions (in some cases collectively referred to 
as tax morale or personal norms) are more effective than legal or formal sanctions in 
improving tax compliance levels. This suggests that taxpayers with strong positive personal 
norms are more compliant than those with lower or negative personal norms. Personal norms 
or tax morale such as, moral values, feelings of guilt, and a sense of civic duty can be 
powerful forms of self-sanctioning (Grasmick & Scott, 1982; and Hasseldine et al., 1994), 
and if such attitudes influence compliance, then enhancing these is a desirable policy 
instrument to add to the traditional enforcement strategy of the tax authority (which includes 
penalties and audits).    
The implication for the tax authority is therefore to focus less on legal based enforcement, 
or formal sanctions (for example, audits and penalties), and to focus more on increasing 
taxpayers‟ personal norms (that is, taxpayers‟ values and motivation to comply). One 
approach is to incorporate personal norms or informal sanctions together with formal 
sanctions in the tax authority‟s enforcement strategies. This argument is supported by 
Kirchler (2007) and Kornhauser (2007), who contend that personal norms are a stronger 
motivator than most enforcement tools.   
In terms of social norms and societal norms, it has been acknowledged in various studies 
that the majority of taxpayers comply even when enforcement activities are low because of 
the influence of social and societal norms (Frey & Torgler, 2007; and Kirchler, 2007). The 
outcome of this study demonstrates that social norms (measured by subjective norms), and 
societal norms (measured by perceived prevalence of tax compliance or noncompliance by 
others) were observed to significantly influence both sample groups‟ intentions to comply 
with their tax obligations. Therefore, if an individual perceives that their important referents 
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generally do not themselves comply (subjective norms), or if the general taxpayers at large do 
not comply (that is, society‟s norm is perceived to be skewed towards noncompliance), then it 
is more likely that the individual‟s level of compliance may decrease. 
The implication for the tax authority is therefore to promote the positive aspects of tax 
compliance, and to communicate to the taxpayers at large that complying fully with the tax 
laws is the norm in society. If taxpayers believe that the majority are complying it is more 
likely that they will comply too. On the other hand, if taxpayers believe that the majority of 
taxpayers are not complying with their tax obligations, compliant taxpayers will eventually 
rationalise any intentions they may have to not comply fully with their tax obligations. 
Negative communications highlighting the number of taxpayers who cheat with their taxes 
might decrease compliance among those who were previously compliant. This view is 
supported by Kornhauser (2007) who found that positive perceptions of society‟s compliance 
behaviour will promote voluntary compliance. However, not only should the tax authority 
promote the perception that voluntary compliance with the tax law is the norm, they must also 
manage information about noncompliant taxpayers, in order not to give the general public the 
impression that tax noncompliance is commonly occurring. Efforts were made by some 
American states to publish the names of tax offenders (that is, for shaming purposes). 
However, some researchers warn that such enforcement actions might have other unintended 
effects, one of which is signalling to other taxpayers that the norm (that tax compliance is 
prevalent in society) is not adopted by the majority (Kahan, 2006). New Zealand previously 
had a form of shame penalty for certain tax shortfalls and offences, where the names of 
offenders were published, but it was repealed in June 2005. Similarly, in Australia the names 
of tax evaders are no longer published in the Australian Tax Office‟s Annual Report. 
Arguably, whilst publicising the names of tax offenders may deter some (for example, those 
who value their reputation) from not complying, the unintended effect may result in more 
taxpayers not complying.  
Caragata (1998, p. 60) also cautioned that “the longer higher levels of tax evasion persists, 
the greater is the threat to public confidence in the tax system and the higher is the risk that 
tax evasion will become more widespread.” It is important to acknowledge publicly that the 
large majority of taxpayers comply, and to inform taxpayers as such. This must be balanced 
with managed communication about the successes of the tax authority in prosecuting 
noncompliant taxpayers. Honest taxpayers would also like to know that the tax authority 
carries a „big stick‟ to deal with citizens who do not comply (OECD, 2004). This will build 
confidence and belief in the legitimacy of the tax system, because there is evidence to suggest 
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that those who are compliant want those who are not compliant to be punished (OECD, 
2004).  
 The responses from respondents who have been penalised under the CPR indicate that the 
penalty will deter them from future noncompliance. However, while the tax authority appears 
to have achieved its objective of deterring noncompliance, the experiences of the respondents 
from both sample groups have been negative. Most of the respondents considered the 
penalties to be harsh, unfair and excessive, although the tax authority would have established 
the level of culpability (as required under the CPR legislation) before imposing appropriate 
levels of penalties. This suggests that perhaps respondents‟ attitudes towards the penalties 
may have been influenced by their perception of the non-seriousness of tax offences. They 
may have compared their fines for tax noncompliance with the lesser fines imposed for other 
civil offences, which they may have considered to be comparatively more serious than the tax 
offence.   
Also of concern for the tax authority is that respondents did not feel that the tax authority 
considered their views in determining the outcome of the dispute. A good disputes process is 
one that is considered to be procedurally fair. PJT posits that if taxpayers believe that their 
views were considered in the disputes process, and the procedures were applied fairly, they 
would be more willing to accept the outcome or decision by the tax authority even if the 
outcome was unfavourable to them (Tyler, 2010). Perhaps that would be another factor to 
consider which may have resulted in the tax offenders not accepting the penalties imposed.  
In order to achieve the desired behaviour from taxpayers, the tax authority as regulator 
may have to move towards strategies that aim to emphasise the procedural fairness aspects of 
their actions (Murphy, 2003). Prior studies have highlighted the ineffectiveness of the use of 
threats and legal coercion as regulatory tools to encourage compliance (for example, Murphy 
2004a; 2004b). These studies demonstrate the need for other approaches to be considered 
when managing noncompliance such as procedural fairness. Therefore, if the tax authority is 
perceived to be acting fairly, taxpayers will trust the motives of the tax authority and will 
react to their decisions voluntarily. Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) caution that regulators (tax 
authorities) have to „walk softly‟ while carrying a „big stick‟. This suggests that whilst threats 
and legal coercion has its place in deterring noncompliance, tax authorities should also apply 
other persuasive approaches, such as tax morale and incorporate procedural justice elements 
into their legal procedures and processes.    
The results from examining respondents‟ perceptions of the severity of committing a tax 
offence, compared to other similar civil offences, suggest that both taxpayer and tax agent 
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samples generally view tax noncompliance as less serious than a number of similar civil 
offences. This outcome is consistent with a number of previous New Zealand studies, which 
demonstrated that the New Zealand public does not rate tax noncompliance as a 
comparatively serious offence (for example, McIntosh & Veal, 2001; and Gupta, 2006; 2007). 
This can have serious implications for the tax authority. If taxpayers perceive tax offences as 
less serious than, for example, a speeding fine that may attract a $40 fine; a fine of even a 
hundred dollars for minor tax noncompliance may be seen as unfair and harsh by 
taxpayers.
172
 Further, taxpayers who view tax offences as not being serious may not be 
willing to put in the necessary effort to ensure that their tax reporting complies with the tax 
laws.  
Therefore, the tax authority may have to create an awareness of the harm that tax 
noncompliance causes society as a whole. A community campaign, such as the one adopted to 
highlight the dangers of speeding and driving while intoxicated, could improve the perception 
of the seriousness of committing a tax offence. The public should be educated that tax 
noncompliance is not a victimless crime.
173
 The victims should be clearly identified as those 
citizens needing medical care, social support and education. The tax authority should make 
the offences equally understood, and the harm that it not only does to the government‟s ability 
to manage the country‟s development and economy, but also the harm inflicted on other New 
Zealanders who would be forced to carry a heavier load (for example, increased taxes). 
Promotions and encouragement of the civic responsibility of complying and contributing 
towards New Zealand‟s development through education in schools, and through community 
media campaigns could improve the general public‟s perception of the seriousness of 
committing a tax crime. This should not only be targeted at individual‟s compliance 
behaviour, but also targeted at discouraging individuals from supporting taxpayers operating 
in the shadow economy (for example, cash jobs).   
8.6 LIMITATIONS 
A number of potential limitations of this study should be considered when interpreting the 
results, and any generalisation of the results to the New Zealand taxpaying population and the 
population of the NZICA. Some of the limitations have been identified in previous chapters, 
                                                     
172 Results from Chapter 6 suggest there may be issues of proportionality, that is, most respondents (tax offenders) 
felt that the penalties imposed for their noncompliance were harsh, unfair and excessive for the type of offence 
committed. In other words, based on the proportionality principle the penalties were perceived to exceed the 
gravity or seriousness of the offence (Devos, 2002). 
173 Crimes where there is a class of „victims‟ but the crime is not identified with specific individual victims. Tax, 
welfare and bank frauds would be considered in this category (Gupta, 2007).    
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and steps were taken in each case to reduce or mitigate their effects on the results of this 
research.   
One of the major criticisms of survey research is the potential for nonresponse bias, which 
is common in most surveys. The survey was distributed to 1,000 randomly selected taxpayers 
and tax agents, resulting in 21 percent and 19 percent response rates, respectively. 
Nonresponse bias is concerned with the possible responses of recipients who did not complete 
and return the survey instrument, which can only be estimated. The limitations inherent in 
nonresponses were discussed in Chapter 5. It was expected that due to the sensitive and 
personal nature of the questionnaire, people would be deterred from participating in this 
survey. This is especially apparent in the web-based survey, where concerns were raised by 
prospective respondents as to whether the author would be able to link the responses back to 
their firms. All practical actions were taken to reduce nonresponse bias, including adopting 
Dillman‟s (2000) guidelines, and comparing the responses of early respondents with late 
respondents, to ensure that nonresponse bias is not a problem. 
Another limitation identified is the relatively small sample size for each sample group.  An 
observed population sample of 180 respondents for the taxpayer group and 164 respondents 
for the tax agent group were obtained for the study. However, the methodological approach 
applied (SEM using PLS-Graph) for analysing the survey data for this study is suitable for 
smaller samples. Based on the PLS-Graph‟s prescription, the required sample size for the 
current research models is a minimum of 130 cases (Chin, 1998). Therefore, the sample size 
of 180 for the taxpayer sample and 164 for the tax agent sample were considered more than 
adequate for this study.  
Data for this study was collected using survey instruments based on self-reports. The 
limitations associated with self-reports were discussed in Chapter 5. These include: self-
presentation concerns; socially desirable responses; honesty in responses; poor memory; and 
responses not reflecting actual behaviour. While most of these are widely accepted limitations 
inherent in self-reports, attempts were made to minimise the effects of this bias, which were 
also discussed in Chapter 5. In brief, this includes adhering strictly to Dillman‟s (2000) 
tailored design approach during the questionnaire development process and providing 
complete anonymity and confidentiality to potential respondents.  Further, the nonresponse 
analysis carried out on the data revealed that there were no problems with response bias in 
either of the sample groups.  
Self-reported past compliance behaviour was used as a proxy for actual compliance 
behaviour. Also, all the study variables are self-reported measures. Efforts were made to 
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secure actual taxpayer compliance data from the New Zealand tax authority. A process was 
developed which would safeguard taxpayers‟ confidentiality and anonymity. Further, the 
author was also prepared to cover any costs associated with extracting the data and mailing 
out the questionnaire to randomly selected taxpayers. However, the request was denied and 
the author was forced to choose the next best alternative method, which is based on self-
reports. Obtaining „hard‟ empirical data on tax compliance has been a constant challenge for 
researchers (Kirchler, 2007, p.183), leading most to resort to creating their own data. Whilst 
care was taken to minimise the effects of self-reports, it may still be possible that respondents 
did not provide truthful answers, or that their responses may not reflect their actual behaviour 
(that is, past behaviour). Tax compliant (or noncompliant) behaviour, attitudes, and beliefs are 
unobservable, and therefore, despite its weakness, self-reports are the most practical method 
for measuring these variables.
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The current survey represents a cross-sectional study which essentially only provides a 
snapshot of respondents‟ views on compliance behaviour at the time of the survey. 
Longitudinal studies are more appropriate for examining tax compliance views over a period 
of time. In defence, the TPB maintains that beliefs and attitudes tend to remain stable over a 
period of time (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen, 1991), and as such, the beliefs and attitudes 
expressed by the respondents may be relevant for a longer period in time.   
As with any statistical tools currently available, PLS modelling is also known to have its 
bias in obtaining parameter estimates. SEM with PLS is known to underestimate the path 
coefficient between latent constructs in the structural models, while over-estimating the 
relationships between the indicators and their latent constructs. However, the estimates will 
be asymptotically correct with a large sample size and a large number of indicators per latent 
variable (Lohmoller, 1989; and Chin, 1998). In terms of the current research model, the 
sample is comparatively large (in terms of the methodology applied), and all constructs are 
measured by multiple indicators.
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A large volume of literature is available on tax compliance; however, due to this volume, 
the time limit for completing this thesis, and the limited resources available for this study, it 
was not practicable or possible to locate and review every relevant article available. As a 
                                                     
174 Tax paying behaviour (or activity) is unobservable, but can be determined by compliance records held by the 
tax authority, which can, however, only indicate noncompliance that was detected. Also, similar studies have used 
self-reports (Bobek & Hatfield, 2003; Trivedi et al., 2005; and Saad, 2009; 2011). 
175 Large numbers of indicators were developed for each construct; however, during the validation of the 
measurement model, a number of indicators were removed. Nonetheless, most constructs have an average of three 
measures after the validation process.  
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result, the search for materials was limited to published articles available in the English 
language. This may result in some important research being omitted and the effect of this on 
the outcome of the current research is unknown.   
A final weakness of this study is the timing difference in the distribution of the two survey 
instruments which were delivered in different tax years. Whilst it was intended that these 
survey instruments were distributed at around the same time, this was not possible for a 
number of reasons, including the resignation of the computer analyst who assisted with the 
development of the web-based survey at a crucial time and the author undertaking this thesis 
part-time. Testing the accessibility of the survey instruments on various personal computers in 
different locations in New Zealand also took longer than expected. The impact of this is 
unknown, and therefore any comparisons made between the two groups should be interpreted 
with caution. Further, there is a gap between the time the survey data was collected (that is, in 
2006 and 2007), and the time the results of the survey will be disseminated (the submission 
date of the current thesis). However, this is unavoidable due to the author completing the 
research as a part-time student with full time work commitments and a family.  
In summary, all practical attempts to minimise some of the limitations listed above were 
carried out, which should improve the generalisability of the statistical findings. Further, most 
of the limitations acknowledged above are unavoidable, and are inherent in most similar types 
of research. Nonetheless, the limitations do not diminish the relevance of the findings or the 
contributions made by the current research, as long as care is taken in applying the results to 
other situations. 
8.7 IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Despite the large body of research currently available on tax compliance behaviour, no 
single study has been capable of producing the unambiguous knowledge that tax authorities 
would find useful on a practical level. Therefore, there is a continuous need to contribute 
towards the body of knowledge in smaller steps, with the new focus on a combination of 
economic and noneconomic factors. The research models employed in the current study have 
attempted to explain tax compliance behaviour of taxpayers and tax agents and in the process 
have provided several possibilities for future research. 
The result of this study illustrates that the TPB, which is based on attitudes and behaviour, 
offers a useful framework for exploring tax compliance issues. Further, results of a number of 
meta-analytic reviews, although not based on tax compliance behaviour, clearly indicate that 
TPB has been used successfully in a large number of studies in the behavioural domain to 
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predict behaviour (for example, Armitage & Conner, 2001). Bobek & Hatfield (2003), 
Trivedi et al. (2005), and Saad (2009; 2011) all found the TPB to be capable of explaining tax 
compliance (or noncompliance) behaviour. Despite this, surprisingly few attempts were made 
to use TPB as the underlying framework for predicting tax compliance behaviour. Therefore, 
more research applying the TPB is needed in tax compliance research to explore factors that 
are likely to strongly influence intentions to comply (or not comply) and compliance (or 
noncompliance) behaviour.   
This study compared the responses of two separate groups of taxpayers (taxpayers and tax 
agents), and provided evidence that factors that influence tax compliance behaviour are not 
generic to all taxpayers. The results clearly suggest that different sub-groups of taxpayers are 
motivated by different factors, and therefore there is scope to extend this study to include the 
effects of various determinants of tax compliance to other sub-groups of taxpayers (for 
example, business taxpayers or those subgroups who are more prone to take risks or have the 
opportunity to avoid tax). This may provide the tax authority with the tools to tailor its 
services according to the type of taxpayers involved, and not simply based on the attributes of 
the generic taxpayer.  
Replication of previous studies also makes a useful contribution to the literature. Hessing 
et al. (1988, p.534) maintain that “the most convincing evidence that a variable plays a key 
role in affecting taxpayer decisions to evade taxes is replication of findings across 
methodologies; otherwise we cannot be sure if the findings reflect the state of nature, or 
simply an artefact of the research method used.” Therefore future replication of this study 
using other methodological approaches could well make a valid contribution to the tax 
compliance literature (McKerchar, 2010). 
Mediating effects can easily be included in a PLS Path Model. The TPB asserts that socio-
demographic variables are not capable of influencing behavioural intentions or behaviour 
directly. Rather, these variables mediate their effects through one of the key constructs of the 
TPB Model. There are opportunities to test this theory, and socio-demographic variables 
could be included in future research models as mediating variables. Variables that have 
moderating effects could also be added to extend the current research. 
This study illustrates the importance of non-legal or informal sanctions on behavioural 
intentions and ultimately behaviour. However, there is a dearth of literature (until recently) 
relating to the study of the deterrent effects of informal sanctions, as most deterrence research 
has focused on the effects of legal or formal sanctions on tax compliance behaviour. The 
number of recent studies using noneconomic or informal sanctions has been increasing over 
229 
 
recent years. Recent studies refer to these noneconomic variables and informal sanctions 
collectively as tax morale (Kirchler, 2007; Kornhauser, 2007; Torgler, 2007; and Traxler, 
2010). A more common definition of tax morale is “the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes” 
(Frey, 1997; Feld & Frey, 2007; and Torgler; 2007). Currently, the literature seems 
ambiguous in respect to the definition given to tax morale. Therefore, there is a clear need for 
future studies to attempt to define and standardise this terminology, which is increasingly 
seen to be an important factor in compliance behaviour.    
Another important and interesting area for future research is an in-depth study on the 
compliance behaviour of taxpayers who have been penalised for noncompliant behaviour. 
The results of this study show that the majority of respondents subjected to the CPR have a 
negative impression regarding their experience with the process. However, despite this 
outcome, most respondents indicated that being penalised have deterred them from future 
noncompliance.
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 Nonetheless, this area of research could provide the tax authority with a 
better understanding of how to manage the penalties process, in order to reduce some of the 
negative attitudes surrounding the process. Over time, these negative attitudes could 
negatively influence the level of tax compliance (Tyler, 2010).  
There is overwhelming evidence from the current study, and from prior studies, indicating 
that tax noncompliance is perceived by most New Zealanders as not a serious offence, 
compared to other similar civil offences (McIntosh & Veal, 2001; Birch et al., 2003; and 
Gupta, 2006; 2007).  Therefore, another rewarding area of research could focus on how or 
why taxpayers develop this view. It would also be useful to determine whether there is any 
relationship between perceived seriousness of tax noncompliance and societal norms; 
considering that a relatively recent study by McIntosh and Veal (2001) reported that 79 
percent of respondents believe that New Zealand, as a society, is increasingly accepting 
noncompliant behaviour from others.  
Another area that may have implications for future research is to use actual compliance 
data to measure behaviour. Tax paying behaviour is not observable and self-reported 
behaviour or responses to hypothetical scenarios may not reflect actual behaviour. Therefore, 
to increase the validity of the results, future research should attempt to use actual compliance 
data held by the tax authorities, which would reflect the actual behaviours of taxpayers. Tax 
authorities should actively support and promote independent research on tax compliance 
behaviour. The outcome of such research could only increase their understanding of 
taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour.  
                                                     
176 A recent study carried out by Devos (2009) supports this finding. 
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A methodological contribution from this study is the introduction of the PLS methodology 
in the field of tax compliance behaviour. The SEM approach, with PLS, is a powerful 
statistical technique, and has been widely used in a variety of fields, from adoption of 
technology to marketing. Arguably, the PLS method has expanded the scope of SEM 
analysis, signalling a future change of focus in empirical research. Further conceptual 
development and empirical validation of this approach should therefore play an important role 
in future research (Gotz et al., 2010). However, only a few studies in the field of tax 
compliance behaviour have applied this approach. This may be because the SEM with PLS 
technique is still in its infancy, and more use in future will give the PLS methodology greater 
legitimacy, and will provide future researchers with more confidence in using this new and 
powerful technique.  
In conclusion, further research is still needed to confirm the findings of this study and to 
determine a practical approach to include them in policy tools. With this in mind, this section 
has identified opportunities for future research, which could increase our understanding of 
taxpayers‟ behaviour. Despite the large body of literature, understanding tax compliance 
behaviour remains a challenge. As noted by McKerchar (2003a, p. 214):  
“There is no doubt that understanding taxpayer compliance remains a challenging 
problem for tax authorities and researchers alike. It is felt that by approaching the 
problem strategically, analysing its components and how they interact, tax authorities 
and researchers will be better placed to understand taxpayer behaviour, and in turn, to 
identify and develop the specific measures needed to efficiently and effectively 
improve compliance.”  
8.8 CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Taxpayer compliance behaviour remains a universal challenge for tax authorities, 
policymakers and researchers despite the large body of literature. However, as noted by 
McKerchar (2003a), only by addressing different aspects of the compliance problem and 
applying different methodologies can any progress be made in understanding the complexity 
of tax compliance behaviour. In response, the current study has applied theories and 
methodological approaches that have been successfully used in behavioural research, but not 
widely applied in tax compliance research. Consequently, it is the author‟s belief that the 
current study has made a worthwhile contribution by offering additional insights into the 
determinants of behavioural intentions and tax compliance behaviour.  
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Appendix 2: The Proposed Model’s Construct Definition 
and Measures 
Constructs Item 
Item 
Code 
Attitudes 1 and 2 refer to attitude towards tax compliance behaviour as measured by the deterrent effects of 
formal and informal sanctions. 
Attitude 1 
(ATT1) 
(Informal 
Sanctions) 
Guilt Feeling 
a) V9 - I would not feel guilty if I underreport my income in my next tax 
return. AGREE/DISAGREE. ® 
b) V10 - For me to feel guilty for underreporting my income is GOOD/BAD. ® 
 Moral Obligation  
a) V13 - I believe I have a moral obligation to report all my income in my next 
tax return. AGREE/DISAGREE. 
b) V14 - Ensuring that I comply with my moral obligations is IMPORTANT/ 
UNIMPORTANT.  
Civic Duty 
a) V6 - Underreporting my income in my next tax return would be 
BENEFICIAL/HARMFUL to our society as a whole. ® 
b) V7 - For me to feel than I have made a positive contribution to society 
through my taxes is GOOD/BAD. 
 
 
GUILT 
 
 
 
MORAL 
 
 
 
CIVIC 
 
 
Attitude 2 
(ATT2) 
(Formal 
Sanctions) 
 
 
Certainty of Punishment 
(a) V8 - If I underreport my income in my next tax return, I expect the IRD 
will impose penalties on the shortfall. LIKELY/UNLIKELY. 
(b) V5 - For me to be penalised financially for underreporting my income is 
GOOD/BAD. ® 
Severity of Punishment 
(a) V4 - If I underreport my income in my next tax return, I expect the IRD 
will detect the unreported income and impose monetary penalties. 
LIKELY/UNLIKELY.   
(b) V16 - If I underreport my income in my next tax return, I expect the 
penalties imposed by the IRD will be  SEVERE/LENIENT. 
Certainty of Detection 
(a) V19 - If I underreport my income in my next tax return, I expect my returns 
will be audited by the IRD. LIKELY/UNLIKELY. 
(b) V15 - If I underreport my income in my next tax return, I expect the IRD 
will detect it through an audit. LIKELY/UNLIKELY. 
 
COPun 
 
 
SOPun 
 
 
 
CODet 
Subjective Norms refer to how respondents believe important referents would want them to behave, and how 
important it is for them to comply with these beliefs. 
Subjective 
Norms  
(SNORM) 
Expectation of Referents 
a) V23 - Most people who are important to me think that I should report all my 
income in my next tax return. AGREE/DISAGREE. 
b) V24 -In general, I want to do what most people who are important to me 
think I should do. AGREE/DISAGREE. 
Behaviour of Referents 
a) V25- Most people who are important to me would not include all their 
income in their next tax return. AGREE/DISAGREE. ® 
b) V26 - Generally, I would do what I believe most people who are important 
to me would do if they were in a similar situation. AGREE/DISAGREE. 
Response from Referents 
a) V27 - Most people who are important to me would not respect me if I 
underreport my income in my next tax return. AGREE/DISAGREE. 
b) V28 - I would be deterred from underreporting my income if I believe that I 
will lose the respect of most people who are important to me.  
AGREE/DISAGRE.  
 
SNORM1 
 
 
 
SNORM2 
 
 
 
SNORM3 
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Perceived Behavioural Control refers to barriers or factors that may allow/facilitate or prevent respondents from 
undertaking the behaviour of interest. 
Perceived 
Behavioural 
Control  
(PBC) 
 
 
PBC1 –(Opportunity) 
a) V22 - If I have the opportunity I intend to underreport my income in my 
next income tax return. AGREE/DISAGREE. ® 
b) V12 - How often would you encounter opportunities to underreport your 
income in your tax return. FREQUENT/INFREQUENT. ® 
PBC2 –(3rdParty Reporting) 
a) V17 - If all my income is subject to reporting by others (employers, banks, 
etc) it would be difficult for me to underreport my income in my next tax 
return. AGREE/DISAGREE. 
b) V18 - How often do you receive income that is not subject to reporting by 
others.  FREQUENT/INFREQUENT. ® 
PBC3 (Financial Distress) 
a) V20 - If I encounter any financial pressure, it would be easy for me to justify 
underreporting my income in my next tax return. AGREE/DISAGREE. ® 
b) V21 - How often would you encounter financial pressures that require you 
to underreport your income? FREQUENT/INFREQUENT. ® 
 
PBC1 
 
 
 
PBC2 
 
 
 
 
PBC3 
Behaviour refers to respondents‟ past behaviour in terms of the frequency of non-compliant behaviour and the 
level of non-compliance (measured by the amount of income suppressed). 
 Behaviour  
(BEHV) 
V2 - How much of your income did you report in your last tax return, or the 
latest return you filed? ALL/NONE. 
V3 - How often have you underreported your income in the past 8 years? 
INFREQUENT/FREQUENT. 
BEH1 
 
BEH2 
Behavioural Intent refers to the responses to a hypothetical scenario in terms of what the respondents would do if 
faced with a similar situation. 
Behavioural 
Intent 
(BI) 
V1 - If you were Joe, how likely would it be that you would include the $5,000 
in your next tax return. LIKELY/UNLIKELY. 
GV4 - I am willing to do the right thing and pay the correct amount of taxes. 
AGREE/DISAGREE. 
BI1 
 
BI2 
Procedural Injustice refers to the perceived unfairness of the procedures used in the application of the 
Compliance and Penalties Regime (CPR) (or vice versa, based on procedural justice theory).  
Procedural 
Justice of the 
CPR 
(CnP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TXAU1 - The IRD always explains clearly the decisions they make. 
TXAU2 - The IRD administers the tax law fairly across all taxpayers 
(individuals and small businesses and large corporations). 
PS3 - The penalties legislation provides sufficient clarity as to how the 
penalties system will be applied by IRD when there is a tax shortfall. 
PS4 - The penalties legislation provides a sufficient degree of certainty as to 
when and under what circumstances penalties will be imposed when there is a 
tax shortfall. 
PS12 - The IRD will consider your point of view in any dispute you have 
regarding your tax affairs and provide the opportunity to have an input in the 
outcome.  
PS16 - The IRD has the commercial expertise for making judgements on 
taxpayers‟ business systems and processes, and is able to use this expertise to 
ensure penalties are imposed fairly.   
PS1 - Penalties and punishments for not complying with the tax laws should be 
imposed in order to punish wrongdoing (for punishment). 
PS2 - Penalties and punishments should not be used to punish past wrong-
doing; rather it should be used to prevent future wrongdoings (for prevention).  
CnP1 
 
CnP2 
 
CnP3 
 
CnP4 
 
 
CnP5 
 
 
CnP6 
 
 
CnP7 
 
CnP8 
 
Effectiveness of the Compliance and Penalties Regime (CPR) measures respondents‟ perceptions of the 
effectiveness of the CPR in deterring tax noncompliance.  
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Effectiveness of 
the CPR 
(CnPeff) 
 
 
PS5 - The penalties system is very effective in increasing tax compliance. 
PS6 - Most taxpayers comply with their tax obligations because of the fear of 
being penalised under the current penalties system.  
OTH2 - Most people pay taxes to avoid being penalised.  
PS13 - Most people resent having to pay the penalties on any tax shortfall in 
addition to repaying the tax shortfall and the interest imposed on the shortfall. 
® 
CnPeff1 
CnPeff2 
 
CnPeff3 
CnPeff4 
Societal Norms refer to respondents‟ perceptions of the prevalence of compliance (or noncompliance) among the 
general population.  
Societal Norms 
(OTHERS) 
 
OTH1 - Most people will do cash-payment jobs if the opportunity arises. ® 
OTH11 - Most people generally want to comply with the tax laws. 
OTH3 - Most people would report businesses that do cash-payment jobs to the 
IRD. 
OTH4 - Most people would be happy to pay less for goods and services from 
businesses that do not pay taxes. ® 
OTH5 - Most people would rather pay more for goods and services from 
businesses that pay taxes. 
OTH1 
OTH2 
OTH3 
 
OTH4 
 
 
OTH5 
Tax Authority refers to respondents‟ general perception of the tax authority.  
Tax Authority 
(TXAU)  
 
PS7 - The IRD is not flexible when imposing penalties for non-compliance. ® 
PS10 - The IRD tends to impose penalties on individuals and small businesses 
more often than large businesses. ® 
TXAU3 - The IRD listens to powerful interest groups and not enough to 
ordinary New Zealanders.  
TXAU4 - The IRD does not provide us with sufficient information on the 
penalties regime. ® 
TXAU5 - The IRD tends to spend too much time on individuals and small 
businesses and lets large corporations get away with paying less tax. ® 
TXAU6 - The IRD tends to spend too much time and resources in detection 
and punishment instead of assisting and educating people to comply. ® 
TXAU7 - The IRD effectively promotes the positive aspects of paying taxes. 
GV3 - It is much easier to get information for completing my tax return from 
other sources than from the IRD. ® 
TXAU1 
TXAU2 
 
TXAU3 
 
TXAU4 
 
 
TXAU5 
 
TXAU6 
 
TXAU7 
TXAU8 
Tax System refers to respondents general perceptions of the tax system (in terms of fairness, cost of complying, 
and simplicity of the system). 
Tax System 
(TxSy) 
TxSy1 - Ensuring everyone pays their fair share of taxes is important for a fair 
system. 
TxSy2 - Keeping the cost of administering the tax system down is important in 
encouraging compliance with the tax laws. 
TxSy3 - A simpler and easier to understand tax system will encourage more 
compliance. 
TxSy4 - Complying with the tax laws is costly and time consuming. ®  
TXSY1 
 
TXSY2 
TXSY3 
 
TXSY4 
Fairness refers to the perceived fairness of the Compliance and Penalties Regime (CPR) and measures 
respondents‟ perceptions of the general fairness of the CPR.  
Fairness of the 
CPR  
(CnPfrn) 
PS8 - Penalties should be imposed based on the ability to pay or affordability 
PS9 - The penalty system does not differentiate between intentional 
noncompliance and unintentional noncompliance. ® 
PS15  - The IRD should not impose any penalties when taxpayers voluntarily 
disclose an unintentional mistake in their return. 
PS11  - Individuals and small businesses have more difficulty in paying the 
penalties imposed for noncompliance than large businesses. 
PS17  - The penalty system is quite harsh when you consider that most people 
try their best to pay the correct amount of taxes. ® 
FRN1 
FRN2 
 
FRN3 
FRN4 
 
FRN5 
Motivational Postures (or Social Distance) refer to the motivational postures taxpayers adopt, which depict the 
quality of the relationship between the tax authority and the taxpayers.  
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Motivational 
Postures (or 
Social 
Distance)(DST) 
 
Commitment 
GV10 - The tax system is very efficient in allocating our tax dollars. 
GV11 - I think it is my moral obligation to support the tax system. 
Capitulation 
GV5 - If you cooperate with the IRD they are likely to cooperate with you.  
GV8 - The IRD is helpful to those who have difficulty in meeting their tax 
obligations.  
Resistance 
GV12 - The IRD is more interested in catching and punishing you for not 
complying than in helping you to comply.  
GV13 - It is not possible to satisfy the IRD completely, they always find 
something wrong with your tax returns.  
Disengagement 
GV6 - I do not want to know or care about what the IRD expects of me.  
GV7- If the IRD gets tough with me; I will become uncooperative with them.  
 
DST10 
DST11 
 
DST5 
DST8 
 
 
DST12 
DST13 
 
 
DST6 
DST7 
Note: 
1. The four TPB constructs comprise composite measures (a x b). 
2. The alpha numeric numbers represent the subheadings and question numbers. For example, GV7 refers 
to question 7 under the subheading General Views (GV). Other subheadings include: The Tax System 
(TxSy); The Penalty System (PS); The Tax Authority (TXAU); Perception of Other Taxpayers 
(OTHERS). Questions relating to the TPB variables are numbered as v1 to v28. 
3. The last column displays the codes for the corresponding items or measures. The development of the 
questionnaire was discussed in Chapter 5. 
4. ® implies that the responses have been reversed. 
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Appendix 3: Survey Instrument 
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Appendix 4: Cover Letter to Participants 
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Appendix 5: 
SPSS Output for Paired Sample t-Test (Taxpayer Sample) 
 
  
Paired Samples Statistics 
  
  
    
Mean N 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
  
  
Pair 1 SVA1 3.6111 180 1.01050 .07532 
  
  
SVA3 3.1000 180 1.25560 .09359 
  
  
Pair 2 SVA2 4.0444 180 .98493 .07341 
  
  
SVA3 3.1000 180 1.25560 .09359 
  
  
Pair 3 SVA4 3.8700 180 1.04672 .07802 
  
  
SVA3 3.1000 180 1.25560 .09359 
  
  
Pair 4 SVA5 3.4327 180 1.20138 .08955 
  
  
SVA3 3.1000 180 1.25560 .09359 
  
  
Pair 5 SVA6 2.0333 180 1.08262 .08069 
  
  
SVA3 3.1000 180 1.25560 .09359 
  
  
Pair 6 SVA7 2.8889 180 1.50563 .11222 
  
  
SVA3 3.1000 180 1.25560 .09359 
  
     
 
 
    Paired Samples Test 
    Paired Differences 
t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
    
 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
    
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Mean Lower Upper 
Pair 1 SVA1 - 
SVA3 
.51111 1.14574 .08540 .34259 .67963 5.985 179 .000 
Pair 2 SVA2 - 
SVA3 
.94444 1.11226 .08290 .78085 1.10804 11.392 179 .000 
Pair 3 SVA4 - 
SVA3 
.77001 1.02601 .07647 .61910 .92092 10.069 179 .000 
Pair 4 SVA5 - 
SVA3 
.33271 1.28346 .09566 .14393 .52148 3.478 179 .001 
Pair 5 SVA6 - 
SVA3 
-1.06667 1.21720 .09072 -1.24569 -.88764 -11.757 179 .000 
Pair 6 SVA7 - 
SVA3 
-.21111 1.51340 .11280 -.43370 .01148 -1.872 179 .063 
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Appendix 6: 
SPSS Output for Paired Sample t-Test (Tax Agent Sample) 
 
Paired Samples Statistics 
  
    
Mean N 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
  
  
Pair 1 SVA1 3.5488 164 1.14208 .08918 
  
  
SVA3 2.1280 164 1.05176 .08213 
  
  
Pair 2 SVA2 2.8893 164 1.37202 .10714 
  
  
SVA3 2.1280 164 1.05176 .08213 
  
  
Pair 3 SVA4 3.4146 164 1.06766 .08337 
  
  
SVA3 2.1280 164 1.05176 .08213 
  
  
Pair 4 SVA5 4.0091 164 .95663 .07470 
  
  
SVA3 2.1280 164 1.05176 .08213 
  
  
Pair 5 SVA6 3.6159 164 1.00550 .07852 
  
  
SVA3 2.1280 164 1.05176 .08213 
  
  
Pair 6 SVA7 4.0610 164 .91809 .07169 
  
  
SVA3 2.1280 164 1.05176 .08213 
  
          
          Paired Samples Test 
    Paired Differences 
t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
    
 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
    
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Mean Lower Upper 
Pair 1 SVA1 - 
SVA3 
1.42073 1.15639 .09030 1.24243 1.59904 15.734 163 .000 
Pair 2 SVA2 - 
SVA3 
.76128 1.44349 .11272 .53870 .98385 6.754 163 .000 
Pair 3 SVA4 - 
SVA3 
1.28659 1.34650 .10514 1.07896 1.49421 12.236 163 .000 
Pair 4 SVA5 - 
SVA3 
1.88101 1.35852 .10608 1.67154 2.09049 17.732 163 .000 
Pair 5 SVA6 - 
SVA3 
1.48780 1.33149 .10397 1.28250 1.69311 14.310 163 .000 
Pair 6 SVA7 - 
SVA3 
1.93293 1.26361 .09867 1.73809 2.12777 19.590 163 .000 
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Appendix 7: PLS Bootstrap Output (Taxpayer Sample) 
  
Output results with Construct Level sign change preprocessing: 
Bootstrap raw data generated for Dr. Annette Mills 
Number of cases in full model: 180 
Number of cases per sample: 180 
Number of samples generated: 1000 
Number of good samples: 1000 
Outer Model Weights: 
==================================================================== 
                   Original    Mean of     Standard    T-Statistic 
                    sample      subsamples  error 
                    estimate 
BEHVp    : 
    BEH1            0.5195      0.5198      0.0240     21.6444 
BEH2            0.5376      0.5386      0.0234     23.0197 
BI      : 
    BI1             0.4691      0.4720      0.0482      9.7331 
    BI2             0.7475      0.7442      0.0478     15.6277 
ATT1    : 
CIVIC           0.4119      0.4091      0.0229     18.0133 
GUILT           0.4396      0.4406      0.0340     12.9186 
    MORAL           0.3784      0.3822      0.0415      9.1220 
ATT2    : 
    COPun           0.1064      0.1096      0.0928      1.1471 
    SOPun           0.5417      0.5351      0.0598      9.0561 
    CODet           0.5296      0.5273      0.0587      9.0295 
SNORM   : 
    SNORM1          0.5046      0.5033      0.0462     10.9150 
    SNORM2          0.4136      0.4153      0.0518      7.9806 
    SNORM3          0.3342      0.3285      0.0612      5.4606 
OTHERS  : 
    OTH1            0.4344      0.4318      0.0577      7.5251 
    OTH3            0.3065      0.3043      0.0666      4.6000 
    OTH4            0.3112      0.3050      0.0557      5.5871 
    OTH5            0.3324      0.3353      0.0515      6.4600 
PBC     : 
    PBC1            0.4782      0.4778      0.0288     16.6289 
    PBC2            0.2754      0.2777      0.0345      7.9887 
    PBC3            0.3852      0.3830      0.0298     12.9056 
TXSY    : 
    TXSY2           0.8399      0.7823      0.1867      4.4976 
    TXSY4           0.6238      0.6360      0.1971      3.1643 
TXAU    : 
    TXAU1           0.2268      0.2244      0.0578      3.9263 
    TXAU2           0.2927      0.2959      0.0563      5.2031 
    TXAU3           0.1986      0.1961      0.0677      2.9353 
    TXAU4           0.1947      0.1944      0.0669      2.9099 
    TXAU5           0.2165      0.2153      0.0381      5.6825 
    TXAU6           0.1468      0.1403      0.0603      2.4361 
CnP     : 
    CnP1            0.1600      0.1669      0.0597      2.6784 
    CnP2            0.3051      0.3031      0.0524      5.8227 
    CnP3            0.2908      0.2890      0.0396      7.3356 
    CnP4            0.3654      0.3614      0.0443      8.2417 
    CnP6            0.1966      0.1894      0.0557      3.5296 
CnPeff  : 
    CnPeff1         0.2308      0.1994      0.2601      0.8874 
    CnPeff2         0.6826      0.6543      0.1160      5.8843 
    CnPeff3         0.3608      0.3398      0.1983      1.8194 
DSTa    : 
    DST6            0.4493      0.4197      0.2279      1.9715 
    DST7            0.7337      0.7242      0.1868      3.9282 
DSTb    : 
    DST12           0.5509      0.5472      0.1386      3.9759 
    DST13           0.5495      0.5483      0.1412      3.8913 
DSTc    : 
    DST5            0.5511      0.5191      0.1725      3.1944 
    DST8            0.6037      0.6192      0.1362      4.4309 
DSTd    : 
    DST10           0.4621      0.4451      0.1391      3.3217 
    DST11           0.7762      0.7754      0.1075      7.2227 
==================================================================== 
Outer Model Loadings: 
==================================================================== 
                    Original    Mean of     Standard    T-Statistic 
                    sample      subsamples  error 
                    estimate 
BEHVp    : 
(Composite Reliability =      0.944 , AVE =      0.895 ) 
    BEH1            0.9440      0.9428      0.0167     56.6570 
    BEH2            0.9478      0.9468      0.0158     59.8835 
BI      : 
(Composite Reliability =      0.785 , AVE =      0.649 ) 
    BI1             0.7048      0.7043      0.0591     11.9241 
    BI2             0.8954      0.8932      0.0233     38.3810 
 
ATT1    : 
(Composite Reliability =      0.855 , AVE =      0.663 ) 
    CIVIC           0.8291      0.8261      0.0272     30.4539 
    GUILT           0.7888      0.7839      0.0389     20.2884 
    MORAL           0.8236      0.8256      0.0249     33.1012 
ATT2    : 
(Composite Reliability =      0.815 , AVE =      0.607 ) 
    COPun           0.5127      0.5009      0.1276      4.0174 
    SOPun           0.8828      0.8764      0.0309     28.5904 
    CODet           0.8822      0.8796      0.0289     30.4903 
SNORM   : 
(Composite Reliability =      0.830 , AVE =      0.622 ) 
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    SNORM1          0.8826      0.8832      0.0246     35.9507 
    SNORM2          0.8009      0.7984      0.0544     14.7355 
    SNORM3          0.6684      0.6632      0.0784      8.5222 
OTHERS  : 
(Composite Reliability =      0.806 , AVE =      0.512 ) 
    OTH1            0.8319      0.8296      0.0381     21.8460 
    OTH3            0.6452      0.6434      0.0881      7.3264 
    OTH4            0.6759      0.6698      0.0670     10.0942 
    OTH5            0.6937      0.6946      0.0578     12.0060 
PBC     : 
(Composite Reliability =      0.904 , AVE =      0.758 ) 
    PBC1            0.9296      0.9295      0.0098     95.1633 
    PBC2            0.8353      0.8351      0.0372     22.4771 
    PBC3            0.8446      0.8423      0.0287     29.4615 
TXSY    : 
(Composite Reliability =      0.620 , AVE =      0.457 ) 
    TXSY2           0.7836      0.7208      0.2083      3.7622 
    TXSY4           0.5480      0.5624      0.2127      2.5768 
TXAU    : 
(Composite Reliability =      0.904 , AVE =      0.612 ) 
    TXAU1           0.6712      0.6696      0.0610     11.0013 
    TXAU2           0.8574      0.8574      0.0267     32.1024 
    TXAU3           0.7830      0.7774      0.0534     14.6640 
    TXAU4           0.7192      0.7150      0.0706     10.1920 
    TXAU5           0.8584      0.8540      0.0295     29.0558 
    TXAU6           0.7858      0.7793      0.0499     15.7418 
CnP     : 
(Composite Reliability =      0.858 , AVE =      0.552 ) 
    CnP1            0.6556      0.6599      0.0799      8.2061 
    CnP2            0.7034      0.7033      0.0660     10.6525 
    CnP3            0.8261      0.8229      0.0384     21.5048 
    CnP4            0.8596      0.8596      0.0278     30.8868 
    CnP6            0.6417      0.6302      0.0728      8.8165 
CnPeff  : 
(Composite Reliability =      0.763 , AVE =      0.532 ) 
    CnPeff1         0.4997      0.4518      0.2731      1.8300 
    CnPeff2         0.9267      0.8839      0.0753     12.3144 
    CnPeff3         0.6986      0.6570      0.1819      3.8408 
DSTa    : 
(Composite Reliability =      0.813 , AVE =      0.687 ) 
    DST6            0.7385      0.7129      0.1637      4.5100 
    DST7            0.9108      0.8946      0.1024      8.8916 
DSTb    : 
(Composite Reliability =      0.905 , AVE =      0.826 ) 
    DST12           0.9091      0.8986      0.0600     15.1426 
    DST13           0.9086      0.9008      0.0554     16.3949 
DSTc    : 
(Composite Reliability =      0.857 , AVE =      0.749 ) 
    DST5            0.8522      0.8272      0.1199      7.1048 
    DST8            0.8786      0.8779      0.0710     12.3684 
DSTd    : 
(Composite Reliability =      0.760 , AVE =      0.619 ) 
    DST10           0.6611      0.6384      0.1387      4.7670 
    DST11           0.8947      0.8914      0.0634     14.1180 
==================================================================== 
Path Coefficients Table (Original Sample Estimate): 
==================================================================== 
        BEHVp  BI     ATT1   ATT2   SNORM  OTHERS  PBC   TXSY TXAU CnP   CnPeff  DSTa  DSTb   DSTc   DSTd         
BEHVp 0.0000 0.3410  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.3450 0.0380 -0.0460 0.1120  0.0150 -0.0710 -0.0670 -0.0100 
0.1800 
BI    0.0000 0.0000  0.3630 0.0710 0.12900.1310  0.1180 0.1510 -0.0070 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
ATT1  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.3760-0.0290  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
ATT2   0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.2240  0.0950  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
SNORM  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 
OTHERS 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
PBC    0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
TXSY   0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
TXAU   0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
CnP    0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 
CnPeff 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
DSTa   0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
DSTb   0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
DSTc   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
DSTd   0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
==================================================================== 
Path Coefficients Table (Mean of Subsamples): 
==================================================================== 
BEHp    BI    ATT1   ATT2 SNORM OTHERS  PBC    TXSY   TXAU  CnP   CnPeff  DSTa  DSTb   DSTc   DSTd         
BEHp   0.0000 0.3221 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.3456 0.0521 -0.0370 0.1054  0.0342 -0.0483 -0.0639-0.0112 
0.1720 
BI     0.0000 0.0000  0.3689 0.0779  0.1323 0.1236  0.1091 0.1420  0.0124 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
ATT1   0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.3823 -0.0054  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
ATT2   0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.2318  0.1074  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
SNORM  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
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OTHERS 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
PBC    0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
TXSY   0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
TXAU  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
CnP    0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
CnPeff 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 
DSTa   0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
DSTb   0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.00000.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
DSTc   0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
DSTd   0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
==================================================================== 
Path Coefficients Table (Standard Error): 
==================================================================== 
        BEHp    BI  ATT1  ATT2   SNORM  OTHERS  PBC  TXSY  TXAU   CnP CnPeff  DSTa    DSTb    DSTc  DSTd         
BEHp  0.0000 0.0850  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0687 0.0691  0.0813 0.0945  0.0650 0.0843  0.0902  0.0856 
0.0786 
BI     0.0000 0.0000 0.0840 0.0713  0.0750 0.0639  0.0816 0.0829  0.0620 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
ATT1   0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0701  0.0910  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
ATT2   0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0704  0.0811  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 
SNORM  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
OTHERS 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
PBC    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00000.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
TXSY   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00000.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00000.0000 
TXAU   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CnP    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CnPeff 0.0000 0.00000.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00000.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00000.0000 
DSTa   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DSTb   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DSTc   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00000.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DSTd   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
==================================================================== 
Path Coefficients Table (T-Statistic) 
==================================================================== 
        BEHp    BI    ATT1   ATT2  SNORM  OTHERS  PBC    TXSY   TXAU   CnP   CnPeff DSTa    DSTb   DSTc   DSTd         
BEHp   0.0000 4.0117 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 5.0193 0.5495 0.5657 1.1858 0.2306 0.8418 0.7427 0.1168 2.2903 
BI     0.0000 0.0000 4.3215 0.9963 1.7207 2.0499 1.4459 1.8223 0.1129 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ATT1   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 5.3611 0.3186 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ATT2   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 3.1827 1.1708 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
SNORM  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
OTHERS 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
PBC    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
TXSY   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
TXAU   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CnP    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CnPeff 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DSTa   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DSTb   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DSTc   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DSTd   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
==================================================================== 
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Appendix 8: PLS Bootstrap Output (Tax Agent Sample) 
 
 
 
Output results with Construct Level sign change preprocessing: 
Bootstrap raw data generated for Dr. Annette Mills 
Number of cases in full model: 164 
Number of cases per sample: 164 
Number of samples generated: 1000 
Number of good samples: 967 
The following samples were not included in the calculations due to error detection: 
  
130,137,157,161,218,219,232,260,308,345,353,373,422,474,532,548,555,572,597,608,651,711,779,787,810,823,827,852,853
,890,916,921,985 
Outer Model Weights: 
==================================================================== 
                    Original    Mean of     Standard    T-Statistic 
                    sample      subsamples  error 
                    estimate 
BEHca   : 
    BEH1            0.6105      0.5259      0.1907      3.2010 
    BEH2            0.5371      0.5915      0.1651      3.2523 
BI      : 
    B11             0.5048      0.5209      0.0541      9.3329 
    BI2             0.6731      0.6578      0.0511     13.1744 
ATT1    : 
    CIVIC           0.4099      0.4057      0.0476      8.6107 
    MORAL           0.6240      0.6197      0.0522     11.9618 
    GUILT           0.2891      0.2955      0.0711      4.0669 
ATT2    : 
    CODet           0.6104      0.5642      0.1738      3.5125 
    COPun           0.3388      0.3195      0.1833      1.8486 
    SOPun           0.3264      0.3474      0.1860      1.7548 
SNORM   : 
SNORM1          0.3892      0.3700      0.0991      3.9283 
    SNORM2          0.3411      0.3438      0.0721      4.7295 
    SNORM3          0.5168      0.5230      0.0867      5.9595 
PBC     : 
    PBC1            0.7846      0.7223      0.2174      3.6085 
    PBC2           -0.0460     -0.0219      0.2328      0.1976 
    PBC3            0.3796      0.3795      0.1475      2.5730 
OTHERS  : 
    OTH1            0.3393      0.3354      0.1407      2.4123 
    OTH3            0.1425      0.1133      0.1764      0.8077 
    OTH4            0.3094      0.2922      0.1310      2.3627 
    OTH5            0.5569      0.5537      0.1018      5.4727 
TXSY    : 
    TXSY2          -0.5021     -0.4872      0.3040      1.6514 
    TXSY4           0.7724      0.7093      0.2347      3.2904 
TXAU    : 
    TXAU1           0.1631      0.1598      0.1389      1.1740 
    TXAU2           0.2818      0.2566      0.1300      2.1676 
    TXAU3           0.5153      0.4996      0.1395      3.6939 
    TXAU4           0.2231      0.2154      0.1138      1.9601 
    TXAU5           0.1842      0.1652      0.1446      1.2740 
    TXAU6           0.0846      0.0830      0.1105      0.7659 
CnP     : 
    CnP1            0.2793      0.2810      0.1265      2.2084 
    CnP2            0.3380      0.3132      0.1235      2.7359 
    CnP3            0.3438      0.3069      0.1586      2.1680 
    CnP4            0.2302      0.2240      0.1277      1.8025 
    CnP6            0.1386      0.1497      0.1574      0.8803 
CnPeff  : 
    CnPeff1         0.1932      0.1787      0.2339      0.8260 
    CnPeff2         0.4309      0.4401      0.1020      4.2244 
    CnPeff3         0.5853      0.5448      0.1151      5.0850 
DSTa    : 
    DST6            0.7689      0.5346      0.4924      1.5615 
    DST7            0.3854      0.4472      0.4686      0.8225 
DSTb    : 
    DST12           0.9890      0.6376      0.5300      1.8660 
    DST13           0.0184      0.3126      0.5278      0.0349 
DSTc    : 
    DST5            0.5117      0.4197      0.3615      1.4155 
    DST8            0.6476      0.6548      0.3026      2.1402 
DSTd    : 
    DST10           0.3808      0.4085      0.2252      1.6912 
    DST11           0.8224      0.7490      0.2625      3.1327 
==================================================================== 
Outer Model Loadings: 
==================================================================== 
                    Original    Mean of     Standard    T-Statistic 
                    sample      subsamples  error 
                    estimate 
BEHca   : 
(Composite Reliability =      0.862 , AVE =      0.758 ) 
    BEH1            0.8880      0.8155      0.2377      3.7353 
    BEH2            0.8525      0.8777      0.1354      6.2967 
BI      : 
(Composite Reliability =      0.831 , AVE =      0.712 ) 
    B11             0.7942      0.8023      0.0453     17.5427 
    BI2             0.8901      0.8810      0.0312     28.4916 
ATT1    : 
(Composite Reliability =      0.762 , AVE =      0.527 ) 
    CIVIC           0.7227      0.7122      0.0599     12.0710 
    MORAL           0.8863      0.8827      0.0219     40.4205 
    GUILT           0.5216      0.5263      0.1070      4.8765 
ATT2    : 
(Composite Reliability =      0.801 , AVE =      0.580 ) 
    CODet           0.9037      0.8687      0.1148      7.8716 
277 
 
    COPun           0.5990      0.5787      0.1619      3.6989 
    SOPun           0.7518      0.7449      0.1361      5.5259 
SNORM   : 
(Composite Reliability =      0.839 , AVE =      0.635 ) 
    SNORM1          0.7694      0.7558      0.0731     10.5229 
    SNORM2          0.7774      0.7729      0.0653     11.9056 
    SNORM3          0.8424      0.8471      0.0435     19.3789 
PBC     : 
(Composite Reliability =      0.781 , AVE =      0.559 ) 
    PBC1            0.9495      0.9003      0.1520      6.2452 
    PBC2            0.4899      0.4585      0.2484      1.9720 
    PBC3            0.7310      0.7069      0.1673      4.3691 
OTHERS  : 
(Composite Reliability =      0.781 , AVE =      0.485 ) 
    OTH1            0.6267      0.6019      0.1450      4.3209 
    OTH3            0.4533      0.4220      0.1879      2.4125 
    OTH4            0.7566      0.7220      0.1142      6.6236 
    OTH5            0.8774      0.8539      0.0617     14.2293 
TXSY    : 
(Composite Reliability =      0.740 , AVE =      0.592 ) 
TXSY2          -0.6527     -0.6202      0.2843      2.2959 
    TXSY4           0.8703      0.8101      0.1787      4.8701 
TXAU    : 
(Composite Reliability =      0.814 , AVE =      0.427 ) 
    TXAU1           0.4787      0.4546      0.1684      2.8428 
    TXAU2           0.6738      0.6257      0.1709      3.9430 
    TXAU3           0.8117      0.7820      0.1013      8.0122 
    TXAU4           0.6037      0.5767      0.1338      4.5126 
    TXAU5           0.6885      0.6400      0.1722      3.9974 
TXAU6           0.6182      0.5798      0.1449      4.2651 
CnP     : 
(Composite Reliability =      0.861 , AVE =      0.555 ) 
    CnP1            0.7350      0.7171      0.1204      6.1071 
    CnP2            0.7699      0.7447      0.1202      6.4065 
    CnP3            0.7534      0.7091      0.1727      4.3622 
    CnP4            0.7997      0.7573      0.1478      5.4120 
    CnP6            0.6589      0.6466      0.1384      4.7618 
CnPeff  : 
(Composite Reliability =      0.824 , AVE =      0.617 ) 
    CnPeff1         0.5733      0.5410      0.2340      2.4496 
    CnPeff2         0.8499      0.8369      0.0820     10.3662 
    CnPeff3         0.8937      0.8626      0.0929      9.6180 
DSTa    : 
(Composite Reliability =      0.822 , AVE =      0.701 ) 
    DST6            0.9381      0.7359      0.3549      2.6432 
    DST7            0.7231      0.6859      0.3306      2.1873 
DSTb    : 
(Composite Reliability =      0.803 , AVE =      0.684 ) 
    DST12           0.9999      0.8235      0.2852      3.5054 
    DST13           0.6064      0.6952      0.2798      2.1676 
DSTc    : 
(Composite Reliability =      0.849 , AVE =      0.738 ) 
    DST5            0.8231      0.7301      0.2549      3.2296 
    DST8            0.8937      0.8575      0.1742      5.1297 
DSTd    : 
(Composite Reliability =      0.760 , AVE =      0.623 ) 
    DST10           0.6153      0.6260      0.1826      3.3700 
    DST11           0.9310      0.8653      0.2267      4.1063 
==================================================================== 
Path Coefficients Table (Original Sample Estimate): 
==================================================================== 
 BEHca  BI     ATT1  ATT2  SNORM  PBC  OTHERS   TXSY   TXAU   CnP   CnPeff   DSTa  DSTb DSTc DSTd         
BEHca  0.0000 0.2870 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1850 0.0000-0.0700 0.1330 0.1800 -0.0350 -0.0570 -0.1300 -0.1860 0.1130 
BI     0.0000 0.0000 0.5210-0.0380 0.1240 0.0480 0.1390 0.0220 0.1440 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
ATT1   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00000.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.2100-0.1620  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
ATT2   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000-0.0580  0.2560  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
SNORM  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
PBC    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
OTHERS 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
TXSY   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
TXAU   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
CnP    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
CnPeff0.0000 0.00000.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
DSTa   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00000.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
DSTb   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
DSTc   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
DSTd   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
==================================================================== 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Path Coefficients Table (Mean of Subsamples): 
==================================================================== 
 
   BEHca  BI     ATT1  ATT2  SNORM  PBC  OTHERS TXSY   TXAU   CnP   CnPeff   DSTa   DSTb  DSTc  DSTd         
BEHca  0.0000 0.2751 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1926 0.0000-0.0973 0.1226 0.1409 -0.0286 -0.0478-0.0748-0.1829 0.1063 
BI     0.0000 0.0000 0.5078-0.03480.1363 0.0449 0.1410 0.0275 0.1490 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
ATT1   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.2372 -0.1725 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
ATT2   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000-0.0503 0.2625  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
SNORM  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
PBC    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
OTHERS 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
TXSY   0.0000 0.0000 0.00000.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
TXAU   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
CnP    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
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CnPeff 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
DSTa   0.00000.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
DSTb   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
DSTc   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
DSTd   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
=================================================================== 
Path Coefficients Table (Standard Error): 
==================================================================== 
         BEHca  BI   ATT1  ATT2  SNORM PBC   OTHERS  TXSY   TXAU   CnP   CnPeff DSTa    DSTb    DSTc   DSTd         
BEHca  0.0000 0.1077 0.0000 0.00000.00000.1666 0.0000  0.0994 0.0762 0.1054  0.1150  0.0954  0.1164  0.1152 0.0753 
BI     0.0000 0.0000 0.0767 0.0786 0.0719 0.0909 0.0581  0.0644 0.0710 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
ATT1   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0768  0.0837 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
ATT2   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00000.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0961  0.1018  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
SNORM 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
PBC    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00000.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
OTHERS 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
TXSY   0.0000 0.0000 0.00000.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
TXAU   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CnP    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
CnPeff 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
DSTa   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
DSTb   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DSTc   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00000.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
DSTd   0.0000 0.0000 0.00000.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
==================================================================== 
Path Coefficients Table (T-Statistic) 
==================================================================== 
        BEHca  BI ATT1  ATT2 SNORM PBC  OTHERS TXSY  TXAU  CnP  CnPeff DSTa  DSTb   DSTc    DSTd         
BEHca 0.00002.6652 0.0000 0.00000.0000 1.1107 0.0000 0.7045 1.7446 1.7082 0.3045 0.5973 1.1172 1.61391.5010 
BI     0.0000 0.0000 6.7932 0.4833 1.7251 0.5282 2.3934  0.3418 2.0271 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
ATT1   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.00002.7352 1.9359 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
ATT2   0.0000 0.00000.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.6038 2.5147 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
SNORM  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.00000.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
PBC    0.0000 0.0000 0.00000.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
OTHERS 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
TXSY   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00000.0000  0.00000.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
TXAU   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
CnP    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CnPeff 0.0000 0.00000.0000 0.00000.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
DSTa   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
DSTb  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DSTc   0.0000 0.0000 0.00000.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
DSTd   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0000 
==================================================================== 
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Appendix 9: PLS Deck Output (Taxpayer Sample) 
 
P   L   S   G R A P H for Partial Least Squares Analysis              
            (2004 Feb 27)                         
 
YEAR-MONTH-DAY: 2011-08-09 
HOUR:MIN:SECS: 23:38:28. 
PLS Deck generated for Dr. Annette Mills                                 
==================================== 
--      P    L    S    X          -- 
-- LATENT VARIABLES PATH ANALYSIS -- 
- PARTIAL LEAST-SQUARES ESTIMATION - 
==================================== 
Number of Blocks       NBLOCS =   15 
Number of Cases        NCASES =  180 
Number of Dimensions     NDIM =    1 
Output Quantity           OUT = 2256 
Inner Weighting Scheme  IWGHT =    1 
Number of Iterations    NITER =  100 
Estimation Accuracy       EPS =    5 
Analysed Data Metric   METRIC =    1 
==================================== 
 Block   N-MV Deflate LV-Mode   Model 
------------------------------------ 
 BEHVp      2   yes   outward Endogen 
 BI         2   yes   outward Endogen 
 ATT1       3   yes   outward Endogen 
 ATT2       3   yes   outward Endogen 
 SNORM      3   yes   outward  Exogen 
 OTHERS     4   yes   outward  Exogen 
 PBC        3   yes   outward  Exogen 
 TXSY       2   yes   outward  Exogen 
 TXAU       6   yes   outward  Exogen 
 CnP        5   yes   outward  Exogen 
 CnPeff     3   yes   outward  Exogen 
 DSTa       2   yes   outward  Exogen 
 DSTb       2   yes   outward  Exogen 
 DSTc       2   yes   outward  Exogen 
 DSTd       2   yes   outward  Exogen 
 ------------------------------------ 
           44               . 
 ==================================== 
Real words needed   16540 from 600000 
Char words needed     479 from  40000 
Dimension No.  1 
Partial Least-Squares Parameter Estimation 
Change of Stop Criteria during Iteration 
Cycle No.    CR1         CR2         CR3         CR4         CR5 
 
1  0.9027E+00  0.6934E-01  0.3366E+00  0.3076E+00  0.4657E+00 
    2  0.1143E-01  0.6000E-02 -0.1808E-03 -0.1766E-03 -0.1754E-03 
    3  0.7006E-02  0.2395E-04  0.3432E-04  0.4093E-04 -0.5044E-04 
4  0.3165E-03  0.4986E-04 -0.3747E-06 -0.2168E-06 -0.8175E-05 
    5  0.4365E-03  0.2777E-06  0.1909E-05  0.1347E-05  0.1473E-05 
    6  0.2497E-04  0.2699E-05  0.5720E-07  0.2765E-07  0.7472E-07 
    7  0.2539E-04  0.1446E-06  0.1070E-06  0.7154E-07  0.8949E-07 
8  0.2039E-05  0.1507E-06  0.5835E-08  0.3519E-08  0.6367E-08 
0Convergence at Iteration Cycle No.   8 
 
0B  .. Path coefficients  
 ================================================================================ 
             BEHVp     BI        ATT1      ATT2      SNORM     OTHERS    PBC      
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 BEHVp          0.000     0.341     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.345 
 BI             0.000     0.000     0.363     0.071     0.129     0.131     0.118 
 ATT1           0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 ATT2           0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 SNORM          0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 OTHERS         0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 PBC            0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 TXSY           0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 TXAU           0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 CnP            0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 CnPeff         0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
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 DSTa           0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 DSTb           0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 DSTc           0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 DSTd           0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 ================================================================================ 
0B  .. Path coefficients  
 ================================================================================ 
             TXSY      TXAU      CnP       CnPeff    DSTa      DSTb      DSTc     
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 BEHVp          0.038    -0.046     0.112     0.015    -0.071    -0.067    -0.010 
 BI             0.151    -0.007     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 ATT1           0.000     0.000     0.376    -0.029     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 ATT2           0.000     0.000     0.224     0.095     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 SNORM          0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 OTHERS         0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 PBC            0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 TXSY           0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 TXAU           0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 CnP            0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 CnPeff         0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 DSTa           0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 DSTb           0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 DSTc           0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 DSTd           0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 ================================================================================ 
0B  .. Path coefficients  
 ==================== 
             DSTd     
 -------------------- 
 BEHVp          0.180 
 BI             0.000 
 ATT1           0.000 
 ATT2           0.000 
 SNORM          0.000 
 OTHERS         0.000 
 PBC            0.000 
 TXSY           0.000 
 TXAU           0.000 
 CnP            0.000 
 CnPeff         0.000 
 DSTa           0.000 
 DSTb           0.000 
 DSTc           0.000 
 DSTd           0.000 
 ==================== 
0R  .. Correlations of latent variables   
 ================================================================================ 
             BEHVp     BI        ATT1      ATT2      SNORM     OTHERS    PBC      
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 BEHVp          1.000 
 BI             0.558     1.000 
 ATT1           0.473     0.604     1.000 
 ATT2           0.401     0.346     0.319     1.000 
 SNORM          0.407     0.518     0.596     0.308     1.000 
 OTHERS         0.263     0.411     0.371     0.323     0.330     1.000 
 PBC            0.532     0.460     0.455     0.424     0.477     0.324     1.000 
 TXSY           0.301     0.380     0.273     0.186     0.350     0.298     0.299 
 TXAU           0.182     0.285     0.339     0.077     0.245     0.440     0.235 
 CnP            0.326     0.305     0.368     0.251     0.251     0.435     0.296 
 CnPeff         0.249     0.285     0.078     0.159     0.245    -0.023     0.276 
 DSTa           0.214     0.327     0.419     0.224     0.213     0.210     0.308 
 DSTb           0.192     0.323     0.346     0.056     0.192     0.334     0.222 
 DSTc           0.190     0.254     0.340     0.075     0.201     0.279     0.115 
 DSTd           0.347     0.361     0.475     0.153     0.281     0.246     0.166 
 ================================================================================ 
0R  .. Correlations of latent variables   
 ================================================================================ 
             TXSY      TXAU      CnP       CnPeff    DSTa      DSTb      DSTc     
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 TXSY           1.000 
 TXAU           0.313     1.000 
 CnP            0.245     0.524     1.000 
 CnPeff         0.033    -0.004     0.285     1.000 
 DSTa           0.111     0.365     0.306     0.193     1.000 
 DSTb           0.281     0.669     0.520     0.017     0.478     1.000 
 DSTc           0.144     0.368     0.549     0.189     0.348     0.541     1.000 
 DSTd           0.244     0.292     0.446     0.138     0.430     0.401     0.452 
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 ================================================================================ 
0R  .. Correlations of latent variables   
 ==================== 
             DSTd     
 -------------------- 
 DSTd           1.000 
 ==================== 
 
0Inner Model 
 ====================================================================== 
 Block           Mean  Location  Mult.RSq  AvResVar  AvCommun  AvRedund 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 BEHVp         0.0000    0.0000    0.4499    0.1053    0.8947    0.4025 
 BI            0.0000    0.0000    0.4742    0.3508    0.6492    0.3079 
 ATT1          0.0000    0.0000    0.1359    0.3374    0.6626    0.0901 
 ATT2          0.0000    0.0000    0.0712    0.3931    0.6069    0.0432 
 SNORM         0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.3776    0.6224    0.0000 
 OTHERS        0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.4884    0.5116    0.0000 
 PBC           0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.2416    0.7584    0.0000 
 TXSY          0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.5428    0.4572    0.0000 
 TXAU          0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.3883    0.6117    0.0000 
 CnP           0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.4485    0.5515    0.0000 
 CnPeff        0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.4679    0.5321    0.0000 
 DSTa          0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.3125    0.6875    0.0000 
 DSTb          0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.1741    0.8259    0.0000 
 DSTc          0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.2509    0.7491    0.0000 
 DSTd          0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.3813    0.6187    0.0000 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Average                           0.0754    0.3685    0.6315    0.0414 
 ====================================================================== 
0Outer Model 
 ====================================================================== 
 Variable      Weight   Loading  Location  ResidVar  Communal  Redundan 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    BEHVp     outward 
 BEH1          0.5195    0.9440    0.0000    0.1089    0.8911    0.4009 
 BEH2          0.5376    0.9478    0.0000    0.1017    0.8983    0.4041 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    BI        outward 
 BI1           0.4691    0.7048    0.0000    0.5033    0.4967    0.2356 
 BI2           0.7475    0.8954    0.0000    0.1982    0.8018    0.3802 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    ATT1      outward 
 CIVIC         0.4119    0.8291    0.0000    0.3126    0.6874    0.0934 
 GUILT         0.4396    0.7888    0.0000    0.3778    0.6222    0.0846 
 MORAL         0.3784    0.8236    0.0000    0.3217    0.6783    0.0922 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    ATT2      outward 
 COPun         0.1064    0.5127    0.0000    0.7371    0.2629    0.0187 
 SOPun         0.5417    0.8828    0.0000    0.2206    0.7794    0.0555 
 CODet         0.5296    0.8822    0.0000    0.2217    0.7783    0.0554 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    SNORM     outward 
 SNORM1        0.5046    0.8826    0.0000    0.2210    0.7790    0.0000 
 SNORM2        0.4136    0.8009    0.0000    0.3586    0.6414    0.0000 
 SNORM3        0.3342    0.6684    0.0000    0.5532    0.4468    0.0000 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    OTHERS    outward 
 OTH1          0.4344    0.8319    0.0000    0.3080    0.6920    0.0000 
 OTH3          0.3065    0.6452    0.0000    0.5837    0.4163    0.0000 
 OTH4          0.3112    0.6759    0.0000    0.5431    0.4569    0.0000 
 OTH5          0.3324    0.6937    0.0000    0.5188    0.4812    0.0000 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    PBC       outward 
 PBC1          0.4782    0.9296    0.0000    0.1358    0.8642    0.0000 
 PBC2          0.2754    0.8353    0.0000    0.3023    0.6977    0.0000 
 PBC3          0.3852    0.8446    0.0000    0.2866    0.7134    0.0000 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    TXSY      outward 
 TXSY2         0.8399    0.7836    0.0000    0.3860    0.6140    0.0000 
 TXSY4         0.6238    0.5480    0.0000    0.6997    0.3003    0.0000 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    TXAU      outward 
 TXAU2         0.2927    0.8574    0.0000    0.2649    0.7351    0.0000 
 TXAU3         0.1986    0.7830    0.0000    0.3869    0.6131    0.0000 
 TXAU4         0.1947    0.7192    0.0000    0.4828    0.5172    0.0000 
 TXAU5         0.2165    0.8584    0.0000    0.2631    0.7369    0.0000 
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 TXAU6         0.1468    0.7858    0.0000    0.3826    0.6174    0.0000 
 TXAU1         0.2268    0.6712    0.0000    0.5494    0.4506    0.0000 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    CnP       outward 
 CnP1          0.1600    0.6556    0.0000    0.5702    0.4298    0.0000 
 CnP2          0.3051    0.7034    0.0000    0.5052    0.4948    0.0000 
 CnP3          0.2908    0.8261    0.0000    0.3176    0.6824    0.0000 
 CnP4          0.3654    0.8596    0.0000    0.2610    0.7390    0.0000 
 CnP6          0.1966    0.6417    0.0000    0.5883    0.4117    0.0000 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    CnPeff    outward 
 CnPeff1       0.2308    0.4997    0.0000    0.7503    0.2497    0.0000 
 CnPeff2       0.6826    0.9267    0.0000    0.1413    0.8587    0.0000 
 CnPeff3       0.3608    0.6986    0.0000    0.5120    0.4880    0.0000 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    DSTa      outward 
 DST6          0.4493    0.7385    0.0000    0.4546    0.5454    0.0000 
 DST7          0.7337    0.9108    0.0000    0.1705    0.8295    0.0000 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    DSTb      outward 
 DST12         0.5509    0.9091    0.0000    0.1736    0.8264    0.0000 
 DST13         0.5495    0.9086    0.0000    0.1745    0.8255    0.0000 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    DSTc      outward 
 DST5          0.5511    0.8522    0.0000    0.2737    0.7263    0.0000 
 DST8          0.6037    0.8786    0.0000    0.2281    0.7719    0.0000 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    DSTd      outward 
 DST10         0.4621    0.6611    0.0000    0.5630    0.4370    0.0000 
 DST11         0.7762    0.8947    0.0000    0.1995    0.8005    0.0000 
======================================== 
        ==PLSW no prob, eh? 
CPU-Time =   0 min  0.04 sec 
Total =      0 min  0.04 sec 
 
       No errors reported. 
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Appendix 10: PLS Deck Output (Tax Agent Sample) 
    P   L   S   G R A P H for Partial Least Squares Analysis              
            (2004 Feb 27)                         
 
YEAR-MONTH-DAY: 2011-08-03 
HOUR:MIN:SECS: 23:14:52. 
PLS Deck generated for Dr. Annette Mills                                 
 ==================================== 
--      P    L    S    X          -- 
-- LATENT VARIABLES PATH ANALYSIS -- 
 - PARTIAL LEAST-SQUARES ESTIMATION - 
==================================== 
Number of Blocks       NBLOCS =   15 
Number of Cases        NCASES =  164 
Number of Dimensions     NDIM =    1 
Output Quantity           OUT = 2255 
Inner Weighting Scheme  IWGHT =    1 
Number of Iterations    NITER =  100 
Estimation Accuracy       EPS =    5 
Analysed Data Metric   METRIC =    1 
==================================== 
 Block   N-MV Deflate LV-Mode   Model 
------------------------------------ 
 BEHVca     2   yes   outward Endogen 
 BI         2   yes   outward Endogen 
 ATT1       3   yes   outward Endogen 
 ATT2       3   yes   outward Endogen 
 SNORM      3   yes   outward  Exogen 
 OTHERS     4   yes   outward  Exogen 
 PBC        3   yes   outward  Exogen 
 TXSY       2   yes   outward  Exogen 
 TXAU       6   yes   outward  Exogen 
 CnP        5   yes   outward  Exogen 
 CnPeff     3   yes   outward  Exogen 
 DSTa       2   yes   outward  Exogen 
 DSTb       2   yes   outward  Exogen 
 DSTc       2   yes   outward  Exogen 
 DSTd       2   yes   outward  Exogen 
 ------------------------------------ 
           44               . 
 ==================================== 
Real words needed   15340 from 600000 
Char words needed     447 from  40000 
Dimension No.  1 
Partial Least-Squares Parameter Estimation 
Change of Stop Criteria during Iteration 
Cycle No.    CR1         CR2         CR3         CR4         CR5 
 
1  0.1106E+01  0.4855E-01  0.2202E+00  0.1818E+00  0.4671E+00 
    2  0.3578E+00  0.6334E-02  0.1675E-02  0.1408E-02  0.9435E-04 
    3  0.3341E-01  0.3983E-03 -0.3426E-04 -0.1178E-03  0.9912E-04 
    4  0.5207E-02  0.5816E-04 -0.1018E-03 -0.1077E-03 -0.2769E-04 
    5  0.1245E-02 -0.1048E-04 -0.2755E-04 -0.2786E-04 -0.4360E-05 
    6  0.7168E-03 -0.2880E-05 -0.1474E-04 -0.1449E-04 -0.3780E-05 
    7  0.1976E-03 -0.2137E-05 -0.4300E-05 -0.4191E-05 -0.1060E-05 
    8  0.9284E-04 -0.6057E-06 -0.1934E-05 -0.1886E-05 -0.5199E-06 
    9  0.2881E-04 -0.2931E-06 -0.6192E-06 -0.6012E-06 -0.1664E-06 
   10  0.1223E-04 -0.9177E-07 -0.2563E-06 -0.2493E-06 -0.7074E-07 
11  0.4080E-05 -0.3911E-07 -0.8706E-07 -0.8450E-07 -0.2405E-07 
Convergence at Iteration Cycle No.  11 
 
 
0B  .. Path coefficients  
 ================================================================================ 
             BEHVca    BI        ATT1      ATT2      SNORM     OTHERS    PBC      
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 BEHVca         0.000     0.287     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.185 
 BI             0.000     0.000     0.521    -0.038     0.124     0.139     0.048 
 ATT1           0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 ATT2           0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
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 SNORM          0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 OTHERS         0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 PBC            0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 TXSY           0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 TXAU           0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 CnP            0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 CnPeff         0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 DSTa           0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 DSTb           0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 DSTc           0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 DSTd           0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 ================================================================================ 
0B  .. Path coefficients  
 ================================================================================ 
             TXSY      TXAU      CnP       CnPeff    DSTa      DSTb      DSTc     
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 BEHVca        -0.070     0.133     0.180    -0.035    -0.057    -0.130    -0.186 
 BI             0.022     0.144     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 ATT1           0.000     0.000     0.210    -0.162     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 ATT2           0.000     0.000    -0.058     0.256     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 SNORM          0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 OTHERS         0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 PBC            0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 TXSY           0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 TXAU           0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 CnP            0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 CnPeff         0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 DSTa           0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 DSTb           0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 DSTc           0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 DSTd           0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 ================================================================================ 
0B  .. Path coefficients  
 ==================== 
            DSTd     
 -------------------- 
 BEHVca         0.113 
 BI             0.000 
 ATT1           0.000 
 ATT2           0.000 
 SNORM          0.000 
 OTHERS         0.000 
 PBC            0.000 
 TXSY           0.000 
 TXAU           0.000 
 CnP            0.000 
 CnPeff         0.000 
 DSTa           0.000 
 DSTb           0.000 
 DSTc           0.000 
 DSTd           0.000 
 ==================== 
0R  .. Correlations of latent variables   
 ================================================================================ 
             BEHVca    BI        ATT1      ATT2      SNORM     OTHERS    PBC      
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 BEHVca         1.000 
 BI             0.367     1.000 
 ATT1           0.381     0.617     1.000 
 ATT2           0.153     0.093     0.152     1.000 
 SNORM          0.088     0.324     0.262     0.278     1.000 
 OTHERS         0.070     0.270     0.177     0.200     0.323     1.000 
 PBC            0.313     0.279     0.295     0.296     0.351     0.240     1.000 
 TXSY           0.046     0.187     0.206    -0.016     0.051     0.045     0.007 
 TXAU           0.151     0.260     0.181    -0.164     0.080    -0.039     0.081 
 CnP            0.149     0.140     0.179    -0.009     0.184     0.044     0.082 
 CnPeff        -0.039    -0.014    -0.122     0.245     0.132     0.111    -0.110 
 DSTa           0.094     0.315     0.229     0.130     0.127     0.114     0.252 
 DSTb          -0.104     0.087     0.074    -0.180     0.069     0.012    -0.061 
 DSTc          -0.091     0.166     0.113    -0.137     0.097     0.035    -0.048 
 DSTd           0.224     0.360     0.510     0.038     0.298     0.220     0.144 
 ================================================================================ 
0R  .. Correlations of latent variables   
 ================================================================================ 
TXSY      TXAU      CnP       CnPeff    DSTa      DSTb      DSTc     
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 TXSY           1.000 
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 TXAU           0.308     1.000 
 CnP            0.250     0.326     1.000 
 CnPeff        -0.075    -0.278     0.191     1.000 
 DSTa           0.103     0.276     0.227    -0.034     1.000 
 DSTb           0.211     0.368     0.378    -0.087     0.206     1.000 
 DSTc           0.089     0.358     0.437    -0.020     0.256     0.577     1.000 
 DSTd           0.190     0.097     0.334     0.005     0.153     0.225     0.221 
 ================================================================================ 
0R  .. Correlations of latent variables   
 ==================== 
DSTd     
 -------------------- 
 DSTd           1.000 
 ==================== 
0Inner Model 
 ====================================================================== 
 Block           Mean  Location  Mult.RSq  AvResVar  AvCommun  AvRedund 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 BEHVca        0.0000    0.0000    0.2587    0.2424    0.7576    0.1960 
 BI            0.0000    0.0000    0.4506    0.2885    0.7115    0.3206 
 ATT1          0.0000    0.0000    0.0572    0.4734    0.5266    0.0301 
 ATT2          0.0000    0.0000    0.0633    0.4197    0.5803    0.0367 
 SNORM         0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.3647    0.6353    0.0000 
 OTHERS        0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.5149    0.4851    0.0000 
 PBC           0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.4413    0.5587    0.0000 
 TXSY          0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.4083    0.5917    0.0000 
 TXAU          0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.5729    0.4271    0.0000 
 CnP           0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.4451    0.5549    0.0000 
 CnPeff        0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.3834    0.6166    0.0000 
 DSTa          0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.2986    0.7014    0.0000 
 DSTb          0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.3163    0.6837    0.0000 
 DSTc          0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.2619    0.7381    0.0000 
 DSTd          0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.3773    0.6227    0.0000 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Average                           0.0553    0.4172    0.5828    0.0280 
 ====================================================================== 
0Outer Model 
====================================================================== 
 Variable      Weight   Loading  Location  ResidVar  Communal  Redundan 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    BEHVca    outward 
 BEH1          0.6105    0.8880    0.0000    0.2115    0.7885    0.2040 
 BEH2          0.5371    0.8525    0.0000    0.2733    0.7267    0.1880 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    BI        outward 
 B11           0.5048    0.7942    0.0000    0.3693    0.6307    0.2842 
 BI2           0.6731    0.8901    0.0000    0.2077    0.7923    0.3570 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    ATT1      outward 
 CIVIC         0.4099    0.7227    0.0000    0.4777    0.5223    0.0299 
 MORAL         0.6240    0.8863    0.0000    0.2146    0.7854    0.0449 
 GUILT         0.2891    0.5216    0.0000    0.7279    0.2721    0.0156 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    ATT2      outward 
 COPun         0.3388    0.5990    0.0000    0.6412    0.3588    0.0227 
 SOPun         0.3264    0.7518    0.0000    0.4348    0.5652    0.0358 
 CODet         0.6104    0.9037    0.0000    0.1832    0.8168    0.0517 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    SNORM     outward 
 SNORM1        0.3892    0.7694    0.0000    0.4081    0.5919    0.0000 
 SNORM2        0.3411    0.7774    0.0000    0.3956    0.6044    0.0000 
 SNORM3        0.5168    0.8424    0.0000    0.2903    0.7097    0.0000 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    OTHERS    outward 
 OTH1          0.3393    0.6267    0.0000    0.6072    0.3928    0.0000 
 OTH3          0.1425    0.4533    0.0000    0.7945    0.2055    0.0000 
 OTH4          0.3094    0.7566    0.0000    0.4275    0.5725    0.0000 
 OTH5          0.5569    0.8774    0.0000    0.2303    0.7697    0.0000 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    PBC       outward 
 PBC1          0.7846    0.9495    0.0000    0.0984    0.9016    0.0000 
 PBC2         -0.0460    0.4899    0.0000    0.7600    0.2400    0.0000 
 PBC3          0.3796    0.7310    0.0000    0.4656    0.5344    0.0000 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    TXSY      outward 
 TXSY2        -0.5021   -0.6527    0.0000    0.5740    0.4260    0.0000 
 TXSY4         0.7724    0.8703    0.0000    0.2426    0.7574    0.0000 
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 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    TXAU      outward 
 TXAU1         0.1631    0.4787    0.0000    0.7708    0.2292    0.0000 
 TXAU2         0.2818    0.6738    0.0000    0.5459    0.4541    0.0000 
 TXAU3         0.5153    0.8117    0.0000    0.3412    0.6588    0.0000 
 TXAU4         0.2231    0.6037    0.0000    0.6355    0.3645    0.0000 
 TXAU5         0.1842    0.6885    0.0000    0.5260    0.4740    0.0000 
 TXAU6         0.0846    0.6182    0.0000    0.6178    0.3822    0.0000 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    CnP       outward 
 CnP3          0.3438    0.7534    0.0000    0.4324    0.5676    0.0000 
 CnP4          0.2302    0.7997    0.0000    0.3604    0.6396    0.0000 
 CnP6          0.1386    0.6589    0.0000    0.5659    0.4341    0.0000 
 CnP1          0.2793    0.7350    0.0000    0.4598    0.5402    0.0000 
 CnP2          0.3380    0.7699    0.0000    0.4072    0.5928    0.0000 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    CnPeff    outward 
 CnPeff3       0.5853    0.8937    0.0000    0.2013    0.7987    0.0000 
 CnPeff1       0.1932    0.5733    0.0000    0.6713    0.3287    0.0000 
 CnPeff2       0.4309    0.8499    0.0000    0.2777    0.7223    0.0000 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    DSTa      outward 
 DST6          0.7689    0.9381    0.0000    0.1199    0.8801    0.0000 
 DST7          0.3854    0.7231    0.0000    0.4772    0.5228    0.0000 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    DSTb      outward 
 DST12         0.9890    0.9999    0.0000    0.0002    0.9998    0.0000 
 DST13         0.0184    0.6064    0.0000    0.6323    0.3677    0.0000 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    DSTc      outward 
 DST5          0.5117    0.8231    0.0000    0.3224    0.6776    0.0000 
 DST8          0.6476    0.8937    0.0000    0.2013    0.7987    0.0000 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    DSTd      outward 
 DST11         0.8224    0.9310    0.0000    0.1332    0.8668    0.0000 
 DST10         0.3808    0.6153    0.0000    0.6214    0.3786    0.0000 
 ====================================================================== 
        ==PLSW no prob, eh? 
CPU-Time =   0 min  0.05 sec 
Total =      0 min  0.05 sec 
        No errors reported. 
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Appendix 11: Discriminant Validity Coefficients (Taxpayer Sample) 
 
Construct AVE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1.BEHVp 0.895 0.946                             
2. BI 0.649 0.558 0.806               
3. ATT1 0.663 0.473 0.604 0.814              
4. ATT2 0.607 0.401 0.346 0.319 0.779             
5. SNORM 0.622 0.407 0.518 0.596 0.308 0.789            
6. OTHERS 0.512 0.263 0.411 0.371 0.323 0.330 0.716           
7. PBC 0.758 0.532 0.460 0.455 0.424 0.477 0.324 0.871          
8. TXSY 0.457 0.301 0.380 0.273 0.186 0.350 0.298 0.299 0.676         
9. TXAU 0.612 0.182 0.285 0.339 0.077 0.245 0.440 0.235 0.313 0.782        
10. CnP 0.552 0.326 0.305 0.368 0.251 0.251 0.435 0.296 0.245 0.524 0.743       
11. CnPeff 0.532 0.249 0.285 0.078 0.159 0.245 -0.023 0.276 0.033 -0.004 0.285 0.729      
12. DSTa 0.687 0.214 0.327 0.419 0.224 0.213 0.210 0.308 0.111 0.365 0.306 0.193 0.829     
13. DSTb 0.825 0.192 0.323 0.346 0.056 0.192 0.334 0.222 0.281 0.669 0.520 0.017 0.478 0.909    
14. DSTc 0.749 0.190 0.254 0.340 0.075 0.201 0.279 0.115 0.144 0.368 0.549 0.189 0.348 0.541 0.865   
15. DSTd 0.619 0.347 0.361 0.475 0.153 0.281 0.246 0.166 0.244 0.292 0.446 0.138 0.430 0.401 0.452 0.787 
Note: The diagonal elements represents the square root of average variance extracted (AVE) between the constructs and their measures. The off-diagonal highlighted above are 
correlations between constructs. For discriminant validity, diagonal elements should be larger than off-diagonal elements in the corresponding row and column.  
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Appendix 12: Discriminant Validity Coefficients (Tax Agent Sample) 
Discriminant validity coefficients (Tax Agent Sample) 
Construct AVE  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. BEHV 0.758  0.871                
2. B I 0.712  0.367 0.844               
3. ATT1 0.527  0.381 0.617 0.726              
4. ATT2 0.580  0.153 0.093 0.152 0.762             
5. SNORM 0.635  0.088 0.324 0.262 0.278 0.797            
6.OTHERS 0.485  0.070 0.270 0.177 0.200 0.323 0.696           
7. PBC 0.559  0.313 0.279 0.295 0.296 0.351 0.240 0.747          
8. TXSY 0.592  0.046 0.187 0.206 -0.016 0.051 0.045 0.007 0.769         
9. TX AU 0.427  0.151 0.260 0.181 -0.164 0.080 -0.039 0.081 0.308 0.653        
10. CnP 0.555  0.149 0.140 0.179 -0.009 0.184 0.044 0.082 0.250 0.326 0.745       
11.CnPeff 0.617  -0.039 -0.014 -0.122 0.245 0.132 0.111 -0.110 -0.075 -0.278 0.191 0.785      
12. DSTa 0.700  0.094 0.315 0.229 0.130 0.127 0.114 0.252 0.103 0.276 0.227 -0.034 0.837     
13. DSTb 0.684  -0.104 0.087 0.074 -0.180 0.069 0.012 -0.061 0.211 0.368 0.378 -0.087 0.206 0.827    
14. DSTc 0.738  -0.091 0.166 0.113 -0.137 0.097 0.035 -0.048 0.089 0.358 0.437 -0.020 0.256 0.577 0.859   
15. DSTd 0.623  0.224 0.360 0.510 0.038 0.298 0.220 0.144 0.190 0.097 0.334 0.005 0.153 0.225 0.221 0.789 
Note: The diagonal elements represents the square root of average variance extracted (AVE) between the constructs and their measures. The off-diagonal elements highlighted 
above are correlations between constructs. For discriminant validity, diagonal elements should be larger than off-diagonal elements in the corresponding row and column. 
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Appendix 13: Outer Model Loadings and Cross Loadings (Taxpayer Sample) 
 
Loadings and Cross Loadings for the Measurement Model (TaxPayer Sample) 
  BEH B1 ATT1 ATT2 SNORM PBC OTHERS TXSY TXAU CnP CnPeff DSTa DSTb DSTc DSTd 
BEH1 0.944 0.518 0.462 0.374 0.401 0.501 0.259 0.258 0.167 0.315 0.247 0.178 0.195 0.152 0.303 
BEH2 0.948 0.537 0.432 0.385 0.369 0.505 0.238 0.310 0.176 0.303 0.224 0.227 0.168 0.207 0.353 
BI1 0.269 0.705 0.406 0.244 0.361 0.245 0.391 0.225 0.328 0.172 0.063 0.190 0.293 0.097 0.172 
BI2 0.578 0.895 0.553 0.310 0.466 0.462 0.305 0.368 0.176 0.300 0.342 0.318 0.247 0.278 0.375 
CIVIC 0.351 0.464 0.829 0.224 0.496 0.379 0.251 0.260 0.266 0.342 0.052 0.323 0.302 0.251 0.432 
MORAL 0.426 0.503 0.824 0.251 0.554 0.368 0.262 0.207 0.251 0.192 0.070 0.367 0.238 0.260 0.464 
GUILT 0.379 0.505 0.789 0.300 0.414 0.362 0.384 0.199 0.305 0.351 0.070 0.333 0.299 0.313 0.275 
COPun 0.064 0.049 0.248 0.513 0.149 0.267 0.109 0.048 0.112 0.079 0.002 0.289 0.095 0.053 -0.017 
SOPun 0.385 0.336 0.274 0.883 0.268 0.360 0.215 0.118 0.065 0.218 0.124 0.135 0.032 -0.004 0.126 
CODet 0.351 0.300 0.272 0.882 0.278 0.378 0.368 0.221 0.057 0.235 0.173 0.227 0.053 0.134 0.163 
SNORM1 0.422 0.486 0.573 0.350 0.883 0.420 0.256 0.325 0.162 0.182 0.244 0.165 0.130 0.157 0.299 
SNORM2 0.296 0.399 0.396 0.217 0.801 0.484 0.255 0.261 0.213 0.265 0.182 0.196 0.176 0.143 0.121 
SNORM3 0.214 0.322 0.428 0.125 0.668 0.192 0.285 0.233 0.226 0.147 0.141 0.144 0.160 0.187 0.240 
PBC1 0.555 0.494 0.451 0.437 0.501 0.930 0.317 0.289 0.237 0.228 0.245 0.277 0.198 0.089 0.165 
PBC2 0.372 0.224 0.309 0.251 0.349 0.835 0.189 0.222 0.135 0.203 0.283 0.217 0.124 0.090 0.078 
PBC3 0.426 0.422 0.400 0.377 0.367 0.845 0.312 0.260 0.219 0.340 0.211 0.301 0.243 0.125 0.170 
OTH1 0.267 0.365 0.356 0.232 0.298 0.329 0.832 0.325 0.418 0.376 -0.040 0.198 0.294 0.256 0.212 
OTH3 0.080 0.257 0.186 0.184 0.195 0.119 0.645 0.173 0.270 0.269 0.051 -0.003 0.197 0.266 0.141 
OTH4 0.134 0.261 0.183 0.153 0.167 0.230 0.676 0.221 0.366 0.218 -0.176 0.176 0.279 0.053 0.083 
OTH5 0.243 0.279 0.308 0.355 0.267 0.220 0.694 0.104 0.185 0.366 0.100 0.212 0.179 0.212 0.255 
TXSY2 0.212 0.307 0.164 0.168 0.301 0.184 0.100 0.783 -0.024 0.093 0.090 -0.011 0.054 0.053 0.143 
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TXSY4 0.197 0.197 0.216 0.072 0.156 0.232 0.342 0.548 0.534 0.268 -0.068 0.193 0.377 0.160 0.199 
TXAU1 0.138 0.234 0.348 0.072 0.173 0.104 0.380 0.217 0.671 0.411 -0.104 0.320 0.503 0.392 0.308 
TXAU2 0.162 0.312 0.322 0.045 0.223 0.189 0.332 0.291 0.857 0.485 0.030 0.292 0.583 0.332 0.325 
TXAU3 0.105 0.215 0.194 0.042 0.156 0.222 0.314 0.233 0.783 0.281 0.034 0.305 0.484 0.149 0.208 
TXAU4 0.187 0.157 0.170 0.088 0.178 0.164 0.295 0.243 0.719 0.383 0.062 0.199 0.362 0.171 0.088 
TXAU5 0.167 0.201 0.304 0.141 0.260 0.253 0.430 0.257 0.858 0.460 -0.034 0.310 0.573 0.331 0.235 
TXAU6 0.065 0.167 0.190 -0.055 0.127 0.173 0.296 0.201 0.786 0.397 -0.004 0.277 0.638 0.323 0.122 
CnP1 0.177 0.214 0.203 -0.010 0.197 0.192 0.246 0.181 0.455 0.656 0.192 0.166 0.456 0.503 0.299 
CnP2 0.279 0.287 0.351 0.110 0.272 0.272 0.394 0.214 0.571 0.703 0.109 0.238 0.503 0.469 0.352 
CnP3 0.237 0.203 0.255 0.259 0.109 0.187 0.301 0.161 0.337 0.826 0.197 0.177 0.318 0.363 0.275 
CnP4 0.310 0.267 0.327 0.300 0.218 0.267 0.390 0.226 0.339 0.860 0.323 0.272 0.331 0.365 0.378 
CnP6 0.159 0.136 0.175 0.174 0.127 0.153 0.233 0.105 0.277 0.642 0.230 0.286 0.409 0.439 0.369 
CnPeff1 0.064 -0.015 0.008 0.105 -0.008 0.110 -0.057 -0.041 0.049 0.177 0.500 0.023 0.020 0.116 0.036 
CnPeff2 0.258 0.276 0.086 0.171 0.249 0.304 0.019 -0.006 -0.031 0.280 0.927 0.193 0.008 0.220 0.088 
CnPeff3 0.161 0.278 0.049 0.050 0.214 0.121 -0.064 0.130 0.017 0.146 0.699 0.154 0.020 0.033 0.194 
DST6 0.130 0.310 0.334 0.163 0.197 0.253 0.200 0.122 0.251 0.189 0.116 0.739 0.369 0.151 0.328 
DST7 0.212 0.257 0.366 0.206 0.169 0.265 0.164 0.077 0.344 0.302 0.192 0.911 0.426 0.381 0.385 
DST12 0.175 0.308 0.349 0.064 0.185 0.237 0.329 0.269 0.698 0.549 0.070 0.456 0.909 0.537 0.366 
DST13 0.174 0.278 0.279 0.037 0.164 0.167 0.279 0.241 0.518 0.397 -0.039 0.413 0.909 0.447 0.363 
DST5 0.157 0.308 0.287 0.087 0.169 0.151 0.233 0.159 0.226 0.430 0.153 0.297 0.397 0.852 0.385 
DST8 0.172 0.138 0.300 0.044 0.178 0.053 0.250 0.094 0.404 0.517 0.173 0.305 0.534 0.879 0.398 
DST10 0.197 0.134 0.223 0.018 0.117 0.145 0.167 0.187 0.316 0.520 0.185 0.246 0.478 0.533 0.661 
DST11 0.330 0.386 0.479 0.186 0.293 0.127 0.217 0.203 0.189 0.265 0.068 0.408 0.232 0.265 0.895 
Note: Going across, all measures must load higher on its own corresponding construct than other constructs. Going down, the measures associated with a construct must display 
higher loadings than the other measures.  
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Appendix 14: Outer Model Loadings and Cross Loadings (Tax Agent Sample) 
 
Loadings and Cross Loadings for the Measurement Model (Tax Agent Sample) 
  BEHV BI ATT1 ATT2 SNORM OTHERS PBC CnPeff DSTa DSTb DSTc DSTd CnP TXAU TXSY 
BEH1 .888 .361 .330 .139 .048 .061 .323 -.020 .103 -.145 -.059 .189 .128 .095 .089 
BEH2 .853 .272 .335 .126 .108 .060 .216 -.051 .060 -.029 -.102 .202 .132 .173 -.017 
B11 .193 .794 .466 .031 .304 .201 .215 -.040 .202 .097 .098 .273 .022 .182 .123 
BI2 .400 .890 .567 .115 .254 .251 .254 .010 .316 .057 .173 .330 .191 .250 .186 
CIVIC .118 .378 .723 .116 .286 .137 .232 -.068 .170 .116 .098 .369 .170 .188 .232 
MORAL .445 .623 .886 .116 .155 .153 .237 -.069 .208 .046 .106 .489 .147 .126 .150 
GUILT .190 .254 .522 .110 .167 .088 .180 -.176 .102 -.008 .024 .184 .060 .088 .060 
COPun -.015 .056 -.047 .599 .091 .085 .059 .138 -.024 -.135 -.036 .021 -.007 -.145 .062 
SOPun .248 .130 .183 .752 .213 .155 .393 .113 .206 -.123 -.192 .052 .026 -.077 -.162 
CODet .126 .052 .176 .904 .291 .198 .243 .264 .116 -.153 -.102 .023 -.025 -.148 .026 
Snorm1 .138 .236 .182 .167 .769 .198 .168 .025 .062 .072 .075 .138 .213 .157 .057 
Snorm2 .047 .207 .108 .166 .777 .186 .225 .135 .102 .156 .133 .224 .100 .069 .082 
Snorm3 .035 .313 .300 .303 .842 .353 .405 .148 .132 -.023 .044 .324 .130 -.008 .000 
OTH1 .150 .169 .096 .243 .229 .627 .197 -.026 .199 .064 .047 .138 .024 .091 .048 
OTH3 .033 .071 -.002 .241 .129 .453 .121 .266 -.120 -.043 -.031 .039 .067 -.278 -.049 
OTH4 .022 .154 .118 .040 .191 .757 .163 -.085 .111 .021 -.011 .193 -.070 .080 .097 
OTH5 .013 .278 .194 .126 .301 .877 .189 .194 .052 -.018 .047 .194 .086 -.098 .010 
PBC1 .352 .255 .294 .305 .340 .222 .950 -.089 .211 -.102 -.069 .137 .023 .081 -.002 
PBC2 .037 -.079 .128 .234 .204 .097 .490 -.078 .075 -.005 -.058 .079 .046 -.063 -.016 
PBC3 .103 .199 .185 .179 .249 .184 .731 -.117 .237 .051 .009 .106 .173 .040 .021 
CnPeff1 .036 -.004 -.008 .108 .054 .078 -.188 .573 .047 .152 .140 .153 .398 .033 .086 
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CnPeff2 -.040 .013 -.129 .167 .123 .073 -.087 .850 -.026 -.048 -.007 .034 .207 -.232 -.092 
CnPeff3 -.049 -.032 -.110 .260 .117 .110 -.063 .894 -.055 -.163 -.076 -.067 .043 -.315 -.088 
DST6 .098 .260 .214 .104 .118 .055 .228 -.031 .938 .144 .245 .096 .179 .269 .106 
DST7 .049 .299 .168 .129 .094 .187 .200 -.026 .723 .248 .176 .204 .231 .181 .056 
DST12 -.105 .084 .070 -.180 .067 .010 -.060 -.087 .203 1.000 .574 .224 .375 .365 .208 
DST13 -.002 .218 .215 -.092 .185 .125 -.067 -.030 .310 .606 .489 .187 .385 .351 .235 
DST5 -.068 .185 .098 -.129 .108 .029 -.056 .011 .263 .502 .823 .211 .385 .290 .098 
DST8 -.086 .110 .098 -.109 .065 .031 -.030 -.040 .187 .494 .894 .175 .371 .324 .060 
DST10 .104 .095 .331 .080 .195 .185 .087 .028 .043 .191 .193 .615 .389 .029 .191 
DST11 .224 .394 .466 .009 .271 .182 .135 -.006 .166 .185 .180 .931 .226 .104 .142 
CnP1 .107 .176 .131 -.043 .164 .025 .041 .180 .209 .237 .355 .257 .735 .183 .161 
CnP2 .107 .163 .180 .028 .152 .077 .068 .174 .123 .351 .403 .279 .770 .305 .216 
CnP3 .194 .079 .111 -.006 .160 .069 .154 .038 .210 .212 .252 .241 .753 .308 .170 
CnP4 .098 .010 .101 -.012 .095 -.026 -.029 .179 .172 .293 .300 .233 .800 .191 .184 
CnP6 -.042 .043 .144 -.013 .074 -.050 .009 .201 .110 .381 .331 .225 .659 .156 .227 
TXAU1 -.004 .125 .081 -.234 -.007 -.146 -.215 -.197 .207 .399 .462 .037 .260 .479 .220 
TXAU2 .154 .123 .049 .038 .032 -.091 .087 -.149 .225 .095 .185 -.012 .209 .674 .173 
TXAU3 .135 .309 .248 -.128 .108 .113 .167 -.217 .156 .258 .183 .102 .171 .812 .268 
TXAU4 .089 .116 .091 -.194 .066 -.094 .015 -.196 .269 .338 .377 .157 .370 .604 .195 
TXAU5 .098 .082 .001 -.068 .021 -.110 .037 -.212 .091 .121 .084 -.029 .119 .688 .131 
TXAU6 .004 .061 .069 -.183 -.016 -.076 -.050 -.114 .258 .532 .430 .144 .370 .618 .215 
TXSY2 .029 -.124 -.142 .021 -.078 -.023 .087 .030 -.047 -.080 -.043 -.087 -.158 -.188 -.653 
TXSY4 .078 .161 .174 -.007 .015 .044 .066 -.077 .102 .221 .087 .189 .221 .277 .870 
Note: Going across all measures must load higher on its own corresponding construct than other constructs. Going down,the measures associated with a construct must 
display higher loadings than the other measures.  
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Appendix 15: Results of the Structural Model (Taxpayer Sample) 
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Appendix 16: Results of the Structural Model (Tax Agent Sample) 
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Appendix 17: Descriptive Statistics (Taxpayer Sample) 
 
Descriptive Statistics Taxpayer 
Measures N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
VI 180 1.00 7.00 4.0333 2.40785 
V2 180 -.01 3.00 1.1641 .45965 
V3 180 -.38 7.00 1.4381 1.20756 
V4 180 1.00 7.00 3.3135 2.03904 
V5 180 1.00 7.00 3.4049 2.14750 
V6 180 1.00 7.00 2.8986 1.27217 
V7 180 1.00 7.00 2.2778 1.17257 
V8 180 1.00 7.00 3.0611 2.01991 
V9 180 1.00 7.00 3.1889 2.12405 
V10 180 1.00 7.00 3.9629 2.00738 
V11 180 1.00 7.00 3.0734 2.06876 
V12 180 1.00 7.00 2.6833 1.99853 
V13 180 1.00 7.00 2.1778 1.63808 
V14 180 1.00 7.00 2.0425 1.39770 
V15 180 1.00 7.00 3.3833 2.03674 
V16 180 1.00 7.00 2.6451 1.42772 
V17 180 1.00 7.00 1.6333 1.16226 
V18 180 1.00 7.00 2.2944 1.97101 
V19 180 1.00 7.00 4.0438 1.95319 
V20 180 1.00 7.00 2.9214 1.99765 
V21 180 1.00 7.00 1.9396 1.50391 
V22 180 1.00 7.00 1.9373 1.61214 
V23 180 1.00 7.00 2.5056 1.99300 
V24 180 1.00 9.00 2.7967 1.93889 
V25 180 1.00 7.00 2.5500 1.96129 
V26 180 1.00 7.00 2.9000 1.92919 
C27 180 1.00 7.00 3.5222 2.12318 
V28 180 1.00 7.00 2.7778 1.93340 
SVA1 180 1.00 6.00 3.6111 1.01050 
SVA2 180 1.00 6.00 4.0444 .98493 
SVA3 180 1.00 5.00 3.1000 1.25560 
SVA4 180 1.00 5.00 3.8700 1.04672 
SVA5 180 1.00 6.75 3.4327 1.20138 
SVA6 180 1.00 5.00 2.0333 1.08262 
SVA7 180 1.00 5.00 2.8889 1.50563 
SVB1 180 1.00 12.65 3.4919 1.82656 
SVB2 180 1.00 7.00 2.6563 1.66847 
SVB3 180 .94 7.00 4.3664 1.52120 
SVB4 180 1.00 7.00 3.2403 1.60067 
SVB5 180 -1.20 7.00 3.7812 2.06057 
SVB6 180 1.00 7.00 5.7996 1.64461 
SVB7 180 1.00 7.00 4.7784 2.08701 
TxSy1 180 1.00 7.00 1.5389 .93572 
TxSy2 180 1.00 7.00 1.7611 1.18823 
TxSy3 180 1.00 7.00 1.9111 1.18316 
TxSy4 180 1.00 7.00 5.5111 1.51155 
TxSy5 180 1.00 7.00 5.1333 1.79197 
PS1 180 1.00 7.00 2.4392 1.21534 
PS2 180 .04 7.00 3.4558 1.92363 
PS3 180 1.00 7.00 3.9824 1.70831 
PS4 180 1.00 7.77 3.9639 1.67476 
PS5 180 1.00 7.00 3.8361 1.59856 
PS6 180 1.00 7.00 3.0789 1.63829 
PS7 180 1.00 7.00 5.1833 1.55881 
PS8 180 1.00 7.00 3.7008 1.99667 
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PS9 180 1.00 7.00 4.9737 1.66525 
PS10 180 1.00 7.00 5.0598 1.59064 
PS11 180 1.00 7.00 2.3889 1.37572 
PS12 180 1.00 7.00 4.1288 1.76883 
PS13 180 1.00 7.30 5.7248 1.36888 
PS14 180 1.00 7.00 2.2167 1.33402 
PS15 180 1.00 7.00 1.8222 1.29527 
PS16 180 1.00 7.00 3.7690 1.83167 
PS17 180 1.00 7.00 5.3388 1.43662 
PS18 180 1.00 7.00 3.4482 1.89229 
PS19 180 1.00 7.00 2.3398 1.25570 
PS20 180 1.00 7.00 4.7559 1.61969 
TXAU1 180 1.00 7.00 4.0664 1.70666 
TXAU2 180 1.00 7.00 4.5103 1.75321 
TXAU3 180 1.00 7.00 4.8854 1.71505 
TXAU4 180 1.00 7.00 4.8141 1.71561 
TXAU5 180 2.00 7.00 5.1155 1.66610 
TXAU6 180 1.00 7.00 4.9937 1.63717 
TXAU7 180 1.00 7.00 4.8496 1.66596 
OTH1 180 1.00 7.00 5.4722 1.55147 
OTH2 180 1.00 7.00 2.6444 1.56292 
OTH3 180 1.00 7.00 4.9944 1.60828 
OTH4 180 1.00 8.29 4.4850 1.93053 
OTH5 180 1.00 7.00 4.4667 1.79197 
OTH6 180 1.00 7.00 3.2500 1.75249 
OTH7 180 1.00 7.00 5.4778 1.26162 
OTH8 180 1.00 7.00 4.7444 1.55395 
OTH9 180 1.00 7.00 4.4944 1.71584 
OTH10 180 1.00 7.00 4.3000 1.68762 
OTH11 180 1.00 7.00 2.6278 1.26416 
GV1 180 1.00 7.00 1.6833 1.07003 
GV2 180 1.00 7.00 3.4278 1.63082 
GV3 180 1.00 7.00 4.4062 1.76377 
GV4 180 1.00 5.00 1.7667 1.06283 
GV5 180 1.00 7.00 3.0167 1.74482 
GV6 180 1.00 7.00 2.8509 1.70764 
GV7 180 1.00 7.00 2.8295 1.83645 
GV8 180 1.00 7.00 4.1225 1.59546 
GV9 180 2.00 7.02 5.6148 1.32123 
GV10 180 1.00 7.00 5.2222 1.52542 
GV11 180 1.00 7.00 2.6179 1.51119 
GV12 180 1.00 7.00 4.4591 1.83075 
GV13 180 1.00 7.00 3.8111 1.76176 
Valid 
N (listwise) 
180 
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Appendix 18: Descriptive Statistics (Tax Agent Sample) 
 
Descriptive Statistics Tax Agent 
Measures 
N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
V1 164 1.00 7.00 2.2852 1.84674 
V2 164 1.00 2.00 1.0162 .11335 
V3 164 .55 7.00 1.1142 .61565 
V4 164 1.00 7.00 4.0405 1.86817 
V5 164 1.00 7.00 3.6821 2.28332 
V6 164 1.00 6.00 2.6059 .97643 
V7 164 1.00 7.00 2.5852 1.18314 
V8 164 1.00 7.93 3.1877 1.92812 
V9 164 1.00 7.00 2.2739 1.66545 
V10 164 -.18 7.00 4.5156 2.01683 
V11 164 1.00 7.00 3.8196 2.28271 
V12 164 -1.29 7.00 3.2955 2.16242 
V13 164 1.00 6.00 1.5334 .92358 
V14 164 1.00 7.00 1.6463 .98429 
V15 164 1.00 7.00 3.8205 1.93926 
V16 164 1.00 7.00 2.6299 1.18868 
V17 164 1.00 7.00 1.8878 1.49516 
V18 164 1.00 7.00 2.9674 2.29679 
V19 164 1.00 7.64 4.6900 1.83461 
V20 164 1.00 7.00 2.1230 1.63780 
V21 164 -.17 7.00 1.5389 1.25270 
V22 164 1.00 7.00 1.3670 1.08933 
V23 164 1.00 7.00 1.9398 1.33789 
V24 164 1.00 7.00 2.5988 1.74154 
V25 164 -.73 7.00 2.4009 1.87344 
V26 164 1.00 7.00 3.2387 2.02982 
V27 164 -.60 7.00 2.9799 1.93292 
V28 164 1.00 7.00 2.3859 1.61097 
SVA1 164 1.00 5.00 3.5488 1.14208 
SVA2 164 1.00 5.00 2.8939 1.36482 
SVA3 164 1.00 5.00 2.1280 1.05176 
SVA4 164 1.00 5.00 3.4146 1.06766 
SVA5 164 1.00 6.30 4.0079 .95375 
SVA6 164 1.00 5.00 3.6159 1.00550 
SVA7 164 1.00 5.00 4.0610 .91809 
SVB1 164 1.00 7.00 5.0915 1.73670 
SVB2 164 1.00 7.00 5.8608 1.46850 
SVB3 164 1.00 7.00 3.2317 1.79159 
SVB4 164 1.00 7.00 4.2500 1.88431 
SVB5 164 1.00 7.00 3.4878 1.86504 
SVB6 164 1.00 7.00 3.1463 1.61376 
SVB7 164 -.17 7.00 2.9319 1.65286 
TxSy1 164 1.00 4.00 1.3598 .55260 
TxSy2 164 1.00 7.00 1.6890 1.18565 
TxSy3 164 1.00 7.00 1.7988 1.16798 
TXSy4 164 2.00 7.00 6.0915 1.15016 
TxSy5 164 2.00 7.00 5.9878 1.07388 
PS1 164 1.00 7.00 2.0881 1.05097 
PS2 164 -3.24 7.00 4.0175 1.99116 
PS3 164 1.00 7.00 3.6830 1.72834 
PS4 164 1.00 7.00 3.6502 1.69408 
PS5 164 1.00 7.00 3.5099 1.49794 
PS6 164 1.00 7.00 3.2160 1.54690 
PS7 164 1.00 7.00 4.9534 1.59326 
PS8 164 1.00 7.00 5.1136 1.86597 
PS9 164 1.00 7.00 4.3841 1.97033 
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PS10 164 -1.89 7.00 4.1120 1.74883 
PS11 164 1.00 7.00 2.8299 1.53068 
PS12 164 1.00 7.00 3.7714 1.69743 
PS13 164 1.00 7.00 5.9878 1.02117 
PS14 164 1.00 7.00 2.3415 1.40743 
PS15 164 1.00 6.00 1.8145 1.20463 
PS16 164 1.00 7.00 4.4123 1.76309 
PS17 164 1.00 7.00 4.9573 1.60272 
PS18 164 1.00 7.00 3.3419 1.66385 
PS19 164 1.00 7.00 1.8354 .96107 
PS20 164 1.00 7.00 5.1571 1.30015 
PS21 164 1.00 7.00 2.9980 1.44460 
PS22 164 -.43 7.00 2.4795 1.38430 
TXAU1 164 1.00 7.00 3.8960 1.50530 
TXAU2 164 1.00 7.00 4.1680 1.57953 
TXAU3 164 1.00 7.00 4.4951 1.51489 
TXAU4 164 1.00 7.00 3.8110 1.57266 
TXAU5 164 1.00 7.00 3.9207 1.63544 
TXAU6 164 1.00 7.00 4.5306 1.51239 
TXAU7 164 2.00 7.00 4.9451 1.37575 
OTH1 164 2.00 7.00 5.3232 1.32894 
OTH2 164 1.00 7.00 3.0854 1.55237 
OTH3 164 2.00 7.00 5.5122 1.20065 
OTH4 164 1.00 7.00 4.5244 1.47557 
OTH5 164 1.00 7.00 4.5703 1.49834 
OTH6 164 1.00 7.00 3.0515 1.54417 
OTH7 164 2.00 7.00 5.6853 1.06277 
OTH8 164 1.00 7.00 4.0678 1.68724 
OTH9 164 1.00 7.00 3.8110 1.60738 
OTH10 164 1.00 7.00 4.5732 1.47811 
OTH11 164 1.00 6.00 2.5038 .97043 
GV1 164 1.00 7.00 1.9207 1.05659 
GV2 164 1.00 7.00 2.9878 1.44421 
GV3 164 1.00 7.00 4.1402 1.67217 
GV4 164 1.00 5.00 1.6159 .71272 
GV5 164 1.00 7.00 3.1707 1.65270 
GV6 164 1.00 7.00 2.4889 1.32508 
GV7 164 1.00 7.00 2.9512 1.61589 
GV8 164 1.00 7.00 3.7988 1.44077 
GV9 164 2.00 7.00 5.7256 1.07581 
GV10 164 2.00 7.00 5.2768 1.51084 
GV11 164 1.00 7.00 2.2845 1.19371 
GV12 164 1.00 7.00 4.3188 1.60790 
GV13 164 1.00 7.00 3.4146 1.62383 
Valid 
N (listwise) 
164 
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Appendix 19: Glossary 
 
ATO - Australian Tax Office 
CPR  - Compliance and Penalties Regime 
DJT   -  Distributive Justice Theory 
EVT - Expectancy-Value Theory 
IRD  - Inland Revenue Department 
IRS  - Internal Revenue Service 
MPT -  Motivational Posturing Theory 
PLS  - Partial Least Squares 
PJT  - Procedural Justice Theory 
PMR -  Process Model of Regulation 
SCT  - Self-Categorisation Theory 
SEM - Structural Equation Modelling 
TMR - Theory of Moral Reasoning 
TRA - Theory of Reasoned Action 
TPB  -  Theory of Planned Behaviour 
 
 
 
